

# The Right to the City in the Informal Sector: Claiming Rights or Gaining Access in Kampala, Uganda?

*Matthew F. Pietrus*  
*Department of Geography*  
*DePaul University*  
*Chicago, IL 60614*  
*E-mail: Matthew.Pietrus@northwestern.edu*

## ABSTRACT

In the developing world, the vast majority of urban poor have been marginalized from their cities, denying them what Henri Lefebvre called the right to the city. In response to this denial, many turn to the informal sector as a means to claim access to space and to the economy. However, using interviews from citizens participating in the informal sector in Kampala, Uganda, this paper argues that while the informal sector provides access to socioeconomic benefits (which is positive), it cannot guarantee them as rights because all activity taking place within it is unprotected and therefore easily and often challenged. This essay then argues that the informal sector cannot and does not confer the right to the city. Finally, it advances that those participating in the informal sector can only achieve the right to the city if they are 1) able to claim rights to shelter and to the economy and 2) able to successfully challenge laws that infringe upon their pursuit of self-improvement.


**Key Words:** right to the city, informality, rights, urban development

---

## INTRODUCTION

Before the warm, equatorial sun peaks and dries the red dirt road, a shoe vendor lays out his blue tarp, carefully displaying an immaculate array of used and counterfeit shoes. Considering the sandstorm of dust vehicles kick up as they speed by, the shoes gleam surprisingly brightly; an obvious image of constant care. Alongside the dozens of other vendors and scantily built shacks which boast permanent layers of amber dust, he continues meticulously aligning his goods. Yet these details are crucial when hawking shoes is the only source of income. Maintaining the cleanliness of goods can make the difference between a day when he earns enough money to feed himself and his family and a day when he does not.

When he places his last pair of shoes, he sits above a stagnant drainage ditch polluted



by green sludge and debris, waiting for the scarce customer that can afford fake Nikes after buying food for their family. But today that customer will not come. Even before this vendor was setting up, he was unknowingly being watched by a city policeman, easily disguised amid the densely urbanized streets of Kampala, Uganda's capital. As the policeman approaches the shoe vendor, an all-too-familiar interaction begins. The city official informs the vendor that he is illegally selling his goods and confiscates all of his shoes. Then, the vendor pleads with the policeman in order to regain his only source of livelihood, and finally offers him a bribe which will hopefully prove sufficient. Indeed, as Isaac, the shoe vendor along Kafumbe Mukasa Road told me after describing this event, "Whatever money I make, it is just for protection; it is not for prosperity."

Yet vulnerability does not end at economic activity. When many return home, they

return to property on which they squat. Therefore they have no legal claim to their own private space. "In slum areas like this," carpenters Charles and Thomas informed me, "you find people in the lower level will come and settle there, and the moment they try and build a house...the government comes and disorganizes [them] by pushing [them] away." Without lawful claims to a place or access to a source of livelihood, Kampala is certainly not a city to which citizens living in informality belong. They do not have that right.

In a city like Kampala, where 60 to 85 percent of the population lives in informal settlements (Giddings 2009, 11; Mukiibi 2011; UN-HABITAT 2007, 10), factors that deny the lower class the right to the city undeniably marginalize the vast majority of the city's population (Fig. 1). The legacy of a complex land tenure system, poverty, and underdevelopment deny these citizens the right to space while corruption, poverty, political




Figure 1. Population of Kampala. Sources: Giddings 2009; UBOS 2002; UBOS 2014; Giddings 2009 (85% estimate); Republic of Uganda 2008 (85% estimate); UN-HABITAT 2007 (60% estimate)

instability and legal restrictions on informal activity prohibit them from earning a livable wage. Without the necessary protection to legitimately claim rights to the economy and to a home, citizens living in informality cannot secure their place in Kampala because where they work, where they live, and where they exist is void of the inalienable civil liberties that are necessary to guarantee that right. This is the informal sector. Without resources or investment capable of producing adequate infrastructure, Kampala has been unable to accommodate its rapidly urbanizing population, which has created a city characterized by underdevelopment. Out of this inability to absorb the almost two million residents who seek housing and jobs, informal activity and informal settlements have emerged citywide. Despite granting access to space and the economy, however, the informal sector cannot secure this access because it is inherently outside of legal protection.

What then, does the right to city look like in a place where residents have no legal claim to any types of rights? How should it look? This essay will begin by exploring literature on the right to the city. Next, it will explain the emergence of underdevelopment and the subsequent rise of informality in Kampala. Then, it will show how citizens participating in the informal sector do not have legitimate rights to socioeconomic benefits of the city because living in informality cannot secure access to space and the economy. Finally, this essay will demonstrate that the right to the city in the informal sector does not exist and can only be achieved if the rights to socioeconomic benefits are granted and if citizens living in informality are permitted the right to operate outside of the law should it infringe upon their strides towards self-improvement.

For this research, I traveled throughout Kampala's informal settlements and conducted interviews with twenty-one individuals. Twenty of them participated in the informal sector, while one was a senior city planner in the Kampala Capital City Authority (KCCA), the governing body of the city op-

erating on behalf of the central government. All of the interviewees were men, a definite limitation, but I found it difficult to find women willing to be interviewed. In order to represent parts of the city, I traveled to different settlements throughout the Central Kampala district to find participants as many citizens participating in informality travel to this region to work. I interviewed people in Katanga, Mulago, Kiseka Market, Old Kampala, Kisenyi, along Kafumbe Mukasa Road, Owino Market, and finally in Kibuli (Fig. 2). Once my translator and I arrived in these areas, we chose interviewees at random and conducted interviews in both English and Luganda, depending on the interviewees' ability in English. I chose my translator based on recommendations from Ugandan colleagues in Kampala, his proven capacity in English and Luganda, and his understanding of the research project. To ensure anonymity, I have changed all of the interviewee's names, but have left their occupations and quotations unaltered. All quotes were taken in July 2012, and the corresponding interviewee, occupation, and date can be found in the works cited.

Before delving into the nuances of the right to the city in Kampala, it is necessary to explain why this essay will not use the term 'slum' or 'slum dweller'. UN-HABITAT'S 2003 report *The Challenge of Slums* recognizes that slums "are multidimensional in nature" but go on to describe them as having: "lack of basic services, substandard housing, overcrowding and high density, unhealthy living conditions and hazardous locations, insecure tenure, informal settlements, poverty and social exclusion" (UN-HABITAT 2003, 11). The same report also recognizes that the term slum "is loose and deprecatory" with "many connotations and meanings" (UN-HABITAT 2003, 9). Robert Neuwirth described these connotations and subsequently why he rejected the use of the term:

Slum is a loaded term....[that] immediately creates distance. [It] establishes a set of values—a morality that people




Figure 2. Neighborhoods where interviews were carried out.

outside the slum share—and implies that inside those areas, people don't share the same principles....[Slum] blurs all distinctions. It is a totalizing word—and the whole, in this case, is the false (Neuwirth 2005, 16-17).

While UN-HABITAT's characteristics that describe the physical space of a slum are correct in many cases—many interviewees listed poor sanitation, low quality housing, and poverty among their major concerns—Neuwirth's rejection of the use of the word because it "creates distance" between those within and those outside while implying a

separation of principles is one notion which this paper seeks to support. Citizens engaged in many activities typical of informality do so to support themselves, their families, and their prosperity. While it is true that all occupations in the informal sector—including informal housing (housing/land on which residents squat, or land which is outside of residential zones) and the informal economy (production and exchange of goods and/or services that are not regulated by laws or policies)—are illegal, they do not share the same connotation as criminality. Selling shoes without a permit because it is too expensive does not equate to holding up a shop at gunpoint. Driving a motorcycle taxi

without proper paperwork does not equate to recruiting children to distribute drugs. Buying and selling untaxed scrap metal does not equate to coercing women to prostitute themselves for individual gain. While negative examples like those mentioned can exist in informal settlements, they are not unique to such areas, since they are likely to exist in all areas stricken by poverty.

In sum, I will not use the term slum because it creates boundaries between those inside and those outside. As Marie Huchzermeyer (2011) suggested in her work on informal settlement eradication and the right to the city in Africa, “the term slum is not the main concern. While ‘cloaked in negativity’, and in urgent need of replacement with a more suitable term, it is not the word but an entire paradigm that needs to be confronted” (Huchzermeyer 2011, 10). In confronting this paradigm, I will use the term ‘informal settlement’ in place of ‘slum’. When referring to those living or working within slums, I will use the term ‘citizens’ or ‘citizens participating in informality’ rather than ‘slum dwellers,’ because they are no different than anyone else: they are citizens. The usage of these terms attempts to shift the paradigm from one that creates separation and labels those within slums as different, lesser ‘undesirables’ to one that more accurately describes the characteristics of the space and the resilience of those living and working within.

## THE RIGHT TO THE CITY

The idea of the “right to the city” is based on the writings of Henri Lefebvre (1967) and has since been expanded upon by later authors (Harvey 2003 and 2012; Mitchell 2003; Marcuse 2009; among others). The right to the city challenges the implicit and explicit marginalization of those who are continually underrepresented socioeconomically, politically, and/or spatially in urban spaces. The right to the city advocates for this group’s inclusion through political representation, equal rights under the law, and access to the economy and to space. The city has become

a place designed for a specific group (usually the affluent) while neglecting the needs and ultimately the rights of another (usually the poor). From Brazil (Friendly 2013) to India (Weinstein and Xuefei 2009), from Northern Ireland (Nagle 2009) to Turkey (Kuymulu 2013), and from New York (Attoh 2012) to Southern Europe (Leontidou 2010), literature on who belongs and who is denied access to the city has emerged as a globally discussed phenomenon.

Henri Lefebvre first wrote about the right to the city in the wake of the massive civil unrest that shook Paris in 1968, but the concept’s ambiguity has allowed many to assert their own claims as to what that right is (Ablode Attoh 2012). Citing different inter-urban conflicts from Paris to Beirut to Los Angeles, Harvey (2003) asserts that the right to the city changes depending on who in the city is attempting to assert their right. Similarly, Marcuse (2009) contends that there is an inherent multiplicity, questioning “whose right is it about? What right is it and to what city?” (Marcuse 2009, 185).

Despite these various possibilities, a simpler notion would be one that purports a sense of inclusivity. Citing Waldron (1991), Mitchell states that “in a society where *all* property is private, those who own none (or whose interests aren’t otherwise protected by a right to access private property) simply cannot *be*, because they would have no place to *be*” (Mitchell 2003, 34 emphasis in original). In other words, an inclusive city is one that provides space to its inhabitants. Furthermore, it must also provide equal access to its benefits such as public services, mobility to different parts of the city through adequate infrastructure, and the ability to access the city’s economy. In other words, it must allow its citizens the opportunity to prosper. Therefore, only through providing access both to space and to its benefits can a city become inclusive.

Yet as Harvey pointed out, “the right to the city is not merely a right of access to what already exists, but a right to change

it after our heart's desire" (Harvey 2003, 939). Harvey made this claim drawing on Robert Park's assertion that "in making the city man has remade himself" (Park 1967, 3), reasoning that the denial of this ability ultimately denies the right of self-improvement. A comprehensive and complete right to the city, then, would consist of one that is inclusive and also changeable. Despite successful examples of marginalized groups achieving inclusion through continued protests—most notably the Civil Rights Movement of the 1960s and Indian independence the first half of the 20<sup>th</sup> century—it remains extremely difficult for groups to incite change when they are politically, economically, and spatially excluded. In other words, gaining any type of right—be it political, economic, or the right to the city—remains an enormous feat when battling from a position that is structurally and legally alienated as well as economically isolated.

Living in informality would seemingly epitomize the denial of this right, but as some argue, the informal sector challenges that denial (Neuwirth 2005, 311) for it creates the opportunity to claim what has been denied: a home and a job. Those who have been denied homes build structures with scrapped materials while those excluded from the economy find innovative ways to generate an income. Finding different ways to create housing and gain access to the economy requires ingenuity (which is something worth celebrating), but the informal sector cannot guarantee the protection of that access because it is inherently outside of legal protection. Citizens living in informality can build a house, but then authorities can forcibly and legally remove them or they can begin vending miscellaneous items, but these can be confiscated on the grounds of selling without a license. In Kampala, the informal economy cannot and does not confer rights or the right to the city, but rather only provides insecure access to space and the economy.

## THE EMERGENCE OF UNDERDEVELOPMENT

This insecure access to the city's socioeconomic benefits results because underdevelopment has created a city that cannot accommodate its growing population. With a GDP of just \$22.6 billion and an ever-expanding population of 35 million, it is no surprise that Uganda ranks 204th out of 228 countries with respect to per capita GDP (CIA 2014; UBOS 2014). One in four (24.5%) people lives below the national poverty line (\$1.20/day), 64.7% live on less than \$2 a day, and two-thirds of the population are either poor or vulnerable to poverty<sup>1</sup> (World Bank 2009; Anguyo 2013; MGS LD 2012). After speaking with several citizens living in informality, it became evident that this meager income provides barely enough to feed oneself. "You can come [to the informal settlements] and you can make 5,000 [shillings] (about \$2)," explained a motorcycle mechanic named Kenneth, "Out of the 5,000 you can only have one meal in a day." While this estimate is above the national poverty line, a report by the Ministry of Labour, Gender, & Social Development states that "the poverty line used in Uganda is set at a very low level by international standards, equivalent to 'extreme poverty' or 'food poverty' in other countries. This represents the very bare minimum level of consumption needed for survival" (MLGSD 2012, xiii). Yet this extreme poverty is by no means uncommon or unknown. Okello, a senior city planner in the KCCA gave a similar testament:

With the massive influx of people the concerns were certainly about fundamentals. It is about...feeding. We are experiencing very poor people. Children are malnourished; we find that the quality of life they are living is not the best.... We are getting people who are pressed; they don't have anything to feed on.... They resort to petty, petty work. Hand to mouth.



This poor economic situation extends not just to Uganda's citizens; it affects the government as well. As in most developing countries, the Ugandan state is poor and they simply do not have enough money to implement many of the programs they have planned.

In order to compensate for this lack of funding, planners in Kampala and officials in the national government seek private investment. In October 2012 the KCCA drafted the Kampala Physical Development Plan (KPDP) which dedicates a quarter of its 120 pages to financial needs, estimating that \$6 billion will be required to implement desired infrastructural programs and \$33 billion more would be needed to sustain them (KPDP 2012, 5). While ideally some of this will come from the local (KCCA) and national governments, about 70% would likely need to come from both NGOs and public-private partnerships (KPDP 2012, 12). Okello states that their development programs require "public-private partnerships for most of the activities that we are doing in the city" and that they are "encouraging public-private partnerships [and] donor funding." And encourage they must. KCCA openly admits the realities of their fiscal difficulties in the KPDP, stating that the "local government...lacks an adequate financial base to provide basic services, let alone support development on any significant level" (KPDP 2012, 6). For this reason, planners place the majority of the responsibility for funding development programs on institutions and corporations independent from the state, making implementation contingent on outside participation. However, given that all comprehensive plans to this date have not been implemented, this sentiment is an optimistic one. The most recent Investor Survey Report by the Ugandan Bureau of Statistics (UBOS) which analyzed investment projects from 1991-2010 showed that only 46 percent of investment projects have started and remain operational (survival rate) and only 70,000 jobs have been created (UBOS 2012). This has attracted about \$2.86 billion thus far which is far below what they require for the

infrastructural development they outline in the KPDP (UBOS 2012).

With a liberalized economy and vast natural resources, Uganda would appear to have a strong base for economic development and public-private partnerships, but as Ambassador Roberto Ridolfi, the head EU delegate to Uganda, contends, "There may be potential investors with money but unpredictable corruption costs scare them away" (Kimbowo 2013). While it is true that there has been investment from several international partners (India, Singapore, Britain, Sudan, and China are the top five), a report by the World Bank showed that:

Despite various privatization reforms and the development of PPPs, public spending still finances the lion's share of infrastructure in Uganda. The private sector contributed an equivalent of 1.1 percent of GDP to annual infrastructure spending in 2003. By contrast, the public sector (on- and off-budget) provided 80 percent of total infrastructure spending amounting to 5.2 percent of GDP (World Bank 2007, 39).

Private investors only contributed 1.1% of Uganda's GDP in 2003 (about \$70m) towards infrastructure (World Bank 2007, 39). Similarly, manufacturing, wholesale and retail trade and accommodation have attracted the most investment, while strategic sectors such as energy and water supply, sewerage, and waste management attracted the least (UBOS 2012). In other words, even if investors are not discouraged by corruption, their investment does not go into physical infrastructure. Even still, corruption is pervasive in Uganda.

From street vendors bribing police officers to accusations of officials in the executive office accepting bribes, corruption, as Okello explains, "starts from the bottom, right in the village up to the institution." According to the anti-corruption research group Transparency International, Uganda ranks 140<sup>th</sup> out of 177 countries analyzed and is the most




Figure 3. Corruption Perception Index (CPI), 2001-2014. Source: Transparency International.

corrupt state in East Africa (Transparency International 2013; TI Kenya 2013). Considering Uganda’s static political situation—with President Yoweri Museveni remaining in power for the past twenty-nine years—it is no surprise that levels of corruption have remained virtually constant (Fig. 3). In May 2013, the prime minister and other politicians were accused of taking bribes from oil companies in the wake of Uganda’s newly found oil reserves (Matsiko 2013). In January 2013, Ugandan Member of Parliament Cerinah Nebanda died a day after challenging the president’s authority concerning healthcare. After a pathologist collected samples suspecting foul play, he was arrested before he could leave the country to run tests, which led many to suspect that government officials had poisoned her (Kalyegira 2012; Kakaire 2012). Because the same political leaders for whom corruption has become commonplace remain in power, corruption levels have plateaued. As Jeffrey and fellow wheelbarrow pusher Moses explained, “we don’t hope for anything good so long as [there are] the same leaders we have been seeing for the past 25

years. We don’t expect anything.” And why should they? Corruption extends from the upper echelons of the executive office to lowly authority figures like the police and has created an environment that scares away the investment necessary to improve their lives.

Corruption extends far down the political hierarchy. Citizens participating in the informal sector discussed a myriad of similar situations, most of which include the police, the institution which most Ugandans believe to be the most corrupt and which took the top position “as the most bribery prone sector” (TI Kenya 2013, 2; Transparency International 2012). Sitting on a milk crate in a fortress of recycled metal, Milton explained that siphoning funds reserved for public services was not uncommon:

Those people who are supposed to be between [us] and the government, the mediators, they do not implement the services how they are supposed to. How they use the money that [the government] gives them is not monitored... [and] the services which we need in our



area like [rubbish collection] we don't have it...The government has funded and [the mediators] don't implement.

While it is easy to condemn these officials for stealing money intended for public use, they too are confronted with poverty. They too have families to feed and children to send to school, and their incomes cannot fill those needs. Underneath a wooden awning that protects their work, carpenters Charles and Thomas articulated that "very many people are selling off their land [and] the little they've acquired in a long time in order for their children to study." Whether through corruption or other informal activities, the goal is the same: to protect one's family. Okello reiterates this notion:

[The] politician is looking for money [and] not giving the service. The technocrat has come in and also has not [been] given probably enough money to take his children to school so everyone is trying to survive the system. They are using the system to survive which is extremely unfortunate. That is the corruption. People are trying to survive... because of meager pay.

Money obtained corruptly helps to feed families and pay children's school fees. Those who exercise their power dishonestly are not necessarily immoral but rather surviving by any means possible in a country where poverty is far-reaching. Low-level corruption is (generally) not the result of power-hungry, immoral actions, but rather a consequence of widespread poverty in which people do anything they can to improve their family's situation. Still, corruption diverts both the little funding that the government has for development as well as much-needed foreign investment which consequently diminishes any hope for citywide (or countrywide) development.

While a lack of funding prohibits large projects, the small budget that does exist allows developmental bodies like the KCCA to implement micro-scale projects. As Okello

described, KCCA uses this money for action area plans which have a seemingly straightforward process: "You go into an area, you identify [its problems], you [make] an action area plan, you implement it and you finish." In the informal settlements of Kisenyi and Mulago, Okello told me, the KCCA and the World Bank have worked on rehabilitating and creating channels to help control flooding. Flooding continually ruins roads, spreads disease, and inundates housing. Thus, alleviating this problem would greatly improve the quality of life for citizens living and working in the informal settlements. Yet all of the residents interviewed in both Mulago and Kisenyi have not seen any positive change in their areas. In fact, when asked what physical changes had occurred while he has worked as a mechanic living in Mulago, Kenneth stated that "I have been here over ten years but I don't see any great change" and that "I don't expect I will be better off [in] the future." Similarly, a bed sheet vendor named Joseph told me that the only changes he had seen were personal changes; nothing had changed in his neighborhood. Finally, leaning over his wheelbarrow Jeffrey expressed that "I have never seen anyone take action in order to make the place clean or a fair environment." This inability to successfully implement even small-scale projects is the result of rapid urbanization, ineffective leadership, a resulting lack of trust in the government, and a complex land tenure system that impedes development.

Kampala has experienced rapid urban growth and planners have been unable to accommodate the ever-growing population. This quick expansion (Fig. 4) is certainly multifaceted, but it is primarily due to rural-urban migration. Despite having the ninth-highest annual growth rate (3.24%) and third-highest birth rate (44.17 births/1,000 population/year) in the world (CIA 2014) as well as decreasing mortality and infant mortality rates (UBOS 2012), Uganda's urban centers are growing faster than its national average because urban economic opportunities exceed those in rural areas (UBOS 2002; Kisamba-Mugerwa

2013; Mulumba et. al 2009). Joseph traveled 300 miles to Kampala from Kisoro—a town in the southwestern corner of Uganda—hoping to gain from the city's economic benefits by selling bed sheets. His answer to why he came to Kampala most adequately sums up the most popular pull factor to the city: "I came to work...to make money."

Since 1980, there has been over a 600% increase in the urban population, with 18.4 of the country now living in an urban center (UBOS 2014; Nyakaana 2007). Twenty five percent of the country's urban population lives in Kampala, and with its population over 1.5 million far surpassing the second largest urban center (Kira at 313,761), it is Uganda's primate city. Each year, the city is the destination for tens of thousands of Ugandans in similar situations as Joseph. Out of the inability to respond this growth, inadequate infrastructure and unplanned settlements developed throughout the entire city, and now, of the 1.5 million residents in Kampala, an estimated 1 to 1.3 million live in informal settlements (UBOS 2014; Giddings 2009; Mukiibi 2011). As prominent Ugandan periodical *New Vision* put it "Kampala is one big slum" (31 October 2012).

Second, my interviewees felt that the major concern of many political leaders is not alleviating poverty, lack of adequate housing, and unemployment, but rather reelection. As Okello explained, that goal sometimes comes through the stigmatization of development:

The politicians would use the poor people...every opportunity, every chance they look at it from votes. Votes votes votes. I don't have to say that it is only the opposition that looks at it from this way. No. It [is] also from the central government. There are programs that are very impeded because...the central government will say don't touch my people. And honestly you say, '*where are we going?*'

In other words, during elections politicians perpetuate the notion that with development

programs come negative consequences such as displacement and relocation and they promise to protect citizens from this threat. Similarly, with the agreeing nods of his fellow wheelbarrow pushers Moses and Amos, Jeffrey noted that politicians' promises do not normally coincide with actual change:

This situation we are living in is not something new we have been in it, we have just gotten used to it. We complain to the KCCA; they elect new leaders. They promise us all the good things to improve the [informal settlements] but we don't see any improvement. Another five years comes, they elect new leaders they come in the same way, but we see no improvement. They only come back to win our votes.

Thus, the economically marginalized have lost faith in their government. Without that trust, planning will not be successful (Talvitie 2012), and development will not occur. Highlighting this negative citizen-state relationship, Kenneth and fellow motorcycle mechanics Patrick and Andrew stated that "[we] have already lost trust in the government... [they] are not doing anything for us. The government is not giving us some ways out to make money." Others believe that the government is not only idle, but actively hindering Uganda's prosperity. According to three young auto mechanics in Old Kampala named Kizza, Michael, and James, "[The government] is providing little to the population of Uganda" and "[they don't] want any good thing in the country." When asked how the citizens participating in the informal sector react to any attempts to implement programs, Okello stated that "they [consider] politics and ... they imagine that whatever program you are bringing is about displacing them and denying them anything. So their participation is limited." Even though planners like Okello continue to develop programs which strive to improve life in informal settlements, the pervasive distrust for the state constrains participation and hinders their implementation.




Figure 4. Urban area growth in Kampala, 1995-2010.

Third, Uganda's land tenure system (explained in more depth later) makes it extremely difficult for planners to implement their programs. In brief, Uganda has multiple land tenure systems under which many landowners do not have title to their property. According to the National Development Plan, individual land owners control 99% of land in Uganda's central region (where Kampala is located), and "95% [of them] do not have land titles" (Republic of Uganda 2010, 160-161). Thus, who owns what land is unclear and inhibits development plans because no one knows where they can build. As Okello states, "the land tenure system here in Kampala [is] a complex one whereby in implementing most of these programs, we get resistance from many of the land owners." Moreover, with 99% of land owned by entities other than the state, where development can take place is extremely limited. In the KPDP (2012) they state that land tenure and private ownership of space impedes development because it "[limits] the supply of developable land... [requires] enormous financial resources to enable land acquisition...significantly [complicates] and [delays] the planning and implementation of assorted projects... [and deters] foreign investors" (Kampala Capital City Authority 2012, 113-114). Unable to understand who they must consult, where they can implement projects, and without available or affordable land on which they can develop, the KCCA and other developmental bodies cannot begin many of their projects: there is nowhere they can develop.

Finally, although different organizations have created urban plans that have attempted to control the growing number of informal settlements, most have not been implemented and those that have were unsuccessful. Professor J.B. Nyakaana of Makerere University has argued that despite the existence of several comprehensive plans, "developments in Kampala, especially housing, have continued to be haphazard, unplanned and located outside planned area[s]" (Nyakaana et al 2007, 7). Exemplifying this failure to

sustain adequate development, The First Urban Project, which was mostly funded by the World Bank and partly by the KCCA, has failed in its waste management project. Despite the "deployment of some 550 skips and 30 transport refuse collection vehicles" (World Bank 2000, 6) waste continues to pile up not only within informal settlements, but within waterways as well. Affecting the project's rehabilitation of the Nakivubo Channel which strove to alleviate flooding in Owino (World Bank 2000, 5), inadequate garbage disposal has forced residents to dump their waste in the channel, consequently forcing it to overflow (Keehan 2011). Finally, this plan aimed to rehabilitate about 45 km of asphalt roads and 27 km of gravel roads (World Bank 2000, 5). However, none of these was in informal settlements and adequate roads remain a major concern of development (Kampala Capital City Authority 2012; Republic of Uganda 2010).

For citizens participating in the informal sector like Jeffrey, inadequate roads and constant flooding inhibit their ability to work. He explained that "[the politicians] promise good roads, but we don't see anything" and that "in most cases now, we do community work. If we see [that] the city council does not respond to [flooding] very fast, we do community work. Where there is a heap of soil, we come and pour it in the potholes and we have to collect the rubbish here ourselves." Because navigable and maintained roads are essential to the livelihoods of a variety of workers in the informal sector—like wheelbarrow pushers, boda drivers, and all those who rely on those professions—they have no choice but to do this work themselves. Actual development is therefore like everything else in informal settlements: informal. Where the city fails to provide adequate infrastructure, citizens living in informality must develop their communities themselves.

Other plans like the National Slum Upgrading Strategy and the Kampala Physical Development Plan which strive—among other things—to improve the number of housing units, create better drainage and

dispose of solid waste (Republic of Uganda 2008; Kampala Capital City Authority 2012) have brought about little change on the ground. None of the interviewees had seen any positive change in their living conditions and some have actually witnessed deterioration in their quality of life. Both Isaac and a matoke (cooking banana) vendor named Godfrey who works in Kibuli stated that “the changes I see are not for the better; [they] are for the worst.”

As a result of a lack of resources, abundance corruption, and ineffective and unused funding, Kampala has become a city of informal settlements. In this environment, adequate housing and access to the formal economy seldom exist, causing many citizens to participate in the informal sector either through squatting on land they do not own or through participating in the informal economy. People create their own jobs in untaxed and unregulated money-making endeavors or they claim their own space by squatting. Whether it is through petty trade, taxi driving, jewelry bead-making, or manual labor, the informal sector provides a (usually meager) livelihood for millions.

### INFORMALITY AND INFORMAL SETTLEMENTS IN KAMPALA

As the informal sector grows on a global scale—informal settlements incorporate thousands more every day, and now include over one billion people worldwide (UN HABITAT 2003)—it has attracted opinions as diverse as the activities that take place within it. Some scholars celebrate the magnificent spectrum of activities taking place in extremely densely populated environments (Brand 2009), while others believe that the informal economy is a haven for entrepreneurial freedom (Bennett et al. 2007). UN-HABITAT contends that informal settlements help to drive a city’s economy because the informal activities within it extend beyond the scope of shantytowns and permeate entire cities (UN HABITAT 2003, vi). Yet the same report admits that “these

few positive attributes do not in any way justify the continued existence of slums and should not be an excuse for the slow progress towards the goal of adequate shelter for all” (UN HABITAT 2003, vi).

Indeed, while the informal sector does give rise to robust markets and extremely creative individuals who find innovative ways to survive, in many cases much of this activity takes place in informal settlements which are characterized by outbreaks of disease, unsanitary living conditions, and lack of adequate infrastructure. They represent the intense marginalization of the urban poor into massive enclaves of poverty, health hazards, and socioeconomic and political instability (Davis 2006). In these places, residents may find themselves amid piles of garbage along dilapidated roads and living in shanty homes that are ever-vulnerable to flooding and collapse. Such living conditions demonstrate the struggle of local authorities to respond to the demand for services, such as in Kampala:

Kampala City Council acknowledges that the amount of garbage generated has overwhelmed its capacity to collect and dispose, given the enormous cost, leading to formation of heaps of uncollected solid waste, offensive odour, continuous environment pollution and repeated occurrence of sanitation related diseases like cholera and dysentery (UN HABITAT 2007, 1).

Immovable mountains of garbage become hills on which children play. Improper or absent waste disposal, insufficient drainage, and inadequate housing foster the spread of disease and exacerbate health problems. While it requires innovation to create a home from recycled sheet metal, crude bricks, and foraged wood, shanty homes (or *muzigos*) struggle to serve as safe shelter in many cases. The mere density of residents living in such settlements is cause for concern. When asked how many people stay in one home, Milton, a scrap metal collector who lived in informal settlements for fifteen years, informed me that



*muzigos*—which are single room structures—house up to seven people with one family<sup>2</sup> living in a single room. In the city of hills, Kampala's informal settlements often times sit in valleys, making them especially vulnerable to the dangers of flooding (Kiwawulo 2010). As shoe vendor Isaac said, "You can spend a night standing because you will have nowhere to sleep because the water floods inside the house where I live." According to Jeffrey, a wheelbarrow pusher who transports goods in Owino Market "whenever it rains, people tend to [drain] the sewer system and it runs in the running water and it causes a lot of sickness, like cholera, in the location." Without adequate infrastructure providing proper housing, potable water, or garbage disposal, residents in informal settlements are even more vulnerable to the spread of bacteria and disease.

Although informal work can accommodate the economically marginalized by providing jobs (Nyakaana et al. 2007, 4), some of the work in the informal economy comes with inherent health risks. While many can participate in safer informal occupations like petty trading, urban agriculture, construction, and food production (World Bank 2005, 3), some resort to more dangerous activities like theft and prostitution (Rwabukwali 1991, 26-40). Primarily for women, prostitution brings with it extremely real and dangerous threats (although as customers men run the risks of contracting STDs as well) because economic pressures make it difficult for "young girls to resist sexual advances especially from well-to-do but promiscuous adults" (Otiso 2006, 36). In a country experiencing the tenth-highest rate of HIV/AIDS infection in the world (1.2 million or one out of fifteen Ugandans), prostitution is a dangerous occupation (CIA 2009).

With this in mind, the informal sector plays two roles. On the one hand, it permits access to space and the economy to the normally alienated urban poor. At the same time however, it cannot protect this access because citizens living and working in the informal sector do so without claim to formal rights.

This difference between gaining access to and claiming a right to socioeconomic benefits is an important one. The latter, while not immune from revocation, provides citizens a legitimate rights claim and is therefore harder (and in many cases illegal) for any authority or individual to contest or infringe upon that right. Mere access to socioeconomic benefits, however, is under constant threat of contestation from authorities (e.g., the state with regard to untaxed economic activity or landlords with regard to squatting) and can be legally revoked. While scholars have shown that informality and formality are not two separate entities but rather a series of intersecting transactions (Roy 2005; Moser 2009; Ward 2004), there is a stark difference between them regarding rights. Those participating in the informal sector do so void of legal entitlements while those participating in the formal sector can claim rights to shelter and the economy. Without this same claim to rights in the informal sector, the state can (and does) contest the access to space and the economy by citizens in the informal sector, enforcing the creation of enclaves of poor working conditions and health hazards.

## RIGHTS & THE DENIAL OF THE RIGHT TO THE CITY

While understanding the context of informality in Kampala is useful, it remains difficult to comprehend the notion of the right to the city without first exploring different definitions of rights generally. Drawing on the conceptualization of legal rights (Hohfeld 2000 [1919]), generational rights (Waldron 1993), and the moral right to break the law (Dworkin 1977), Attoh (2011) provides a useful theoretical understanding of rights and how they help define the right to the city. Summarizing Hohfeld (2000 [1919]), Attoh (2011) states:

...all legal entitlements can be understood as either one or a combination of four basic rights: claim rights, liberty



rights, power, and immunities. Claim rights....are rights that correlate with duties....To have a liberty right is to be free of any duty....to have a power is to have the ability to change a legal relation; and immunity is to be free of another's legal power (Attoh 2011, 670-71).

This understanding begins with the premise of "legal entitlements" as rights—values or benefits which one can claim as their right to by law. However, the informal sector refers to that which operates outside of the law. Roy (2005) argues that informality is a 'state of exception' in so far as it only exists outside of legal obligations because planners, government agencies, and policy makers (i.e. the state) label this place as informal; as out of "their realm of control" (Roy 2005, 155). He states that "[Informality] is not, to [use] Agamben's (1998) terminology, the "chaos that precedes order, but rather the situation that results from its suspension" (Agamben 18) (Roy 2005, 149). Thus, informality is, as Roy argues, "not the object of state regulation but rather produced by the state itself" (Roy 2005, 149). This logic helps to dismantle the dichotomy of two distinct sectors—informal and formal (Roy 2005)—but in turn gives rise to two questions. First, what implication does that have on rights of those who live in informality? Second, with Hohfeld's understanding of "legal entitlements" as rights, how does this definition of rights function in a place—the informal sector—that is outside the law?

Second, Attoh (2011) explores Jeremy Waldron's (1993) conceptualization of rights as generational and the relationship between these different generations. First-generation rights are those which pertain to the "traditional liberties and privileges of citizenship: free speech, religious liberty, the right not to be tortured, the right to a fair trial, the right to vote, and many others" (Attoh, 2011, 671). Second-generation rights pertain to socioeconomic rights which "encompass rights to housing and a right to a fair wage" (Attoh

2011, 671). Finally, third-generation rights are communal rights that serve to protect the economic well-being and customs of groups such as nations, communities, and peoples (Attoh 2011, 672). However, the priority of claiming these three generational rights changes in the context of informality. Attoh (2011) refers to Isaiah Berlin's (1969) work *Four Essays on Liberty*:

It is true that to offer political rights, or safeguards against intervention by the State, to men who are half-naked, illiterate, underfed and diseased is to mock their condition; they need medical help or education before they can understand, or make use of, an increase in their freedom. What is freedom to those who cannot make use of it? (Berlin 1969, 124)

It is this concept, Attoh argues, which leads many scholars (Waldron 1993; Berlin 1969) to advocate first for socioeconomic rights and then for others. Indeed, of what importance is the right to free speech when one cannot feed themselves or their family?

Finally, Attoh analyzes Roland Dworkin's (1977) essay *Taking Rights Seriously* and the concept that "when laws infringe upon our dignity or our equality, Dworkin argues, the language of rights not only allows us to challenge such laws, it allows us to break such laws and make our case to a jury of our peers" (Attoh 2011, 673). This is an interesting assertion in the context of informality because in order to access the informal sector, one must break laws. Be it by squatting on property one does not own or hawking goods without a permit, those participating in the informal sector break the law in order to have shelter or access to a source of livelihood. The question then arises, if living in informality inherently means operating outside of the law, is this justified?

Framing this conceptualization of the right to the city around these questions posits the first of two main themes at the heart of this essay: can citizens claim a right to the city

through the informal sector? In brief, they cannot. Without legal protection, authorities are able to revoke access to informal housing and to the informal economy for citizens participating in the informal sector.

The inaccessibility of space is the result of two phenomena. First, most citizens in the informal sector simply do not have enough capital to purchase land. Working as carpenters, Charles and Thomas informed me that “70,000 [shillings] (about \$28) cannot sustain people to live for a month. [It’s] not enough money.” As a mechanic, Kenneth explained that “I am a poor man and there is no way I can get out of this poverty because whenever I try to work, I am just working for food. I don’t expect that I will be better off for the future. Whatever I get is for today.” A report by the International Housing Coalition argues that most people resort to living in informal settlements because

rents for a standard house in a *serviced* neighborhood are typically in the \$185 - \$250 per month range, well beyond the means of the poor. Even though most people are either renters or squatters, land remains a huge problem because the vast majority does not have the means to purchase a plot (Giddings 2009, 11 emphasis added).

Thus, most remain permanent squatters or informal renters and are unable to break from this cycle. Yet, even if these citizens were able to accumulate enough capital to begin to save, Uganda’s land tenure system makes it extremely difficult (if not impossible) to own or buy land.

Dating to British colonization in the early twentieth century, most land in Kampala remains under *mailo*—or private—tenure (Fig. 5) and much of that land has two legal owners: 1) the landowner who has the title; and 2) the bona fide tenant who can claim ownership of the land under customary law if they have stayed there unchallenged for over 12 years (Owaraga 2012; Giddings 2009). When making decisions concerning

this land, the titleholder must reimburse and relocate tenants should they want to move them and the bona fide tenant must consult the land owner with each sale, development or lease of the land (Giddings 2009). Augustus Nuwagaba of Makerere University explained that “the problem with Mailo land is that it creates legal ownership of land which the owner does not occupy and occupation of land which the occupant does not own” (quoted in Businge 2007). It is this ambiguity which Businge contends:

[Results] in a situation where the mailo land title holder cannot sell the land or utilise it because he/she has to adequately compensate the tenants, while the tenants are not comfortable enough to develop or sell land for which they don’t have a title, even though they may own it under customary law (Businge 2007).

Ultimately, this complication has created informal settlements which landowners cannot develop and which citizens living there cannot own. While squatters can claim legal ownership of the land should they occupy a place for twelve years, they remain indistinct co-owners who do not possess a title and are therefore subjected to challenges from authorities like the KCCA or the police.

Out of this complexity, many citizens living in informality resort to informal housing where they squat on land because rents are generally unaffordable (Giddings 2009, 8). But this type of living and working environment has no protection and the KCCA can forcibly reallocate and move them. Charles and Thomas voice this concern stating that “wherever you try to settle, you’ve been moved away from there so you are never settled at all. That is the biggest challenge [we] have in our work.” A bicycle repairman named Ssalongo and his two coworkers named Isaiah and Akiki shared a similar sentiment when asked about the challenges they face regarding housing, “Now, the KCCA comes [and] wants to chase us away, they don’t relocate

us. If they happen to arrest you, they leave you jobless here.” Even just outside of the city center in Kibuli, Godfrey expresses the same issue: “Because the KCCA might come and find your small business and say it is not supposed to be there. They will want to destroy you.” While the informal sector allows these citizens a place to stay and a place to work, they are temporary establishments that do not guarantee any type of security.

Next, there is an exclusion from the economy. In Kampala, most economic activity requires a trading license, and of the jobs in the informal sector, the vast majority requires this documentation in order to function. According to a World Bank report, the most popular activities in Kampala’s informal sector include: making food, clothes, wood products, and handcrafts as well as metal fabrication, service, and transport (World Bank 2005, 3), and all but one of the interviewees fell into one of these categories. There were

three auto mechanics (service), one bed sheet vendor (trade), two carpenters (wood products), one scrap collector (metal fabrication), three motorcycle mechanics (service), one boda driver (transport), three wheelbarrow pushers (transport), one shoe vendor (trade), three bicycle mechanics (service), and one matoke vendor (food processing). The only interviewee that did not participate in one of these sectors was a young man and his even younger colleagues who were musical performers. With the exception of some handcraft vendors who make and sell their goods on their own property, in accordance with the Trade (Licensing) Act 1969, all of these require a license in order to operate, but many citizens in the informal economy do not obtain this license because, frankly, it is too costly. Ranging from 7,500 to 2,250,000 shillings (\$3-900) (Radoli 2013), even the cheapest license is unaffordable considering the vast majority live on less than \$2/day. If




Figure 5. Land Ownership in Kampala, 2009. Source: Giddings 2009, 13.

(and usually when) caught without a license, businesspeople can face fines up to 20 million shillings (\$8000) and jail time up to 12 months (Senkabirwa 2013; Trade (Licensing) Act 1969). Yet many of these citizens operating without a license are more likely to pay less expensive, albeit illegal bribes to lowly authority figures in lieu of jail time.

With each interview, a motif emerged. Ssalongo reported that “Where I operate, the KCCA does not want me to operate my business. Sometimes when I am working [with] a client [repairing] his bicycle, the KCCA comes and confiscates my tools.” Joseph explained that “Interacting with the city council is not [easy] because sometimes... [we] meet when you’ve moved your pad, you’ve not made money, you’re exhausted, they take what you’re selling and go away with it.” Finally, when asked whether or not the KCCA has ever helped them, Isaac stated that “[The KCCA] have never helped me apart from letting me down. They have always been confiscating my things and I do not go and get them [because] it is very hard for me to get them back.” Without a license and therefore vulnerable to paying bribes, fines, or facing jail time, vendors operating in the informal economy find it even more difficult to prosper.

These vendors’ vulnerability not only affects their personal well-being, but also creates micro-capital flight. Rather than face persecution, many leave the city center which subsequently takes business away from enterprises that rely on that population. According to prominent Ugandan periodical *New Vision*, “In September 2011, Kampala Capital City Authority (KCCA) ordered all vendors and hawkers to leave the city streets. Since then, they have engaged in running battles with enforcement officers” (Anguyo 2013). One boda cyclist (or motorcycle taxi driver) named Gusta explained that his income from fares has decreased as a direct result of this repression:

It is the city council which has paralyzed the boda boda work in the city.

[We] used to make money when the street vendors were there because people would come [and] want to buy things from the vendors cheaply. Now, the KCCA has sent them away. They no longer operate in the city which means few people come into the city. [We] have few passengers to carry.

As a result of oppressive monitoring by authorities, the loss of vendors has drastically slowed the transient population that would normally commute to the city center in search of these goods. Now, supply of drivers far outweighs demand for their services and they have no choice but to take meager fares because if they do not, someone else will:

Since there are so many young men boda boda cycling, [I] find [I] don’t have time to negotiate [fares] with the customer. As I negotiate with a customer another person comes and takes him at any fare. The only option is—whoever comes with little money or enough money—to take him.

Because poverty and underdevelopment force more people to rely on boda driving as a source of income, the supply of drivers increases. At the same time however, the demand for their services drastically falls because of repressive authorities and as a result prices deflate, wages decrease, and poverty ensues. Indeed, corruption has indirectly crippled one of the most popular forms of transportation which provides the livelihood for many in the city. With access to the economy limited, ever-vulnerable, and under constant threat, as Isaac put it, “At work it is not a safe place; at home, it is not safe. We just live by the mercy of god.”

Unable to confer rights to housing or to the economy under current circumstances, the informal sector cannot grant citizens a right to the city. So then, what should the right to city look like living in informality? In need of rights to space and the economy, claiming a right to the city in the infor-

mal sector would first resemble Waldron's (1993) concept of gaining socioeconomic rights to housing and a source of livelihood. To achieve the former, a comprehensive land reform needs to take place. This is by no means a new proposal, as scholars, policy makers, and the government of Uganda have continued to try and tackle the confusion and conflict that arises from land disputes (Republic of Uganda 1998, 2010; Giddings 2009; Nkurunziza 2006). Roy (2005) points out that while squatters were able to purchase public land through a policy in Manila, it resulted in catering to the upper and middle class squatters while marginalizing the lower class (page 153). Moreover, this type of program could not be implemented in Kampala because most land is owned privately. While the resolution of this problem is beyond the scope of this paper, a recommendation would be to consider informal settlements and those who live there when drafting these plans and new legislature. In particular, looking at how policies will affect the informal land market and whether or not this will subsequently take a home away from the majority of the city who relies on informal housing is paramount to discussions about policy change. All too often, this group remains forgotten in these discussions and perpetually alienated from housing after new policies are drafted. Indeed, despite his in-depth analysis of the land market in Kampala, Giddings (2009) admits that "this study focuses primarily on formal sector land issues. Further analysis is required on the number and type of informal sector land transactions" (Giddings 2009, 16).

Regarding the right to a source of livelihood, citizens in the informal sector cannot enjoy the right to the city without state support. This does not, as Roy argues, necessarily have to come through formalization but until regulations shift from marginalizing these citizens to supporting them, they will not achieve the right to the city. While it would appear that most citizens in the informal economy are more likely to encounter

cheaper fines through paying bribes rather than face the costly penalties and jail time associated with operating without a permit, this is problematic. First, any type of fine is detrimental to an income which already provides barely enough to purchase food for the day. Second, corruption perpetuates citizens' pervasive distrust for the state which in turn hinders development plans and drives away foreign investment. However, this essay does not advocate that these already economically strained citizens face higher, albeit legal fines. Instead, policies should exist that protect these citizens from fines, both formal and informal so that they can use the little money they earn to try and improve their socioeconomic situation. In this way, the informal economy should become more regulated (not policed) in order to protect the majority of the city's citizens who are ever vulnerable to poverty.

Second, achieving the right to the city in the informal sector would also resemble Dworkin's (1977) concept of a moral right to challenge or break the law. In Kampala as well as in many cases for that matter, living in informality is in itself illegal but results because economic and political conditions create widespread underdevelopment. As this essay demonstrated, this underdevelopment does not accommodate the growing urban population, resulting in citizens' participation in the informal sector in order to gain access to shelter and a source of livelihood. In doing so, they are constantly vulnerable to either legal persecution or authorities abusing their power. Yet, they are unable to challenge this persecution even though the underdevelopment out of which they resort to informality is the result of a weak state and economy. If these conditions infringe upon their right to improve their well-being, they should, as Dworkin and this essay argue, be able to legally challenge that infringement. However, outside some ability to legally contest land disputes (which is in itself time-consuming and confusing given the current land tenure system), they cannot "challenge such laws,

...break such laws, and make [their] case to a jury of [their] peers" (Attoth 2011, 673). Thus, in trying to find shelter and a source of livelihood, these citizens live in a constant state of persecution.

## CONCLUSION

Participating in informality is necessary for many who cannot gain access to formal shelter or a source of livelihood. In this sense, it is certainly a positive. However, because informality cannot confer any types of legal rights, that access is often challenged, which leaves citizens ever-vulnerable to poverty. Frequently denied access to both space and the economy, citizens participating in informality cannot claim a right to the city without facing contestation. Yet this is the paradox of the informal sector: it allows citizens a place to stay, but without security of tenure. It allows them a place to work, but not an occupation protected by labor laws. It allows them partial access to the city, but not complete inclusivity. It allows them access to socioeconomic benefits but in no way confers them as rights.

In sum, informality does not confer the right to the city. Rather, it provides necessary, but constantly vulnerable access to space and to the economy. However, as this paper contends there is a marked difference between gaining access to and claiming a right to shelter and a source of livelihood. Second, in order to achieve the right to the city in informality, policies and regulations must be made in order to protect these citizens' rights to the socioeconomic benefits of urban life. Finally, it must also permit channels through which they can fairly challenge and break laws that infringe upon their pursuit of self-improvement. Without these conditions, citizens in the informal sector will not achieve the right to the city. As Isaac told me, "in [the informal sector] people don't have their full rights"; and without conferring these rights in the informal sector, the right to the city does not exist.

## NOTES

1. Vulnerable to poverty is defined as spending below twice the national poverty line (\$2.40/day).
2. The most recent census from the Uganda Bureau of Statistics (2014) showed that the average household size in Kampala was 3.5 (UBOS 2014, 36).

## ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I would like to express my deepest gratitude to my draft readers Sarah & Tina for their unconditional support and for not being afraid to dissect previous drafts of this paper; to the reviewers and editors of *The Geographical Bulletin* for their remarks that have strengthened this essay's central argument; to the department of geography at DePaul University for their support, both financial and academic; to the members of PED, especially Abdul, Milton, and Drew for introducing me to the pearl of Africa; to my mentor Dr. Winifred Curran for her selfless guidance, endless advice, and for giving me the necessary mental stability to continue this research; and finally, to all of the interviewees who gave me the honor of representing their voices which all too often go unheard.

## REFERENCES

- Ablode Attoth, K. 2012. The Transportation Disadvantaged and the Right to the City in Syracuse, New York. *The Geographical Bulletin*, May: pp. 1-19.
- Anguyo, I. 2013. 67% of Ugandans Vulnerable to Poverty. *New Vision*, 19 March. [<http://www.newvision.co.ug/news/640813-67-of-ugandans-vulnerable-to-poverty.html>]. Last Accessed 2 September 2014.
- Anguyo, I. 2013. Vendors, Hawkers Reap Big Amid Traders' Strike. *New Vision*, 29 June. [<http://www.newvision.co.ug/news/644499-vendors-hawkers-reap-big>].



- amid-traders-strike.html]. Last Accessed 7 September 2014.
- Attoh, K. 2011. What Kind of Right is the Right to the City?. *Progress in Human Geography*, 35(5): 669-685.
- Bennett, J. and Estrin, S. 2007. Entrepreneurial Entry in Developing Economies: Modeling Interactions between the Formal and Informal Sector. Ann Arbor: International Policy Center, Gerald R. Ford School of Public Policy at the University of Michigan. [<http://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/handle/2027.42/55758/IPC-working-paper-044-BennettEstrin.pdf?sequence=4>] Last accessed 22 November 2013.
- Berlin, I. 1969. *Four Essays on Liberty*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Brand, S. 2009. Steward Brand Proclaims 4 Environmental 'Heresies'. *TED Talks*. [[http://www.ted.com/talks/lang/en/stewart\\_brand\\_proclaims\\_4\\_environmental\\_heresies.html](http://www.ted.com/talks/lang/en/stewart_brand_proclaims_4_environmental_heresies.html)]. Last accessed 15 February 2012.
- Businge, G. 2007. Uganda's Difficult Path towards an Agreeable Land Policy. *UGPulse*, 30 May. [<http://www.ugpulse.com/government/uganda-s-difficult-path-towards-an-agreeable-land-policy/593/ug.aspx>]. Last accessed 27 August 2013.
- Davis, M. 2006. *Planet of Slums*. London: Verso.
- Dworkin, J. 1977. *Taking Rights Seriously*. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press.
- Friendly, A. 2013. The Right to the City: Theory and Practice in Brazil. *Planning Theory & Practice* 14(2): 158-179.
- Giddings, S.W. 2009. *The Land Market in Kampala, Uganda and its Effect on Settlement Patterns*. Washington, D.C.: International Housing Coalition. [<http://www.intlhc.org/docs/giddings-kampala.pdf>]. Last accessed 27 August 2013.
- Harvey, D. 2012. *Rebel Cities: from the Right to the City to the Urban Revolution*. London: Verso.
- Harvey, D. 2003. The Right to the City. *International Journal of Urban and Regional Research* 27(4): 939-941.
- Hohfeld, W. 2000 [1919]. *Fundamental Legal Conceptions: As Applied in Judicial Reasoning*. Clark, New Jersey: Lawbook Exchange Ltd.
- Huchzermeyer, M. 2011. *Cities with Slums: from Informal Settlement Eradication to a Right to the City in Africa*. Claremont, South Africa: Juta Academic.
- Kakaire, S. 2012. Nebanda could have been Poisoned. *The Observer*, [online] 16 December. [[http://www.observer.ug/index.php?option=com\\_content&view=article&id=22686:nebanda-could-have-been-poisoned](http://www.observer.ug/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=22686:nebanda-could-have-been-poisoned)]. Last accessed 11 September 2013.
- Kalyegira, T. 2012. Poison: is this Uganda's New Political Weapon? *Daily Monitor*, [online] 23 December. [<http://www.monitor.co.ug/Magazines/ThoughtIdeas/Poison+++Is+this+Uganda+s+new+political+weapon+/-/689844/1649840/-/ag86c3/-/index.html>] Last accessed 11 September 2013.
- Kampala Capital City Authority (KCCA). 2012. *Kampala Physical Development Plan*. Kampala: KCCA. [<http://www.kcca.go.ug/uploads/KPDP%20Draft%20Final%20Report.pdf>]. Last accessed 18 October 2013.
- Kuymulu, M. 2013. Reclaiming the Right to the City: Reflections on the Urban Uprisings in Turkey. *City* 17(3): 274-278.
- Keehan, N.D. 2011. Uganda: Nakivubo Channel-Where Slums' Human Excreta, Garbage Ends Up. *New Vision*, [online] 21 November. [<http://allafrica.com/stories/201111211786.html>]. Last accessed 12 September 2013.
- Kimbow, J. 2013. New Jobs from New Investments a Myth. *The Observer*, [online] 7 May. [[http://www.observer.ug/index.php?catid=79%3Abusinessstopstories&id=25153%3Anew-jobs-from-new-investments-a-myth&format=pdf&option=com\\_content&Itemid=68](http://www.observer.ug/index.php?catid=79%3Abusinessstopstories&id=25153%3Anew-jobs-from-new-investments-a-myth&format=pdf&option=com_content&Itemid=68)]. Last accessed 11 September 2013.
- Kisamba-Mugerwa, W. 2013. Statement by Dr. W. Kisamba-Mugerwa Chairman National Planning Authority of Uganda at the 46<sup>th</sup> Session of the United Nations

- Commission on Population and Development. New York, April 23<sup>rd</sup>.
- Kiwawulo, C and Tenywa, G. 2010. Heavy Downpour, Floods Batter Kampala. *New Vision*, [online] 22 February. [<http://www.newvision.co.ug/D/8/12/710804>]. Last accessed 14 July 2013.
- Lefebvre, H. 1996. *Writing on Cities*. Oxford: Blackwell.
- Leontidou, L. 2010. Urban Social Movements in 'Weak' Civil Societies: the Right to the City and Cosmopolitan Activism in Southern Europe. *Urban Studies* 47(6):1179-1203.
- Marcuse, P. 2009. From Critical Urban Theory to the Right to the City. *City* 13(2-3): 185-196.
- Matsiko, H. 2013. Tullow Uganda Refutes Bribery Allegations. *The Independent*, [online] 22 March. [<http://www.independent.co.ug/ugandatalks/2013/03/tullow-uganda-refutes-bribery-allegations/>]. Last accessed 11 September 2013.
- Ministry of Gender, Labour, and Social Development (MGLSD). 2012. *Uganda Social Protection Public Expenditure Review*. Kampala, Uganda.
- Mitchell, D. 2003. *The Right to the City: Social Justice and the Fight for Public Space*. New York: The Guilford Press.
- Moser, C. 1994. The Informal Sector Debate, Part 1: 1970-1983. In Rakowski, C. (ed.) *The Informal Sector Debate in Latin America*. Albany, New York: State University of New York Press: 11-29.
- Mukiibi, S. 2011. The Effect of Urbanisation on the Housing Conditions of the Urban Poor in Kampala, Uganda. Kampala: Makerere University. [<http://mak.ac.ug/documents/Makfiles/aet2011/Mukiibi.pdf>] Last Accessed 3 September 2014.
- Mulumba, D and Mlahagwa Olema, W. 2009. *Policy Analysis Report: Mapping Migration in Uganda*. African Migration and Gender in Global Context: Implementing Migration Studies. [<http://www.immis.org/wp-content/uploads/2010/05/Policy-Analysis-Report-Uganda.pdf>] Last Accessed 3 September 2014.
- Nagle, J. 2009. Sites of Social Centrality and Segregation: Lefebvre in Belfast, a 'Divided City'. *Antipode* 41(2): 326-347.
- Neuwirth, R. 2005. *Shadow Cities: a Billion Squatters, a New Urban World*. New York: Routledge.
- Nkurunziza, E. Two States, One City? Conflict and Accommodation in Land Delivery in Kampala, Uganda. *International Development Planning Review* 28(6): 159-180. Liverpool: University of Liverpool Press.
- Nyakaana, J.B. et al, 2007. Population, Urban Development and the Environment in Uganda, the Case of Kampala City and its Environs. Kampala: Makerere University.
- Otiso, K.M. 2006. *Cultures and Customs of Uganda*. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press.
- Owaraga, N. 2012. Conflict in Uganda's Land Tenure System. Africa Initiative. [<http://www.africaportal.org/articles/2012/05/14/conflict-uganda%E2%80%99s-land-tenure-system>]. Last accessed 27 August 2013.
- Park, R. 1967. *On Social Control and Collective Behavior*. Chicago: Chicago University Press.
- Radoli, L. 2013. KCCA Issues Ultimatum over Trading License Fees. *Uganda Radio Network*. [<http://ugandaradionetwork.com/a/story.php?s=48957>]. Last accessed 27 August 2013.
- Republic of Uganda. 2010. *National Development Plan: 2010/11 – 2014-15*. Kampala: Republic of Uganda.
- Republic of Uganda. 2010. *The Land (Amendment) Act, 2010*. [<http://ulau.org/files/downloads/LAND-AMENDMENT-ACT-20101.pdf>]. Last Accessed 8 September 2014.
- Republic of Uganda. 2008. *National Slum Upgrading Strategy and Action Plan*. Kampala: Department Of Human Settlements, Ministry of Lands, Housing and Urban Development. [[http://ssauganda.org/uploads/NATIONAL%20SLUM%20UPGRADING%20STRATEGY%20UG%20\(2\).pdf](http://ssauganda.org/uploads/NATIONAL%20SLUM%20UPGRADING%20STRATEGY%20UG%20(2).pdf)]. Last accessed 18 October 2013.

- Republic of Uganda. 1998. *Land Act 1998*. Kampala: ULII. [<http://www.ulii.org/ug/legislation/consolidated-act/227>]. Last Accessed 8 September 2014.
- Republic of Uganda. 1969. *Trade (Licensing) Act 1969*. Kampala: ULII. [<http://www.ulii.org/ug/legislation/consolidated-act/101>]. Last accessed 8 September 2014.
- Roy, A. 2005. Urban Informality: Towards and Epistemology of Planning. *Journal of the American Planning Association* 71(2): 147-158.
- Rulekere, G. 2006. Land Tenure Policies Complicating Development in Kampala. *UGPulse*. 24 April. [<http://www.ugpulse.com/business/land-tenure-policies-complicating-development-in-kampala/379/ug.aspx>]. Last accessed 20 August 2013.
- Rwabukwali, C.B. 1991. Adolescent Fertility and Sexuality in Uganda: Determinants, Consequences and Management. in Omari, C.K. and Shaidi, L.P. (eds.) *Social Problems in Eastern Africa*. Dar es Salaam, Tanzania: Dar es Salaam University Press, 26-40.
- Senkibirwa, A.S. 2013. 40 City Traders Charged Over Non-Payment of Licence fees. *Daily Monitor*, 8 March. [<http://www.monitor.co.ug/News/National/40+city+traders+charged+over+non+payment+of+licence+/-/688334/1714328/-/1135qfz/-/index.html>]. Last accessed 27 August 2013.
- Talvitie, A. 2012. The Problem of Trust in Planning. *Planning Theory*, 11: 257-278.
- Transparency International (TI) Kenya. 2013. *The East African Bribery Index 2013*. [<http://www.tiuganda.org/files/downloads/East%20Africa%20Bribery%20Index%202013.pdf>] Last Accessed September 2, 2014.
- Transparency International Uganda. 2012. Uganda Tops East Africa in Corruption. Transparency International. August 30. [[http://www.transparency.org/news/pressrelease/uganda\\_tops\\_east\\_africa\\_in\\_corruption](http://www.transparency.org/news/pressrelease/uganda_tops_east_africa_in_corruption)]. Last accessed 11 September 2013.
- Uganda Bureau of Statistics. 2014. National Population and Housing Census 2014: Provisional Results. Kampala: Uganda Bureau of Statistics. [[http://unstats.un.org/unsd/demographic/sources/census/2010\\_PHC/Uganda/UGA-2014-11.pdf](http://unstats.un.org/unsd/demographic/sources/census/2010_PHC/Uganda/UGA-2014-11.pdf)]. Last accessed 24 March 2015.
- Uganda Bureau of Statistics. 2012. *Investor Survey Report 2012*. Kampala: Uganda Bureau of Statistics. [<http://www.ubos.org/onlinefiles/uploads/ubos/Investor%20Survey%20Final%20%20April%202013.pdf>]. Last accessed 11 September 2013.
- Uganda Bureau of Statistics. 2012. *2012 Statistical Abstract*. [UBOS.org.<http://www.ubos.org/onlinefiles/uploads/ubos/pdf%20documents/2012StatisticalAbstract.pdf>]. Last accessed 13 June 2013.
- Uganda Bureau of Statistics. 2002. *2002 Uganda Population and Housing Census*. Kampala: Uganda Bureau of Statistics. [<http://www.ubos.org/onlinefiles/uploads/ubos/pdf%20documents/2002%20CensusPopnSizeGrowthAnalyticalReport.pdf>]. Last accessed 13 June 2013.
- United Nations Human Settlements Program (UN-HABITAT). 2003. *The Challenge of Slums: Global Report on Human Settlements 2003*. London: UN-HABITAT.
- United Nations Human Settlements Program (UN-HABITAT). 2007. *Situation Analysis of Informal Settlements in Kampala*. Nairobi: UN-HABITAT.
- U.S. Central Intelligence Agency. 2014. [<https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ug.html>]. Last accessed 11 September 2013.
- Waldron, J. 1993. *Liberal Rights: Collected Papers*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Ward, P. 2004. Introduction and Overview: Marginality Then and Now. *Latin American Research Review* 39(1): 183-187.
- Weinstein, L. and Xuefei, R. 2009. The Changing Right to the City: Urban Renewal and Housing Rights in Globalizing Shanghai and Mumbai. *City & Community* 8(4): 407-432.
- World Bank. 2009. World Development Indicators. [<http://databank.worldbank>].

- org/data/views/reports/tableview.aspx]. Last accessed 13 September 2013.
- World Bank. 2007. *Uganda Moving Beyond Recovery: Investment and Behavior Change, for Growth*. Poverty Reduction and Economic Management Unit African Region. [[http://www.hks.harvard.edu/fs/drodrik/Growth%20diagnostics%20papers/World%20Bank\\_Uganda\\_cem\\_0907\\_report.pdf](http://www.hks.harvard.edu/fs/drodrik/Growth%20diagnostics%20papers/World%20Bank_Uganda_cem_0907_report.pdf)] Last Accessed 10 September 2014.
- World Bank. 2005. *Urban Informal Sector in Uganda*. [[http://info.worldbank.org/etools/docs/library/211247/Uganda\\_Urban%20Informal%20Sector.pdf](http://info.worldbank.org/etools/docs/library/211247/Uganda_Urban%20Informal%20Sector.pdf)] Last accessed 27 August 2013.
- World Bank, 2000. *Implementation Completion Report: (core ICR)*. The World Bank. [[http://www-wds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2001/03/26/000094946\\_01032006454183/Rendered/PDF/multi0page.pdf](http://www-wds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2001/03/26/000094946_01032006454183/Rendered/PDF/multi0page.pdf)]. Last accessed 14 March 2012.
- Kenneth, motorcycle mechanic in discussion with author, July 15, 2012.
- Kizza, auto mechanic in discussion with author, July 15, 2012.
- Michael, auto mechanic in discussion with author, July 15, 2012.
- Moses, wheelbarrow pusher in discussion with author, July 15, 2012.
- Milton, scrap metal collector in discussion with author, July 15, 2012.
- Okello, senior city planner KCCA in discussion with author, July 26, 2012.
- Patrick, motorcycle mechanic in discussion with author, July 15, 2012.
- Ssalongo, bicycle mechanic in discussion with author, July 15, 2012.
- Thomas, carpenter in discussion with author, July 15, 2012.

## INTERVIEWS

- Akiki, bicycle mechanic in discussion with author July 15, 2012.
- Amos, wheelbarrow pusher in discussion with author, July 15, 2012.
- Andrew, motorcycle mechanic in discussion with author, July 15, 2012.
- Charles, carpenter in discussion with author, July 15, 2012.
- Gusta, boda driver in discussion with author, July 15, 2012.
- Godfrey, matoke vendor in discussion with author, July 15, 2012.
- Isaac, shoe vendor in discussion with author, July 15, 2012.
- Isaiah, bicycle mechanic in discussion with author, July 15, 2012.
- James, auto mechanic in discussion with author. July 15, 2012.
- John, musician in discussion with author, July 15, 2012.
- Jeffrey, wheelbarrow pusher in discussion with author, July 15, 2012.
- Joseph, bed sheet vendor in discussion with author, July 15, 2012.