UPROOTED PEOPLE IN SUDAN: FROM DROUGHT AND WAR
TO PEACE AND DEVELOPMENT

CONSULTANCY ON THE REHABILITATION AND REINTEGRATION OF IDPS
AND RETURNEES FOR THE IGAD PARTNER FORUM WORKING GROUP
“PLANNING FOR PEACE”

François Grünewald
Groupe URD
FAO Consultant
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EXECUTIVE SUMMARY</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MISSION</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.1 Background</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.2 Methodology</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SUDAN</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.1 Historical and ethnic roots of the crisis</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.2 Impact on the agricultural sector</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.3 The Transition Zone</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DISPLACEMENT IN SUDAN: A COMPLEX AND SENSITIVE ISSUE</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.1 Introduction</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.2 Issues of concern</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.2.1 Protecting and developing human capital</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.2.2 Promoting self reliance</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.2.3 Improving the absorption capacity of local communities</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.2.4 Creating trust and references</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.2.5 The landmine problem</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.2.6 Unknown factors and IDPs' risk minimization strategy</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.2.7 Peace scenarios</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RECOMMENDATIONS</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.1 Phasing the restlement process: Contiguum versus continuum</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.2 Voluntary return to area of origin</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.2.1 Peace with Sudan remaining united</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.2.2 Peace under the partition of Sudan</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.2.3 Peace and the referendum</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.3 Local integration</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.3.1 Scope of the phenomenon</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.3.2 Urban areas</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.3.3 Rural areas</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.4 Voluntary resettlement in appropriate locations</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CONCLUSION</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ACF</td>
<td>Action Contre la Faim</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAHW</td>
<td>Community Animal Health Workers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAP</td>
<td>Consolidated Appeal Process</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CARE</td>
<td>Cooperative for Assistance and Relief Everywhere</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CDC</td>
<td>Centre for Disease Control, Atlanta</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EC</td>
<td>European Commission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ECHO</td>
<td>European Community Humanitarian Office</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FAO</td>
<td>The Food and Agriculture Organisation of the United Nations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FEAU</td>
<td>Food Economy Analysis Unit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FEWS</td>
<td>Famine Early Warning System</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GIS</td>
<td>Geographic Information System</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GoS</td>
<td>Government of Sudan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HAC</td>
<td>Humanitarian Aid Commission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HAD</td>
<td>Humanitarian Aid Department</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICRC</td>
<td>International Committee of the Red Cross</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IDP</td>
<td>Internally Displaced Person</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IFRC</td>
<td>International Federation of the Red Cross and Red Crescent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IGAD</td>
<td>Inter Governmental Authority for Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IPF WG</td>
<td>IGAD Partner Forum Working Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MERLIN</td>
<td>Medical Emergency Relief International</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MSF</td>
<td>Médecins Sans Frontière</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non-Governmental Organisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OCHA</td>
<td>Office for Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OLS</td>
<td>Operation Lifeline Sudan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RASS</td>
<td>Relief Association of South Sudan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SFC</td>
<td>Supplementary Feeding Centre</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SPLA</td>
<td>Sudan People's Liberation Movement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SRRA</td>
<td>Sudan Relief and Rehabilitation Association</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TFC</td>
<td>Therapeutic Feeding Centre</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOR</td>
<td>Terms of Reference</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VAM</td>
<td>Vulnerability Analysis and Mapping Unit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNHCR</td>
<td>United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNICEF</td>
<td>The United Nations Children's Fund</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN CEREO</td>
<td>UN Co-ordinator for Emergency and Relief Operations in Sudan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNHCU</td>
<td>United Nations Humanitarian Co-ordination Unit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNIMIX</td>
<td>UNICEF Supplementary Feeding Food</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WFP</td>
<td>World Food Programme of the United Nations</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I would like to express my deep gratitude to those who helped me in my mission – top-level management; farmers; ministerial staff dealing with IDPs and refugees; staff of UN Agencies and NGOs; and the Sudanese people.

I would also like to thank the FAO Sudan Representation and the Emergency Co-ordinators in Khartoum and Nairobi as well as to the Chairman of the IPF Working Group and his two dedicated competent assistants in Khartoum and Nairobi. The EU delegation in Khartoum, which has been very supportive during the mission, deserves special mention.
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The mission’s objective was to provide inputs for strategic thinking on the rehabilitation and reintegration of uprooted people in Sudan. During the mission, the consultant interviewed the Sudanese authorities, the opposition, civilians as well as staff from international and national aid organizations. In addition, the consultant made extensive use of written material and participated in the National IDP day; the monthly NGO coordination meeting; the monthly Operation Lifeline Sudan (OLS) coordination meeting and the Sudan Relief and Rehabilitation Association (SRRA) workshop on database and early warning systems.

ISSUES OF CONCERN

In the last few decades, drought, environmental degradation, conflict and poor economic conditions have led to population displacements of huge magnitudes. Estimates indicate that nearly 3 to 5 million out of a population of about 30 million have been displaced.

The dynamics of these displacements vary in scale, duration, causality and are influenced by geographic factors. When planning the resettlement of uprooted people, it is useful to bear in mind the following issues.

Protecting and developing human capital

In the North, after years of a deadlocked dialogue on the issue of IDPs, opportunities for a renewed debate with Sudanese stakeholders on what would constitute principled engagement seem to have emerged recently. Although the IDP crisis in Upper Nile and around the Oil fields has further deteriorated the climate of discussion, these opportunities should not be neglected. While this constructive engagement will require caution and courage, it will be effective only if there is a strong commitment to internationally recognised legal instruments. In the South, grass-root initiatives, such as the Wunlit Agreement, are paving the way for the identification of local problem solving mechanisms. Support to these mechanisms will be essential for the return of uprooted people.

International legislative instruments are the framework under which national rules and regulations can protect human capital. Respect for International Humanitarian Law, the Convention for Refugees and other instruments is paramount to lasting peace and national reconciliation and key to the management of uprooted people. In addition to the protection of civilians, steps should be taken to ensure that displacement does not continue to erode the social fabric. Years of conflict have created generations of uneducated children and adults who are slowly losing their traditional knowledge and skills. Support should therefore be given to activities such as basic education, vocational training and the creation of job opportunities. Here it should be noted that donors often consider education as a development issue not to be supported by humanitarian funds. This is due to a conceptual misunderstanding of the needs of civilians in protracted crises.

Preventing the dependency syndrome

IDPs and refugees take into account the availability of aid in their resettlement strategy. Many of them enjoy services in camps that are lacking in their areas of origin. Those interviewed during the mission stated that their decision to return home will depend on whether they would be able to avail of similar services. Unsustainable resettlement programmes are frequent. For instance, in the North, the exemption of IDPs from cost recovery has aroused the resentment of host communities and fostered a habit of dependency among IDPs. When assistance stops, people move again. In order to promote self reliance, cost recovery issues, discontinuation of free assistance and support to self sustaining programmes should be discussed as soon as possible. Assistance should not be used as a leverage to
push people back. However its availability in temporary areas of settlement should not prevent people from returning to their areas of origin when conditions permit.

**Combating environmental degradation**

In the last three decades Sudan has suffered severe environmental degradation. Desertification has increased the risks affecting agricultural production and livestock rearing, and droughts since the mid ’80s have caused displacement and increased conflict among communities over grazing land and watering points. In addition, security perimeters around garrison towns limit land available for cultivation. As a consequence, cultivation cycles have been accelerated, leading to loss of soil fertility, erosion and pest infestation. Combating environmental degradation will help expand the country’s resource base and facilitate the sustainable reintegration of uprooted people.

**Increasing the absorption capacity of local communities**

Complex population movements put pressure on fragile service delivery structures. Therefore a local development approach which aims to improve services in the proposed area of resettlement is recommended rather than a typical relief approach which targets IDPs specifically and is likely to arouse the resentment of host communities. The development approach should target all sectors: health, education, access to productive means etc, Mechanisms such as local development funds and micro projects should be explored. Reintegration kits, which are restricted to simple equipment, should not be designed in a way that would arouse the resentment of host communities. Improving services in an area is also an opportunity to address the land tenure issue.

**Investing in urban areas**

People are moving to large cities (Khartoum, Juba etc.), medium size towns (El-Obeil, Malakal, Rumbek etc,) and small urban centres (Torit, Bor, Yambio etc,) on a large scale. Urbanization is an opportunity to invest in urban infrastructure, social services and employment generation and thereby greatly facilitate reintegration and economic development. Participatory approaches in urban planning and social service development should be used.

**Creating trust**

One of the challenges of the pre peace period is initiating the healing process which would involve the following:

- warn warring parties of punishment in case of human rights violations
- alleviate trauma by encouraging people to express their suffering and identify other ways to facilitate the healing process
- promote reconciliation through efforts such as the Wunlit People to People Peace Agreement

It is also important to ensure that people do not become disillusioned with the resettlement process. In this regard a four pronged strategy described as follows should be implemented:

- ensure relocation, resettlement and return takes place on a voluntary basis
- enable people to gain confidence in the proposed area of resttlement
- secure government’s commitment to facilitating resettlement at both federal and provincial levels
- ensure sufficient and timely mobilization of financial resources
Landmine problem

The landmine problem will heavily influence resettlement. Mine awareness campaigns should be stepped up in areas where IDPs live or plan to return. The first step is to identify location and patterns of mine laying as well as the results of mine clearance efforts. In order to expedite the exchange of information on mine technology, mine laying tactics etc, discussions between warring parties should take place immediately after a peace agreement has been reached.

IDPs’ risk minimization strategy and unknown factors

IDPs follow a diversified strategy under which some group or family members return home while others use aid for resettlement or remain in cities where employment opportunities are more attractive. This strategy should be considered in the planning of resettlement programmes. It is also important to bear in mind the fact that, for many, displacement is their first exposure to the world outside their home areas. They come to new places with expectations and are likely to move again if these expectations are not met.

However, it is difficult to take into account all the factors that influence IDPs’ decision to return. Although some have been identified such as the cause for displacement, duration, distance, pull and push factors, land rights etc, many others remain unknown.

Peace scenarios

The peace settlement will largely determine the post-conflict dynamics of displacement. It is therefore important to consider the implications of peace and the time frame within which peace can be achieved. Among the different peace scenarios, two extreme options are: i) Sudan remaining united (with different constitutional options such as autonomy, federation) and ii) the partition of Sudan. The outcome of peace will most likely be determined by a referendum.

CONCLUSION: A FOURTEEN POINT STRATEGY

A fourteen point strategy aimed at facilitating the resettlement of uprooted people is as follows:

i) Refer to thoroughly evaluated pilot initiatives and other projects which support resettlement: Experiences in areas where people have returned, such as Sananel Naga (Darfur), Sitra (Kordofan) or in many places in South Bahr-El-Ghazal (Maper), Eastern Jongley (returnees from Ethiopia), Western Equatoria (refugees returning from Uganda and DRC), should be taken into account. Conducting interviews with refugees in camps in neighbouring countries would be useful to understand why they do not wish to return.

ii) Ensure that planning is flexible enough to adjust to different peace scenarios: A road map strategy which takes into account the different peace scenarios – either Sudan remaining united with different constitutional options or the partition of Sudan – should be adopted.

iii) Enable people to gain confidence and access to information on the areas of resettlement: This can be achieved by instituting mechanisms through which: a) individuals can inspect the proposed area of resettlement and report back to their family and friends and b) whole communities are involved in more complex exercises such as the Wunlit or Lilir processes. A well-supported information policy on the ground situation including the availability of aid, should also be in place in order to prevent false expectations.
iv) **Support local problem solving mechanisms:** Traditional mediation techniques, such as those developed under the Wunlit, Lirlir and Wuulu People to People Peace Agreements, should be supported.

v) **Ensure that identification papers are properly issued to uprooted people:** Issuing identification papers is important for registration for possible referendum and need estimates (population estimates), legal and property claim, etc.

vi) **Develop database on resource bases and services linked to a Geographic Information System:** This will be useful to all humanitarian actors. In addition to being used as a planning tool, the database may be used for monitoring and coordination if the participatory approach mentioned in point ix is adopted.

vii) **Switch from relief approaches which target a particular group of individuals to development approaches which focus on area-based problems:** This type of approach would improve the absorption capacity of host communities. Road infrastructure, markets and social services should be the core sectors for investment. This is especially important in the South where targeting of assistance has run against traditional solidarity and safety nets.

viii) **Compile information on the livestock sector in Sudan:** Regional experience in restocking which is crucial to rebuilding sustainable livelihoods should be reviewed.

ix) **Establish a flexible funding mechanism:** Mechanisms such as funds for local development and micro-projects for activities elaborated at the provincial and local levels should be developed using a participatory approach. These mechanisms will be facilitated by the National Policy of Decentralisation in the North and autonomy for the South. Testing this approach could be part of the pre-peace reference creation mechanism mentioned in first point.

x) **Ensure that IDPs and refugees resettle on a voluntary basis:** This applies to both formal refugees under the “non-refoulement” and the “right of asylum” principles and to IDPs. This right is also upheld in the Sudanese Constitution;

xi) **Secure commitment on both sides and at all levels (central, regional and local) on important issues:** Their commitment on issues such as land rights, asset claim and human rights, in addition to wealth and resource sharing should be secured. In fact, the Trust Fund could be partly co-financed by oil revenues and used to better the conditions of Southern – war IDPs and the Northern ecological and economic IDPs;

xii) **Ensure sufficient and timely mobilisation of financial and in-kind resources:** The project portfolio approach that attracts earmarked funds has limited operational efficiency in a situation of transition from protracted war to fragile peace. The “project shopping list” approach should be replaced by more flexible funding mechanisms.

xiii) **Set the basis for an Integrated Mine Action to facilitate return and reintegration.** Mine awareness campaigns should be stepped up in areas where IDPs live or plan to return. The first step is to identify location and patterns of mine-laying as well as the results of mine clearance efforts. In order to expedite information on mine technology, mine laying tactic etc, warring parties should commence discussion immediately after peace agreement.

xiv) **Develop training tools for participatory planning in rehabilitation and development, and launch training sessions in order to establish mechanisms for Local Development Funds as early as possible.**
I  Mission

1.1  Background

The mission was held within the framework of the Inter Governmental Authority for Development Partner Forum Working Group. Its objective was to provide inputs for strategic thinking on the rehabilitation and re-integration needs of IDPs and returning refugees. (See Annex 1 for terms of reference). The mission forms part of several consultancies designed to provide inputs for the planning of post-conflict recovery.

1.2  Methodology

The management of population movements is a sensitive issue as it is both an internal affair under state sovereignty and an international issue subject to international treaties and conventions. In the past decade, there have been heated debates on population movements in Sudan. Here, it should be recalled that “principled positions of non-engagement” are probably as damaging as “unprincipled strategies of engagement”. The international community has been divided between “ethical fundamentalism” (we do nothing before thinks improve) and “implementation-driven pragmatism” (we do thinks regardless the context). Ultimately, the people suffer.

The mission tried to reconcile these two approaches and follow an ethical and principled pragmatism taking into account different scenarios and a timeframe from short to long term. Using this approach which takes into account principles and realities and is in keeping with the Hypocratic Oath “first, do no harm”, cautious but decisive rules of engagement can be defined. Although the mission aimed at a comprehensive analysis of all factors, not all elements could be explored in the required depth. Errors and misjudgements are the author’s responsibility.

The mission took place over five weeks and was divided into two phases. During the first three-week phase, the consultant focused on the IDP issue in the Northern Sector and visited the Western, Eastern, and Central parts in order to gain a better understanding of the field situation. During the second phase, the consultant travelled to the opposition-controlled part of the South. (See Annex 2 for itinerary).

The consultant held interviews with Sudanese authorities, the opposition, civilians as well as staff of international and national aid organisations (see Annex 3 for list of people met) and made extensive use of written material (see Annex 4 for bibliography). In particular, the consultant met with two consultants engaged in the “Sudanese Voices for Peace” project in the North and the South. The consultant also had the opportunity to participate in four important collective exercises: the National IDP day in Khartoum, the monthly NGO co-ordination meeting in Khartoum, the monthly OLS/NGO co-ordination in Nairobi and the Sudan Relief and Rehabilitation Association (SRRA) Workshop on database and Early Warning Systems. Intermediate and final debriefing took place with the IPF Working Group in Khartoum, National Authorities and the Opposition, and UN agencies.

The models of the Displacement Dynamics (given below) and Cycle for Crisis Management were used as references.
Crisis reaches a level leading to displacements

1st phase of internal displacements

2nd phase of internal displacements

Towards the end of the crisis with political moves leading to repatriation or return to the area of origin

Additional displacements linked to the failure of the reintegration process

Returnees

Resettlement or return to area of origin

End of crisis

Departure to country of second asylum

First displacements across an international boundary

Establishment of more stable camps

Local integration in the country of first asylum

INSIDE THE AFFECTED COUNTRY

OUTSIDE THE AFFECTED COUNTRY

Post Peace development
ENTERING THE CRISIS

CRISIS INCEPTION
DIAGNOSIS

PREPAREDNESS
(INCLUDING ESTABLISHMENT
OF A RESPONSE CAPACITY)

INTEGRATION OF THE
CRISIS IN THE
DEVELOPMENT
PARADIGM
FOR LONG TERM
PREVENTION

LEARNING
PROCESS AND
INSTITUTIONAL
CHANGES

EVALUATION
OF THE RESPONSE

REHABILITATION

RECONSTRUCTION

CRISIS RESPONSE
MANAGEMENT CYCLE

EMERGENCY
RESPONSE

RESPONSE
THROUGH THE
SUPPORT TO
LOCAL
CAPACITIES

MOBILISATION
OF RESPONSE
CAPACITIES

DIFFUSING STAGE

CRISIS INCEPTION
DIAGNOSIS

EARLY WARNING

TOWARDS THE END OF THE CRISIS

CRISIS - DISASTER
IN MOST INSTANCES, CRISIS ARE LONG
II. SUDAN

Research on the Sudan crisis and the dynamics of displacement must take into account the country’s history, socio-cultural fabric and agro-ecology. As these factors shed light on the root causes of displacement, they are central to strategic thinking on post-crisis management, particularly the reintegration of IDPs.

2.1 Historical and ethnic roots of the crisis

For the lay person, the Sudanese crisis is seen as a war between an Arabic Muslim world and the Christian African world. However, this perception hides a more complex reality. History, the role of neighbouring countries and colonial powers, the presence of natural underground resources such as gold, oil and gas and the position of Sudan during the Cold War and its aftermath are factors which have a bearing on the conflict. In particular, Sudan’s ethnic and cultural diversity has led to the prolongation of the war. Power struggles among ethnic groups have shaped the history of the country. The map below shows the geographic distribution of ethno-linguistical groups.

Two important factors which affect chances for peace and also have repercussions on the management of IDPs are respect for International Humanitarian Law (IHL) by the parties involved in the conflict and the overall human rights situation. IHL violations by both sides should cease. Human rights violations, such as the abduction of women, herd raiding and asset striping, are carried out during confrontations between: i) the Arab and non Arab Northern militias (Muralhilin, Resegat, etc.) on the one hand and the Southerners on the other hand; and ii) groups in the South such as the Nuer and the Dinka peoples and; iii) even among the Nuer groups. Personal antagonisms since the aborted 1991 Nassir coup have also influenced the dynamics of the conflict.

The history of unfulfilled agreements and peace conferences has contributed to feelings of distrust among the various parties. Measures to promote reconciliation will be key to the success of the resettlement of the uprooted Sudanese people. In this context, the options offered under the Wunlit Agreement which aims to solve the Dinka-Nuer confrontation should be underlined.

In addition the discovery of underground resources has exacerbated the conflict. The country is rich in resources such as oil, gas and gold. Water is also a much coveted resource and has become a key factor in the crises over centuries. As it is a key national resource in which all Sudanese have a stake, its allocation and management are crucial. This resource has shaped history and relations with neighbouring countries, played an important role in the decades long negotiations and will impact the number and viability of the relocation/repatriation option.
Map 1: Geographic distribution of ethnic groups
In regard to water, the following two issues merit separate analyses:

- **Water from the Nile** has influenced Sudan’s relations with its neighbours (Ethiopia, Uganda, Egypt) and consequently debates at the negotiation table on the control of assets and resources or wealth sharing arrangements. One should bear in mind the Jongley Canal project (diversion of the water for the Sudd to the White Nile) which acted as a catalyst for the resumption of the war at the end of 1980. Water courses will also affect the success of the reintegration of uprooted people. In the South, the major means of livelihood – livestock activities, wild food collection and fishing – depend on the Nile.

- **Access to water** for human consumption and animal rearing has been cause for conflict. Underground water can be tapped nearly everywhere in Sudan, depending on the financial means available. The sharing, access to and management of this resource will determine whether a nation wide peace agreement works at the local level, particularly in relation to forage availability and pastoral management. The following section on the Transition Zone will underline the challenges behind what appears to be a simple technical matter but is in fact a decisive factor in the peace process and management of uprooted people. Nonetheless, the country lacks infrastructure for human and animal access to water. Massive investment will be required to maintain or increase the caring capacity in view of the influx of resettling IDPs and refugees.

Map 2: Water flows in the Nile river basin
2.2 Agriculture

Planning for resettlement must take into account resource bases. Sudan is one of the largest countries in Africa. From 3° North to 22° North, Sudan is composed of a wide variety of agro-ecological zones, from desert to near equatorial climates as shown in the map below.

Map 2: Different bio-climatic zones

In the last three decades, Sudan has experienced severe environmental degradation. The country has been impacted by the desertification process affecting Sahel and the Northern part of Sub-Saharan Africa. Desertification has aggravated climatic uncertainty, particularly geographic and temporal irregularity and increased the risks affecting agricultural production and livestock rearing. Since the mid ’80s, droughts have occurred increasingly, resulting in displacement and a rise in inter-community conflicts for grazing land and watering points.

Apart from the southern band with good rains and a clear two rainy seasons per year, the rest of the country is characterized by a high level of climatic irregularities. Rainfall is irregular, both between years and between locations within the same year. The flooding process of the Nilotic plain is also highly variable.

Rainfed agriculture and, to a lesser degree, irrigated crop production have contributed significantly to the country’s wealth over decades. The black soils in the central plains are very fertile. Colonial and post colonial development policies which promote large agricultural schemes (eg. the Geriza project, Kenana sugar cane farm, etc.) have led to large scale displacements. These displacements were initially seasonal and later extended over a long period of time. Some have even become permanent. Traditionally, the agricultural sector has provided large incomes to the State and seasonal employment opportunities to a sizeable unoccupied labour force, including people uprooted by war and for economic or ecological reasons. However the increasingly frequent rain deficit in large areas has undermined this sector’s productivity.
In some areas, the two decades of war have created security perimeters around garrison towns, limiting land available for cultivation. As a consequence, cultivation cycles have been accelerated, leading to soil fertility depletion, erosion and pest infestation.

Risks to agriculture, security and livelihoods have become permanent and, a large part of the population has adopted pastoralism as the central pillar in their survival strategies. The different livestock rearing systems have mobility in common. Under these systems, pastoralists move in search of better conditions. However, their mobility increases the risk of conflict over grazing land and watering points.

Financial resources should be mobilized to support the establishment of sustainable livelihoods for IDPs, crucial to their resettlement.

2.3 The Transition Zone

The Transition Zone is the land between 8° North and the 12° North. An analysis of the Sudan crisis shows that some of the most acute problems influencing the dynamics of the crisis and population movements have their origin in the Transition Zone. This zone covers most of the “grass front line” - areas where Northern pastoralists interact and compete with Southern pastoral groups. The band of land “Bahr-el-Ghazal / Bar-El Jebel / Sobat River basin” is replete with explosions of local violence which have been further incited by the current conflict. The 1992-94 famine in the Hunger Triangle in Upper Nile, the 1999 food crisis in Bahr-el-Ghazal and frequent asset stripping by the Murahilin militias have occurred in the Transition Zone. The zone also covers a significant part of the “delineation line” between the Dinka and Nuer groups, the two most powerful communities in the South who share a history of conflict over grazing land and fishing rivers. In addition, intra-Nuer confrontations over grazing land and cattle have made a large part of the area very unstable and have contributed largely to conflict with the Murahilin. The fact that the southern Opposition has been divided largely accounts for local displacements in the last ten years. This area will be one of the most difficult to deal with in the peace process and IDP reintegration programmes.

The Transition Zone also covers the Nuba Mountains and most of the land of the Nuba People. The Nuba land has been divided by both sides. Many Nuba have taken shelter in Northern cities such as Khartoum or El-Obeid and many others have sought shelter in rural areas further away from their traditional land in both Government or opposition-controlled areas, but still within the Transition Zone. The zone is rich in gas and oil. Large deposits of hydrocarbons have been discovered in Upper Nile, Unity State, White Nile, etc. The role of these deposits in the continuation of the war, population displacements and human rights violations has been debated heatedly. In some areas, the exploitation of oil has prevented people from accessing their land. Agreements on the use of “oil money” and its sharing between the North and South is key to resolving the conflict.
Map 4: Transition zone
III DISPLACEMENT IN SUDAN: A COMPLEX AND SENSITIVE ISSUE

3.1 Introduction

Sudan has a history of population movements. Human settlements along the Nile valley were followed by the progressive penetration of Arab merchants and Islamic pastoral groups. In the South, the progressive expansion of the Nilotic groups, often at the expense of other groups, resulted in population movements toward the fringes of the upper terraces. For many groups both in the North and the South, mobility is a way of life: pastoral groups in the dry Savannah or in the toïcs and swamps have been moving from one place to another for centuries. Even Khartoum and the main cities of the country are the result of population movements (mainly from the areas north of Khartoum). The Nuba people who have anchored their civilisation in and around the Nuba Mountains are one of the few exceptions.

In the past few decades, drought, environmental degradation, conflict, and a depressed economic situation led to population displacements. Severe drought in the mid 80s and consequent humanitarian aid; waves of war and ethnic conflict in the South and the transition zone since the 80s; and additional conflict in the West (frontier with Chad) and the East (borders with Ethiopia and Eritrea) have contributed to the complexity of the IDP crisis in Sudan. In addition, severe environmental degradation in the West and East (the North is already a full desert apart from a few oases and the Nile riverbank systems) has resulted in displacement over a long period of time. Displacement may even become permanent. Like the rest of the world, Sudan is undergoing a process of urbanization. Drought in the Western part of the country led to population movements from rural to urban areas. Although the actual magnitude is not known, socioeconomic migrations account for a large part of Sudan’s uprooted population. Although statistics vary greatly, reasonable estimates indicate that between 3 to 5 million out of a total population of 30 to 32 million have, for one reason or another, been displaced. The map below shows the geographic patterns of displacement.

Conflict-induced displacements differ in scale, duration and causality and are influenced by geographic factors.
- Conflict with neighbours in the East (Kassala and Red Sea States), exacerbated by internal strife, have led to temporary small scale movements.
- In the Nuba mountains, IDPs lack cropping land and additional income sources. With an improvement in the security situation in some areas, they are now returning to their ancestral lands.

- In the South, there are many different patterns of displacement:
  - In many instances, the war began in Southern towns, compelling people to move from urban to rural areas. Aerial bombings and land military operations against towns have led to displacement.
  - After the “1991 Bor aborted coup”, the conflict moved to rural areas under Dinka/Nuer confrontations. This affected large parts of Jongley, Bahr-El-Ghazal, Western Bahr-El-Ghazal and the Sobat river area. These inter-factional and inter-tribal confrontations account for a large part of the suffering endured by the Southerners and displacements in the 1990s. In some zones, stability has been achieved, thanks to the Wunlit People to People Peace agreement and its follow-up exercises(LirLir and Wuulu). Although still very fragile, the Peace Agreement and the follow up exercises provide a basis for the local traditional conflict transformation and resolution mechanisms to become functional again. Its replication in other areas will be core to the success of IDP relocation programmes.
  - Some areas remain particularly volatile, such as Upper Nile/Unity where intra Nuer confrontations take place. Nuers are fighting for control over the much coveted “oil basin” in the Bentiu area. Local Nuer commanders are still fighting against other Nuer factions and people are evacuating these zones in large numbers. Reconciliation among the Nuers will be difficult.
The activities of the Muralihin and other militia groups in the areas within and bordering the Transition Zone have also led to displacement. These militia groups, who travel along the railway to Wau to ensure security of trains, have committed large scale human rights violations including asset stripping, cattle raiding and the abduction of women and slaves. Their activities, which were initiated a century ago during the Madhi regime and resumed in the early 80’s, will be one of the most difficult aspects of peace negotiations.

The map below shows the geographic patterns of displacement.
Another aspect of the IDP issue is the difference between an IDP and an economic migrant. As time passes, original reasons to flee might be overshadowed by other reasons (mainly economic) to stay. There is a clear overlap of reasons, the time factor determining the position in the continuum presented below. People might leave their place of origin for certain reasons, and stay in new locations for new ones. Even in the course of the flight, rational of displacement might evolve, from escaping violence to escaping hunger.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CONFLICT</th>
<th>ECONOMIC</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>INSECURITY</td>
<td>ENVIRONMENTAL</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

IDPs’ modes of settlement are diverse: some settle in urban and rural camps, while others mingle with the local population. Some settlements are official while others are illegal. While some settlements are composed of different ethnic groups (eg. concentrations of IDPs around cities and Khartoum), others are ethnically homogenous (most of the recent displacements in the South). In some areas like Kosti, there are a lot of seasonal job opportunities in the surrounding large-scale agricultural schemes.

A tentative typology taking into account the different factors influencing displacement is as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Categories</th>
<th>Characteristics</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Refugees</td>
<td>Sudanese who sought refuge in Ethiopia, Kenya, Uganda, and RDC under the UNHCR umbrella. Many of them claim that the situation is not secure for their return and that they do not want to leave areas where they enjoy good services to go to places with poor services. Sudan has also sheltered refugees from these countries.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Returnees (ex-Refugees)</td>
<td>Refugees returning, especially to Western and Eastern Equatorias, Jongley, Eastern White Nile and Kassala. Back and forth movement has been observed; parts of the family remain in camps as a “fall back position”.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IDPs displaced by the 1984-85 and 1987 droughts</td>
<td>These IDPs mainly come from Darfur and Kordofan in the West and from the East (Kassala, Red Sea). Many have settled in Khartoum and other cities. Although they have suffered no prejudice due to ethnic, political or religious reasons, they still constitute a large part of Khartoum’s camps, shanty towns and illegal settlements. As the economic conditions in their areas of origin remain precarious and ecological degradation continues, a large part of this population chooses to remain in Khartoum or other cities.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| IDPs displaced by the war in the South   | (a) IDPs who remained in the South
(b) IDPs who left for the North
(c) IDPs who remained in the transition zone
(d) IDPs who fear retaliation
Since the Torit events 30 years ago, problems in the South have continuously led to population displacements. Some displacements have occurred over short distances and for short periods of time. With the vagaries in war, people have moved back and forth many times.
Whether or not people find themselves in a place they could leave and an escape way or not make the difference between the displaced in the garrison town in the South and the southern IDPs in the North. IDP in the South were either caught in garrison town they could not escape from or only displaced in the bush makes a big difference. / Unlike IDPs displaced in the bush, IDPs caught in garrison towns could not escape.
Hundreds of thousands people went North to seek refuge in the Northern cities, employment basins and areas where job are available and, eventually, to Khartoum.
Some tried to settle in safe places in the Transition Zone, in areas where they thought they could find means of subsistence through seasonal labour (most of the time exploitative) and sharecropping. Hundreds of thousands Dinkas from Bar-El-Ghazal, now in Darfur, are in this category. In many instances, they had to settle within or nearby communities with which they previously had interactions, varying from trade to fierce competition over grazing lands.
Those who believed their choices made them traitors to their kin moved North. Several thousand civil servants fall in this category, although they do not officially claim to be IDPs. Although this category is probably small in size, they will play a major role after the peace agreement has been reached.
IDPs displaced by the war in the Nuba Mountains

Although a part of the Nuba has joined the opposition, the root causes of conflict-induced displacements in the Nuba Mountains differ significantly from those relating to displacement caused by the mainstream war in the South. Many Nuba IDPs first find a home in Nuba land, sometimes a few kilometres away from their place of origin. With the specific features of the Nuba areas and its strategic implications (hills, foothill as no-man’s-land, plains), an IDP of today might just be a former IDP returning to its home. (the relation between the strategic implications of the Nuba land and the status of an IDP is NOT CLEAR) IDPs settled hundred kilometres away might return to their areas of origin during the night if advised by traditional leaders.

IDPs displaced by insecurity at the Eritrean border

In the Eastern provinces, conflict in neighbouring countries has created cross border movements resulting in one of the oldest refugee caseloads in Africa. The recent confrontation between Eritrea and Ethiopia has added to the military activities undertaken by the relatively new military Alliance between Southern and Northern opponents to the Central Government. The confrontation has created a climate of insecurity culminating with the attack on Kassala. Insecurity along with threats that the border has been planted with landmines has led to the displacement of some of the pastoral tribes traditionally living in these areas.

IDPs displaced by the activities of the Murayilin, Rarzeigat and Banaga militias in the transition zone

Set up at the end of the ‘80s by the regime of El Sadik El Madih, these militias have been involved in various military activities, including the protection of the train to Wau. They have carried out raids, kidnapping, arson, rape and killing in large parts of the Transition Zone, prompting people to withdraw South or take shelter in government-controlled garrison towns.

IDPs displaced by the inter-factional, inter-tribal and inter-sub tribal conflicts in the South.

Recent fighting around Bentiu is the latest episode in confrontations among Nuer Groups and between the Nuer on the one hand and the Dinka on the other. Confrontation in this area, which began in 1992-’93, resulted in the infamous “Hunger Triangle”. In recent years, cattle raids and conflicts over grazing lands among these groups have probably inflicted more suffering and killed more people than the war with the North itself. Speculations that conflicts in oil-rich areas are triggered off by outsiders with vested interests abound.

Newly returning IDPs

In some parts of the South, mainly in Western Equatoria and South Bahr-El-Ghazal, a certain degree of stability and the effects of the Dinka/Nuer Wunlit Agreement have enabled people to return to their areas of origin. Although this movement is still at its very beginning, thousands of people have already returned.

3.2 Issues of concern

3.2.1 Protecting and developing human capital

The country’s biggest asset is its people. International legislative instruments are the framework under which national rules and regulations can protect human capital. Respect for International Humanitarian Law, the Convention for Refugees and other instruments is paramount to lasting peace and national reconciliation, key to the management of uprooted people.

In addition to protecting human capital, it is also important to ensure that displacement does not continue to erode the social fabric of the society. For this purpose, support should be given to activities such as basic education, vocational training, creation of job opportunities, debates on reconciliation and human rights etc., prior to and after the cease fire. Steps should also be taken to address psychological trauma caused by displacement. Women and children will require special attention.

In particular, it is important to invest in the country’s education sector, both formal and informal. The conflict has created generations of uneducated children and adults who are gradually losing their traditional knowledge and skills. The creation of education facilities in regional capitals outside Khartoum will reduce the existing pressure of displaced populations on Khartoum as well as limit attraction to the capital city. It is important to use displacement as an opportunity for people to acquire new skills which promote civil society development rather than allow human capital to degenerate.

3.2.2 Promoting self reliance

The experience of refugee and IDP programmes show that the exit strategy and phasing out exercises are difficult. Many refugees and IDPs enjoy services in camps that are lacking in their areas of origin. Refugees and IDPs interviewed during the mission stated that their decision to return home will depend on whether they would be able to avail of similar services. The current flurry of “minimum standards” (SPHERE Project for instance) are only accentuating this process¹. Refugees cited insecurity and low standards of services in their areas of origin as the main reasons preventing their return.

¹ for information on these debates please consult the various following sites :www.sphereproject.org and www.urd.org).
Unsustainable resettlement or repatriation programmes are frequent. For instance, in the North, the exemption of IDPs from cost recovery in the health sector has aroused feeling of resentment among host communities and fostered a habit of dependency among IDPs. When assistance stops, people move again. In order to ensure sustainability, cost recovery issues, discontinuation of free assistance and support to self-sustaining programmes should be discussed as soon as possible.

Assistance should not be used as a leverage to push people back. However its availability in temporary areas of settlement should not prevent people from returning to their areas of origin when conditions permit. In the North, a step-by-step approach – through which programmes progress from free to partial participation to the costs – should be implemented even before peace is achieved. In the South, the situation is a bit more complicated. Although in many areas there are signs of the increasing use of Sudanese pounds, Kenyan shilling or Ugandan currency, the economy there is not monetised or only marginally so, and barter mechanisms are still prevalent. Studies on these issues should be conducted as soon as possible if informed decisions are to be made.

3.2.3 Improving the absorption capacity of local communities

Complex population movements put pressure on fragile service delivery structures which in many areas were either damaged by the conflict or had never existed. A local development approach will be required, rather than a typical relief approach which targets IDPs specifically and thus arouses feelings of resentment among host communities. Under the former approach, the level of services in areas where uprooted people settle should be improved in order to enhance the areas’ absorption capacity. As these services cannot be created overnight, a phased investment in social services is advisable.

Improving services in an area will also provide an opportunity to address the land tenure issue. Land redistribution among resident communities, returning IDPs and refugees will need to be resolved. The agro-ecosystems and related land tenure vary greatly from one area to another: old and new Nile Valley systems, dry agro-pastoralist systems in the Transition Zone and in the Toposa/Karamanjo territories, Nilotic systems, Nuba system, systems on the upper terrace in Equatoria, etc.

3.2.4 Creating references:

Respect for International Humanitarian Law and Human Rights

One of the challenges of the pre-peace period is to initiate a healing process. This would involve the following:

a) Warring parties should be warned of punishment in case of human rights violations;
b) People should be encouraged to talk about traumatic events, express their suffering and identify other ways to facilitate the healing process will help alleviate psychological trauma;
c) Steps should be taken to promote reconciliation. In this context, ongoing efforts such as the Wunlit People-to-People Peace agreement and its follow-up (Lirlir and Wuulu) are commendable.

Another aspect of the healing process is to legally redress violations of international humanitarian law. Mechanisms such as Justice and Truth Commissions or Reconciliation Councils or an activated International Fact Finding Commission as per the Geneva Conventions should be set up.

Additionally, a special “action line” should also be designed to reduce the activities of the Murahilin/Miserya militias based in the Transition Zone and other similar groups (Murle militias, etc.). The militias, who continue to be the main cause of insecurity in the transition zone, will become more and more difficult to deal with as they are no longer under the control of their traditional leaders. The atrocities they conduct on a daily basis will make peace and reconciliation a difficult task.
Equity and justice in the aid allocation process/ how about changing the title to Increasing IDPs’ confidence in resettlement programmes

Decision makers and planners of resettlement should take into account IDPs’ own survival strategies. To increase IDPs’ confidence in resettlement programmes and help ensure they are not disillusioned, the following four pronged strategy should be adopted:

i) ensure relocation, resettlement and return takes place on a voluntary basis

ii) enable people to gain confidence in the proposed area of resettlement. This would involve instituting mechanisms through which: i) individuals can inspect proposed area of resettlement and report back to their family and friends and ii) whole communities are involved in more complex exercises, such as the Wunlit or Lilir processes.

iii) secure the Government’s commitment to facilitating resettlement at both federal and provincial levels in both the North and the South, especially regarding land tenure issues;

a) iv) ensure sufficient and timely mobilisation of financial resources in order to prevent disillusionment with the resettlement process.

The success of the resettlement process will depend on the Sudanese authorities’ level of commitment. With oil revenues contributing greatly to the national budget, the government should allocate resources in support of resettlement. The international community cannot take sole responsibility for financial support.

3.2.5 The landmine problem

A recent mission carried out within the framework of the IPF Working Group underlined the complex nature of the landmine problem. In particular, this mission underlined the influence the landmine issue would have on resettlement including the chances for re-establishing sustainable livelihoods. The landmine issue needs the international community’s full commitment.

Mine awareness campaigns should be stepped up in all areas where IDPs live or plan to return. The first step is to identify location and patterns of mine-laying as well as the results of mine clearance efforts. The situation differs in besieged garrison towns surrounded by mine fields (e.g. Wau, Juba etc.) where conflict still continues and in old garrison towns which have changed hands. In the latter case, most returnees have no idea where old defence lines and minefields are located. In some areas, mine clearance has already taken place while in others, marking and subsequent mine clearance will take place much later. In order to expedite the exchange of information on mine technology, mine laying tactics etc, discussion among warring parties should commence immediately after the peace agreement. This will be crucial to the safety of mine clearance experts.

3.2.6 Unknown factors and the risk minimization strategy

A diversified approach has been central to the survival of the Sudanese people. IDPs also follow this approach, even at the sub group and family level. For instance, while some family or group members return home, others try to use the aid available for resettlement (especially if there is a land title at stake) or remain in cities (especially in Khartoum) where employment opportunities are more attractive. When planning resettlement, their diversified strategy should be taken into account.

However, it is difficult for a resettlement plan to take into account the many factors that influence IDPs’ decision to return. Although some have been identified such as cause of displacement, duration, distance, pull and push factors, land rights, etc, many others remain unknown. IDPs base their decision to return on an assessment of the situation at home. In some areas, community representatives are sent to make inquiries in their areas of origin and many IDPs may return overnight upon the advice of their
traditional leaders. As prospects for peace improve, IDPs may move quickly in order to secure their property. On the other hand, people who have registered for relocation or return might not show up on the day of their planned departure. Confidence building mechanisms will have to be in place and functional before people move en masse.

3.2.7 Peace scenarios

The peace settlement will largely determine the post-conflict dynamics of displacement. It is therefore important to consider the implications of peace and the time frame within which peace can be achieved. Among the different peace scenarios, two extreme options are: i) Sudan remaining united (with different constitutional options such as autonomy, federation) and ii) the partition of Sudan. The outcome of peace will most likely be determined by a referendum.

IV RECOMMENDATIONS

4.1 Phasing the resettlement process: “Contiguum versus continuum”

A phased resettlement strategy should be planned. The strategy should include a set of actions to be implemented before, during, and after the peace process and take into account the different peace scenarios.

In view of the fact that the movements of uprooted people are not linear or homogenous, the strategy should not be mono axial. Instead it should consider the specific conditions in each area and changes in the situation. Sudan is a good example of this type of “contiguum versus continuum approach”. While in the South, rehabilitation activities have begun in areas where refugees have returned en masse, humanitarian aid has been provided to areas where violence continues.

A road map approach has been adopted. In order to prepare the ground for peace, the following activities should be carried out:

- Gather experience on resettlement and reintegration initiatives;
- Conduct studies on issues that heavily influence IDPs’ resettlement prospects such as restocking, seed security, local peace mechanisms, etc.
- Plan and implement preparedness measures to support rehabilitation efforts
- Mobilize commitment from all parties to a flexible approach in planning and implementation
- Strong support to bottom up approaches as opposed to typical top-down approaches

These activities will indicate the general direction for post-conflict exercises which should focus on:

- supporting the re-establishment of sustainable livelihoods;
- supporting local peace and problem solving mechanisms;
- creating and improving social services and promoting their sustainability;

Some of the recommendations presented in the executive summary are very specific and incorporated within one of the phases below. Other are of a transversal nature and have to be present in a group or in all phases.
## Activities which support resettlement and related phases

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of activities</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Timing</th>
<th>Requirements</th>
<th>Contribution to peace</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Support people to people peace exercises</td>
<td>Everywhere</td>
<td>before peace</td>
<td></td>
<td>Will facilitate local conflict resolution</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Identify, support and evaluate test cases and pilot projects which support the</td>
<td>North, South, urban and rural</td>
<td>before peace</td>
<td>Urban and rural development specialists</td>
<td>Experimenting with local development mechanisms will serve as a useful reference mechanism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>resettlement of IDPs</td>
<td>areas</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Promote and support problem solving mechanisms such as the Wunlit and Lilir</td>
<td>Mainly in the South and the</td>
<td>before peace</td>
<td></td>
<td>Will help in shaping problem solving mechanisms</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agreements</td>
<td>Transition Zone</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Support education activities with a strong peace culture component</td>
<td>North and South</td>
<td>before peace</td>
<td>Training of trainers, support to education structures</td>
<td>Will promote tolerance and reconciliation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Establish database on resources and services linked to GIS</td>
<td>Areas affected by displacement</td>
<td>before peace</td>
<td>GIS equipment and specialists; idem for baseline database</td>
<td>The database will serve as a monitoring and co-ordination tool. It will promote transparency and thereby prevent claims of partiality in resettlement programmes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Launch a series of socio-economic urban and rural studies, especially on livestock</td>
<td>North and South. Research on</td>
<td>before peace</td>
<td>Set up a multi- donor trust fund and identify appropriate</td>
<td>These studies will facilitate understanding of difficult and sensitive issues related to uprooting.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>restocking</td>
<td>restocking should be regional.</td>
<td></td>
<td>implementors</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Set up the foundations for an integrated Mine Action Plan</td>
<td>On both sides (do u mean government and opposition?)</td>
<td>Discretely at the beginning i.e. before resettlement and in full swing when people start moving</td>
<td>Co-operation between the Government and the opposition will promote trust</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Develop skills in participatory techniques in what?</td>
<td>North and South</td>
<td>When feasible (before and after peace)</td>
<td></td>
<td>Will help in shaping problem solving mechanisms</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Support fact finding mechanisms</td>
<td>North and South, especially in the</td>
<td>When feasible (before and after peace)</td>
<td>Logistical, authorisation from both sides</td>
<td>Will enable people to determine conditions at home</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Initiate dialogue between donors and Sudanese parties on the concept of local</td>
<td>North and South, and when possible, jointly</td>
<td>Before peace</td>
<td>Local development specialists who will present case studies</td>
<td>Will develop an understanding of &quot;local democracy&quot; and governance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>development funds</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ensure the free flow of information</td>
<td></td>
<td>Can start after significant progress in the peace process</td>
<td>Develop a mail system such as the Red Cross Messages</td>
<td>Will prevent misinformation and consequently unrealistic expectations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ensure that identification papers for uprooted people are issued properly</td>
<td></td>
<td>Can start after significant progress in peace process</td>
<td></td>
<td>Will be key to confidence in a referendum and legal and property claims</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Continue to switch from pure relief to developmental approaches with particular</td>
<td>urban and rural areas</td>
<td>as often as possible</td>
<td>change in attitude among all stakeholders</td>
<td>Will be important in the South as assistance there has undermined traditional solidarity and safety nets</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>attention to environmental and micro-economic issues</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Establish mechanism to ensure return is voluntary</td>
<td>In all concerned locations</td>
<td>Should be tested through pilot projects</td>
<td>Manpower, logistics</td>
<td>Will ensure that people do not feel forced to return</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Establish flexible funding mechanism</td>
<td>Under a Authorities– UN/Inter donor co-ordination</td>
<td>Immediately after peace agreement</td>
<td>Political will of all stakeholders (national and international), funds</td>
<td>As it could be partly funded from “oil money”, this wealth sharing exercise can play an important role in consolidating peace.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
As in the case of refugees, there are three main strategies for dealing with IDPs:

i) voluntary return to the area of origin;
ii) local integration;
iii) voluntary resettlement in an appropriate location.

The choice of strategy will differ depending on whether we consider the period before or after the peace agreement. Experience has shown that the management of the pre-peace phase heavily influences peace negotiations and post-war strategies and, that every individual will be constrained by a series of push and pull factors. These factors will be influenced by the strategies of the warring parties and actions decided upon by the international community.

4.2 Voluntary return to area of origin

4.2.1 Peace with Sudan remaining united

The Sudanese Constitution grants Sudanese citizens the right to settle anywhere within national boundaries. This provides a strong legal basis for voluntary return to areas of origin in the post conflict period. The population movements likely to take place are described below.

In the North, most of the drought IDPs who were able to return have done so despite the degraded environment in their areas of origin. Other IDPs who have been displaced for ecological and economic reasons are part of a large security network (economic links spread by a social group over a large area in order to limit risks) linking Darfur and Kordofan to large scale agricultural schemes with high manpower requirements in Gezira and Kosti and to Khartoum.

War IDPs face a different situation. They are unlikely to return to their homes unless they are certain of peace. A brief description of their situation is as follows:

- In some areas, IDPs or refugees have begun to return. Re-establishing sustainable management of natural resources through agriculture, animal rearing, fishing and gathering of natural wild products depends on the security situation. IDPs decide to resettle taking into account the frequency of aerial bombings and the activities of armed forces and militia groups. It is crucial to investigate how a process similar to what led to the Wunlit Agreement can be supported between the pastoral groups from the North (Baragat, Rezeigat, Beja) and their Nilotic neighbours. This exercise is important for peace within the Transition Zone;

- A large number of those who have been displaced for decades by the war have managed to carve an economic niche in large cities in the North are not likely to return. They may follow a diversified strategy whereby some family members remain in the city and others return. Children who spent most of their life in Khartoum suburbs would not wish to return to the swamps;

- A substantial number of IDPs will return spontaneously. The most recent return movements of IDPs and refugees who have been temporarily displaced and/or desire to remain close to their food security base have been spontaneous. They may return upon the end of local violence. Here, the tribal factor plays an important role. For instance, the resolution of conflict between the Dinka and Nuer people through the Wunlit Agreement (see in south Bahr-El-Ghazal) has facilitated the return movement. On the other hand, the ongoing intra Nuer conflicts have caused further displacement.

- For some who have been recently displaced, return will depend on whether peace provides wealth sharing arrangements that support sustainable livelihoods. This is particularly the case for IDPs who come from oil basins in the Upper Nile/Unity State.
- In the Nuba mountains region, Nuba people have been displaced within the Nuba land, in some cases just for short distances. As the situation stabilises, Nuba chiefs have returned to explore prospects for resettlement even before warring parties reach a final peace agreement.

Whether return occurs through official or unofficial channels, host communities are likely resent the distribution of resources in favour of returning IDPs and refugees. Resettlement programmes should therefore include a component aimed at increasing the absorption capacity of resettlement areas. If peace brings dividends in terms of development, host communities will cease to view the settlement of uprooted people in their areas as a threat.

It is also important to note that IDPs and refugees will base their decision to return on a comparison of services in their area of origin with those they are currently enjoying in their area of temporary settlement. They will also consider security conditions: i) between the area of origin and the current area of settlement; and ii) in the area of origin. In order to ensure that refugees and IDPs are able to base their decision to return on a realistic assessment of the situation, fact-finding/confidence-building exercises should be facilitated. However, as discretion is important to ensure that these exercises are successful, the international community should be cautious in its intervention.

As many IDPs are pastoralists, restocking of livestock is an important consideration when planning resettlement. Regional assessments should be carried out to assess requirements for and mechanisms of re-stocking.

4.2.2 Peace under the partition of Sudan

In the event of partition, southerners will return from the North and refugee camps. A sizeable number of the Sudanese diaspora may also return to contribute to the building of a new nation. The resettlement movement will be massive and rapid.

The agricultural sector and its support infrastructure (roads, marketing facilities etc.,) will provide employment opportunities for returnees. Of course, one can expect that depending on where the “new border” is drawn and on what kind of “resource sharing arrangements” can be agreed upon, resources for job creation and infrastructure set up will be more or less available… For many “drought and ecological” uprooted people, the problems of life in Khartoum’s slums and camps will not been solved by the separation between the North and the South. An active involvement in the urban sector will remain necessary. After all, these rural Northerners uprooted in the Northern towns are also living often below poverty level and a balanced peace will require that their fate is also taken into account. An active involvement in the urban sector will remain necessary./ However partition will not necessarily improve the economic conditions of IDPs in Khartoum’s slums and camps who have been displaced by drought and for ecological reasons....this is all I understood from the part in red. Can u specify what u mean by “ active involvement in the urban sector will remain necessary”. Are the “rural Northerners uprooted in the Northern towns” distinct from the “drought and ecological” uprooted people? The first category incorporates the second as well as war displaced for Northern origin and people from the east. Do u mean steps should be taken to improve the economic conditions of both groups? Yes

Here, the quality of the services to be created will be less seen as a “pull or push factor” but as an indication of the political will of the international community. Reintegrating IDP here will not be seen as “humanitarian” work but as a full fledge political gesture involving a vision of the creation of a Nation. The development of the newly born nation will be the objective, and returning IDPs and refugees can play a big role in it. / this is what I understood form the part in red In the case of partition, the quality of services will be a less important consideration in IDPs’ and refugees’ decision to return. Instead, it will indicate the international community’s commitment to building a nation in which IDPs and refugees can play a big role.
4.2.3 Peace and the referendum

Population movements prior to the referendum will heavily influence the outcome of the vote. The international community should ensure that the referendum is held in a democratic and organized manner.

IDP movements will be influenced by the following:

- whether displaced people vote in their area of current residence or return to their area of origin to register in order to vote
- whether the votes will be analysed/counted at the zonal, regional or national levels

4.3 Local integration

4.3.1 Scope of the phenomenon/ Inappropriate title?

The process of local integration will differ in each peace scenario. In the event that Sudan remains united, local integration will play a major role. Many will find it difficult to reintegrate into their areas of origin. They will therefore return to areas where they have been displaced and attempt to settle there. This will be the case with Southerners in Khartoum or in the North.

4.3.2 The urban factor

Underdevelopment, food shortages and insecurity in rural areas have resulted in migration from villages to provincial towns and to the capital city. Sudanese authorities are concerned with the consequences of rural to urban migration. Investment strategies for social urban infrastructure and employment generation should take into account the effects of this migration.

However, “human rights considerations” have been raised, more on the “how to DEAL WITH THE URBAN PROBLEM” than on the “need to DEAL WITH IT”. This resulted in a lack of understanding and dialogue between Khartoum Authorities and the International aid actors. This resulted for a while in complete stalemate between both sides, the National Authorities freezing the process of travel permit delivery (NOT CLEAR is it better now ?). Until peace is achieved, local integration will remain the only option for many IDPs in Khartoum and provincial urban centres. Local integration will require activities ranging from urban planning to job creation as well as security management and service deployment. A high level of investment will be required.

The Authorities should guarantee long term safety of land tenure, rights of the population and an attractive fiscal policy facilitating job creation in the neighbourhoods of IDP settlements. Only then can a positive change in perception and attitude take place in the international community during the peace negotiation period.

A significant number of uprooted people will remain in Khartoum and its surroundings. However, the present system of informal official camps, shanty towns and illegal settlements will not last long and is not in the interest of the IDPs or the residents of Khartoum as it threatens the environment and the security situation.

Unfortunately, the level of means required is by far overreaching what NGOs can do or know how to do. We talk here about real economy for hundred thousands of families, not about the typical NGO camps related income generating activities. Nevertheless, it is urgent to enter into a constructive engagement with all communities and local authorities and initiate a step-by-step, contractual and principled process to improve the urban environment and create jobs for the IDP and Khartoum poor.
Project on plastic garbage collection and recycling, on health and education and on job creation through micro-finance should be designed and launched ASAP.

Investment in human resource development and job creation are key to the successful integration of uprooted people in Khartoum. While NGOs can support income-generating activities, providing jobs for thousands of families is beyond their capacity. Nevertheless, it is important to enter into a constructive engagement WITH WHO? With local authorities and initiate a step-by-step, contractual and principled process to improve the urban environment and create jobs for IDPs and the poor in Khartoum. Projects on plastic garbage collection and recycling; health and education; and job creation through micro-finance should be implemented as soon as possible.

4.3.2 Rural areas

In some rural areas, IDPs and the host community are very open to local integration, particularly when they share close ethnic or economic ties. Local integration becomes more of a sensitive issue when the host community wants to keep cheap and expendable manpower at its disposal.

Local integration will depend on IDPs’ short, medium and long term assessment of the security situation in the area concerned. They will not stay in areas where the socio-cultural environment appears unfavourable. In this regard, the impact of the Wunlit Agreement on the dynamics of local integration should be monitored. This type of local people to people peace mechanism can facilitate local integration. It remains to be seen whether this mechanism which has helped resolve the conflict between the Dinka and the Nuer people can be used for the Nilotic Tribes from the Transition Zone.

4.4 Voluntary resettlement in appropriate locations

Resettling people in an area they do not belong to is difficult as no land is unoccupied and free from land rights. Traditional land tenure, ownership over grazing and watering rights and competition over seasonal job opportunities are issues that need to be resolved to make resettlement possible. For instance, the situation is problematic in Northern Sudan where suitable land with proper access to drinking water is scarce. Moreover, pressure on natural resources is high as years of desertification and exploitative land management practices have degraded the resource base in the southern and eastern parts of Northern Sudan (Darfur, Kordofan, Kassala, etc.).

Limited infrastructure and the concentration of investment in a few large cities have limited job opportunities. The situation is conducive to tension between host communities and relocated IDPs. Therefore it is likely that the domain of validity of the option “voluntary resettlement” will largely remain either a “fall back position” during a “pre-peace option” (in case peace fails to be achieved) or an option for “natural resource management” in the case of “peace with one united country” (in order to adjust with the degradation of the resource base in the area f origin) (NOT CLEAR). Depending on the outcome of the peace agreement and the political system that will be established, some groups may opt for resettlement in areas other than those of their origin. People who have been uprooted by drought and ecological causes will probably volunteer to resettle in less ecologically fragile areas, more conducive to the development of sound strategies ensuring food and economic security and better placed in terms of employment opportunities. For these groups who belong to the transition zone, the east or the west of the area northe from the 12 paralel, this will take place in all cases. In might also become a viable option for certain Southerners in the case of “Peace with one united country” scenario ( in order to gain access to job or natural resources). It will also take place under the “peace with two countries” scenario as the first return movements will be followed by secondary migrations (as part of the nationalist move following peace many people will move back home but will move again as they will find no infrastructure home).

Some of these voluntary resettlement will remain within urban boundaries (creation of new areas around Khartoum). Other will comprise movements from urban to rural or camps to rural movements (SanaelNaga). They should be supported as part of the overall development strategy for the country.
While some may choose to resettle within urban areas (new areas will be created around Khartoum), others may move from urban to rural areas or from camps to rural areas. Support to their resettlement should form part of the country’s overall development strategy. OK

Criteria of freedom of choice, as well as appropriate studies dealing with sustainability and equity issues, will have to be part of the methodological pre-conditions for any investment in these fields.

Strong commitment from both Federal and Provincial governments will have to be secured in multi-actors written agreements. Where feasible, and only if the move is, if not voluntary, at least accepted after a real dialogue, can resettlement schemes take place.. OR IN OTHER WORDS Resettlement programmes should be sustainable and equitable and based on voluntary choice. Strong commitment should be secured from federal and provincial governments through multi-actor written agreements.

Before the international community supports resettlement, it is important to clarify the following:

- Purpose and rationale of engaging the resettlement process; /rationale behind resettlement
- Process that makes resettlement voluntary and the means to monitor voluntary choice (pull and push factors); / what constitutes voluntary resettlement and the means to monitor whether resettlement is voluntary
- ways and means that will be used.

The investments made or expected in the proposed area of settlement are of paramount importance. Unfulfilled promises will arouse resentment and trigger off secondary migrations (often back to the areas they just departed from). Therefore, feasibility studies, comprising the following, should be conducted:

- Social surveys of the people to be integrated and host communities
- Economic studies in order to assess the sustainability of the proposed resettlement in urban and rural areas;
- Agro-ecological studies in order to verify the land carrying capacity with a view to prevent conflict over resources;
- Establishment of inter and intra-community problem solving mechanisms.

In the North, the idea to resettle people through large-scale mechanised agricultural projects might not resist economic feasibility studies on the medium and long term sustainability OF THESE PROJECTS. NOT CLEAR Is it clearer now ? / do we mean: Resettling people through large-scale mechanised agricultural projects may not be economically feasible in terms of medium and long term sustainability. YES It would probably be better to have smaller projects rather than grand schemes. Investments in water and social infrastructures have to be part of a first phase and supported by a major component on community mobilisation. The productive sector will have to be tackled rather quickly in the form of seeds and tools distribution, setting up of micro-finance systems and establishment of restocking mechanisms.
V CONCLUSION

The end-result of this mission is more a picture of complexity rather than simplicity. The situation is so multi-facetted. The Sudan is an immense country bordering on a handful of countries which have both generated refugees in Sudan and hosted Sudanese asylum seekers. The dynamics of displacement are multi-factor, multi-cause and multi-phase processes. Some people moved once, other have been on the road for years. They have lost a lot, sometimes everything, during these events. They also often gained a new vision of what the world consisted of. These uprooted populations are closely monitoring the different peace initiatives. In an informal manner, they too are already preparing their palette of choices for the period after the peace negotiation.

Although planning is a useful tool for preparedness and resource mobilisation, it should not become a paralysing factor. In dealing with the complexity of the IDPs and returnees in the Sudan, there is no and will never be quick fix and ready-in-the-shelf solutions. The emergency culture is currently prevailing among many agencies, as well as the present set of know-how among them. It will in many instances not be appropriate for the post-peace phase. Only an “cultural shift” complemented by an intensified dialogue from all the parties involved can ensure that the issue of uprooting could be dealt with in an human, principled, economical viable and ecologically sound manner that will constructively contribute to the establishment of a durable peace in the Sudan. This will require something that Donors and UN do not like much : flexibility, adaptability and responsibility given to the local partners.

Regardless of the peace scenario that will prevail, integration of IDPs in the economic life is the only way to avoid this long term and costly aid machinery which save lives but probably create a large number of long term problems in the aftermath. This has a name: the sustainable development of the area currently called South Sudan.

The complex nature of population movements in Sudan demands a flexible approach to planning resettlement in which local partners play a greater role. A change in attitude and increased dialogue among all stakeholders will help ensure a principled, economically viable and ecologically sound approach to dealing with uprooted populations. This approach will contribute to long-lasting peace in Sudan.

Sustainable development is the key to the resettlement of uprooted populations. The prevailing “emergency culture” will not be appropriate in the post-conflict phase. Whatever the peace outcome, integrating IDPs and returnees into the economy is the only way to avoid long-term costly emergency aid which saves lives but may have negative repercussions in the long term.