



Karamoja conflict and security assessment



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SAFERWORLD

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Acknowledgements

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Saferworld worked with two local community-based organisations in the participatory data collection component of this assessment: Action for Poverty Reduction and Livestock Management in Karamoja (ARELIMOK) and the Warrior Squad Foundation (WSF). ARELIMOK is a local community-based organisation based in the Moroto district of Karamoja, with a strong peace component to its work. ARELIMOK supports peacebuilding efforts in Karamoja involving various groups including elders, youths, women and reformed warriors, and sits on various structures including the Moroto district peace committee. WSF is a local community-based organisation based in the Kotido district of Karamoja and working on issues of community development, with a focus on the thematic areas of gender-based violence, livelihoods, HIV/AIDS and peacebuilding. WSF's vision is of a "peaceful, just, and prosperous environment where all people enjoy their rights". Saferworld is very grateful to ARELIMOK and WSF for the invaluable role that they played in enabling and supporting this assessment.

Saferworld

Saferworld is an independent non-governmental organisation that works to prevent and reduce violent conflict and promote co-operative approaches to security. Saferworld believes that everyone should be able to lead peaceful, fulfilling lives, free from insecurity and violent conflict.


We work with governments, international organisations and civil society to encourage and support effective policies and practices through advocacy, research and policy development and through supporting the actions of others. Saferworld works in Africa, South Asia, Europe and Central Asia and has offices in London, Brussels, Colombo, Juba, Kampala, Kathmandu, Nairobi, and Priština, as well as staff based in Bangladesh and Vienna.

Saferworld has a regional conflict prevention programme that consists of the Sudan and Great Lakes Programme, comprising well-established programmes in Uganda and Southern Sudan, and the Kenya and Horn of Africa Programme, comprising our Somalia and Kenya programmes. Saferworld has been working in Uganda since 1997, and established an office in Kampala in 2006. Saferworld's work in Uganda has been supported by a variety of donors, including the UK Department for International Development (DFID), the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (SIDA), the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Government of Ireland, the BIG Lottery and Comic Relief.

Saferworld's work in Uganda focuses on three linked thematic areas:

- conflict-sensitive approaches to development
- security and justice sector development
- small arms and light weapons control.

Map of Karamoja'



¹ Subsequent to this assessment, two new districts were created in Karamoja: Amudat was created in December 2009 out of Nakapiripirit District, consisting of Loroo, Amudat and Karita sub-counties; and Napak was created in July 2010 out of Moroto District, consisting of Iriiri, Lotome, Matany, Lokopo, Ngoleriet and Lopei sub-counties.

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Acronyms

ARELIMOK	Action for Poverty Reduction and Livestock Management in Karamoja	OCHA	(United Nations) Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
ASTU	Anti-Stock Theft Units	PEAP	Poverty Eradication Action Plan
CBPP	Contagious Bovine Pluero Pneumonia	PMA	Plan for the Modernisation of Agriculture
CECORE	Centre for Conflict Resolution	PRDP	Peace Recovery and Development Plan
CEWARN	Conflict Early Warning Mechanism	RELOKA	Re-establishment of Law and Order in Karamoja (programme)
CIMIC	Civil Military Co-operation	SALW	small arms and light weapons
CMCC	Civil Military Co-operation Centres	STP	Society for Threatened Peoples
CSO	civil society organisation	UDHS	Uganda Demographic and Health Survey
DISO	District Internal Security Officer	UHRC	Uganda Human Rights Commission
GoU	Government of Uganda	UJCC	Uganda Joint Christian Council
IRC	International Rescue Committee	UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
KADP	Karamoja Agro-Pastoral Development Programme	UNHCHR	United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights
KIDDP	Karamoja Integrated Disarmament and Development Programme	UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
LC	Local Councillor (levels I–V)	UNLA/F	Uganda National Liberation Army/Front
LRA	Lord's Resistance Army	UPDF	Uganda People's Defence Forces
NAADS	National Agricultural Advisory Services	WFP	World Food Programme
NGO	non-governmental organisation	WHO	World Health Organisation
NUREP	Northern Uganda Rehabilitation Programme	WSF	Warrior Squad Foundation
NUSAF	Northern Uganda Social Action Fund		

Glossary

Anti-Stock Theft Units These are special units, under the command of the Uganda Police Force (UPF), who provide additional security, in particular to prevent and address raids and theft of livestock.

Conflict A situation in which one or more people or actors have, or perceive that they have, incompatible goals and act on this incompatibility in some way. Conflict does not have to be violent – violence is only one type of response to a situation of conflict. Conflict can also be described as ‘latent’ (see below) when a situation of conflict has not yet given rise to violence.²

Conflict sensitivity This is an approach to all interventions whereby one a) conducts a conflict analysis in order to understand the conflict context and dynamics; b) attempts to anticipate how the planned intervention will affect the conflict and peace dynamics in that context; and c) attempts to revise and adapt interventions to minimise any negative impacts and maximise positive impacts on the conflict and on peace dynamics.³

Emuron (s), ngimurok (pl) These are traditional diviners and healers in Karamojong society who perform a variety of roles from providing traditional medicines for illnesses, through to blessing raids or blessing students to get good marks in school.

Insecurity The threat or actual experience of violence or damage to person and/or property. It can also include the threat or experience of deprivation in a broader sense, including meeting basic needs like food and shelter. For this report, the focus has been more on the physical side of security.

Karachuna Male youth in Karamojong society who implement the collective will of their community’s traditional decision-making systems, and often take on the roles of protectors and ‘warriors’.⁴

Karamoja For the purposes of this assessment, ‘Karamoja’ refers to the five (old) districts of Abim, Kaabong, Kotido, Moroto and Nakapiripirit, which cover approximately 27,200 km² of North Eastern Uganda. Subsequent to the assessment, two new districts were created in Karamoja: Amudat was created in December 2009 out of Nakapiripirit District, consisting of Loroo, Amudat and Karita sub-counties; and Napak was created in July 2010 out of Moroto District, consisting of Iriiri, Lotome, Matany, Lokopo, Ngoleriet and Lopei sub-counties.

Karamojong Refers to the inhabitants of the above districts and includes the ethnic groups (or sub-tribes) of the Dodoth (north); Jie (central); Pokot (Kenyan border) and Bokora, Matheniko and Pian (south). Smaller ethnic groupings that also come under the generic term ‘Karamojong’ include the Tepeth, Nyakwe, Ik, Ngipore and Ethur. Other common spellings include ‘Karimojong’.

Kraal Mobile, often fortified, cattle camps (also known as *alomar* or *adakar*).

² Adapted from a combination of sources, including Mitchell C, *The Structure of International Conflict*, (London: Macmillan, 1981), and APFO, CECORE, CHA, FEWER, International Alert and Saferworld, *Conflict-sensitive approaches to development, humanitarian assistance and peacebuilding: A resource pack*, (January 2004).

³ Adapted from op cit APFO et al 2004, p 1.

⁴ For a brief overview of how karachuna have become increasingly independent and are viewed as a security threat by the state, see Mutengesha S and Hendrickson D, *State Responsiveness to Public Security Needs: The Politics of Security Decision-Making: Uganda Country Study*, CDSG Papers, (King’s College London, 2008), pp 55–56.

Latent conflict Describes ‘situations of tensions, which may escalate into violence’.⁵ The term can also cover the pre-conflict stage when ‘there is an incompatibility of goals between two or more parties, which could lead to open conflict [...and/or where] the conflict is hidden from general view, although one or more of the parties is likely to be aware of the potential for confrontation’.⁶

Manyatta Traditional semi-permanent family habitat of the Karamojong, consisting of huts and granaries.

Panga Large field knife often used for clearing bushes for cultivation or for pruning crops. It can also be used for domestic tasks such as chopping meat.

Pastoralism A lifestyle centred on livestock keeping, pastoralism has been defined as “the finely-honed symbiotic relationship between local ecology, domesticated livestock and people in resource-scarce, climatically marginal and highly variable conditions. It represents a complex form of natural resource management, involving a continuous ecological balance between pastures, livestock and people.”⁷ Pastoral systems have also been defined as “systems of natural resource use in which free-ranging or grass-fed animals are the principal means of exploiting the territorial organisation. The animals can be farmed or ranched if kept on private land, herded or shepherded when kept on communal land, or hunted or mustered in the case of wild or feral species.”⁸

Protected kraal UN OCHA characterises protected kraals as those ‘established under the security responsibility of the [Uganda People’s Defence Forces] and provided with escorts to pasture and water’.⁹

Small arms and light weapons (SALW) Although there is no universally recognised definition of SALW, the International SALW Tracing Instrument describes SALW as “any man-portable lethal weapon that expels or launches, is designed to expel or launch, or may be readily converted to expel or launch a shot, bullet or projectile by the action of an explosive”. [...] (a) ‘Small arms’ are, broadly speaking, weapons designed for individual use. They include, inter alia, revolvers and self-loading pistols, rifles and carbines, sub-machine guns, assault rifles and light machine guns; (b) ‘Light weapons’ are, broadly speaking, weapons designed for use by two or three persons serving as a crew, although some may be carried and used by a single person.”¹⁰ When the assessment uses the term, it does not include other weapons such as clubs, knives and machetes.

⁵ Op cit APFO et al 2004, p 2.

⁶ Responding to Conflict, *Working with Conflict: Skills and Strategies for Action* (London: Zed Books, 2000), p 19.

⁷ Nori M and Davies J, *Change Of Wind Or Wind Of Change? Climate change, adaptation and pastoralism* (Nairobi: World Initiative for Sustainable Pastoralism, 2007), p 7.

⁸ Pratt D J, Le Gall F, and de Haan C, *Investing in Pastoralism: Sustainable natural resource use in arid Africa and the Middle East* (Washington DC: World Bank, 1997), p 13.

⁹ OCHA, *Focus On Karamoja: Special Report No 2 Urgent Humanitarian Needs – August To October 2008*, p 4. There is some contention regarding the terminology of protected kraals. One recent report recognises this contention and instead refers to ‘protected kraals’ as ‘kraals at barracks’, which is in many senses a better description. However, this report employs the term ‘protected kraals’ as it is common usage. Stites E and Akabwai D, *Changing Roles, Shifting Risks: Livelihood Impacts of Disarmament in Karamoja, Uganda* (Feinstein International Center, July 2009), p 5.

¹⁰ United Nations General Assembly, *International Tracing Instrument to Enable States to Identify and Trace, in a Timely and Reliable Manner, Illicit Small Arms and Light Weapons* (United Nations, 8 December 2005), Article 4, www.poa-iss.org/InternationalTracing/ITI_English.pdf.

Executive summary

1. Introduction

THE KARAMOJA REGION OF NORTH EASTERN UGANDA is one of the most marginalised parts of the country. For decades, it has suffered high levels of conflict and insecurity, alongside low levels of development and serious challenges to individual well-being. Apart from being affected at certain points by the conflict between the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) and the Government of Uganda, groups living in Karamoja have also been involved in cycles of cattle raiding and counter-raiding. At various times, pastoralist or semi-pastoralist groups living across the border in Kenya and Sudan have also actively participated in these attacks. Various strategies have been adopted in the past to address insecurity, resolve conflict and increase development opportunities for the people of Karamoja. Some successes have been registered, but huge challenges still remain.

As a contribution to deepening the understanding of the complex dynamics causing conflict and insecurity in Karamoja, Saferworld conducted a participatory conflict and security assessment in the region. The objective of the research was to investigate the underlying issues contributing to conflict and insecurity in Karamoja, and to do so in a way that would allow Karamojong people themselves to steer the direction of the research. The research findings are intended to enable the work of Saferworld and other stakeholders (governmental, non-governmental and international) in Karamoja to respond to the conflict and security needs of the region.

Research process and methodology

The research focused on three sub-counties in Moroto (one of which has since moved to the new Napak District) and seven sub-counties in Kotido district and was conducted over several phases to enable Saferworld to build up relationships and get to know various stakeholders while gathering important information. The first step was a literature review,¹¹ conducted in March 2009 to capture existing knowledge, analysis and arguments relating to conflict and security in the region. The research team then started the field research by conducting focus group discussions and key informant consultations at the *manyatta* (household) level in June 2009 to frame the key issues. A variety of people were consulted, including women, elders, youth and reformed warriors, children, male and female *ngimurok* (soothsayers/traditional healers) and civic leaders. In total, 300 people were consulted in this way, and in addition, key informant interviews were held with key government, civil society and international actors engaged in Karamoja – some based in the region and others in Kampala.

11 Powell J, *Karamoja: A literature review*, (Saferworld, March 2010).

From this preliminary research, an analytical framework was developed that focuses on the three main conflict types that emerged from the initial consultations (see below). These three conflict types formed the basis of the research framework, in which each type was broken down into core conflict dynamics, grouped in terms of:¹²

- **Behaviour:** behaviours and actions causing, related to or as a consequence of conflict and/or peacebuilding
- **Systems and structures:** political, economic, social and cultural systems or structures causing, related to or as a consequence of conflict and/or peacebuilding
- **Values and beliefs:** values, beliefs, attitudes, ideologies and world views causing, related to or as a consequence of conflict and/or peacebuilding

For each core dynamic, a set of indicators was developed, providing a baseline for tracking trends and changes in future.

Drawing on this analytical framework, a broader research process was then undertaken, lasting about three months and involving community-level interviews, key informant interviews and secondary data collection. The principle source of data for the assessment was a series of structured group interviews, using a standardised questionnaire in order to tease out the specifics of the previously identified core conflict dynamics. The questionnaire included closed questions as well as some open questions to elicit more qualitative information. Group interviews were held in two sub-counties in Kotido District and three in Moroto District. In each sub-county, five group interviews were held with: adult women; adult men; elders; male youth and reformed warriors; and *ngimurok*. While this interview sample cannot be described as statistically representative (which could only have been better achieved through randomised household surveys or similar), the breadth of respondents and the scope of the questions provide useful 'key directions' that can be further explored and built upon in future research.

Complementing the group interviews, key informants were also interviewed, among them local civil administration officials, development actors, security actors (military and civilian) and human rights observers. In addition, the research team sought out available statistics, reports and policies that contributed to understanding of the core dynamics and issues raised in the group consultations and key informant interviews. Obtaining accurate and up-to-date information about conflict and security dynamics in Karamoja proved to be a difficult task – partly because of the sensitivity of some issues (for instance how widespread arms availability continues to be), and partly because some of the data being released publicly, like some of the Conflict Early Warning Mechanism (CEWARN) reports or the Uganda Human Rights Commission (UHRC) reports, is only published a year or more after events. The assessment could therefore draw on such data for indicating overall trends, but had to rely heavily on consultations and interviews for more recent events and findings.

The main findings were presented back to stakeholders at two community-level validation meetings (one each in Kotido and Moroto Districts, bringing together two people from each focus group), two district-level validation workshops (one each in Moroto and Kotido, bringing together community members selected at the community-level validation meetings, district officials, civil society organisation representatives and UN agencies) and one national feedback meeting in Kampala.

¹² This is an adaptation of the 'conflict triangle' developed by Johan Galtung. See Galtung, J, "Cultural Violence", *Journal of Peace Research*, 1990 vol. 27 no. 3.

Core conflict types

Emanating from the initial consultations, the assessment focused on three main types of conflict or tension, namely: Conflict and insecurity between ethnic groups (Conflict Type A); Conflict between the state and Karamojong society (Conflict Type B); and Conflict and insecurity within communities (Conflict Type C). The definition adopted for 'conflict' was the following: a situation where one or more people or actors have, or perceive that they have, incompatible goals, and act on this incompatibility in some way. Conflict does not have to be violent – violence is only one type of response to a situation of conflict. Conflict can be described as 'latent' when tensions exist, but the situation has not necessarily escalated into violence.

As such, it is clear that the three conflict types outlined above are quite different. Conflict Type A is characterised by tense or broken-down relationships between groups of people, and where occasional violence is perpetrated by one group against another in cycles of attacks and retributions. Conflict Type B is characterised by tense relationships feeding on structural issues of political, economic and social marginalisation, sometimes expressed in Karamojong attacks on state representatives (notably the Uganda People's Defence Forces/UPDF) and in state responses (notably by the UPDF) to insecurity in the region in a sometimes violent manner. Conflict Type C relates more to individual-level conflicts, sometimes involving violence by one or more individuals and households towards other individuals and households at the very local level, but not necessarily mobilising distinctive groups against each other.

The complexity of conflict and insecurity dynamics in Karamoja creates challenges for responses, with some regarding the main issues as relating to conflicts and inter- or intra-group relationships and others concluding that the main issues are more about criminality and the availability of weapons. The conclusion of our research is that both elements are present, and that they feed into each other in very specific ways at the local level.

Structure of the report

The full research report contains details of the findings and conclusions of Saferworld's assessment, organised in a way that allows readers to focus on the areas that interest them the most without having to read the entire report. This also means that certain findings are repeated across conflict types, in order to facilitate reading without constant cross-referencing. Overall, the report focuses on the three conflict types outlined above and within these conflict types, on the structural issues, attitudes and behaviours that inform each conflict. In addition, in order to allow for tracking trends and monitoring the impact of interventions, a set of indicators was developed for each of the conflict's core dynamics.

While the conflict types emerged out of consultations in the second phase of the research process, the assessment did not continue to synthesise the analysis of each conflict type into an overall analysis that sets out how each conflict type influences the others. Reading the overall conclusions, it is clear that certain core dynamics cut across the different conflict types, but play out in a different way within each of these dynamics. Future assessments will aim to explore these dynamics in more depth.

Conflict Type A: Conflict and insecurity between ethnic groups

Summary findings

2. Summary of main findings and recommendations

THE FOLLOWING PROVIDES A SUMMARY of the core dynamics of conflict and insecurity between ethnic groups, followed by a narrative overview of this Conflict Type.

1. Behaviour

- armed violence between ethnic groups
- security perspectives and measures taken in response to violence between ethnic groups

2. Systems and structures

- supply and demand of illicit arms
- civilian disarmament
- provision of security and justice
- access to key resources and public services
- livelihoods
- activities contributing to inter-ethnic conflict prevention and peacebuilding
- inter-ethnic relationships

3. Values and beliefs

- perceptions of conflict
- perceptions of identity
- values and beliefs around violence and dialogue

Some of the most visible and well-documented violence in Karamoja occurs between different ethnic groups, particularly in the form of cattle raiding. The effects of such violence are well-known – death, injury, displacement and disruption of economic and social activities. The assessment shows that this form of violence is still prevalent in Karamojong society, affects all communities and mostly still involves firearms. While some responses have been initiated to change this dynamic, perceptions differ between the Karamojong and state actors about their effectiveness. The Karamojong still report a high level of fear of attacks by other ethnic groups (or sub-groups), leading to restricted freedom of movement. State actors on the other hand see their responses as having become more proactive and effective, and perceive there to have been an overall reduction in violent incidents across Karamoja.

Underlying this violence are a number of more long-term and structural factors. The first cluster of these factors relate to access to the tools of violence (arms availability and demand factors) and responses to control or reduce the violence, namely civilian disarmament processes and longer-term security and justice provision. The second cluster of issues deals with socio-economic motivations for conflict between groups, focusing on access to resources and livelihoods. And the third cluster of factors relates to current attempts to improve perceptions of and relations between different ethnic groups.

During the assessment, questions about arms availability generated some interesting and contradictory responses. On the one hand, most Karamojong and security force respondents reported a decrease in the numbers and availability of weapons. At the same time, Karamojong respondents reported hearing gunshots regularly, perhaps indicating that arms possession was under-reported in a context of ongoing civilian disarmament. In terms of demand factors for small arms possession, Karamojong

respondents reported protection from other ethnic groups and protection of livestock as the key reasons why they would want to own a weapon. Yet at the same time, opinion was almost equally split between Karamojong respondents about whether owning a weapon made them feel safer, and most felt that gun ownership should be regulated. State security actors saw the reasons for gun ownership as mostly relating to cattle raiding activities between different Karamojong groups.

Responses to weapons proliferation, particularly civilian disarmament processes, are considered by state actors to have been quite effective in collecting a large number of weapons,¹³ reducing public display/use of weapons by Karamojong *karachuna* and reducing the number of arms-related casualties reported. Public support in Karamoja for the idea of a 'gun-free' society is also very high, and there is widespread acceptance that the government should continue with disarmament programmes. However, the disarmament approaches used have resulted in very low public support for the way in which disarmament has been conducted. Respondents strongly felt that their ethnic groups had been disarmed more than other neighbouring groups. This perceived asymmetrical disarmament has made communities feel vulnerable to attack from other groups, thereby influencing and often exacerbating inter-group conflicts. State actors report that disarmament has been undertaken in an equal manner across the region. Low public support for existing approaches to disarmament are also the result of Karamojong experiences of a high level of abuse and human rights violations carried out in the process of military-led disarmament exercises.

Public perceptions differ about the effectiveness of state protection from attacks or retaliatory violence by other ethnic groups. The UPDF is regarded as the key provider of such protection and is very visible in most communities (probably because of the large numbers of UPDF personnel deployed in the region relative to the rest of Uganda). But they are only moderately trusted and community respondents see the UPDF as being only partially effective in protecting people, livestock and property from attacks. On the other hand, the police are seen by the majority of community respondents as trustworthy, but not deployed in sufficient numbers or with sufficient resources to provide regular engagement with communities. Public expectations of improving police effectiveness related more to their contribution to recovering stolen cattle and helping to maintain peace and order within communities. It is worth noting that respondents differed about the effectiveness of UPDF strategies like protected *kraals*, with those in Moroto District being much more positive about this than those in Kotido District.

Justice provision was identified as a strong influencing factor in inter-group conflicts and disputes, but community respondents reported very weak capacity and access to formal state justice providers. However, they identified local government officials (both elected and non-elected) as the key justice providers for conflicts or crimes between ethnic groups, followed by the UPDF and police.

Despite the received wisdom that inter-group conflicts in Karamoja are about access to resources, just under half of community respondents perceived that access to key resources like water and food aid was unequal between different groups. In addition, less than half thought that access to these resources caused conflict between groups. Yet development actors interviewed reported food relief, water and land as sources of conflict and violence between groups, citing incidents of theft or attack to obtain food relief or ration cards – sometimes as part of inter-group raids and at other times as separate incidents. When it came more specifically to pastoralism in Karamoja, it was clear that this plays a key role in conflict between ethnic groups. Cattle raiding remains an accepted practice in maintaining this livelihood, and it generates violence between groups. But the violence and insecurity in turn undermines people's ability to look after their cattle. Interestingly, less than half of community respondents saw pastoralist

¹³ According to the Regional Disarmament Committee Secretariat for Karamoja, 28,040 weapons had been collected by July 2010.

livelihoods as contributing to conflict. While most respondents believed more alternative livelihood options would contribute to peace, there were very strong suggestions that peace and prosperity in the region could only be achieved if there were greater investments in livestock-based livelihood development. Young men in particular were keen on receiving assistance to diversify economic activities and increase their skills in other livelihood areas. Anecdotally, many *ngimurok* involved in the assessment indicated that they are now less frequently asked to bless raids, and are becoming more involved in blessings for good school grades or providing traditional medicine for people's ailments. This could again indicate a shift in values within communities – and by the *ngimurok* themselves – away from violent cattle raids and towards goals like better education.

On the topic of improving inter-ethnic relationships, most respondents had either participated in or were aware of peace meetings and similar activities. Almost all respondents saw these as contributing to more positive inter-ethnic relationships, with positive results for trade, marriage and other interactions between groups. However, implementing meeting agreements was identified as a challenge, alongside the risk that meetings raise expectations without resolving the problems discussed during the meetings.

People's values and beliefs inform conflicts and insecurity between ethnic groups. The assessment indicated that inter-ethnic conflicts were a self-fulfilling prophecy in the sense that fear of conflict and violence between groups was very high, and respondents also reported an increase in this fear over the last two years. They cited the desire to restock cattle or recover stolen cattle as the two most prevalent causes for attacks. Yet when probed about the legitimacy of this kind of violence, respondents strongly felt that violence against people from a different ethnic group was never acceptable and expressed a strong preference for resolving matters peacefully through peace meetings or regular dialogue. Notions of ethnic identity also do not appear to play a strong role in inter-ethnic conflicts, as most respondents prioritised their identities as firstly Ugandan and Karamojong (equally) and only secondarily as their specific ethnic group.

4. Recommendations for action

- **Improve monitoring and assessment of inter-ethnic conflict:** Better systems are needed to monitor and assess what is actually happening in Karamoja and to measure the impact of programmes and security responses in the region. While some analysis is being generated, e.g. through the Conflict Early Warning (CEWARN) system, this information needs to be added to and made available in a timely manner to inform conflict prevention, security responses and development programmes by government, the security services and non-governmental organisations (NGOs). Communities themselves need to be centrally involved in both this analysis and the formulation of appropriate responses. This should include a specific focus on protection from and support to dealing with sexual violence, predominantly perpetrated against women during inter-ethnic attacks.
- **Promote practical efforts at community-supported and voluntary civilian arms control:** People in Karamoja support the principle of civilian arms control, but not the way in which it has been carried out thus far. The Karamoja Integrated Disarmament and Development Programme (KIDDP) commits the Government of Uganda to pursue consultative weapons control, working with the communities and police. These approaches have the potential to make significant progress in controlling weapons in Karamoja, while reducing the risk of further human rights violations through forcible disarmament and cordon and search operations, and should be vigorously pursued.

- **Promote co-operative inter-ethnic activities and joint use of resources and public services:** If done in a conflict-sensitive way, opportunities exist to promote peaceful interaction between different ethnic groups in Karamoja through development programmes and service provision. Communities in Karamoja see trading and peace meetings as very good ways of encouraging peaceful interaction between ethnic groups. Inter-ethnic marriage, sacrifices and religious events, sports, joint grazing of livestock and sharing of markets and services (such as health, education and water) were also seen as potentially contributing to inter-ethnic co-operation. In order to have the most positive impact on conflict and peace dynamics, such initiatives will have to be carefully monitored and communities closely involved in shaping and monitoring such programmes and services.
- **Support inter-ethnic confidence-building, dialogue and long-term conflict transformation:** Inter-ethnic peace meetings should be encouraged and supported as a basis for building mutual confidence and for collaborating with each other and the security services (both police and military) to deal with security threats like cattle raids. Responses in the assessment, such as a near universal rejection of arms, violence and raiding and very strong support for dialogue and peace meetings, indicate the potential for a much deeper and more fundamental transformation of inter-ethnic relations. Though these processes should be dictated and led by the Karamojong, ultimately they will need external resources and support if they are to succeed.
- **Embrace pastoralism as part of the foundation for peace and development in Karamoja:** While cattle raiding is intimately linked with pastoralist practices, some of the incentives for raiding can be reduced if pastoralism becomes more viable as a livelihood. The ecology and society of Karamoja suggest that pastoralist livelihoods are likely to remain at the centre of life and prosperity for the foreseeable future. Therefore, stakeholders need to find ways of enhancing support to livestock-based livelihoods, rather than promoting sedentarism. This could include animal-rearing, cross-breeding and livestock nutrition projects that improve the quality and health of livestock, as well as investment in services and industries related to livestock. There is a need for a national pastoralism policy that includes much more positive support for pastoralist livelihoods. Many respondents cited the success of pastoralist-friendly policies in northern Kenya, which have enabled sustainable pastoralism, including through good irrigation programmes and growing of robust crops.
- **Implement water and food relief programmes in a more conflict-sensitive way:** While there are different opinions about the exact causal relationship between access to food relief and water on the one hand, and inter-ethnic conflict on the other, these factors do seem to be linked. It is vital that distribution of these resources is sensitive to local conflict dynamics. Those involved in planning relief efforts need to ensure that water and food relief projects do not become sources of contention between ethnic groups, but also that these projects are implemented in ways that can actually contribute to peacebuilding processes. In addition, food distributions need to be planned and delivered in ways that ensure the safety of both distributors and recipients.
- **Invest in income-generating activities that are labour-intensive, target youth and promote co-operative interaction between ethnic groups:** Given the challenging economic and ecological environment in Karamoja, continued attention needs to be paid to creating additional income opportunities, supported by the relevant education and vocational training. Investment in new infrastructure could promote economic development and create employment if well-designed. Reformed warriors and other male youth are a particularly important target group for income-generating activities or 'make work' projects. This is not to say that young

women should not benefit – as changing dynamics in gender identities means that they are also increasingly able to pursue education and employment outside the household – but masculinity in Karamoja is still closely tied to raiding, a fact supported by women's expectations that men should raid to obtain sufficient cattle for the family. Providing young men with more opportunities for constructive economic engagement would therefore give them alternatives to raiding, while still empowering them economically. This may even contribute to changing women's attitudes towards raiding as a key component of masculinity.

- **Utilise Karamojong identity as a means for promoting unity and peacebuilding:** Although ethnic identities are important components of life in Karamoja, it is the wider Karamojong and Ugandan identities that resonated as most important in the assessment. These 'unifying' identities could be utilised as an important peace-building tool and help to mitigate the inter-ethnic characteristics of conflict.

Conflict Type B: **Conflict between the state and Karamojong society**

Summary findings

The following provides a summary of the core dynamics of the conflictual relationship between the state and Karamojong society, followed by a narrative overview of this Conflict Type.

1. Behaviour

- state violence against the Karamojong
- Karamojong violence against the state
- government programmes contributing to a positive relationship between the state and the Karamojong

2. Systems and structures

- supply and demand of illicit arms
- civilian disarmament
- provision of security and justice
- governance factors contributing to conflict between the state and Karamojong society
- access to public services

3. Values and beliefs

- Karamojong perceptions of conflict with the state
- perceptions of identity
- values and beliefs around violence and dialogue

The relationship between the state and society in Karamoja has long been a difficult one. The current government has significantly increased its engagement with Karamoja in recent years, including through devising new programmes such as the Karamoja Integrated Disarmament and Development Programme (KIDDP), meant to decrease insecurity and stimulate development in the region. It remains, however, a strained relationship, identified during assessment consultations as a principle conflict type. This conflict is mostly latent, but punctuated by specific incidents of violence.

Focusing on the last two years, the assessment attempted to measure the scope and prevalence of violent incidents committed by state actors against civilians in Karamoja, and by Karamojong against state actors. Documented information on such incidents was taken mainly from research reports and the detailed annual reports of the UHRC,

who have monitors based in the region. In addition, perceptions of such violence were obtained from Karamojong respondents during the group interviews in particular. The picture that emerges is one of high levels of fear and a perception of regular violence against Karamojong communities, predominantly by the UPDF. For example, when asked “Has anyone in your *manyatta* been killed in the last two years by someone employed by the Government?” 23 out of the 25 groups had respondents who answered “yes”. In a follow-up question as to who was most responsible for these killings, the UPDF was indicated as by far the most responsible (in comparison to police and the Anti-Stock Theft Units/ASTUs). Equally, respondents reported very high levels of human rights abuses (torture, beatings and inhumane treatment) perpetrated in cordon and search operations undertaken as part of disarmament operations, or when people were detained.

The UHRC annual reports indicate that the main types of abuses reported were torture and cruel or inhuman treatment, and that the main perpetrators of abuses were private individuals (31 cases) and the UPDF (25 cases), followed by the police (14 cases). The 2008 UHRC report highlights that cordon and search operations in particular contributed to an increase in reported complaints about torture and cruel or inhuman treatment. More recently, the UHRC published a press release expressing its concern over reported UPDF abuses, prompting President Museveni to order a formal investigation.¹⁴

In terms of violence perpetrated by Karamojong against state actors or institutions, reports from respondents indicate a low incidence of such attacks, with the main reasons for attacks being retaliation, self-defence or recovering weapons or cattle taken during disarmament exercises or other incidents.

Lastly, respondents exhibited high levels of awareness of the state programmes for Karamoja (such as the KIDDP, the Northern Uganda Social Action Fund/NUSAF and the National Agricultural Advisory Services/NAADS) and believed these programmes to be a positive sign of government intent. However, there was low actual understanding of what these programmes were meant to achieve and low perceptions of community participation in them.

In terms of structural factors underlying the latent conflict between the Karamojong and the state, two clusters of issues can be distinguished. The first cluster of factors relate to state provision of safety and security, broken down into access to the tools of violence (arms availability and demand factors) and responses to control or reduce the violence, namely civilian disarmament processes and longer-term security and justice provision. The second cluster of factors deal with the state’s presence and influence in people’s lives, as represented by perceptions about governance and access to public services.

In terms of conflict between the Karamojong and the state, arms availability is at the heart of state concerns for establishing security, law and order in the region. State security actors interviewed consequently talk about arms proliferation as the key challenge to containing security threats within Uganda. Most Karamojong and security force respondents saw a decrease in numbers of weapons and saw it as difficult to obtain weapons. At the same time, Karamojong respondents reported a high incidence of hearing gunshots, perhaps indicating that arms possession was under-reported in a context of ongoing civilian disarmament. In terms of demand factors for small arms possession, Karamojong respondents reported protection from other ethnic groups and protection of livestock as the key reasons why they would want to own a weapon. Yet at the same time, opinion was almost equally split between Karamojong respondents about whether owning a weapon made them feel safer, and most felt that gun ownership should be regulated. State security actors saw the reasons

¹⁴ See “Uganda Human Rights Commission Press Release”, *New Vision*, 23 May 2010, available at <http://newvisionuganda.info/D/526/532/720586>; and “Museveni names team to probe Karamoja killings”, *Daily Monitor*, 25 May 2010, available at www.monitor.co.ug/News/National/-/688334/925070/-/x07e5m/-/index.html.

for gun ownership as mostly relating to cattle raiding activities between different Karamojong groups.

Efforts to address weapons proliferation, particularly civilian disarmament processes, are considered by state actors to have been quite effective in collecting a large number of weapons,¹⁵ reducing public display/use of weapons by Karamojong *karachuna* and reducing the number of arms-related casualties reported. Public support in Karamoja for the idea of a 'gun-free' society is also very high, and there is widespread acceptance that the government should continue with disarmament programmes. However, the disarmament approaches used have generated a high level of abuses against civilians, resulting in very low public support for the way in which disarmament has been conducted. Disarmament approaches are core to the relationship between the state and Karamojong citizens, as a manifestation of both state control and state responsibility to protect its citizens. If civilian disarmament can be undertaken in an accountable and responsible way, it may contribute to increased trust in the government and therefore reduce the risk of Karamojong violence against the state while improving the general security situation in the region. Respondents had different opinions about how the disarmament process made them feel about the state, with women feeling strongly positive and elders and male youth in particular feeling quite negative. Given that weapons are generally held by men, this needs to be addressed if violence within Karamoja and towards the state is to be reduced.

Public perceptions differ about the effectiveness of state protection from attacks or retaliatory violence by other ethnic groups. The UPDF is regarded as the key provider of such protection and is very visible in most communities (probably because of the large numbers of UPDF personnel deployed in the region relative to the rest of Uganda). But they are only moderately trusted and community respondents see them as being only partially effective in protecting people, livestock and property from attacks. On the other hand, the police are seen by the majority of community respondents as trustworthy, but not deployed in sufficient numbers or sufficiently resourced to provide regular engagement with communities. Public expectations of improving the effectiveness of the police related more to their contribution in recovering stolen cattle and helping to maintain peace and order within communities. Moreover, community respondents were keen to see a stronger police presence and regarded the lack of police capacity as a form of marginalisation by the state.

Justice provision was identified as a strong mediating factor in inter-group conflicts and disputes, but community respondents reported very weak capacity and access to formal state justice providers. Instead, they identified local government officials (both elected and non-elected) as key justice providers for conflicts or crimes between ethnic groups, followed by the UPDF and police. Despite being largely unable to access the formal justice system, they also reported high levels of trust in this system. In fact, when asked to compare the formal system and traditional justice mechanisms, communities responded that the two systems were seen as equally important and in fact complementary. This is a potential positive element in terms of strengthening relationships between Karamojong and the state. In terms of obtaining justice for violence committed against people by the state, most respondents were willing to report such incidences, and then mostly to local leaders or the police. Trust in existing civil-military structures was not very high.

In broader governance terms, most respondents felt positive about efforts by the state to provide better lives and access to resources to people in Karamoja, particularly related to food and water. However, respondents were only moderately positive about access to locally grown food and replenishment of livestock, and were not positive about access to land. They felt that government programmes were generally responding to their needs, although when it came to actual delivery on the ground, a high

¹⁵ According to the Regional Disarmament Committee Secretariat for Karamoja, 28,040 weapons had been collected by July 2010.

percentage of respondents perceived government institutions to be corrupt and felt they only sometimes saw the impact of such programmes. In terms of core services like health, education and roads, respondents were very positive about government performance, demonstrating potential to improve the relationship between the state and Karamojong people.

The assessment also delved more deeply into the nature of the relationship between the state and Karamojong and uncovered two interesting dynamics: that this relationship was characterised as quite positive by people in Moroto District, but as quite negative by people in Kotido District (even being described as a ‘conflict’ in the latter); and that many respondents, when asked about the ‘government’, think about central government rather than local government, who most people seem to trust. The fact that Karamojong respondents saw their identity as first and foremost Ugandan and Karamojong (equally), bodes well for a positive relationship with the state in terms of their belonging to a national identity. Lastly, respondents strongly asserted that they valued dialogue as a means to resolving disputes or problems with state institutions and that violence against the state was mostly unacceptable.

4. Recommendations for action

- **Strengthen capacities to monitor, report and take action on human rights violations in Karamoja:** Human rights are clearly an issue in Karamoja. In order to effectively address this issue, more support should be provided to actors monitoring and reporting violations, as well as to those in a position to respond to or prevent violations. Firstly, the number of UHRC field offices should be expanded and they should be better resourced. UHRC field offices also need to work closely with other human rights actors in order to accurately document and investigate abuses. Secondly, the UPDF and the Uganda Police Force need to be engaged to take action on reported violations and monitor the training currently provided to staff on human rights to ensure that it actually results in attitudinal and behavioural change. Although potentially contentious and painful at first for some state actors, effectively reducing human rights abuses and the impunity of staff will ultimately improve the relationship between the state and Karamojong society.
- **Acknowledge legacies of violence:** It is apparent that state forces, particularly the UPDF, have a legacy of violence in their dealings with Karamojong communities. Whether this violence is lawful or not, it has contributed to severe mistrust, anger, fear and grievances toward the state on the part of the Karamojong. Likewise, armed Karamojong have a history of violence against state actors, which contributes to a context of lawlessness and insecurity, as well as to animosities on both sides. A constructive and sustainable relationship between the state and citizens in Karamoja can only be built if actors on both sides acknowledge these legacies.
- **Increased sensitisation about the roles and responsibilities of both the state and communities:** There is confusion amongst the Karamojong regarding the roles and responsibilities of the UPDF and the police. Improved community sensitisation efforts would enable greater and more appropriate community engagement on security, but also improve transparency and manage expectations about what security forces can realistically and lawfully do in response to security threats. This process of community sensitisation should also include helping people to understand state-led programmes affecting the region (i.e. the Northern Uganda Rehabilitation Programme [NUREP], the NAADS, and KIDDP) and how they could influence and provide feedback on such programmes. Increased public participation would not only improve the sustainability and impact of development and governance programmes, but also improve Karamojong perspectives about their relationship with the state. Importantly, sensitisation needs to be a two-way process and not just about the roles and responsibilities of the state, but also about

how Karamojong communities and citizens can contribute responsibly and constructively to improved governance, security and social cohesion in partnership with the state.

- **Support those actors who can successfully mediate between Karamojong society and the state, and create more opportunities for dialogue:** It was clear from the assessment that a number of actors could have a more pronounced role in improving interaction and dispute resolution between Karamojong and the state. The Local Councillors (LCs) are an obvious lynchpin by which Karamojong society connects with the state – are there means of supporting their role? The police also have a relatively high legitimacy rating – how can this be built upon and the police's role in mediating between society and the state be improved? The UHRC also has a core function of ending impunity and mediating on human rights. Improving its legitimacy, credibility and capacity is an important means of ensuring that Karamojong grievances are heard. Dialogue was overwhelmingly seen as a successful means for peacefully resolving disputes and issues that could otherwise result in conflict with state actors. These sentiments could be harnessed if there were more opportunities for 'ordinary' Karamojong to participate in genuine processes of dialogue, decision-making and dispute resolution with the state.

Conflict Type C: Conflict and insecurity within ethnic groups

Summary findings

The following provides a summary of the core dynamics of the conflictual intra-ethnic relationships that exist within Karamoja, followed by a narrative overview of this Conflict Type.

1. Behaviour

- violence within the community

2. Systems and structures

- supply and demand of illicit arms
- provision of security and justice
- access to key resources and public services
- livelihoods
- activities contributing to intra-community conflict prevention and peacebuilding
- local leaders and community cohesion

3. Values and beliefs

- perceptions of security and conflict
- values and beliefs around violence and dialogue

While inter-ethnic violence is a more well-recognised dynamic in Karamoja, the assessment found that intra-community (and therefore intra-ethnic) violence was also at a very high level, increasing local-level insecurity and undermining social cohesion. This violence is reported to be mostly perpetrated against men, using firearms, and some of it seems to be well-organised. Very high levels of theft within communities were reported as characterising this conflict type, targeting livestock, but also food and personal property.

In terms of more structural factors underlying intra-community conflict and violence, three clusters of issues can be distinguished. The first cluster of factors relate to access to and use of the tools of violence, and the role of the state in trying to maintain secu-

rity and justice in the face of such violence. The second relates to competition between individuals or families for access to key resources and services, and livelihood options. And the third cluster relates to possible solutions to the violence in terms of existing mechanisms for intra-community conflict prevention and peacebuilding, and the role of local leaders in promoting community cohesion.

While arms availability in itself was not mentioned as a key factor fuelling intra-community conflict, clearly the availability of arms shapes the nature and lethality of the violence committed. Most Karamojong and security force respondents reported a decrease in the numbers and availability of weapons. At the same time, Karamojong respondents reported hearing gunshots regularly, perhaps indicating that arms possession was under-reported in a context of ongoing civilian disarmament. In terms of demand factors for small arms possession, Karamojong respondents reported protection from other ethnic groups and protection of livestock as the key reasons why they would want to own a weapon – only rarely for protection against people within their own community. Yet at the same time, opinion was almost equally split between Karamojong respondents about whether owning a weapon made them feel safer, and most felt that gun ownership should be legally regulated. State security actors saw the reasons for gun ownership as mostly relating to cattle raiding activities between different Karamojong groups.

The police and the LCs were reported as being most important in protecting people from attacks and crimes committed by people from within the same community. In Moroto District, people reported that the UPDF had a strong role in protecting people from such intra-community attacks, whereas in Kotido District people reported a very low involvement of the UPDF in this regard. Overall, people's trust in the police was very high, although the frequency with which they saw the police in their communities differed. During the course of the assessment process, this situation improved with the deployment of more police personnel in Kotido in particular. Respondents also reported a very low experience of police involvement at the *manyatta* level. Nevertheless, the role of the police was described as one of keeping law and order, preventing or dealing with crime and drunkenness.

The police were also seen as the main justice provider in cases of conflict or crime within the community, followed by the LCs (primarily LCIs but also LCIIIs) and then the elders. Respondents also said that they tend to first report to the LCIs and then through them to the police, evidencing a high level of trust in the first layer of local government to help them resolve intra-community problems. While people expressed a fairly high trust in the government court system to deliver fair and effective justice, the actual presence of the formal system in Karamoja is very limited, with an average of one (more junior) magistrate per district and only one state prosecutor present, based in Moroto. The nearest Chief Magistrate is in Soroti and according to respondents has not come to Karamoja for years.

Respondents also value the traditional justice systems for resolving intra-community conflicts and disputes. In fact, when asked to compare the formal system and traditional justice mechanisms, the two systems were seen as equally important and complementary. This indicates a positive potential for strengthening synergies between these two systems to resolve community-level conflicts.

Communities only reported moderate conflict due to perceptions of some people within communities having more access to water and replenishment of livestock, but they reported a high perception of unequal access to food relief and believed this to cause conflict within communities. Respondents did not see access to core services such as health and education to be very unequal, but they felt that where perceptions of unequal access existed, this caused conflict within families and communities. In terms of livelihoods, most Karamojong respondents saw themselves as pastoralist (or agro-pastoralist), and did not see this livelihood as strongly contributing to either conflict or peace. They did, however, feel that conflict was a result of unequal resources within the

community and that making pastoralist livelihoods more sustainable while at the same time increasing alternative livelihood options would significantly contribute to peace in terms of both inter-ethnic and intra-community conflicts. On this topic, young men and reformed warriors in particular came out strongly asking for more options so that they did not have to resort to raiding – or to idleness. They appealed to the government and others to help them be productive in their societies.

In terms of responses to intra-community conflicts, peace meetings were seen as an important mechanism for resolving intra-community disputes and conflicts. While the frequency of these meetings varied, people felt that their overall impact was positive. However, criticism was expressed that recommendations from peace meetings were not always implemented, and that some people used peace meetings as an opportunity to prepare for attacks.

Local community leaders were on the one hand seen as understanding and representing the needs and aspirations of their communities. On the other hand, respondents raised concerns about corruption. They felt that their leaders were doing fairly well in securing them access to food relief and water, but not so well on access to land or locally produced food, and quite badly in securing access to cash or credit. The leaders were also rated as ‘moderate’ in their ability to ensure that new projects or programmes actually reach communities.

On perceptions of conflict and security in particular, it is clear that fear of intra-communal violence and conflict is overall high among respondents. People feel that the predominant causes of intra-community conflicts are hunger, persistent drought and lack of access to water, poverty, and jealousy and petty quarrels between people that are not resolved. From the consultations, a picture emerges of a fractured society where quarrels between individuals and within families are not only common, but also inform broader intra-communal conflicts and tensions – sometimes leading to loss of life. Yet people in Karamoja still highly value dialogue and peaceful ways of resolving conflict within communities and families. Most people equally see violence against other members of their communities to be unacceptable.

4. Recommendations for action

- **Improve assessment of intra-community conflict:** While ‘inter-ethnic’ conflict is frequently referred to and addressed in conflict and security programmes, there need to be better systems in place to monitor those conflict and security issues that exist within communities in Karamoja. This includes examining all levels of intra- and inter-family and intra- and inter-clan dynamics. The needs and priorities of vulnerable or ‘invisible’ actors (such as women with young children), which are often overlooked, should be included in such assessments. Measuring and understanding the context at the community-level will inform better programme responses and avoid the risk that well-meaning programmes aggravate some of these more ‘invisible’ conflicts – or indeed miss opportunities to help resolve them.
- **Support and strengthen local dispute resolution mechanisms:** The Karamojong see dialogue as a highly successful means of peacefully resolving disputes at the community level. Their demand for enhancing existing local dispute resolution and dialogue mechanisms should be supported. Moreover, the participation of key local actors in these mechanisms should also be increased. LCs have a crucial role to play in preventing and resolving community-level conflicts and disputes. Elected political actors are seen as important arbiters not only in interacting with the state but also on local matters, and should be engaged either through formal or traditional mechanisms. Similarly, carefully managed linkages between the formal and traditional justice systems would also improve the means and opportunities for Karamojong to resolve local disputes.

- **Increase transparency, accountability and community participation in local-level decision-making:** There are indications that Karamojong communities distrust the way in which local community leaders manage the state's engagement with them. This results in dashed expectations on the part of communities, which in turn leads to local grievances and disputes. But it also points to a strong possibility that good central government efforts at improving the lives of ordinary people in Karamoja are being thwarted by corruption or dishonesty at local government levels. This pattern needs to be improved by on the one hand better monitoring of local government performance and on the other hand, greater participation of communities in consultations, prioritisation and monitoring of social service delivery and development programmes. In this effort, both government and non-government actors should be careful not to only consult elites and 'gatekeepers' in the communities, but to find a way to engage people from the *manyatta* level as well.
- **Implement food relief, water and livelihood programmes in a more conflict-sensitive way:** Water access, food relief and livelihoods contribute strongly to conflict at the community-level – even more so than they aggravate inter-ethnic conflict. The solution is not necessarily to provide more of these key programmes but to ensure their distribution is sensitive to local conflict dynamics, and can be implemented in ways that contribute to peacebuilding processes. In addition, food distributions need to be planned in ways that ensure the safety of both distributors and recipients.
- **Invest in income-generating activities that are labour intensive and target male youth:** As also noted in the recommendations for Conflict Type A, there is a need for appropriately designed initiatives for income-generating activities or 'make work' projects, predominantly targeting young men. 'Labour-intensive' work would keep young men 'occupied' and demonstrate that there are alternative economic options to raiding. This in turn could help inform attitudes towards defining 'masculinity' within broader Karamojong society, where many women and men measure a man's masculinity against his ability to provide cattle for his family through raiding.
- **Conduct more research and action on sexual violence in Karamoja:** The assessment methodology did not allow us to probe the nature and prevalence of sexual violence in Karamoja. It is clear from discussions that this is, however, a pressing issue. Better understanding is therefore needed of this issue, and organisations who can work to prevent such violence and mitigate its effects should be supported.

3. Cross-cutting recommendations

BECAUSE THERE IS A LARGE NUMBER OF OVERLAPPING DYNAMICS between the three Conflict Types, this section outlines cross-cutting recommendations for taking practical action to address conflict at all three levels.

These recommendations are organised into four groups: A) protection from violence; B) policing and justice provision; C) civilian disarmament; and D) peace dialogue. They aim to provide a set of detailed, specific and practical suggestions for decision-makers relating to all three Conflict Types.

A. Protection from violence

Protection from violence and the provision of security are major concerns of the people in Karamoja. The findings of the assessment suggest that the provision of security might be improved if the state adopted more people-centred and co-operative approaches to security and responded more directly to the expressed priorities and needs of Karamajong communities. Karamajong communities frequently said that they felt as though they were the targets, rather than the beneficiaries, of state security operations.

Recommendations for improving protection from violence include:

1. **Conduct a strategic review of Karamoja security approaches:** The assessment findings raise questions about some of the security approaches in Karamoja, including the effectiveness of cordon and search tactics and protective *kraals*, the lawful use of force by state security actors, and the reach and location of UPDF deployments. Significant shifts have occurred in the government's approach, with much more emphasis on the police's role and on 'community policing' strategies. However, these early gains must be protected and further expanded by regular reviews and updates between the military, police and civilian authorities in Karamoja, including feedback from communities. Every effort should be made to prevent UPDF and police violations of human rights.
2. **Review and improve livestock protection and recovery tactics:** The protection and recovery of livestock also needs to remain a priority for security forces, and the recent deployment of the ASTUs in Moroto District should be carefully monitored to see how effective they are. Cattle tracking, reporting and monitoring mechanisms need to be improved. Specific suggestions include: improving the rapid response capacity of the UPDF and/or ASTUs to raids, so that "raiders [are not] given time to enjoy what they have raided"; stressing the importance of recovering all or as many animals as possible; maintaining accurate records about raids and recovery efforts and sharing these with communities.
3. **Increase the number of Karamojong personnel in security decision-making and management roles:** Greater recruitment of people from Karamoja into the police – particularly into the ASTUs – has been taking place. Due to conditions in the region, entry requirements had to be lowered for this recruitment. It is however, important to get more Karamojong into the security services and moreover, eventually into management positions. Resources should be dedicated to ensure further education opportunities for Karamojong in the security services to enable career growth and promotion.
4. **Co-ordinate central or collective grazing areas for all groups:** Increased security in the region has already to some degree started opening up former 'no-go' areas. This should be built upon by working with communities to identify better management and sharing of grazing areas, which could then be protected/overseen by the security services. This would improve the health of cattle, but also help to build trust between ethnic groups and between them and the state security services.

5. **Improve communication and relationships between the UPDF, police and local communities:** The UPDF and the police have taken some steps towards better relationships with communities in Karamoja, including through the police adopting a community policing approach. These are positive steps, and need to be expanded upon and monitored so that good initiatives are in fact implemented in practice and relationships with communities built up over time. This could include involvement from the security services in peace dialogue meetings (if appropriate), establishing clear consultation structures with communities across the region (not just in major centres) and working with local civil society organisations (CSOs) and the UHRC to ensure any violations by security personnel are dealt with quickly and feedback provided to the affected communities.

B. Policing and justice provision

Recommendations for improving policing and justice provision include:

1. **Recruit and appropriately train more police, and increase their deployment across Karamoja:** On paper, the government is already committed to increasing police deployment and making the role of the police more prominent in the region. These commitments should be followed through. Police need to be permanently stationed at the village level, and conduct regular patrols. This would address perceptions that villages are more insecure at night than during the day, increase local confidence in police capacity and enable the police to better understand and build relationships with each community. Recruiting people from Karamoja – women in particular – will help in this regard, as will more specific training for police for working in Karamoja.
2. **Increase resources for the police:** The current low level of resources for police posted to Karamoja means that community members themselves describe a police posting to Karamoja as “punishment”. Improved facilities and resources would help greatly in improving the attitude, commitment and motivation of police serving in Karamoja, so that the police will no longer be so eager to “run back to Kampala”. Improved police posts, transportation, detention facilities and administrative resources are all needed. Improved police accommodation was raised by all participants in the assessment, with suggestions that there should be better provision of the ‘uniport’ accommodation buildings that the police use elsewhere in Uganda.
3. **Strengthen and regularise community-based policing activities:** A core tenet of community-based policing is good local public awareness about the role of the police, the judiciary and the UPDF; access to justice; the differences between civil and criminal cases; and other law and order issues. However, community-based policing should go beyond public awareness. It should involve greater and more regular access to the police, right down to the *manyatta* level. The aim should be to create a situation whereby communities and the police work together to solve problems affecting public safety in a preventive fashion, rather than the police reacting to incidents as they occur. These activities should enable the police to become more service-oriented, accountable to the public and focused on the priorities of the communities they serve.
4. **Greater police collaboration with civil society:** Closer police links with CSOs would help to build greater trust in the police and to make them more accessible. This would entail CSOs actively encouraging the police to accompany them to the field and inviting police involvement in programmes that touch on aspects of community safety, security and conflict prevention. This would reinforce the fact that police can make a constructive contribution to a wide range of local issues, not just ‘enforcement’.
5. **Increase justice provision and linkages between formal and traditional systems:** While the formal courts system is largely well respected and has relatively good legitimacy in Karamojong society, its coverage of the region is still sparse. The state needs to continue to expand the formal courts system across all of Karamoja. This would contribute to a significantly more positive view of the state within Karamojong society. Moreover,

a functioning justice system could contribute to resolving aspects of inter-ethnic and intra-community conflict in the region. Secondly, linkages between the formal courts system and the traditional mechanisms that actually process most disputes in the first instance, need to be improved. This needs to be approached carefully, but further measures to increase the inter-connections between the two systems would make justice provision in the region much more effective.

C. Civilian disarmament

It is important to recognise that the state's current attempts at disarmament will likely continue to be met with violence to some degree. But responses in the assessment also indicate support for a 'gun-free' Karamoja, thereby strongly suggesting that the state needs to adapt its approach to disarmament through a process of consultation with communities and taking into consideration the following prerequisites:

- 1. Better understand the demand dynamics behind small arms possession and use:** Despite the widespread public support for fewer arms in circulation in Karamoja, the reasons for gun ownership also need to be addressed. This means continued engagement with various sections of Karamojong societies – and taking into account differences between groups and regions – in order to understand people's reasons for wanting to keep their arms. These could vary from security to cultural or social reasons, and attitudinal change therefore needs to involve a range of civilian actors (community leaders, women's groups, civil society, etc). A first step might be creating a dialogue forum for discussing arms possession, without threat of sanction to those involved. This needs to be part of a process of comprehensively engaging communities, women, youth, *ngimurok*, elders and leaders, to understand different perspectives and motivations regarding gun ownership and disarmament options.
- 2. Ensure that all ethnic groups feel safe enough to disarm:** Most Karamojong believe that the different ethnic groups within Karamoja have not been disarmed equally and this has created severe security vulnerabilities. To address this, disarmament should target all ethnic groups at the same time. There was also strong recognition that no amount of disarmament within Karamoja will have any lasting positive effect if the borders with Kenya and Sudan are not made properly secure from cross-border raids and arms supplies. Ultimately, confidence in and compliance with disarmament would be higher if adequate security could be guaranteed to Karamojong communities – disarmament will gain momentum, "when someone who surrenders their gun already has protection."
- 3. Strengthen data collection and analysis of incidents involving small arms:** More small arms incident data needs to be collected and analysed, including data on collected/seized weapons, gunshot deaths and injuries, gun sightings, reported gunshots, and so on. The development of appropriate disarmament and security strategies will be significantly compromised without comprehensive and credible data of this kind.

A revised approach should include:

- 1. Increased community consultation and participation:** Communities and their representatives – including local leaders and *manyatta* leaders, the police, peace committees, and NGOs – should be more involved in planning and conducting disarmament. This entails improved civil-military relations, more peace meetings and intensive peace education so that people who possess guns become willing to give them up – as many have already done. Special efforts should be made to engage youth, as well as those who currently encourage raiding and arms possession (including *ngimurok* and women). Interview groups specifically recommended that LCs should be more involved before disarmament operations are carried out because they have information on who has arms and can facilitate consultation with communities.

2. **Target individuals not communities:** There was strong sentiment that the UPDF should “follow guns not people” and not punish whole communities because certain individuals possess guns. Respondents suggested strengthening UPDF deployments in areas where there are known gun flows so as to eventually cut off supply. They also suggested the UPDF should stop depending on witnesses who provide ‘false accusations’ and use more rigorous intelligence and means of information gathering.
3. **Create a civilian gun ‘hotline’:** There was a suggestion that a contact ‘hotline’ would be useful for civilians to call if they want to report a gun. They could call in, stay safe and allow the police to respond. While some form of UPDF telephone line exists, community members felt that a hotline managed locally at district level by the police or civilian authorities (who were felt to be more approachable than the military), would be more effective.
4. **Carefully consider providing disarmament incentives:** The government should consider providing material incentives to those people who voluntarily disarm (such as money, ox-ploughs, etc) or providing income-generating and other community projects to those communities that voluntarily disarm. Communities felt this would make the desire for guns and use of guns less attractive. This is a challenging endeavour, as people are already competing for access to resources. But respondents also felt that the guns they surrender have a price, and that they are not ‘reimbursed’ for the expense they made in acquiring them. While weapon ‘buy-back’ schemes have a very chequered history and there are numerous examples where the provision of material incentives for disarmament have created dangerous unintended consequences, there have also been examples where appropriately developed incentives have been thought to contribute to successful voluntary weapons collection exercises. Therefore, incentives should not be dismissed outright but considered very carefully.
5. **Improve accountability of weapons collection:** People should be given certificates and fully registered when they hand in guns so it is known who has already disarmed. Although people may cheat the system and keep additional arms or re-arm, this would reduce harassment and accusations of non-compliance. This would also help in creating reliable data on numbers of weapons collected, from which area, which in turn could provide a means of analysing the small arms situation in Karamoja (including tracing of supply, distribution of civilian firepower, etc) and can also be used to improve transparency around where collected weapons end up (i.e. a check on weapons ‘leakage’).
6. **Conduct disarmament with the accompaniment of impartial and independent observers:** Communities very clearly and strongly emphasised that disarmament should be conducted without torture, beating, shooting of civilians, detention or theft of property. This could be better ensured if impartial and independent observers were on hand to advise the UPDF and the police, and to prevent incidents of violence.

D. Peace dialogue

Assessment participants argued strongly for a shift away from *ad hoc* peace meetings towards more comprehensive and co-ordinated processes focused on longer-term peace dialogue. This more sustainable approach should build confidence, establish relationships, test preventative measures and eventually begin to transform conflicts. However, it is clear that peace meetings and dialogue processes present a number of challenges and can result in unintended negative impacts. Not enough research and monitoring are being conducted to systematically evaluate the concrete impacts of these activities, especially over the long term. It is not clear how these processes can deal more directly with issues of raids, guns and violence or how agreements and resolutions can be better upheld, monitored and enforced. Although peace dialogue processes seem to be very important they need to be implemented with caution.

Recommendations for improving peace dialogue processes include:

1. **Increase and regularise meetings:** An increase in the frequency and regularity of peace meetings (monthly meetings and even ‘continuous dialogue’ processes were suggested) would provide the basis for more sustainable lines of communications and dispute resolution mechanisms, rather than the *ad hoc* or crisis talks that take place at present. However, it is equally important that peace dialogue processes are better linked to existing local governmental and traditional decision-making mechanisms. This would ensure a wider stakeholder base and enable agreements to be better followed up through the support of both governmental and traditional authorities. It is important to note that increased governmental engagement and official support (through LCs, local administration, the police and UPDF) would not mean that peace processes are ‘taken over’ by the government, but that government would simply be included as a stakeholder in any peace processes.
2. **Actively involve key participants:** Peace meetings are often controlled by ‘gatekeepers’ who “come for the breakfast and travel money” while blocking other more crucial actors from participating. *Karachuna* and warriors, often key spoilers to peace processes, are usually left out of peace meetings and dialogue processes; their participation should be actively sought. Elders and *kraal* leaders who are “not acting peacefully”, and women and *ngimurok* who encourage this type of behaviour should also be targeted for inclusion. Lastly, increasing children’s involvement in peace meetings could be an important means to build a more sustainable basis for conflict transformation. Children’s participation in peace promotion work could even become part of the school curriculum.
3. **Improve transparency and information-sharing about dialogue processes:** There is a great need to improve wider community awareness of the content and results of peace meetings and dialogue processes. Greater awareness would improve confidence in the processes and contribute to commitments being upheld. Communities should be informed about how meetings are organised; improved community feedback and validation mechanisms should be established both during and after meetings; and government, NGOs, traditional authorities and communities should co-ordinate to communicate results and expectations.
4. **Link dialogue processes to practical initiatives:** Dialogue for its own sake is not sustainable. Therefore, these processes also need to be directly linked to practical activities or initiatives that concretely contribute to peacebuilding. This could include income-generation activities, co-operation in the joint use of resources and services, and sporting or cultural events.
5. **Promote more opportunities for inter-personal exchange:** Opportunities to freely meet with members of different ethnic groups (and sometimes even different members from within the same community) and to engage security and local authorities on equal terms are rare and valuable. They are also felt to be crucial building blocks for the Karamojong to establish and improve relationships between ethnic groups, with state institutions and within their own communities. Although they may not have immediate concrete results and need to be managed carefully to avoid unintended negative results, there should be increased support to create more opportunities for these exchanges.

Introduction

KARAMOJA IS AN ARID REGION IN NORTH EASTERN UGANDA (roughly the size of Belgium) that borders Kenya and Sudan. The cow is the centre of the value system of the semi-nomadic pastoralist people who live in this area and cattle raiding is very common. The region has long been characterised by endemic armed violence, violent conflict, illicit small arms proliferation and insecurity. The high levels of armed violence and insecurity have exacerbated widespread poverty and the region suffers from some of the worst development indicators in the world. The Government of Uganda has attempted to both ‘voluntarily’ and ‘forcibly’ disarm the people of Karamoja. While this appears to have reduced violence to some degree in recent years, many residents feel that it has left them more vulnerable than ever and has failed to solve the many underlying causes of conflict and insecurity. Moreover, excessive and unlawful use of force during some disarmament operations has contributed to poor relations between the Ugandan state and the Karamojong.¹⁶

Saferworld believes that all future efforts to address the problems in Karamoja, be they in the security, governance, development or humanitarian realms, must be informed by the needs and experiences of local communities and be based upon a solid grasp of the factors that contribute to both conflict and insecurity in the region. There is continuing debate over whether Karamoja is affected by conflict or insecurity, or a combination of both. For the purpose of this assessment, Saferworld considered conflict dynamics as including relationships of tension and in some cases violent actions, at different levels (inter-personal, intra- and inter-communal, and with the government).¹⁷ Insecurity is defined as the threat or actual experience of violence or damage to person and/or property. It is on this basis that Saferworld conducted a ‘Karamoja conflict and security assessment’ in 2009 as the first phase of its programme on ‘Promoting Peace and Security in Karamoja’.

This assessment aims to inform and strengthen the work of all peacebuilding, security and development actors engaged in Karamoja, by:

- Highlighting community members’ experiences of, and perspectives on, conflict and insecurity, so as to enable programming which responds to, and is sensitive towards, their context and needs
- Increasing understanding of the region and promoting greater investment of resources into efforts to address priority needs and opportunities for peacebuilding and human development
- Providing a ‘baseline’ assessment of the conflict and security situation in Karamoja, against which Saferworld and other actors can monitor changes in the context and seek to track the impact of their work.

¹⁶ For an overview of the broad Karamoja conflict and security context, see op cit Powell 2010.

¹⁷ See glossary for inter alia definitions of ‘conflict’, ‘latent conflict’ and ‘conflict sensitivity’.

This report sets out the detailed results of the assessment and provides recommendations for policymakers and practitioners. Saferworld intends to support key actors in applying some of these recommendations as part of its work in Karamoja.

The assessment provides current information from community level perceptions to inform programming, but does not seek to provide a historical perspective on the Karamoja region, which can be found elsewhere.¹⁸

Approach and methodology¹⁹

The Karamoja context is shaped by a complex range of conflict and security dynamics, all linked to different governance, social, cultural and development issues. It was not possible for this initial assessment to exhaustively address all of these dynamics. Instead, the assessment sought to establish and measure a limited but robust set of baseline indicators that best capture the priority needs of Karamoja stakeholders and denote general trends in the conflict and security situation over the last two years (roughly the two-year period from the beginning of 2008 to the end of 2009). Recommendations contained in the report reflect the situation as researched during the assessment process.

The assessment was conducted in the districts of Moroto and Kotido.. Both districts experience a variety of conflicts, include people from a range of ethnic groups and were also relatively accessible locations in which to conduct the research and test the methodology. It was felt that conducting the initial assessment in these two districts would be the best means of generating information that would have broad relevance across the whole region.

Crucially, the assessment adopted a participatory and needs-based approach throughout the process, from the design through the research and feedback phases. Saferworld collaborated with two community-based organisations, Action for Poverty Reduction and Livestock Management in Karamoja (ARELIMOK), based in Moroto District, and the Warrior Squad Foundation (WSF), based in Kotido District. The assessment focused on three sub-counties in Moroto District and seven sub-counties in Kotido District. The research was conducted over several phases to enable building up relationships and getting to know various stakeholders while gathering important information.

The first step was a literature review,²⁰ conducted in mid-2009 to capture existing knowledge and analysis about the region. This already indicated some contradictions, but also some core areas of agreement among different authors.

The second step was conducting mostly group consultations at the *manyatta* (household) level in June 2009 to frame the key issues. A variety of people were consulted, including women, elders, youth and reformed warriors, children, male and female *ngimurok* (soothsayers/traditional healers) and civic leaders – 300 people in total. Additionally, key informant interviews were held with government, civil society and international actors engaged in Karamoja – some based in the region and others in Kampala. This approach enabled the research team to draw out the key conflict and security dynamics prioritised by Karamojong themselves, supplemented by the views of those working with people in the region.

¹⁸ See, for example, Gray S, "A Memory of Loss: Ecological Politics, Local History and the Evolution of Karimojong Violence", *Human Organization*, 2000, vol. 59 no. 4, pp 401–418; Jabs L, "Where Two Elephants Meet, the Grass Suffers: A Case Study of Intractable Conflict in Karamoja, Uganda", *American Behavioral Scientist*, 2007, vol. 50 no. 11, pp 1498–1519; Knighton B, *The Vitality of Karamojong Religion: Dying Tradition or Living Faith*, (Ashgate, 2005).

¹⁹ This section provides a broad outline of the approach and methodology – please see Annex 1 for further details.

²⁰ Op cit Powell 2010

From this preliminary research, an analytical framework was developed, clearly identifying a conflict typology consisting of three **conflict types**²¹ in the region:²²

Conflict Type A: Conflict and insecurity between ethnic groups The type of conflict cited most frequently by respondents living in or working on Karamoja is that between ethnic groups, often expressed through inter-ethnic cattle raids and other armed raiding.

Conflict Type B: Conflict between the state and Karamojong society Tense and distrustful relations and sporadic armed violence between state forces and the Karamojong, coupled with the historical marginalisation of Karamoja, demonstrate an enduring 'latent conflict' between the state and Karamojong society.

Conflict Type C: Conflicts and insecurity within communities High levels of conflict exist within Karamojong communities and ethnic groups, and social cohesion at the community level is challenged in a number of ways.

Linkages between conflict types

Though obviously interconnected, the assessment did not attempt to synthesise analysis of all three conflict types into one over-arching conflict analysis. There are however, significant overlaps and links between them. Future updates of the assessment will seek to investigate these further.

The majority of existing conflict and security literature on Karamoja focuses on inter-ethnic conflict. However, the consultation phase of the assessment clearly highlighted that the two other conflict types are of great importance. When describing Karamojong society and the Ugandan state as being in a condition of latent conflict (Conflict Type B), the assessment is not suggesting that the Karamojong have organised forces or that the two parties are on the verge of war. Instead, the consultation phase highlighted that the relationship between the two parties is characterised by significant tensions, animosities, grievances and fear. As a consequence, there are periodic outbreaks of armed violence involving state actors and citizens in Karamoja, which contribute to a context of enduring insecurity and mistrust.

Similarly, though often not evident to external actors, the consultation process highlighted high levels of tension and disputes within communities, which undermine stability and cohesion and occasionally causes violence or open conflict (Conflict Type C). These are important dynamics to take into account for any community-focused interventions.

The three conflict types (A, B and C) were used as the basis for the assessment framework. Each conflict type was broken down into a set of '**core dynamics**' – i.e. dynamics which seemed to have a significant bearing on each particular conflict type. Within each conflict type, the dynamics²³ were grouped in terms of:

- behaviours and actions causing, related to or a consequence of conflict and/or peacebuilding
- political, economic, social and cultural systems or structures causing, related to or a consequence of conflict and/or peacebuilding
- values, beliefs, attitudes, ideologies and world views causing, related to or a consequence of conflict and/or peacebuilding.

For each core dynamic, a number of '**indicators**' were developed, providing a baseline against which changes could be measured in the future.

Importantly, the core dynamics and indicators used in the assessment do not exhaustively capture every conflict and security dynamic in Karamoja. However, they were identified, prioritised and developed directly out of a consultative process with Karamojong stakeholders rather than being drawn from an externally imposed and

²¹ The conflict typology is defined in terms of the categories of parties to these conflicts, rather than the possible causes of conflict. This is because the assessment sought to avoid 'prejudging' the conflict causes and rather to investigate the range of factors and dynamics contributing to conflictual or violent relationships between these groups.

²² This typology is somewhat reinforced in an unpublished report on enhancing justice in Karamoja, which noted that "communities identified conflicts among them at different levels, that is, interpersonal within households, in the community between different families, between different communities and between the communities and the government". Muhereza F E, Ossiya D and Ovonji-Odida I, *A Study on Options for Enhancing Access to Justice and Improving Administration of Law and Order in Karamoja: Draft 2*, (unpublished, Kampala: Danida, July 2008), p 59.

²³ This categorisation is drawn on Johan Galtung's 'conflict triangle', see op cit Galtung 1990.

pre-determined set of priorities. They also went beyond just ‘direct physical violence’ and examined a broad spectrum of the systems and values that also contribute to conflict and insecurity in Karamoja. On this basis, Saferworld believes that the dynamics and indicators examined in the assessment represent a robust cross-section of the core conflict and security issues in Karamoja.

The assessment utilised data from community-level group interviews, key informant interviews and existing primary and secondary data to measure the core dynamics and indicators.

The group interview responses cannot be considered a precise statistical representation of Karamojong perception or ‘opinion’. Although a randomised household survey could provide statistically representative results for the whole population, undertaking such a survey was deemed impractical for an assessment of this scope and resources. Instead, structured group interviews were deemed to be the most practical means for generating some form of representative response from Karamojong society. They included all major stakeholder categories, enabled geographical representation across the two target districts and provided enough coverage to claim a credible level of representation of local perspectives and experiences. Group interviews also provide some peer check on ‘over-reporting’, which can occur when utilising methods that are reliant upon self-reporting events. While they do not provide precise statistical representation, the combined responses of the group interviews adequately point out the main directions and tendencies from which to measure the relevant core dynamics and indicators for each conflict type. **Therefore, group interviews provide major ‘sign-posts’ and a ‘barometric’ means for measuring conflict and insecurity in Karamoja that, when the assessment is repeated, should highlight major shifts over time.**

Importantly, Saferworld ‘backed up’ the assessment by conducting a series of community- and district-level validation meetings in Moroto and Kotido districts in March 2010, as well holding a national feedback workshop in Kampala on 29 March 2010, before finalising this report. Community-level and district validation participants were asked to interrogate the findings, analysis and recommendations of the assessment to ensure that they genuinely reflected their perspectives. Participants at the validation meetings were also asked to reflect upon the results and suggest practical recommendations that could be made to government, civil society, international and community actors to improve responses to conflict and insecurity in Karamoja. The national feedback meeting was held to give actors at the national level an opportunity to engage with and question the findings. Discussions at the national meeting also illustrated how many different perspectives exist on conflict and security in Karamoja and the need for more regular sharing of analysis among key actors working in the region.

Presentation of the findings, analysis and recommendations

This report deals with each conflict type in turn and provides detailed findings and analysis, as well as recommendations for practical action to address conflict. For each conflict type (A, B and C), an overall conflict summary is provided, followed by some specific recommendations for action related to that particular conflict. This is followed by the findings and analysis for each core dynamic and the indicators related to each.

Findings for most of the indicators were ‘quantified’ to some degree by presenting results in the form of an index ranging from 1 (‘Very low’) to 5 (‘Very high’). This makes it possible to present perceptions and normally qualitative responses in a more standardised manner so that changes can be measured over time. This should not be seen as statistically representative, but rather as a broad indication of overall trends. The 1 to 5 scoring reflects the *frequency* with which the group interviews gave a particular response.

For example, one of the core dynamics under Conflict Type A (Conflict and insecurity between people of different ethnic groups), was ‘armed violence between people of different ethnic groups’. Indicators 1.1.1 used to measure this dynamic was ‘experience of a *manyatta* member being killed by an attack by someone from another ethnic group’. This indicator has been given a ‘baseline score’ of ‘5/5 – Very high’. This is because in 24 out of the 25 groups interviewed, respondents answered ‘yes’ to Question #26: ‘Has anyone in your *manyatta* been killed in the last 2 years during an attack by a person from another ethnic group?’

CORE DYNAMIC 1.1

Armed violence between people of different ethnic groups

Indicators	Baseline
1.1.1 Experience of a <i>manyatta</i> member being killed by an attack from another ethnic group	Very high (5/5) , with victims being of all genders and ages

As another example, under Conflict Type B (Conflict between the state and Karamojong society), a core dynamic was included on ‘civilian disarmament’, and one of the indicators used to measure this dynamic was ‘public support for the way the government has been doing disarmament over the last two years’. This indicator has been given a ‘baseline score’ of ‘2/5 – Low’. In this case, it was scored ‘2 out of 5’ because only 10 out of the 25 group interviews responded ‘yes’ to the relevant question, namely: “Do you support the way the government has been doing disarmament in the last 2 years?”

Cross-cutting recommendations: Practical action to address conflict at all levels

Because of the large degree of overlap between the dynamics of the three conflict types, cross-cutting recommendations were also formulated for taking practical action to address conflict at all three levels. These are listed at the end of the report and have been organised into four groups: A) protection from violence; B) policing and justice provision; C) civilian disarmament; and D) peace dialogue processes.

The Karamoja security context: an overview

KARAMOJA HAS BECOME MORE SECURE IN THE LAST FEW YEARS in many respects, evidenced by the growth in international and local organisations working there, and the reduced need for road closures due to insecurity. However, compared to the rest of the country, the region still suffers disproportionately from insecurity and violence. The continued violence leads to loss of life and assets, and undermines development in the Karamoja region – resulting in some of the lowest poverty, human development and service delivery indicators in Uganda (see below).

Comparative Humanitarian and Development Indicators²⁴

Indicators	National	Karamoja
Life expectancy [UNDP 2007]	50.4 years	47.7 years
Population living below poverty line [World Bank 2006]	31%	82%
Maternal mortality rate (per 100,000 live births) [UDHS 2006]	435	750
Infant mortality rate (per 1,000 live births) [UNICEF/WHO 2008]	76	105
Under 5 mortality rate (per 1,000 live births) [UNICEF/WHO 2008]	134	174
Global Acute Malnutrition (GAM) rate [MoH/WFP April 2009]	6%	9%
Immunization (children 1–2 years, fully immunized) [UDHS 2006]	46%	48%
Access to sanitation units [UNICEF 2008]	62%	9%
Access to safe water [UNICEF 2009]	63%	40%
Literacy rate [UDHS 2006]	67%	11%

While comprehensive security statistics are difficult to obtain, reports from the field indicate that the continued presence of illegal small arms continue to aid cattle raiding and armed resistance to disarmament operations by the security forces. For example, between September and December 2009, 204 people were killed and 16,997 livestock were lost, during a total of 125 incidents.²⁵ At times these attacks involve groups from across the border in Kenya and Sudan – out of the 125 violent incidents, 7 (5.6%) were identified as cross-border. Between January and March 2010, over 33 human deaths (all men) were registered and over 4,868 livestock were reported lost.²⁶ All of the

²⁴ OCHA, *Focus On Karamoja: Special Report No. 4 January to June 2009*, p 1.

²⁵ CEWARN Country Updates for Uganda, January–April 2010

²⁶ CEWARN Country Updates for Uganda, January–April 2010

conflict corridors in the region were reported active, including those used by the Pokot warriors from Kenya to launch attacks deep into the interior of Moroto District.

In response to these threats, the government's primary focus over the past 10 years or so has been on disarming civilians in Karamoja. While various approaches have been tried, the Uganda People's Defence Forces (UPDF) has repeatedly engaged in phases of forcible disarmament (particularly 'cordon and search' operations), which at various points have led to serious human rights abuses against Karamojong civilians. Since 2006, the government has been working with international donors, Karamojong leaders and civil society to design more comprehensive approaches towards the region – aiming to address the availability of arms, but also the causes of insecurity and poverty. The current framework in place for the region is the Karamoja Integrated Disarmament and Development Programme (KIDDP), which is based on a holistic approach to the region that focuses on providing security, stemming arms flows, recovering weapons from civilians, but also on establishing policing and justice systems, and improving broader service delivery, including in health, education and livelihood diversification.²⁷ The latest version of the KIDDP focuses very much on peaceful and voluntary disarmament, but in reality it is still up to the UPDF to decide whether more forceful methods of disarmament are required.

Many people and organisations working in Karamoja therefore remain concerned about the level of and potential for human rights violations by the UPDF. A recent incident in April 2010, for example, saw the shooting of 41 Jie herdsmen in a punitive action when the UPDF pursued cattle stolen in Kaabong District. In response to this and other allegations, some of which were investigated by the Uganda Human Rights Commission (UHRC), the Jie County Member of Parliament submitted a dossier to the Ugandan President,²⁸ and the Society for Threatened Peoples (STP) wrote to the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights to demand an investigation, arguing that "The brutal action of the Ugandan army is out of all proportion and cannot be justified in any way [...] It is not the first time that the army has acted with excessive violence against Karamojong to combat cattle-theft. Since December 2009 at least 110 Karamojong shepherds have been killed in violent disarming actions and clashes with the Ugandan army."²⁹ On 24 May 2010 the UHRC also published a press release in the *New Vision* newspaper, calling on the UPDF to carry out investigations and to take punitive actions against officers who might be found to have been responsible for these abuses.

In response to these accusations, President Museveni has named a team, led by senior UPDF officials, to investigate the reported killings.³⁰ The president has also in recent months made changes to UPDF commanders in Karamoja, and expressed renewed commitment to establishing peace and security in the region.

²⁷ *Karamoja Integrated Disarmament and Development Programme: Creating Conditions for Promoting Human Security and Development in Karamoja 2007/2008–2009/2010* (Kampala: Government of Uganda, 2008), hereafter 'KIDDP'.

²⁸ Butagira T, "Museveni names team to probe Karamoja killings", *Daily Monitor*, 25 May 2010.

²⁹ Society for Threatened Peoples (GfbV), "Bloody punitive action following theft of cattle: Ugandan Army kills 41 shepherds – Independent investigation of the massacre demanded", 14 April 2010 press release.

³⁰ Op cit Butagira 2010.

Conflict Type A:

Conflict and insecurity between ethnic groups

Conflict summary and recommendations for action

INTER-ETHNIC CONFLICT BETWEEN GROUPS IN KARAMOJA causes high levels of violence, death, injury and destruction. Fear of this violence remains high, although some respondents reported reductions in the use of weapons in inter-ethnic attacks, as well as a reduction in the size of the groups. Elements of pastoralist livelihoods – particularly cattle theft and/or recovery – are at the centre of this violence, although access to other resources such as food aid also plays a role. While there is strong support for developing alternative livelihood opportunities and skills, communities are also keen to make pastoralist livelihoods more viable and less likely to generate conflict. Most Karamojong support a reduction in or removal of the weapons in their society. However, they do not support the way in which civilian disarmament has been conducted in terms of the perceived asymmetrical removal of arms between different communities and the high levels of violence perpetrated against them during disarmament. The UPDF is nevertheless seen as an important actor in preventing or dealing with inter-ethnic attacks, although the relationship between the army and the public needs to be further improved. There is also a strong public desire for a greater police role and presence. Despite the high levels of fear of attack by other ethnic groups, most Karamojong do not see violence as an acceptable way of dealing with other groups, and instead strongly support inter-group dialogue, and intervention by local authorities, as desirable ways to resolve disputes. They also see themselves in terms of Ugandan and Karamojong identities first, and only afterwards as a member of a particular ethnic group.

1. **Improve monitoring and assessment of inter-ethnic conflict:** Better systems are needed to monitor and assess what is actually happening in Karamoja and to measure the impact of programmes and security responses in the region. While some analysis is being generated, e.g. through the Conflict Early Warning (CEWARN) system, this information needs to be added to and made available in a timely manner to inform conflict prevention, security responses and development programmes by government, the security services and NGOs. Communities themselves need to be centrally involved in both this analysis and the formulation of appropriate responses. This should include a specific focus on protection from and support to dealing with sexual violence, predominantly perpetrated against women during inter-ethnic attacks.

2. Promote practical efforts at community-supported and voluntary civilian arms control:

People in Karamoja support the principle of civilian arms control, but not the way in which it has been carried out thus far. The KIDDP commits the Government of Uganda to pursue consultative weapons control, working with the communities and police. These approaches have the potential to make significant progress in controlling weapons in Karamoja, while reducing the risk of further human rights violations through forcible disarmament and cordon and search operations, and should be vigorously pursued.

3. Promote co-operative inter-ethnic activities and joint use of resources and public services:

If done in a conflict-sensitive way, opportunities exist to promote peaceful interaction between different ethnic groups in Karamoja through development programmes and service provision. Communities in Karamoja see trading and peace meetings as very good ways of encouraging peaceful interaction between ethnic groups. Inter-ethnic marriage, sacrifices and religious events, sports, joint grazing of livestock and sharing of markets and services (such as health, education and water) were also seen as potentially contributing to inter-ethnic co-operation. In order to have the most positive impact on conflict and peace dynamics, such initiatives will have to be carefully monitored and communities closely involved in shaping and monitoring such programmes and services.

4. Support inter-ethnic confidence-building, dialogue and long-term conflict transformation:

Inter-ethnic peace meetings should be encouraged and supported as a basis for building mutual confidence and for collaborating with each other and the security services (both police and military) to deal with security threats like cattle raids. Responses in the assessment, such as a near universal rejection of arms, violence and raiding and very strong support for dialogue and peace meetings, indicate the potential for a much deeper and more fundamental transformation of inter-ethnic relations. Though these processes should be dictated and led by the Karamojong, ultimately they will need external resources and support if they are to succeed.

5. Embrace pastoralism as part of the foundation for peace and development in Karamoja:

While cattle raiding is intimately linked with pastoralist practices, the incentives for raiding can be reduced if pastoralism becomes more viable as a livelihood. The ecology and society of Karamoja suggest that pastoralist livelihoods are likely to remain at the centre of life and prosperity for the foreseeable future. Therefore, stakeholders need to find ways of enhancing support to livestock-based livelihoods, rather than promoting sedentarism. This could include animal-rearing, cross-breeding and livestock nutrition projects that improve the quality and health of livestock, as well as investment in services and industries related to livestock. There is a need for a national pastoralism policy that includes much more positive support for pastoralist livelihoods. Many respondents cited the success of pastoralist-friendly policies in northern Kenya, which have enabled sustainable pastoralism, including through good irrigation programmes and growing of robust crops.

6. Implement water and food relief programmes in a more conflict-sensitive way:

While there are different opinions about the exact causal relationship between access to food relief and water on the one hand, and inter-ethnic conflict on the other, these factors do seem to be linked. It is vital that distribution of these resources is sensitive to local conflict dynamics. Those involved in planning relief efforts need to ensure that water and food relief projects do not become sources of contention between ethnic groups, but also that these projects are implemented in ways that can actually contribute to peacebuilding processes. In addition, food distributions need to be planned and delivered in ways that ensure the safety of both distributors and recipients.

7. Invest in income-generating activities that are labour-intensive, target youth and promote co-operative interaction between ethnic groups:

Given the challenging economic and ecological environment in Karamoja, continued attention needs to be paid to creating additional income opportunities, supported by the relevant education

and vocational training. Investment in new infrastructure could promote economic development and create employment if well-designed. Reformed warriors and other male youth are a particularly important target group for income-generating activities or 'make work' projects. This is not to say that young women should not benefit – as changing dynamics in gender identities means that they are also increasingly able to pursue education and employment outside the household – but masculinity in Karamoja is still closely tied to raiding, a fact supported by women's expectations that men should raid to obtain sufficient cattle for the family. Providing young men with more opportunities for constructive economic engagement would therefore give them alternatives to raiding, while still empowering them economically. This may even contribute to changing women's attitudes towards raiding as a key component of masculinity.

8. Utilise Karamojong identity as a means for promoting unity and peacebuilding:

Although ethnic identities are important components of life in Karamoja, it is the wider Karamojong and Ugandan identities that resonated as most important in the assessment. These 'unifying' identities could be utilised as an important peacebuilding tool and help to mitigate the inter-ethnic characteristics of conflict.

1. Behaviour

CORE DYNAMIC 1.1

Armed violence between ethnic groups

The level of violence between ethnic groups in Karamoja is believed to be **HIGH**. This violence results in the deaths of all categories of people and is perpetrated primarily with firearms.

Indicators	Baseline
1.1.1 Experience of a <i>manyatta</i> member being killed during an attack from another ethnic group	Very high (5/5) , with victims being of all genders and ages
1.1.2 Experience of a <i>manyatta</i> member being sexually assaulted during an attack by another ethnic group	High (4/5) , predominantly targeting women
1.1.3 Tools of violence used in inter-ethnic attacks	Firearms (5/5) predominate as the tool most frequently responsible for death during inter-ethnic attacks (followed by traditional weapons as very low frequency), suggesting the potential for a high lethality of violence.
1.1.4 Experience of theft during attacks from other ethnic groups	Very high (5/5) . Significantly, this involves the theft of not just livestock (5/5), but food (5/5) and personal items (5/5), sometimes including money.

Q.26 Has anyone in your *manyatta* been killed in the last 2 years during an attack by a person from another ethnic group?

- Yes – Very high (5/5)
- No – Very low (1/5)

Q.27 Which categories of people were killed?

- Men – Very high (5/5)
- Women – Very high (5/5)
- Children – High (4/5)

Q.30 Which categories of people were sexually assaulted?

- Women – High (4/5)
- Children – Low (2/5)
- Men – Very low (1/5)

There has been a long history of violent conflict between ethnic groups in Karamoja, most commonly characterised by armed raids between different ethnic communities to steal or recover livestock, or to otherwise incur retribution on other ethnic groups.

Respondents felt the experience of violence between ethnic groups to be high. 24 out of 25 interview groups had members who reported that someone from their *manyatta* had been killed during a raid by another ethnic group in the last two years. These attacks resulted in the deaths of equal numbers of men and women, adults and children. Although it was very difficult to formulate means for measuring levels of sexual violence during these attacks (due to the pilot nature of the assessment and the complexities involved in approaching this sensitive issue³²), interview groups reported high occurrences of sexual violence during inter-ethnic raids. Such attacks predominantly targeted women but were also sometimes perpetrated against children and in a few cases against men.

³² The assessment found it difficult to explore the issue of sexual violence and violence against women in much detail. During the consultation phase, Saferworld was advised that some questions were too sensitive to ask in group interviews and in public settings. More challenging was the fact that certain forms of criminal sexual violence were seen by some actors as acceptable – or at least common – practice in Karamoja. Terms such as 'rape' were problematic because Karamojong respondents define rape in different ways.

Motivations for raiding

During the consultation phase, focus groups identified specific motivations behind raiding, including:

- revenge for the murder of relatives or retaliation for raids inflicted upon them (“revenge attacks are normally indiscriminate and ruthless”);
- anger over a sense of uselessness from being unemployed or because there is “nothing else to do”;
- out of pride, because raiding is a path to gain riches and earn respect in the community – “they raid to have a large number of animals and be recognised as a man; they want to earn the respect that comes with having a large number of animals”;
- to gather enough cows to pay bride prices – “they raid to find animals to pay handsome bride prices, to avoid richer guys taking away their wives and children”;³¹
- to pay debts – youth often steal cattle and property in order to pay for beer bought on credit or to pay fines that have been levied on them in the settlement of disputes (such as killing a neighbour’s animal);
- encouragement by women and wives – women have a central role in encouraging raiding: wives supposedly “abuse” husbands who stay at home while others are acquiring wealth through raiding (“men who have no animals are called ‘dogs’ by their wives”) and women conduct great celebrations when men return from successful raids;
- hunger – “hunger is the reason people have failed to have peace because if they don’t have enough to eat they are forced into raiding and stealing – and this year’s harvest is going to be very poor”;
- simply for the sake of it, and “rebellious against their parents’ advice”.

Violence during inter-ethnic attacks was perpetrated predominantly with firearms, making the potential lethality of violence very high. While group interview participants attributed inter-ethnic attacks predominantly to raiding for the purpose of stealing livestock, it is important to note that all types of property were targeted for theft during raids: food and personal items just as much as prized livestock. Money itself was also sometimes a specific target of theft during raids, which seems significant for a society where livelihoods have traditionally been based on cattle as opposed to a cash economy. This may indicate a change in what assets are regarded as economically important. While the theft of firearms was reported to be negligible, this may have been because it is illegal to possess firearms.

CORE DYNAMIC 1.2

Security perspectives and measures taken in response to violence between ethnic groups

Ugandan state security actors and Karamojong communities have contradictory views as to what measures should be taken to address violence between ethnic groups.

State security actors believe that the security situation in Karamoja has stabilised, and report that the state has shifted its security response from ‘static’ protective measures towards increasing preventative patrolling and improving incident response capabilities. However, amongst Karamojong civilians, restricted freedom of movement to undertake many vital activities due to fear of inter-ethnic attacks is VERY HIGH. This suggests that the overall fear of inter-ethnic attacks in the region is high and that the state security response is either not working as efficiently as intended or is not reassuring Karamojong people that they are safe to move around.

³¹ The payment of bride price happens at a number of points during a marriage, not just at its beginning. Remaining portions of dowries are expected to be paid when wives become pregnant, and when they deliver their first child, or at later times to ‘confirm’ marriages. Development actors interviewed for this assessment did not think that bride price was a major factor in raiding any longer.

Indicators	Baseline
1.2.1 Government strategies in place for protecting cattle and property	UPDF-protected <i>kraal</i> system closing down – not seen as an effective long-term strategy and resulted in unintended consequences that may have contributed to raiding. UPDF Strategy now focused on: ■ enforcing civilian disarmament ■ improved capability for mobile patrol and response to raids ■ improving civil-military relations
1.2.2 Fear of inter-ethnic attacks restricts freedom of movement	Very high (5/5) for movement to access land for grazing and cultivation Moderate (3/5) for movement to access health, education and trading centres

Government security perspectives and responses

The security perspectives and responses of state actors such as the UPDF, the Ugandan Police, the District Internal Security Officers (DISOs) and the UHRC remain important measures of the context. State actors interviewed for the assessment reported that state responses to insecurity and conflict between ethnic communities have shifted from a static and protective stance to one that is more proactive and responsive. ‘Protected *kraals*’ were established by the UPDF to provide direct security for livestock when there was rampant cattle raiding involving killings and burning of homesteads in previous years, but these *kraal* are now being closed down.³³

The state actors interviewed for this assessment believed that the security situation had stabilised in the past few years and that the protected *kraals* were no longer necessary. In many ways, they felt that the protected *kraal* system was a ‘quick-fix’ rather than a long-term response, and that it had a number of weaknesses. Because the Karamojong sent their children to look after livestock at the protected *kraals*, the *karachuna* did not need to take care of the livestock and were free to engage in raiding.³⁴ Secondly, because the Karamojong children could not adequately care for the cattle at the protected *kraals*, and because the UPDF wanted to demonstrate good civil-military relations, the UPDF committed troops, resources and time to caring for the animals. In this way, protected *kraals* were seen to ‘pin down’ the UPDF and diminish their ability to rapidly and flexibly deploy to deter and combat raiders. Ultimately, the protected *kraals* were seen by some state actors interviewed to have actually contributed to increased raiding. For example, there were complaints that Jie communities who placed cattle under UPDF protection were then freed up to “terrorise the Turkana”. During the national feedback meeting, a number of state actors informally acknowledged that protected *kraals* were also being disbanded because they prevented the UPDF from collecting arms from raiders.

The consultation and validation phases of the assessment revealed that many Karamojong have reservations about the effectiveness of the protected *kraals* approach. In particular, the *kraals* were seen to result in overgrazing (due to their static nature) and to restrict the ability of owners to access their cows and move them for sale or migration. The recent literature also highlights that protected *kraals* can have a number of negative consequences for livestock. The Feinstein International Center reported that ‘The high concentration of animals has resulted in a higher prevalence and more rapid spread of disease, including foot rot and Contagious Bovine Pluero Pneumonia (CBPP). Furthermore, the animals are causing environmental damage as they are grazing in limited areas.’³⁵

³³ Although there were still an estimated 38 protected *kraals* in Karamoja as of June 2009 according to OCHA. Op cit OCHA 2009, p 1

³⁴ For a brief overview of how *karachuna* have become increasingly independent and are viewed as a security threat by the state, see op cit Mutengesa and Hendrickson, 2008.

³⁵ Op cit Stites et al 2009, p 25.

The detrimental effect of the *kraals* on livestock health were also noted in the April 2009 OCHA-supported inter-agency assessment³⁶ on protected *kraals* in Kaabong District. The assessment raised several further points of concern, notably that the *kraals* resulted in environmental stress (including water points), displacement of people and deprivation of land for agricultural production. It also became more difficult for people to access animal products like meat, ghee and milk, because only specific people were allowed by UPDF orders to enter the *kraals*. In addition, 'large numbers of children working in the Protected *Kraals* are not attending school; over 60 per cent of school-aged children in visited communities were not enrolled in schools, while between 35 per cent and 45 per cent were forced to drop out in part because they have to take care of the animals.'³⁷ Being present in the *kraals* meant the children had easy access to animal products like milk, but it also made them vulnerable to attacks on the *kraals* or grazing areas.

State actors interviewed reported that while protected *kraals* had been disbanded, Karamojong civilians still settled their livestock near UPDF barracks, and livestock could be brought to the UPDF if they came under particular threat. While they believed that this reflected an improved overall security situation, it also represents a strategic shift by the state towards becoming more proactive and responsive. They reported that the UPDF was now focused on increasing its ability to rapidly deploy in order to respond to attacks and catch raiders in the wilderness, and on civil-military relations with the Karamojong. This includes providing medical assistance, hospital repair and transportation during peace days but also preventative measures such as assistance in the branding and registration of cattle. The UPDF was also reported to be prioritising civilian disarmament as its fundamental task for contributing to a more secure and peaceful Karamoja.

Karamojong security perspectives and responses

Q.10 Does fear of being attacked by people from other ethnic groups prevent you from doing any of the following activities?

- travelling to gardens or land for cultivation – Very high (5/5)
- moving cattle to grazing land – Very high (5/5)
- travelling to health clinics – Moderate (3/5)
- sending children to school – Moderate (3/5)
- travelling to towns or trading centres – Moderate (3/5)

While the situation may have stabilised, the fear of attack from other ethnic groups was strong amongst Karamojong group interviewees. The most dramatic indicator of fear is the degree to which Karamojong civilians self-restrict their movements. Almost all interview groups believed that fear of attack from other ethnic groups significantly restricted movements necessary for cultivation and cattle grazing, while some felt that fear of attack restricted movement necessary for medical treatment, education and trading. This strongly suggests that normal daily life in Karamoja is highly disrupted – if not by actual violence, then at least by the perceived threat of violence between ethnic groups. It could also indicate that violence and insecurity between ethnic groups in Karamoja particularly affects agricultural and livestock areas.

"We are not getting enough support from government and NGOs. We have been left on our own even by our husbands who live in fear because of the army and attacks from enemies... We spend all our time looking for food and it is difficult during drought... Widows have been accused of bad luck when their husbands are arrested and killed."

Women's focus group, consultation phase

³⁶ Op cit OCHA 2009, p 2. The OCHA report noted "Due to livestock congestion and long distances to water and pasture points, high mortality rates, particularly of calves and culled animals, were being registered. A majority of Kraals with large livestock populations estimated losing an average of 100 animals a month since November 2008 due to starvation and diseases. The incidence of diseases such as East Coast Fever, goat plague, Contagious Bovine Pleuro Pneumonia (CBPP) and mange was reported to have increased since the Protected Kraals were established. For Kraals located near Kidepo National Park, the risk of cross-spreading of vector-borne diseases such as Nagana was also cited."

³⁷ Ibid.

2. Systems and structures

CORE DYNAMIC 2.1 Supply and demand of illicit arms

There are MODERATE to HIGH levels of supply and demand for arms amongst civilians in Karamoja; both contribute to a high capacity for lethality in inter-ethnic conflict.

The situation is characterised by:

- lack of credible data on arms possession, flows and demand;
- denial by civilians that they own weapons, although gunshots occur weekly and even daily;
- a strong sense amongst civilians that they should not possess guns, but that they still need them to protect themselves and their livestock – mainly from other ethnic groups
- Kalashnikov/AK 47 variant rifles are the predominant weapons, possessed mainly by young males;
- it is difficult for civilians to obtain weapons, but they are obtained from rogue soldiers and police, cross-border arms flows and weapons traders.

Indicators	Baseline
2.1.1 Civilians seen in the community with firearms	Almost never (1/5) , suggesting that the level of civilian arms possession was very low
2.1.2 Government estimates of civilian firearms possession	Moderate levels of civilian firearms possession: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ■ no confirmed official statistics, only personal estimations ■ number of weapons estimated in the low thousands
2.1.3 Frequency of gunshots heard in the community	Weekly on average, with almost half of interview groups having heard gunshots on a daily basis
2.1.4 Types of small arms seen in the possession of civilians in the community	Kalashnikov/AK 47 variant rifles were the most commonly seen small arms in civilian possession
2.1.5 Types of small arms collected from communities	Kalashnikov/AK 47 variant rifles were the main types of small arms collected during civilian disarmament
2.1.6 <i>Government perception:</i> who possesses small arms in the community?	Young males aged 18–35, particularly the <i>karachuna</i> , based on who has been disarmed so far
2.1.7 <i>Communities perception:</i> why do civilians feel they need small arms?	Protection from other ethnic group. High 4/5 Protection of livestock. High 4/5 Attack other ethnic groups. Low 1/5 Protection from other people within their community. Low 1/5
2.1.8 <i>Government perception:</i> why do civilians feel they need small arms?	To conduct raids for commercial and cultural reasons, including for status and acquiring cattle for bride price To protect themselves and cattle from raids and attacks from other ethnic groups, as well as to conduct revenge raids and attacks
2.1.9 <i>Communities perception:</i> Owning a small arm makes you safer	Moderate (3/5)
2.1.10 <i>Communities perception:</i> Civilians should not possess small arms	High (4/5) , most people felt that civilians should not be allowed to possess guns
2.1.11 <i>Communities perception:</i> sources of illicit civilian small arms?	Top two sources: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ■ UPDF or police: Medium (3/5) ■ Weapons traders: Low (2/5)
2.1.12 <i>Government's perception:</i> sources of illicit civilian small arms?	Top two sources: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ■ cross border flows ■ UPDF and police – but only from theft, battlefield captures and during past national crises

Indicators <i>continued</i>	Baseline <i>continued</i>
2.1.13 <i>Communities perception:</i> how easy it is for civilians to obtain small arms?	Difficult/very difficult for civilians to obtain small arms
2.1.14 <i>Government's perception:</i> how easy it is for civilians to obtain small arms?	Very difficult/impossible for civilians to obtain small arms

Illicit small arms possession is often seen to be at the crux of violent conflict and insecurity in Karamoja, increasing the quantity and potential lethality of inter-ethnic violence.³⁸ This perspective was reinforced in the consultation phase of the assessment. For this reason, illicit small arms were included as an important driver and measure of inter-ethnic conflict in Karamoja.

The issue of illicit small arms possession is complex. Rather than focusing purely on possession numbers and flows of arms (or 'supply' dynamics) in Karamojong communities, we developed a number of indicators that were intended to shed more light on the reasons why people possess illicit arms (or the 'demand' dynamics). Understanding demand dynamics is central to developing arms control measures. Even if all feasible measures could be implemented to cut off illicit arms supplies and remove all weapons from civilians, this would not address the deep-rooted dynamics that fuel demand. Although a vicious circle links supply and demand, a means of supply will always be found as long as there is demand for arms. However, investigating demand-side dynamics is highly challenging. Because civilian arms possession is illegal, conversation about ownership is highly constrained by fear of arrest or sanction. Discussions in many communities indicated a strong reluctance to speak about illicit weapons possession for fear of being turned in to the authorities by 'spies' and 'informers'.

Supply of illicit small arms

In group interviews, participants reported almost never seeing civilians carrying guns in their communities. In only two group interviews did participants report seeing civilians with any small arms in the last two years.

When asked even more directly about the number of people who possess guns in their communities, 23 out of 25 interview groups believed that no-one possessed a gun (the two exceptions reported that they 'Did not know').

During the validation phase, Karamojong were more forthcoming in discussing weapons possession. Workshops confirmed that, because of the Ugandan government's disarmament processes, civilians do not move around carrying guns freely anymore. This is in and of itself a successful form of arms control. As discussions developed, there were many admissions that some people in communities do still own guns and regularly shoot back when they come under attack during raids. Furthermore, almost half of all interview groups reported hearing gunshots on a daily basis. Although these could have been shots fired by state security forces or raiders, it represents such a high frequency that it is hard to believe that they do not include a significant number of shots fired from local civilian arms.

Interestingly, although only two interview groups acknowledged having seen civilians with weapons in their communities over the past two years, five interview groups reported the types of small arms they had seen in the possession of civilians – Kalashnikovs and AK variant rifles were the most commonly seen small arms. Although not conclusive in themselves, responses for gunshots and weapon types reinforce the impression that group interviewees may not have been entirely forthcoming when asked directly about weapons possession.

Q.89 In the past two years, have you seen civilians carrying small arms in your sub-county?

- Never – Very high (5/5)
- Almost Never – Very low (1/5)
- Monthly – Very low (1/5)
- Weekly – Never (0/5)
- Daily – Never (0/5)

Q.91 How many people living in your sub-county do you think currently own a small arm?

- None at all – Very high (5/5)
- Not very many (e.g. only a small number of people have them) – None (0/5)
- Many (e.g. most *manyattas* have one) – None (0/5)
- Very many (e.g. every *manyatta* has at least one) – None (0/5)
- Don't know – Very low (1/5)

Q.87 How often during the last two years have you heard gunshots in the sub-county where you live?

- Every day – Medium (3/5)
- At least once a week – Very low (1/4)
- Once a month or so – Very low (1/5)
- Almost never – Very low (1/5)
- Never heard a gunshot in last 2 years – Very low (1/5)

³⁸ For further exploration of the relationship between illicit small arms, insecurity and conflict in Karamoja, see Bevan J, *Crisis in Karamoja: Armed Violence and the Failure of Disarmament in Uganda's Most Deprived Region*, (Small Arms Survey, 2008).

Q.92 Over the past two years, which types of small arms have you seen being carried by civilians in your sub-county?

- Kalashnikov/AK 47 rifles – Very low (1/5)
- G3 rifles – Very low (1/5)
- submachine guns (9mm) – Very low (1/5)
- light machine gun (5.56 or 7.62mm) – Very low (1/5)
- heavy machine guns (12.7mm) – Never (0/5)
- rocket-propelled grenades (RPG) – Never (0/5)
- mortars – Never (0/5)
- mines/grenades – Never (0/5)
- don't know – Very low (1/5)
- refused to answer – Very low (1/5)
- Blank – Medium (3/5)

Q.96 If you or someone in your sub-county wanted to obtain a small arm, how easy would this be?

- Very difficult – Medium (3/5)
- Difficult – Medium (3/5)
- Easy – Never (0/5)
- Very easy – Very low (1/5)

Q.93 Why do you think some civilians might want to own small arms?

- Protection from other ethnic group – High 4/5
- Protection of livestock – High 4/5
- Attack other ethnic groups – Low 1/5
- Protection from other people within their community – Low 1/5

There are few credible, publicly available official statistics regarding illicit small arms possession in Karamoja. When security actors were interviewed, some claimed that “people are no longer acquiring arms” and “don’t have illegal arms”. Others estimated that illicit civilian weapons possession ranged from just several thousand in the region with most being hidden and inactive, to illicit weapons being “all over Karamoja” with some people having been disarmed more than four times. The most recent and perhaps the most accurate statistic we were able to obtain, was that 28,040 arms had been collected as of July 2010, according to the Regional Disarmament Committee Secretariat for Karamoja.

All officials interviewed however, confirmed that civilian disarmament remains a central government priority in Karamoja. Based on the types of weapons collected through disarmament exercises, civilians were thought to possess Kalashnikov/AK 47 variants, G3 and other self-loading rifles and a few ‘homemade’ guns, almost exclusively in the possession of male youths aged 15–35 years.³⁹

According to the interview groups, sources within the UPDF and police were the most ready means for civilians to acquire arms; however, the details of how exactly these ‘transfers’ are made could not be explored due to the sensitivity of the issue. Some security actors interviewed vehemently disputed that any state weapons ever make their way illicitly into the hands of civilians in Karamoja. Others suggested that this only occurs when arms are stolen from soldiers and the police; taken from them if they are killed during raids (i.e. as ‘battlefield losses’); or sold on to civilians by police or UPDF deserters. One interviewee pointed out that large numbers of previous government weapon stocks are in the hands of Karamojong civilians not from current “leakage” but as a result of transfers that occurred during previous regime crises. Thousands of arms were looted or passed to civilians from the security services and armed groups in 1979 with the overthrow of Idi Amin, in 1985 when Milton Obote was deposed, and in 1986 when the Uganda National Liberation Army (UNLA) was removed from power. This same interviewee believed that leakage from state stocks now is “minimal” and that it is being “contained effectively”. During further validation consultations, other security actors informally acknowledged that there might be instances of rogue individuals in the UPDF selling ammunition but that this is not the practice of the army as a whole. During the validation phase, community and district representatives also pointed out that raiders often wear new UPDF and police uniforms when they attack, for which there could only be two sources.

Interview groups identified ‘weapon traders’ as the next most prevalent source of illicit arms, but also noted ‘foreign countries’ (i.e. Sudan and Kenya) as places where civilians could sometimes obtain small arms. Security actors interviewed confirmed that significant numbers of illicit arms are available across the Ugandan border in Sudan and Kenya.

Despite identifying these various sources, group interviewees and security actors interviewed agreed that it was difficult for Karamojong civilians to obtain illicit arms.

Demand for illicit small arms

Civilian demand for small arms is driven by the need to protect animals and to repel attacks from other ethnic groups. Almost all interview groups (4/5) ranked these as the two main reasons they would want to possess a gun. Very few respondents said they would acquire guns to conduct livestock raids, and other economic activities.

Interviews with security actors also highlighted a wide range of perceived ‘demand’ dynamics behind civilian possession of illicit small arms. Although not all agreed on this point, many security actors interviewed did not believe that illicit weapons were obtained for self-protection or reasons of security, as they felt that the Ugandan state

³⁹ One interviewee spoke about how weapons were actually family property and that once a man reaches about 45 years of age, he passes on the gun to the young men in the family.

was or should be responsible for this function. They certainly felt that Karamojong civilians did not need to protect themselves from threats by state forces. Instead, they focused on the social and economic dynamics of raiding; they argued that Karamojong civilians obtain weapons in order to conduct revenge attacks against other ethnic groups and to raid cattle for commercial and cultural reasons, as well as for replenishing depleted cattle stocks. Cattle raiding was seen as becoming big business and a means for generating cash income.⁴⁰ Cattle raiding was also seen as an important means by which to obtain the cattle numbers necessary to pay 'bride prices', for increasing social status and for other cultural practices.⁴¹

Q.88 Do you think people in your sub-county feel safer if they own a small arm?

- Yes – Medium (3/5)
- No – Medium (3/5)

Q.94 Do you think that it should be legal for a civilian to possess small arms or light weapons?

- Yes – Low (2/5)
- No – High (4/5)

Despite the demand dynamics described above, which suggest that illicit small arms possession in Karamojong society should be high, group interviews demonstrated that there are mixed feelings towards possession of arms. Only about half of interview groups felt that owning a gun makes you 'feel safer' and most felt that owning a gun should be illegal.

Interestingly, during the validation phase a number of respondents indicated that possession of a weapon significantly decreased your personal security because it made you a target of the UPDF and the police.

CORE DYNAMIC 2.2

Civilian disarmament

Thousands of weapons have been collected and seized since the first civilian disarmament programme was launched in Karamoja in 2001, but after almost a decade of civilian disarmament, high levels of armed violence persist, and almost nothing has been done to address the underlying causes of the violence. Karamojong believe that the way in which disarmament has been carried out has increased insecurity, made communities more vulnerable to attack from ethnic groups and involved significant levels of state violence against civilians. Nonetheless, there is significant support for disarmament in principle within Karamojong society that should be capitalised upon.

Indicators	Baseline
2.2.1 Your ethnic group has been 'more disarmed' than neighbouring ethnic groups	High (4/5)
2.2.2 Disarmament has left your ethnic group vulnerable to attack from others	Very high (5/5)
2.2.3 People feel more secure as a result of the disarmament process	Varied , though tending marginally towards 'slightly less secure' (appearing to apply to a slightly greater extent in Kotido District than in Moroto District)
2.2.4 Disarmament operations in the last two years have involved violence against civilians	High (4/5)
2.2.5 Government perception of disarmament success	Disarmament has been proceeding well, particularly in the last two years characterised by: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ■ no open carriage of weapons by warriors ■ fewer guns used in raids ■ casualties no longer "flood the hospitals" ■ criminals now moving without bullets
2.2.6 Number of arms collected during ongoing disarmament programme	28,040 arms collected as of July 2010, according to the Regional Disarmament Committee Secretariat for Karamoja
2.2.7 Public support for the idea of trying to create a gun-free Karamoja	Very high (5/5)

⁴⁰ For further exploration of the 'commercialisation' of cattle raiding, see op cit Bevan 2008, pp 27–31; op cit Stites et al 2009, p 5.

⁴¹ For a brief overview of the various socio-cultural and other dynamics behind cattle raiding, see Jabs 2007, pp 1507–1509.

Indicators <i>continued</i>	Baseline <i>continued</i>
2.2.8 Public support for the way the government has been carrying out disarmament programmes over the last two years	Low (2/5) , particularly among youth (1/5)
2.2.9 Public support for the government to continue disarmament programmes	Very strong (5/5)

At the time of the assessment, civilian disarmament remained at the heart of government responses to violent conflict and insecurity in Karamoja and 'forced' disarmament activities were ongoing across the region. Because the effectiveness of disarmament activities in reducing the possession, supply and demand of illicit civilian weapons can have a direct impact on the Karamojong's capacity for inter-ethnic violence, civilian disarmament is an important measure of inter-ethnic conflict in Karamoja. However, Karamojong perspectives and support for disarmament activities are equally important measures of inter-ethnic conflict – if Karamojong society as a whole does not support civilian disarmament activities, it is highly unlikely that these will ever succeed, and arms possession will remain a contributing factor to inter-ethnic conflict.

Current Karamojong perspectives of civilian disarmament

According to the interview groups, civilian disarmament strategies and operations by the authorities have not had the intended ameliorative impact on the Karamojong's perceived level of threat from inter-ethnic conflict and violence. Within all ethnic groups, there were very strong perceptions that disarmament had taken place asymmetrically (whether intentionally or not) and that their own ethnic group had been disarmed to a greater degree than others. As a result, many firmly believe that disarmament has left them vulnerable to attack from other ethnic groups. During the district-level validations, some local authorities accepted that certain sub-counties had been more disarmed than others. Katikakile in Moroto was given as an example of a sub-county that had not been disarmed as much as the rest of the district, due to difficulties of access and terrain.⁴²

Q.100 Do you feel more or less secure as a result of the disarmament processes?

- Much more secure – Very low (1/5)
- Slightly more secure – Very low (1/5)
- No difference – Very low (1/5)
- Slightly less secure – Low (2/5)
- Much less secure – Low (2/5)

However, whether people feel generally more or less secure overall as a result of disarmament varies. In Moroto District, the extent to which interview groups felt less secure was moderate whereas in Kotido District it was high. Overall, a slightly greater proportion of participants felt that disarmament has made them less secure rather than more secure.

In addition, many interview groups cited examples from the last two years where disarmament operations have involved violence against civilians. Such violence is very damaging to the relationship between the state and Karamojong society (discussed at greater length in Conflict Type B).

Karamojong support for disarmament

The group interviews demonstrated ongoing Karamojong hostility to the disarmament operations that have been carried out so far by the Ugandan state. Support for the way in which state actors conducted disarmament between 2007 and 2009 was low (and particularly low amongst Karamojong male youth).

Importantly, while people do not broadly support the way in which the state has been carrying out disarmament, there was almost universal support in group interviews for the idea of trying to create a 'gun-free' Karamoja. Additionally, almost all interview groups believed that the disarmament process should continue. These responses strongly suggest that the state needs to adapt its approach to disarmament through a

Q.98 Do you support the way in which government has been carrying out disarmament operations in the last two years?

- Yes – Low (2/5)
- No – Medium (3/5)
- Refused to answer/Blank – Very low (1/5)

⁴² Stated at the validation meeting in Moroto on 2 March 2010.

process of consultation with communities, with the aim of improving Karamojong support for and participation in disarmament processes.

Current government perspectives on civilian disarmament

Among security actors interviewed for the assessment, civilian disarmament in Karamoja was thought to have been quite successful. There was a belief that there had been tremendous though gradual change in the levels of weapons possession and armed violence since disarmament programmes began in 2001. Disarmament, led by the UPDF with support from the police, was thought to have been carried out in equal measure across different areas and was ongoing everywhere in the region; interviewees reported that arms were being collected every day and that security was increasing. One actor suggested that the disarmament process had a success rate of collecting “85% of all weapons” in the region so far. Another stated that 27,119 arms had been collected as of 9 October 2009 according to his records. Finally, the Regional Disarmament Committee Secretariat said in June 2010 that 28,040 weapons had been collected throughout all disarmament phases in Karamoja.

Aside from numbers of weapons collected, security actors pointed to other indicators of success. Before the disarmament operations began a decade ago, the UPDF and others would regularly encounter large groups of armed warriors; this is no longer the case as raiding groups can now only put together a handful of guns. Even ‘hardened criminals’ were now lacking ammunition. They no longer saw casualties “flooding” the hospitals. The wider opinion of those security actors interviewed was that the last two years of disarmament (2007–2009) had been the most successful and the most common incidents now are ‘criminal activities,’ which are not specific to Karamoja.

According to security actors interviewed, civilian disarmament in Karamoja takes place on an ongoing and regular basis under the framework of the KIDDP and was coordinated with others under the KIDDP. Therefore, disarmament was not an on-going ‘operation,’ but part of the UPDF’s regular work. There seem to be no specific disarmament strategies or plans: the UPDF responds to events as they arise, and tailors its actions according to intelligence and information collected through civil and military structures, as well as from sources in the community. One local human rights actor interviewed noted that the UPDF is still conducting a lot of cordon and search operations, but has shifted to an intelligence-led system utilising informants. The UPDF call this a “popular intelligence network”, whereby disarmament is supposedly community-guided. However, this approach runs the risk of informants being targeted by their communities.

In the past, the UPDF has been criticised for ‘cordon and search’ tactics that have reportedly involved significant disruption of local life, violence against civilians and human rights violations.⁴³ One security actor interviewed argued that the UPDF’s improved human rights-based operating procedures meant that any continuing human rights violations and incidences of unlawful violence were the consequence of individual negligence and ill-discipline and did not stem from a purposeful strategy of the military as a whole.

Security actors interviewed pointed out that the UPDF had faced significant resistance to civilian disarmament, including violent responses from armed Karamojong. The UPDF regularly exchanges fire with armed Karamojong and there have been deaths on both the government and civilian sides. The UPDF continues to practice cordon and search tactics, although these have been modified as armed Karamojong became familiar with the original cordon and search tactics and began avoiding the UPDF, using wilderness ‘hideouts’. The UPDF then began occupying those hideouts (including in the mountains) and conducting cordon and search in those areas.

⁴³ Explored in detail in Human Rights Watch, “Get the gun!” *Human rights violations by Uganda’s National Army in law enforcement operations in Karamoja region* (New York: September 2007), UNHCHR, *Update Report on the Situation of Human Rights in Karamoja, from 29 October to 15 November 2006*, (Kampala: UNHCHR, 2006), and op cit Bevan 2008.

Many security actors interviewed acknowledged that there is only limited support for disarmament among the Karamojong. They recognised that development also needs to occur in order to resolve inter-ethnic conflict and address security issues, including the provision of more roads, water and access to education. Though good schools exist in the region, there are not enough teachers and there is not enough support for education. Encouragingly, some security actors also believed there needs to be greater emphasis on peacebuilding and peace dialogue. Amongst these actors at least, disarmament was seen as important for ‘settling’ inter-ethnic conflicts, but many felt that the ultimate resolution of those conflicts depends on the Karamojong themselves coming together with their ‘enemies’ and changing their perspectives: “there is a need for attitudinal change”. An equally important challenge is that no parallel disarmament programmes are taking place in neighbouring areas of Kenya or Sudan, enabling on-going flows of illicit arms across these porous borders.

CORE DYNAMIC 2.3

Provision of security and justice

The availability of security and justice provision in Karamoja is **LOW**. Poor security provision, including border security and protection from cross-border or intra-Karamoja attacks, enables inter-ethnic attacks, retaliatory violence and the proliferation of small arms for self-protection. The lack of formal justice mechanisms prevents inter-ethnic grievances and disputes from being adequately resolved.

The UPDF rather than the civilian authorities (including the police) is seen as the primary provider of protection from attacks by other ethnic groups. However, the perceived effectiveness of this protection is only **MODERATE**. The military are very visible but not very approachable or trusted. Encouragingly, local councillors (LCs) are seen as the primary providers of justice in responding to attacks and disputes between ethnic groups, and trust in the police is **VERY HIGH**. However, the police are not deployed in adequate numbers, are not very visible at the community level and are not seen as providing any effective protection from attacks by other ethnic groups. Perception that the formal courts system delivers effective justice is **HIGH** (strong); however, traditional justice systems need more recognition as they were considered an equally valid means of achieving justice.

Indicators	Baseline
2.3.1 Who provides protection from attacks by other ethnic groups	UPDF – Very high (5/5) , followed by the police – Moderate (3/5)
2.3.2 Deployment of police as indicator of capacity to provide protection	<p>Target police deployments in Karamoja:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ■ at least 30 police officers per sub-county ■ 4,000 total police personnel in Karamoja ■ specialised units for every district <p>Police deployments in Karamoja as reported in October 2009 (see narrative for more details):</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ■ 21 police posts in 43 sub-counties ■ About 2,000 police personnel in the Karamoja region ■ Police deployment in Kotido District: 168 personnel ■ Police deployment in Moroto: 308 personnel ■ Police have completed recent recruitment drive and more police recruits are training in Masindi
2.3.3 Visibility and engagement of police in the community	<p>Average frequency of seeing police in the community was about once a month</p> <p>Perceived experience of police engaging at the <i>manyatta</i> level was very low (1/5)</p>
2.3.4 The police provide effective protection from attacks by other ethnic groups	Very low (1/5)

Indicators <i>continued</i>	Baseline <i>continued</i>
2.3.5 Deployment of UPDF as an indicator of capacity to provide protection	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ■ Karamoja has one UPDF division ■ Each district has a brigade ■ Each brigade has three battalions ■ A battalion has 736 personnel ■ Each district should therefore have about 2,208 personnel
2.3.6 Visibility of UPDF in the community	Average frequency of seeing UPDF in the community was about once a week
2.3.7 The UPDF provides effective protection from attacks by other ethnic groups	Moderate (3/5)
2.3.8 Level of trust in the police	Very high (5/5)
2.3.9 Level of trust in the UPDF	Moderate (3/5)
2.3.10 Cattle are safer when kept in protected <i>kraals</i>	Moderate (3/5) on average, but diverging perspectives in Moroto District (High 4/5) and Kotido District (Very low 1/5)
2.3.11 Effectiveness of the state in recovering livestock	Moderate (3/5) on average, but with variations in location: people in Moroto District thought the government was doing a good job, whereas people in Kotido District did not
2.3.12 Who provides justice in cases of attacks or disputes between people of different ethnic groups	Local government (5/5) (including elected LCs and non-elected officials), followed by the UPDF (4/5) and the police (3/5)

Protection from attacks by other ethnic groups

When interview groups were asked who protects them from attacks by other ethnic groups, most answered that the UPDF is the dominant security provider, followed by the police and then LCs. Family, traditional authorities (e.g. elders, warriors, *ngimurok*) and local non-state actors (e.g. churches, vigilantes, business people) were perceived as providing virtually no protection from attacks by other ethnic groups.

Police capacity to provide security and protection

Police overall deployment in Karamoja is approximately 2,000, and the total target is for 4,000 police personnel. There are currently 308 personnel in Moroto District and as of October 2009 there were approximately 168 in Kotido District. Although this number has fallen from the previous year, the local commanders expected that more police officers would be deployed soon. A DANIDA report suggests that only 66 police officers were physically present in Kotido as of March 2008.⁴⁴ The possible discrepancy between the numbers of officers physically present and the numbers on paper could reflect the high rate at which officers are believed to abscond from deployment in Karamoja.

According to local District Police and Regional Police Commanders interviewed in October 2009, the Ugandan Police were implementing plans to deploy a police post and 30 police personnel to every sub-county in Karamoja. At the time of interview, police posts had already been established in 21 of the 43 sub-counties. Any other developed area in Karamoja with a significant population was also expected to get a police post. Every district was reported as having its required specialised units, including crime scene officers and dog sections. At the time of the assessment, more police were reportedly being trained in Masindi, following a new round of recruitment. One commander raised the challenge of adequate police accommodation: police currently need to live in the sub-county police posts because they have nowhere else to stay.

Q.58 At the moment, who do you feel protects you from attacks by other ethnic groups?

- UPDF – Very high (5/5)
- Police – Moderate (3/5)
- LCs – Low (2/5)
- Anti-Stock Theft Units (ASTU) – Very low (1/5)
- Senior elders/chiefs – Very low (1/5)
- *Manyatta* leaders – Very low (1/5)
- Warriors – Very low (1/5)
- Church – Very low (1/5)
- Family – Very low (1/5)
- Neighbours/other people in the community – Very low (1/5)
- Other non-elected government officials – Very low (1/5)
- *Ngimurok* – Very low (1/5)
- Business leaders – Never (0/5)
- Vigilante groups – Never (0/5)
- Criminal groups – Never (0/5)

In terms of training, interviewees emphasised that police posted to Karamoja are regular police and are trained to normal police standards according to the general training manual and procedures. This includes generic training on the rights of suspects and children's rights. However, police deployed to Karamoja did not receive special training for dealing with the requirements of policing in Karamoja. According to the Regional Police Commander in Moroto, "the training is usually generic and where references are made to the peculiar conditions in Karamoja, this is often on *ad hoc* basis". He believes that there is a need for a specially-tailored training curriculum "based on a policing model designed to respond to the local needs and challenges for policing in this unique environment [in Karamoja]".

Police deployment and availability in Karamoja in 2008

- By March 2008, in the entire Nakapiripirit District, the police had only 17 officers and men, including the DPC and Special Branch officers, in a district with 10 sub-counties.
- There are no crime scene police officers and crime scene investigation kits such as fingerprinting kits and cameras. The study team was informed that sometimes, police just borrow cameras to use at the crime scene. The police in Karamoja do not have a Police Surgeon to carry out post-mortems or examine victims of rape and defilement.
- In all the districts of Karamoja, there were no women police officers in the sub-counties. The few policewomen were stationed at district headquarters. At the main police station in Kotido, for example, there were 5 women police officers by March 2008. The low presence of police-women was constraining when it came to handling issues specific to women and where a policewoman would be preferred to a policeman e.g. in the child and family protection unit. A policewoman is normally required to go arrest and search women. They are also essential in interviewing victims of rape and defilement. Women police officers are required to search women, record statements from women, escort women to hospital, and to keep their property.
- In March 2008, there was one vehicle for the entire police force in Kotido District, which was not enough for policing activities because of the distance from the main station to the sub-counties – sub-county police stations were between 6 and 38 km away from the main station. At the time of the study, a patrol vehicle had been secured for Kotido District. The vehicles available belonged to regional police and the Re-Establishment of Law and Order in Karamoja (RELOKA) programme. By March 2008, the whole of Nakapiripirit District had one operational vehicle for the Police. If the District Police Commander was on official duties outside the district, then no vehicle was available for the entire police service there. None of the sub-counties even had a motorcycle or a bicycle for police work. A police constable in Abim lamented: *"There is virtually no transport to go out and carry out investigations. The only motorcycle is broken down and is also not secure to use on road. It is quite difficult to carry a suspect on a motorcycle."*

Source: Muhereza F E, Ossiya D and Ovonji-Odida I, *A Study on Options for Enhancing Access to Justice and Improving Administration of Law and Order in Karamoja: Draft 2*, (Kampala: Danida, July 2008), pp 97–103.

Q.64 How often do you see a police official?

- One or more times in a day – Low (2/5)
- Once a week – Very low (1/5)
- Maybe once a month – Very low (1/5)
- Only rarely – Low (2/5)

Note: the above is based on the October 2009 interviews and reflects both Kotido and Moroto districts

Despite these numbers and plans, the perception of police engagement and capacities is low amongst the Karamojong. Interview groups did not report seeing the police very often in the community – on average about once a month – although there was a strong geographic split in responses. In Moroto District, the police were seen in the community on a daily basis, while in Kotido District police were seen 'only rarely'. However, during the March 2010 district validation meetings in Kotido, many said that police presence in the district had increased and the police were seen much more frequently than reported in the October 2009 group interviews. This increased presence was felt to be a response to increasing threats of violence and raids from Jie communities.

The impression that the police have low levels of penetration in rural areas was reinforced by interview group perceptions that police engagement at the *manyatta* level was very low.

Interview groups did not consider the police to be providing effective protection from attacks by other ethnic groups. This was surprising given that interview groups also reported that police are the second main providers of protection from such attacks (after the UPDF). It was also surprising given that the police were perceived as a very trustworthy institution – when asked directly, almost all interview groups replied that they did trust the police. Though these responses were somewhat tempered by

accusations of police corruption in some group interviews and during the validation phase, they do suggest that the police may have a high level of *legitimacy*, but are not believed to have the *capability* to protect communities from attacks by other ethnic groups.

The perceived role of the police in the community

Beyond the actual operational capacities of the security forces, their perceived role and functions in the community are an important measure of whether they can have a positive impact on levels of inter-ethnic conflict and insecurity. Interview groups were therefore asked to reflect on the role of the police and UPDF in their communities.

The primary positive roles of the police in the community were seen to be:

- keeping law and order;
- arresting “wrongdoers”, criminals and cattle raiders;
- providing protection and security – from criminals and “fighting”, for “food/food distribution”, and also for the protection of women and children.

It was also regularly noted that the police have a role to play in sharing public information, awareness-raising and mobilisation on law, security and human rights issues, as well as addressing criminality. The police were also sometimes seen to be important in uniting people and promoting peace in communities, as well as in social control functions, including:

- reducing drunkenness;
- “teaching discipline” and guiding against “wrongdoing”;
- “fighting adultery”;
- enforcing ‘modern dress’ amongst warriors and more traditional people.

The terms ‘punish’, ‘judge’ and ‘justice’ were brought up a number of times in discussions about the role of the police, indicating that they often go beyond their strictly policing role and may be overstepping into the territory of the formal justice system. Their responsibility for preventing and investigating crimes was only sometimes noted. Importantly, the recovery of stolen animals and property was only mentioned in a few instances.

The main negative aspects of police behaviour in the community were seen to be:

- “doing nothing” – when crimes were reported or the police arrived at a crime scene, it was felt that they did not do anything constructive
- corruption – “there is no single service without a bribe”⁴⁵
- police are not properly granted the orders to recover stolen cattle
- in one sub-county, because there are no police deployed there, the police are not seen to have any role whatsoever

Police appear to have some legitimacy in the communities in which they work, which can be built upon and strengthened if they tackle alleged cases of bribery. They are specifically seen as having a security role, although they have little actual capacity to carry this out. However, the group interviews demonstrated that the police in Karamoja have important roles and functions beyond simply security provision, including supporting social practices and peacebuilding. As such, strengthening police ability to contribute to inter-ethnic conflict prevention would not only mean improving the operational capacity of the police to uphold rule of law and security functions, but also developing the police’s ability to engage with Karamojong communities in broader problem-solving or resolving disputes.

⁴⁵ For examples of police demanding supplementary payments to carry out basic functions, see op cit Muhereza et al 2008, p 103.

The UPDF's capacity to provide security and protection

The UPDF structure and scale of deployment allows for easy visibility in the communities. According to the UPDF's Regional Internal Security Officer for Karamoja, each district has a brigade comprised of three battalions. A battalion has approximately 736 soldiers, which means that for the five districts (excluding Amudat, the new district) the region has slightly over eleven thousand men. This figure only exists on paper: it was difficult to ascertain whether this deployment plan has been met, and we were told by the same source that deployment is affected by other factors including desertion due to the harsh conditions of living in Karamoja.

According to recent newspaper reports, the UPDF 5th division has been deployed to Kaabong and Abim districts while the UPDF 3rd division is operating in the "eastern, central [areas] and also part of Sudan and Kenya borders".⁴⁶ According to statements by President Museveni, "The battalions in Karamoja have 200 men each yet they should have 736". He added that since the force is thin on the ground, it cannot handle the exercise adequately.⁴⁷

According to the UPDF Director of Human Rights, UPDF soldiers and officers receive training, awareness-raising and capacity-building on human rights, which he himself leads. Army personnel with key responsibilities such as civil military relations are prioritised for attending these trainings. By October 2009, the UPDF had trained ten battalions and had five left to train. In Karamoja, the army receives one-day 'detach to detach training', which covers human rights, civil military relations, children's rights and protection, gender-based violence, the role of the police and the rule of law. The UPDF follows a 'training of trainers' approach, by training one officer who is able to pass on the training to others. Sometimes they also train police personnel based in the same area. Save the Children Uganda and the African Leadership Institute have also supported human rights trainings for the UPDF.

Despite this positive picture, human rights observers interviewed for this assessment believe that significant challenges remain in maintaining adequate levels of human rights knowledge and respect in the UPDF. Units in Karamoja experience constant transfers of personnel as troops rotate between Uganda, Sudan and the Democratic Republic of Congo. As a result, it is difficult to ensure that UPDF soldiers posted to Karamoja have received human rights training in the context of Karamoja disarmament operations.

Q.70 How often do you see an army official?

- One or more times a day – High (4/5)
- Once a week – Never (0/5)
- Maybe once a month – Very low (1/5)
- Only rarely – Very low (1/5)
- Almost never – Very low (1/5)

Interview groups reported seeing UPDF soldiers in the community very frequently – about once a week on average. Again, there was a strong geographic split in these responses. In Moroto District, UPDF soldiers were seen in the community most often – on a daily basis; while in Kotido District, UPDF were seen 'rarely' or 'almost never'. These differences may be a result of the fact that Moroto houses the UPDF regional division headquarters.

Interview groups perceived the UPDF as only providing moderately effective protection from attacks by outside ethnic groups, and as only moderately trustworthy. This is surprising given that interview groups also regarded the UPDF as the primary provider of protection from attacks by other ethnic groups. While the UPDF may be perceived as the lead protection and security actor, it is also seen to only have moderate legitimacy and capabilities in actually fulfilling that role. That even the most important security provider is not seen as fully trusted or providing adequate levels of protection suggests there are significant gaps for security provision in Karamoja. The subsequent implication is that inter-ethnic violence will remain unchecked and continue to fuel inter-ethnic conflict.

⁴⁶ Op cit Ocowun 2010.

⁴⁷ Wanyama O, "Museveni hails Karamoja on development", New Times Online, 11 May 2010.

The perceived role of the UPDF in the community

The main positive roles of the UPDF in the community were seen to be:

- protecting people and property
- tracking and recovering raided animals
- looking after and grazing animals
- civilian disarmament
- protecting animals

Other roles mentioned by a small number of interview groups included peace promotion and dialogue, and recovering girls who had been abducted by other groups.

A minority of interview groups qualified their statements about the UPDF, suggesting that the UPDF seeks to fulfil these roles but does not always do so successfully. They included comments such as the UPDF “follows [raided] animals but only for a short distance and then comes back” and “the army takes the animals for grazing but then the enemies raid the animals at the grazing ground in the presence of the army”.

In addition, a minority of interview groups identified clearly negative UPDF activities within the community, such as “killing people” and “doing nothing, only beating people who cannot protect themselves”. Groups were however, reluctant to discuss these issues further, possibly out of fear of retribution.

Group interview responses about the role of the UPDF in the community present a mixed picture when compared to responses regarding the UPDF’s trustworthiness and capabilities. The UPDF is clearly seen as the primary security provider and fulfils a number of other positive roles. But underlying capacity and trust issues and some history of violence against civilians remain to be overcome if the UPDF is to become more effective in addressing inter-ethnic conflict and insecurity.

Protection of livestock

Protecting livestock from cattle raiding was seen as a critical element in addressing inter-ethnic conflict during the consultation phase of the assessment. We therefore investigated the efficacy of the protected *kraal* system. Perceptions of how safe cattle are in protected *kraals* differed across districts, with interview groups in Moroto District strongly feeling that cattle are safer, while those in Kotido felt cattle were only slightly safer.

Similarly, while the perceived effectiveness of the state in recovering stolen livestock was moderate overall, there were major differences of opinion depending on locality. In Moroto District the perception that the state was doing a good job in the recovery of stolen livestock was very high, whereas in Kotido District it was very low.

It is important to note that state security actors involved in the consultation phase, key informant interviews and the national feedback workshop all commented on significant problems they face regarding exaggerations around cattle raiding. State security actors noted many occasions where communities falsely inflated numbers of stolen cattle when they reported raids to the authorities. This was seen to severely complicate recovery efforts because security forces would then mistakenly track for much larger herd sizes than had actually been stolen. This disinformation also generated disappointment in communities when the numbers of recovered cattle ended up being below the false expectations created by inflated reports. In this way, the police and the UPDF felt they often received unfair criticism for failing to properly recover ‘ghost cows’.

Capacities for justice provision

Gaps in the provision of justice in Karamoja were also identified during consultations as having a major impact on inter-ethnic conflict. Overall, there is a critical deficiency of courts, judges and resources in Karamoja and their lack escalates grievances and retaliation between different ethnic groups.⁴⁸

Q.75 Which of the following actors would you go to in order to get justice if you were in conflict with people from a different ethnic group, or if someone from a different ethnic group committed a crime against you?

- Local government (both elected LCs and non-elected officials) – Very high (5/5)
- UPDF – High (4/5)
- Police – Moderate (3/5)
- Courts – Low (2/5)
- Senior elders/chiefs – Very low (1/5)
- Manyatta leaders – Very low (1/5)
- Church – Very low (1/5)
- Neighbours/other people in the community – Very low (1/5)
- Ngimurok – Very low (1/5)
- NGOs – Very low (1/5)
- Civil-military centre – Very low (1/5)
- Human rights commission – Very low (1/5)
- Other – Very low (1/5)
- ASTU – Never (0/5)
- Warriors – Never (0/5)
- Family – Never (0/5)
- Business leaders – Never (0/5)
- Vigilante groups – Never (0/5)
- Criminal groups – Never (0/5)

Interview groups perceived local government officials (both elected and non-elected) as the primary providers of justice for conflicts or crimes between ethnic groups, followed by the UPDF and the police. The formal courts were not seen as major justice providers in these cases, while family, traditional authorities, local non-state actors and local state actors (civil military co-operation/CIMIC centres, ASTUs, UHRC) were perceived as providing almost no justice in dealing with conflict or crimes between ethnic groups.

Interview groups identified LCs as the first point of contact in seeking justice when in conflict with someone from another ethnic group, predominantly because they:

- are the closest part of government to communities and are the part of government that understands their communities most intimately;
- are seen as a ‘mediating’ authority between communities and the higher levels of the state and the security services (“without a letter from the LC, the police cannot help me”);
- are elected representatives of the communities and are therefore seen as being approachable;
- have the authority and capacity to transcend ethnic lines and interact with other ethnic groups.

The UPDF was perceived as a close second for providing justice in conflicts between ethnic groups, predominantly because they have the means for enforcement and protection – i.e. “because at least they have guns”. The UPDF was seen as having the main role in tracking and recovering stolen cattle and responding when people are killed in inter-ethnic raids.

The police were seen as the third most important justice actor, predominantly because they are seen as the legitimate upholders of law and order and are less threatening than the UPDF. In one group interview, it was characterised as “rescuing the life” of a suspect if he was given over to the police rather than the UPDF, who might otherwise harm him or even execute him.

Although NGOs were noted only in a few instances as inter-ethnic justice actors, it was heavily stressed that they can play a very decisive role. They can often respond quickly and provide key resources (transportation, food and finances) for supporting conflict and dispute resolution between ethnic groups.

The UPDF also plays a role in justice in the context of weapons control. Cases of illegal possession of arms in Karamoja are dealt with by military field court marshal under the UPDF Act, which criminalises unauthorised possession of war materials.

The capacities of the formal courts system and the relationship between them and traditional justice systems were also examined in the assessment. Although it is obvious that a lack of access to these justice systems undermines the ability to address inter-ethnic conflicts and disputes, it was felt that these systems were more important in terms of addressing the latent conflict between the state and Karamojong society, and in terms of resolving intra-community conflicts and disputes. Therefore, justice systems and actors are examined at more length in Conflict Type B and Conflict Type C.

⁴⁸ See Conflict B ‘Core Dynamic 2.3: Provision of security and justice’ for a description of the formal justice institutions in Karamoja and their capacities.

CORE DYNAMIC 2.4

Access to key resources and public services

While Karamojong do not perceive unequal access to key resources between different ethnic groups as contributing to inter-ethnic conflict, evidence suggests that access to food relief and, to a lesser extent, access to livestock, land and water are factors in inter-ethnic conflict.

Although Karamojong communities believe there are significant inequalities in access to key public services between different ethnic groups, most did not believe this actually contributes to inter-ethnic conflict.

Indicators	Baseline
2.4.1 Other ethnic groups have more access to key resources	Moderate (3/5) for water , while all others are low to very low.
2.4.2 Communities are in conflict with other communities over key resources	Low (2/5) or Very low (1/5) , for food relief, water, replenishment of livestock, grown food and cash – communities do not perceive themselves to be in conflict with other communities over key resources. However, development actors interviewed on the ground reported a significant amount of inter-ethnic conflict in relation to the distribution of and access to food aid and water.
2.4.3 Other ethnic groups have more access to key public services	High (4/5)
2.4.4 Unequal access to key public services contributes to conflict between ethnic groups	Low (2/5)

Much of the literature on Karamoja – a region characterised by marginal and scarce resources – contends that access to key natural and economic resources is at the core of inter-ethnic conflict and insecurity in Karamoja.⁴⁹ Wishing to test these views, we questioned interview groups about access to key resources and whether they were a source of conflict amongst ethnic groups.

Contrary to the literature and the opinions of development actors, interview groups did not perceive key resources to be a major source of inter-ethnic conflict. Firstly, they did not strongly feel that there were any significant inequalities in access to resources between ethnic groups. Where inequality existed, interview groups ranked water to be the most important, followed by food relief. However, less than half of the interview groups felt that there was any unequal distribution of water or food relief between ethnic groups.

Secondly, interview groups did not think that key resources caused conflict between ethnic groups. In as much as resources may cause conflict (only indicated by less than half of interview groups to be the case), food relief and the replenishment of livestock were ranked as the top resources causing such conflict.

Responses from development actors contradict group interview perceptions that access to key resources do not contribute to inter-ethnic conflict and violence. Development actors interviewed reported a significant degree of both inter-ethnic and intra-community conflict in relation to food relief, and also to a lesser extent in relation to livestock, land and water.

Almost all development actors interviewed highlighted food relief as a source of conflict and violence both between and within ethnic groups. Raiders sometimes steal ration cards and food items – this happens during attacks from both within and between ethnic groups. People are also attacked when carrying food relief home from the distribution sites. Sometimes food distributions have to be postponed because of insecurity and some NGO food relief staff have received death threats from communities because of their ethnicity.

Q.108 Do you think that people from other ethnic groups have more access to the following resources than your ethnic group?

- Water – Moderate (3/5)
- Food relief from the UN or other agencies – Low (2/5)
- Replenishment of livestock – Low (2/5)
- Don't know – Low (2/5)
- Locally grown food – Very low (1/5)
- Land – Very low (1/5)
- Cash or credit – Very low (1/5)

Q.109 Do you think that people from your ethnic group are in conflict with people from other ethnic groups over any of the following?

- Food relief from the UN or other agencies – Low (2/5)
- Replenishment of livestock – Low (2/5)
- Water – Low (2/5)
- Other – Low (2/5)
- Don't know/blank – Low (2/5)
- Locally grown food – Very low (1/5)
- Land – Very low (1/5)
- Cash or credit – Very low (1/5)

⁴⁹ For example, see op cit FEWS NET 2005, pp 12–13 and pp 23–29. The lives of pastoralist Karamojong are 'characterised by a critical dependence on a vulnerable natural resource base and extreme marginal conditions, which hamper their access to roads, markets and services', op cit Rota and Sidahmed 2010, p 7.

Water scarcity and access were also identified as sources of conflict by development actors, both between and within ethnic groups. Resettlement in the fertile areas has caused some conflict and tensions over land. Some development actors felt that raiding for livestock had become more commercialised with people raiding now in groups of fifty rather than five although this appears to contrast reports from security actors which indicate that the raiding groups have over time been diminishing in size.

Unlike the above responses about access to key resources, there was a high perception in group interviews that some ethnic groups had better and more access to key public services, such as health care and education. Nevertheless, interview groups did not for the most part feel that unequal access to key public services contributed to conflict between ethnic groups. It was suggested by some observers that public services such as education and public infrastructure might not have much value in the eyes of the Karamojong due to their semi-migratory livelihoods, and therefore would not be worth fighting for. (Conversely, public health and veterinary services, which have a direct impact on the daily life and personal well-being of the Karamojong, would be much more valued and could be a source of conflict.)

CORE DYNAMIC 2.5

Livelihoods

Karamojong perceptions that current pastoralist and agro-pastoralist livelihood practices do not contribute to inter-ethnic conflict are contradicted by evidence that suggests these practices are closely associated with conflict. The answer to this is not simply livelihoods diversification, but more support to sustainable pastoralist practices that in turn could contribute to wider peacebuilding efforts.

Indicators	Baseline
2.5.1 Do current livelihoods contribute to peace or conflict?	Livelihoods contribute to peace – Moderate (3/5) Livelihoods contribute to conflict – Low (2/5)
2.5.2 There are efforts to diversify livelihoods in communities	High (4/5)
2.5.3 New alternative livelihoods will make inter-ethnic relationships in Karamoja more peaceful	Very high (5/5)

Elements of pastoralist and agro-pastoralist lifestyles (or the frustration of traditional pastoralist lifestyles) were highlighted during the consultation phases as core causes of inter-ethnic conflict in Karamoja.⁵⁰ The assessment attempted to explore these issues further.

Interview groups reported pastoralism and agricultural production as the dominant livelihoods in the region.⁵¹

Although this assessment does not claim to offer an empirical study of livelihoods and economic activities, these answers are a reasonable indication that cattle-keeping and agriculture are seen as the dominant means for survival in the minds of the Karamojong. This could reflect the fact that economic diversification is still limited in Karamoja and/or that these options are not perceived to be as important or as rewarding as pastoralist and agricultural livelihoods.

Most interview groups did not think that current Karamojong livelihoods contributed to conflict; in fact, slightly more groups thought that they contributed to peace.

The need for 'alternative' livelihoods and the diversification of livelihoods in Karamoja is often cited as important for both the economic development of the region, but also for reducing reliance on livestock and subsequently reducing levels of conflict and

Q.133 What are the main livelihoods of this sub-county?

- Pastoralism (based primarily around keeping cattle) – High (4/5)
- Agriculture (based primarily around growing crops) – High (4/5)
- Other – Moderate (3/5), with charcoal making, firewood collection and general labour being the main other livelihoods
- Agro-pastoralist (both keeping cattle and growing crops) – Low (2/5)
- Trade or industry – Low (2/5)

Q.134 Do you think that these current forms of livelihood are contributing to peace or conflict in Karamoja?

- Contributing to peace – Moderate (3/5)
- Contributing to conflict – Low (2/5)

⁵⁰ For a brief overview of how pastoralist socio-cultural dynamics contribute to conflict in Karamoja, see op cit FEWS NET 2005, p 14 and pp 35–39.

⁵¹ It is interesting to note that during the group interviews and validation meetings, community respondents did not understand pastoralism itself to be a 'livelihood'; instead, keeping livestock and cattle was simply understood to be their way of life, while livelihoods consisted of all other income-generating activities.

Q.137 Do you think that the development of alternative livelihoods will make relationships between people of different ethnic groups in Karamoja more or less peaceful?

- More peaceful – Very high (5/5)
- Less peaceful – Very low (1/5)

insecurity.⁵² There was a strong perception amongst interview groups that there are efforts to diversify livelihoods in Karamojong communities as well as a very strong belief that new alternative livelihoods would contribute to more peaceful inter-ethnic relations.

There was recognition amongst a wide range of development actors interviewed that the connections between livelihoods and conflict are very complex. Conflict is clearly both a cause and a consequence of livelihoods in the region – for example, cattle raiding has long been a part of pastoralist practices and causes conflict between different ethnic groups. But violence stemming from inter-ethnic conflict in the region has an impact upon the freedom of pastoralist communities to move livestock and people and thus puts their livelihoods under great threat. All in all, there seems to be a vicious circle between conflict and livelihoods in Karamoja.

The question of pastoralism

At the centre of this is contention over the nature and practices of pastoralist livelihoods and how they contribute to inter-ethnic conflict.⁵³ One NGO interviewee contended that pastoralist livelihoods have conflict “built-in”.

Development actors interviewed for the assessment suggested that different avenues of development support could prevent pastoralism from being a driver of conflict. For example, communities could be supported to develop joint markets whereby they would be able to trade with each other and with different ethnic groups and districts.

However, it was also pointed out that a major problem for pastoralism in Karamoja is how to make it more viable. One element of this is limited access to pasture (as opposed to a limited quantity of pasture). This limited access is partly due to an expanding ‘green belt’ of agriculture – attempts by pastoralist Karamojong to access and transit the green belt leads them into conflict with agricultural communities and eventually the state.⁵⁴ However, most development actors reported that the biggest problem regarding access to pasture (and water) was insecurity, not drought or an expanding green belt. They believe that large swathes of viable pastureland have been abandoned due to conflict and that intense insecurity in these areas prevents Karamojong herdsmen from utilising them. Some believed that the amount of inaccessible or unused pasture had actually increased in the last two years because of protected *kraals*, which are necessarily static and have to be close to barracks and villages, greatly limiting livestock migration.

There was a strong sense amongst development actors interviewed that more holistic approaches were needed to increase pastoralist access to those areas unused due to insecurity; that if they could be made secure, it would open up large expanses of pasture. Such an approach should include water point construction and rehabilitation, but would also require peacebuilding and security provisions. One local development actor reported instances of people resettling in previously ‘no go’ areas, including people from different ethnic groups. Some of the ethnic groups intermingled their *kraals* for protection, as outsiders would not know which ethnic group to attack. This was felt to have worked in Nakonyen (Moroto District) in bringing together the Matheniko, Tepeth and Pokot. They had been living peacefully with each other, until they were allegedly attacked by the Jie who were not part of the arrangement.

⁵² Because of the perceived centrality of alternative livelihood issues in conflict and insecurity in Karamoja, “Support the Development of Alternative Means of Livelihood” makes up Programme Component 4 of the KIDDP, op cit Government of Uganda, 2008.

⁵³ For a general examination of pastoralism and conflict around the globe, see op cit Nori et al 2005.

⁵⁴ A range of non-conflict factors are suggested to have reduced access to pasture in Karamoja, including imposed restrictions on pastoralist mobility, new water points constraining seasonal grazing patterns, an increase in lands devoted to agriculture and nature reserves at the expense of grazing lands, and inadequate access to public services. See Mwaura C, *Kenya and Uganda Pastoral Conflict Case Study* (United Nations Development Programme: Human Development Report Office Occasional Paper, 2005/20), pp 8–9.

'Alternative' livelihoods

The government and international development actors are engaged in numerous 'alternative' livelihood promotion programmes in Karamoja, many of which are targeted at reducing dependency on livestock. Underlying many of these programmes is the argument that reducing dependency on livestock will lead to a consequent reduction in the conflict and raiding associated with livestock keeping. It is also believed that developing other means for making a living will increase general prosperity and provide a more settled way of life, thereby consolidating peace and security.⁵⁵

Amongst interview groups, there was a strong perception that the development of alternative livelihoods has the potential to contribute to a reduction in both inter-ethnic and intra-community conflict. When asked about the actual or expected impacts of education and employment projects on conflict in Karamoja, participants thought that they:

- constructively brought people together:
 - ☐ "adult education encourages people from different communities to interact"
 - ☐ "it has a positive effect – the quarrying which was conducted in Rupa made people come to work together"
 - ☐ "it has improved the relationship between people in the sub-county and encouraged peaceful co-existence"
 - ☐ "group work will encourage people to work together to earn a living"
- kept people occupied:
 - ☐ "it brings peace because it makes people satisfied, when people have things to do then they keep busy"
 - ☐ "bricklaying keeps people busy and away from raiding"
 - ☐ "children go to school and interact with members from different communities. They then get disinterested in other forms of activities that would cause conflict"
- reduced incentives for raiding and theft by reducing inequality and insufficient access to resources:
 - ☐ "most of the conflict has been over resource-based concerns, if they all earn a living then they would envy no other"
 - ☐ "if everyone has access to the sufficient food, theft will be reduced"

During the consultation phase, 'reformed warrior' and male youth focus groups made it very clear that they did not want the government and other actors to give up on them or discount their willingness to be productive. They listed many livelihood ideas, such as opening stores, working in building trades, working as labourers and providing services. They felt that they had energy, ideas and some skills, but not the start-up opportunities or resources – which is why they "just sit under trees".

While alternative livelihoods were generally seen as important and positive in relation to reducing conflict, some interview groups emphasised that support to cattle-based livelihoods continues to be of paramount importance. They suggested that livestock and pastoralist livelihoods should be strengthened through support to cross-breeding and improved animal nutrition projects. They implied that "hatred" and conflict would be reduced if Karamojong communities could get assistance to improve the quality and health of their livestock.

Although the majority of group interview responses suggested that alternative livelihoods were seen as contributing to a reduction in conflict, some warning notes were also sounded, including recognition that:

55 For a review of the pastoralist 'livelihood debates', see op cit Powell 2010, pp 7–8.

- improved trade in the region may lead to an increase in demand for stolen or raided cows or create new opportunities for raiding;
- increased levels of food and money in the community could lead to increased opportunities and incidences for theft and looting (although this contradicts comments from other groups that an increase in food would likely decrease levels of theft);
- everyone must be included in income-generation or alternative livelihood projects, otherwise this will lead to complaints that people have been left out, and to an increase in tension.

When discussing alternative livelihoods, interview groups focused primarily on traditional education, vocational training and employment or 'make work' schemes, such as bricklaying or quarrying. Activities such as collecting firewood and charcoal were perceived more as 'coping strategies' rather than livelihoods and had only been taken up because of the insecurity associated with cattle-keeping. These activities were not seen as viable alternative livelihoods and some interview groups reported that these activities themselves involved security risks.

A strong theme was present in all interviews with development actors, namely that implementing alternative livelihood programmes presents significant challenges, and that these merit greater consideration. Firstly, many believe that alternative livelihoods simply cannot replace pastoralism in many parts of Karamoja, particularly in the 'dry belt'. The basic ecology of much of the terrain will never be conducive to agriculture and other activities. As a result, livestock-keeping will remain the only sustainable means of making a living in these areas. More than anything, pastoralism was seen not simply as a means for 'making a living', but a complete social, cultural and economic life system that could not be instantly transformed.

Secondly, development actors felt that government and some external actors were attempting to sideline pastoralism through the promotion of alternative livelihoods. The government has established a 'model village' in Nadunget to promote sedentary and agricultural ways of life.⁵⁶ The government's Food Security Action Plan mentions reducing the number of livestock in Karamoja, while the Poverty Eradication Action Plan (PEAP) and the Plan for the Modernisation of Agriculture (PMA) say very little about promoting pastoralism. This was offered as one reason why the population in the green belt is increasing: many resources are being invested into the green belt, whereas in the dry belt there are only peace and HIV/AIDS programmes.

While no empirical evidence was found to back up these perspectives, a very clear message came out of interviews with development actors: decision-makers need to recognise that they cannot stop the Karamojong from owning cattle or dramatically curtail the Karamojong pastoralist lifestyle. In fact, it was felt that more resources should be invested into supporting sustainable development and management of livestock – managing livestock better would mitigate its contribution to conflict in Karamoja. Although development actors supported the need for economic diversification, they believed that you cannot shift people completely and immediately from pastoralist to other livelihoods and that programmes supporting these alternatives must be better chosen and more carefully planned.

⁵⁶ The 'model village' is a parish where the government is offering low-cost housing to promote modern settlements, as well as providing other incentives such as farm tools and other agriculture inputs.

CORE DYNAMIC 2.6

Activities contributing to inter-ethnic conflict prevention and peacebuilding

Peace meetings are an important mechanism for conflict prevention, dispute resolution and peacebuilding in Karamoja and were seen by most respondents as very positive (VERY HIGH rating).

Peace meetings are characterised by:

- very high community awareness of the meetings and participation in them, though meetings involve only limited participation of children;
- significant variances in their frequency, ranging from monthly to yearly;
- having a positive impact, although also having some significant flaws;
- receiving crucial support from international and national NGOs.

Indicators	Baseline
2.6.1 Awareness of peace promotion meetings	Very high (5/5) , suggesting that meetings take place regularly and have visibility in communities
2.6.2 Frequency of peace promotion meetings	Monthly to yearly – while peace meetings do happen regularly (i.e. monthly) in some places, others happen very infrequently or on an <i>ad hoc</i> /crisis reaction basis.
2.6.3 Level of community participation in peace promotion meetings	Very high (5/5) for both genders but with only limited involvement of children
2.6.4 Peace promotion meetings have a positive result	Very high (5/5) , although with some key challenges
2.6.5 Level of NGO support to peace promotion meetings	Peace promotion meetings are supported by at least 4 NGOs: IRC (International Rescue Committee), Oxfam, Mercy Corps, KADP

Peace meetings and longer-term peace dialogue processes stood out as important dynamics during the consultation phase of the assessment. In and of themselves, they are important reflections of the levels of inter-ethnic (as well as intra-community) conflict and insecurity as they tend to be conducted in response to these conflicts. Stakeholders identified these meetings as enabling communities and stakeholders to engage with one another and build constructive dialogue, confidence and agreements on behaviour and interaction (such as ‘peace resolutions’). Peace meetings were therefore thought to be a potential basis for conflict prevention and peacebuilding in the region.

Q.155 How often do these peace meetings take place?

- Once a week – Never (0/5)
- Once a month – Moderate (3/5)
- Once a year – Very low (1/5)
- Ad hoc or one-off meetings – Low (2/5)

Interview groups reported being very aware of peace meetings that take place within their communities, indicating that such activities are well-publicised. However, while peace meetings occurred quite regularly in some places, peace meetings happened very infrequently or on an *ad hoc* or crisis response basis in many other locations.

Interview groups found peace meetings to be generally very organised. They were usually initiated from the local level upwards (starting from the LCs, level I, at the village level, up to the sub-county and then up to the district). They involved not just traditional authorities and systems, but also included the appropriate LCs at each level. Peace meetings were held to address both inter-ethnic issues and issues within ethnic groups and were sometimes ‘scheduled’ (e.g. monthly, three times a year). However, most peace meetings happened in response to incidents – usually raids or killings. The predominant issue addressed at peace meetings was peace and conflict resolution/prevention, followed sometimes by (in descending order of importance): organising grazing (often communal grazing) and sharing water; outbreaks of hunger, famine and droughts; co-existence and ‘unity’; development issues; and for forgiveness and ‘correcting wrong-doing’. Only one interview group reported that peace meetings had been called to prevent raids or to recover cattle after a raid had taken place.

Reformed warriors

A number of 'reformed warrior' groups have emerged in Karamoja, composed of formerly-armed male youth who have embraced peace promotion efforts and are involved in convincing their peers to give up the practice of armed raiding. Reformed warriors have been encouraged to join peace campaigns, where they mobilise other youth to become involved, and are an entry point to those still practicing raiding. Because they were once involved in raiding, they feel they can make a strong contribution to transforming the social and cultural practices that surround raiding. However, their position in communities is precarious. There were strong sentiments in community consultations that reformed warriors should be important targets for livelihood support activities – this would demonstrate some benefit for giving up raiding and inspire others to follow suit. It is difficult for them to be effective mobilisers for peace if they remain idle and even poorer than when they were raiding. Moreover, their activities have earned them the label of 'enemy' by those still involved in raiding and they may require protection and increased recognition in order to remain constructive 'peace mobilisers'. All in all, increased resources for and engagement of reformed warriors could make a strong contribution to peacebuilding and security in Karamoja.

These findings were reinforced through interviews with national and international NGOs, who have invested significant resources into supporting peace meetings in the region. While some of these NGOs are responding to urgent requests for support to meetings in the case of specific attacks or when particular grievances arise, others are engaged in regular peace dialogue processes. Some NGOs have incorporated peace meetings as a regular activity within their programmes, often focusing on building dialogue between communities where violent conflict and insecurity are highest. This has involved 'home and away discussions' (whereby meetings are held in the home area of both groups) and also ongoing consultations between groups. However, amongst NGO representatives there was still a sense that meetings were overly reactive; that despite being a very important and established practice, there was no normal 'routine' for when to conduct peace meetings. For others it was not the frequency or regularity of the meetings that was important, it was what they achieved. One NGO representative strongly felt that regular peace meetings should not take place because "then you sell hot air" and the meetings would be a waste of money and become irrelevant. Instead, they felt there was a need to attach peace meetings to actual activities, such as sports or cultural events. Other NGO representatives also indicated that peace meetings were not as effective as they could be because they had not been integrated as a normal part of regular social and governance systems in the region, such as government planning at the local level.

Q.156 Of the following groups, which types of people participate in the peace promoting meetings?

- Men – Very high (5/5)
- Women – Very high (5/5)
- Youth – Very high (5/5)
- Elders – Very high (5/5)
- Children – Low (2/5)

Q.157 Have peace meetings had a positive or negative result?

- Positive result – Very high (4/5)
- No difference – Very low (1/5)
- Negative result – Very low (1/5)

Group interviews indicated that there are high levels of participation by community members in peace meetings. Encouragingly, both genders, youth and elders fully participate in peace meetings. Children are an exception and participate much less frequently.

Interview groups demonstrated a very high belief that peace meetings had positive results. Interview groups believed that the main positive results of peace meetings were:

- increased general harmony, 'unity' and peaceful co-existence between ethnic groups;
- increased direct exchanges and visits between ethnic groups;
- improved trade and business;
- improved freedom of movement for both people and livestock grazing;
- increased sharing of water resources and increased communal/joint livestock grazing;
- ability to properly carry out marriages, including inter-ethnic marriages;
- a general improvement of security.

While almost all groups felt that peace meetings could deliver a number of positive outputs for inter-ethnic relationships, peace meetings as they have been conducted until now were not considered to be the only solution to violent conflict and security in the region. Conspicuously, interview groups did not perceive peace meetings to directly deliver positive results on: improving animal recovery; improving the actual settlement of disputes; actually decreasing the number of raids or preventing attacks;

or directly improving the provision of key public services. Moreover, the principle negative result of peace meetings on relations between ethnic groups was that raiding and stealing often continued regardless of meetings and agreements. (This was particularly the case for group interviews in Kotido District.) This was because meetings do not address the fact that impoverished warriors and ‘unoccupied’ people will still raid and steal. There were also no means of enforcing agreements or preventing them from being dishonoured. Some parties took advantage of the peace following agreements to carry out surprise raids.

Development actors engaged in Karamoja peace promotion activities perceived peace meetings as generally having positive potential, but they recognised some shortcomings. Some believed that the conflict and security situation in Karamoja would be much worse without NGO involvement and peace meetings. They believed that peace meetings played a very big role in attracting attention to conflicts and increasing awareness; they felt that a number of very specific inter-community conflicts were resolved or mitigated as a result of peace meetings. However, there was not enough research or monitoring being conducted to systematically evaluate the concrete impacts of meetings and dialogues, especially over the long term. While getting people together to discuss an issue that concerns them was considered a good step, it is the actual implementation of meeting recommendations and agreements that remains a challenge. Some development actors felt that processes for bringing stakeholders together to talk about their grievances could often be counter-productive because the meetings raised issues, but did not actually solve them. The better approach, they felt, was to bring stakeholders together to develop joint livelihoods programmes and other collaborative activities so that concrete results could be achieved. It was also pointed out that while meetings created an image of community solidarity, ‘spoilers’ within communities have very often undermined peace agreements.

Peace meetings have achieved positive results in many instances and present significant potential for contributing to the promotion of peace and security in Karamoja. However, respondents also identified many drawbacks and weaknesses, and argued that peace meetings may fall short of having a concrete impact on actual raiding, theft and violence. Indeed, if they are not managed sensitively, peace meetings can have negative impacts or result in further complications. More work is needed to determine in concrete terms how peace meetings and dialogue processes can lead successfully to improved security, stability and conflict resolution in Karamoja, and how they can be improved.

CORE DYNAMIC 2.7

Inter-ethnic relationships

Interview groups believed that trading and peace meetings are the most important and useful kinds of peaceful inter-ethnic interaction.

Indicators	Baseline
2.7.1 Variety and frequency of peaceful inter-ethnic interaction	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ■ Trading – Very high (5/5) ■ Peace meetings – Very high (5/5) ■ Marriage – Moderate (3/5) ■ Sacrifices – Moderate (3/5) ■ Religious events – Moderate (3/5) ■ Other – Moderate (3/5) with ‘drinking with other groups’ and the mixing/joint grazing of livestock at the top of the list

Q.12 In what ways do you interact peacefully with other ethnic groups?

- Trading – Very high (5/5)
- Peace meetings – Very high (5/5)
- Marriage – Moderate (3/5)
- Sacrifices – Moderate (3/5)
- Religious events – Moderate (3/5)
- Other – Moderate (3/5) led by ‘drinking with other groups’ and the mixing/joint grazing of livestock

Pre-assessment consultations highlighted important ‘positive’ and peaceful means for inter-ethnic interaction. In an attempt to better understand these potential ‘peace promoters’, we asked the interview groups to specifically identify the ways in which different ethnic groups interact peacefully with one another.

The responses indicate that inter-ethnic trading and peace meetings are seen to be very good ways of encouraging peaceful interaction between ethnic groups, while inter-ethnic marriage sacrifices and religious events are also seen as somewhat supportive of

peaceful interactions. Additional ideas for peaceful inter-ethnic engagement included inter-ethnic sports, ‘drinking’ (or socialising) and joint grazing of livestock. These types of activities (though clearly not alcoholism) could be promoted as key peace-building actions by government, civil society and communities themselves.

3. Values and beliefs

CORE DYNAMIC 3.1 Perceptions of conflict

The Karamojong belief that they are in conflict with other ethnic groups is **VERY HIGH** and their fear of attacks from other ethnic groups is **VERY HIGH**. Interview groups defined conflict and insecurity between ethnic groups as raiding of livestock, killing and the stealing of property and food; however, conflict is believed to be driven by a wide mix of causes, not simply cattle raiding.

Indicators	Baseline
3.1.1 People are in conflict with other ethnic groups	Very high (5/5)
3.1.2 Fear of attack from other ethnic groups	Very high (5/5)
3.1.3 More afraid of being attacked by other ethnic groups	Very high (5/5) feeling that they are more afraid of attack, than two years ago
3.1.4 Characteristics of inter-ethnic conflict:	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ■ Raiding livestock – Very high (5/5) ■ Killing – Very high (5/5) ■ Stealing of property – High (4/5) ■ Stealing of food – High (4/5) ■ Other – Medium (3/5) including beatings/abuse ■ Burning of houses – Low (2/5) ■ Uprooting of crops – Low (2/5)
3.1.5 Perceived causes of inter-ethnic conflict:	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ■ Desire to restock cattle – Very high (5/5) ■ Desire to recover stolen cattle – High (4/5) ■ Historical grievances – Medium (3/5) ■ Desire to steal food or other items – Medium (3/5) ■ Other – Very high (5/5), including hunger/poverty, guns, disunity amongst tribes and the need to prove strength/credibility for marriage

Q.7 What kinds of things happen when there are conflicts between people of different ethnic groups?

- Raiding livestock – Very high (common) (5/5)
- Killing – Very high (5/5)
- Stealing of property – High (4/5)
- Stealing of food – High (4/5)
- Other – Medium (3/5) including beatings/abuse
- Burning of houses – Low (2/5)
- Uprooting of crops – Low (2/5)

Q.11 What do you think are the main causes of conflict between people from different ethnic groups?

- Desire to restock cattle – Very high (5/5)
- Desire to recover stolen cattle – High (4/5)
- Historical grievances – Medium (3/5)
- Desire to steal food or other items – Medium (3/5)
- Other – Very high (5/5) including hunger/poverty (3/5), guns (2/5), disunity amongst tribes (1/5) and the need to prove strength or credibility for marriage (1/5)

Almost all interview groups felt that their communities were in conflict with other ethnic groups, indicating that there is a high level of inter-ethnic conflict in Karamoja. Similarly, they reported that they strongly fear attack from other ethnic groups and that their fear of attack increased between 2007 and 2009. This elevated fear of attack is a strong indication that levels of violence – or fear of violence – between ethnic groups in Karamoja is very high and could be increasing.

Group interviews reaffirmed the characteristics that are usually associated with inter-ethnic conflict in Karamoja: raiding for livestock, killings and the stealing of property and food. Other violence such as ‘beatings’ sometimes occurs and there is occasional burning of houses and the destruction of crops.

Interview groups reported that the desire to stock and recover cattle is the top cause of conflict between ethnic groups. Historical grievances and the desire to steal food were also perceived as regularly causing conflict. However, a wide range of additional causes that often do not get attention were also cited, including: hunger and poverty; guns; “disunity amongst tribes”; and the need for men to prove their strength or credibility in order to get married.

CORE DYNAMIC 3.2

Perceptions of identity

Both the 'Ugandan' and 'Karamojong' identities are more important to the Karamojong than their specific ethnic identities. Promoting these unifying identities could serve as a strong basis for inter-ethnic peace promotion in the region.

Indicators	Baseline
3.2.1 Ranking of most important and relevant identity	First: Ugandan <i>and</i> Karamojong Third: Ethnic group

An important dynamic of inter-ethnic conflict in Karamoja is how people perceive their own identity. In consultations during the design phase of the assessment, this issue was prioritised, given that most large-scale violence happens between different ethnic groups.

Q.139 What category or description matters to you most? Rank according to how you prefer to be identified (on a scale of 1 = most important to 3 = least important):

- 1. both Ugandan (average score of 1.8 out of 3) and Karamojong (average score of 1.8 out of 3)
- 3. Ethnic group (average score of 2.4 out of 3)

However, when asked directly to rank how they best described their own identities, most interview groups ranked both their national Ugandan and their Karamojong identities equally as their foremost identity. Their specific 'ethnic' identities (e.g. Matheniko, Jie) were seen as not very important in comparison. This is surprising given that violent conflict in Karamoja is so centrally defined by violence between ethnic groups. It points to the possibility that the unifying Karamojong and Ugandan identities of people could be utilised as an important peacebuilding tool and help to mitigate the inter-ethnic characteristics of conflict in the region.

CORE DYNAMIC 3.3

Values and beliefs around violence and dialogue

The perceived frequency and value of inter-ethnic dialogue are both HIGH, while the perceived acceptability of violence against other ethnic groups is LOW. Although permission is usually not given for attacks on other ethnic groups, elders, *ngimurok* and family members are seen as the main actors able to authorise inter-ethnic attacks.

Indicators	Baseline
3.3.1 Experience of regular dialogue with other ethnic groups	Very high (5/5)
3.3.2 Dialogue with people from other ethnic groups succeeds in solving matters peacefully	High (4/5)
3.3.3 Acceptability of violence	Violence is not ever acceptable – High (4/5) Violence is acceptable against people from a different ethnic group – Low (2/5)
3.3.4 Raiding other ethnic groups is acceptable	Very low (1/5)
3.3.5 Permission is needed before an attack on another ethnic group	Very low (1/5)
3.3.6 Who provides permission for attacks on other ethnic groups	Senior elders/chiefs (5/5) , followed by <i>ngimurok</i> (4/5) and then Family (3/5)

Q.142 Do you think that it is ever acceptable to use violence against people who...

- ...it is not ever acceptable to use violence against other people – **High (4/5)**
- ...are from a different ethnic group – **Low (2/5)**
- ...live in your sub-county – **Very low (1/5)**
- ...are employed by the government – **Very low (1/5)**
- Other – **Very low (1/5)**, including raiders and those who have killed (i.e. murderers)

Overall, interview groups believed that they have regular dialogue with people from other ethnic groups and there was a high perception that dialogue is a successful means of peacefully resolving disputes and issues that might otherwise result in conflict. Given that some peace meetings and dialogues are already happening, it is worth exploring to what extent this strong support for dialogue as a means of inter-ethnic conflict resolution is in fact translating into improved relationships.

Interview groups were asked directly if they ever thought that it was acceptable to use violence against other people – from a different ethnic group, from their own sub-county, or those employed by the government. Only a low number of interview groups thought that it was ever acceptable to use violence against someone if they were from a different ethnic group. This could indicate that there are strong beliefs opposed to using violence against other ethnic groups that could be reinforced as a peacebuilding

Q.146 Who provides permission for attacks on other ethnic groups?

- Senior elders/chiefs: Very high (5/5)
- *Ngimurok*: High (4/5)
- Family: Medium (3/5)
- *Manyatta* leaders: Low (2/5)
- Warriors: Low (2/5)
- Criminal groups: Low (1/5)
- Church: Never (0/5)
- Neighbours/other people in the community: Never (0/5)
- Business leaders: Never (0/5)
- Vigilante groups: Never (0/5)

tool to address inter-ethnic conflict. However, a large number of groups left the answer blank and it is therefore difficult to take this as a definitive conclusion.

Similarly, the feeling amongst interview groups that raiding other ethnic groups is acceptable and normal was very low – indeed there was almost universal rejection of the idea. The interview groups did not think that community or traditional leaders provided any permission or had much control over attacks on other ethnic groups. However, when there is control, they strongly believe that elders and *ngimurok* have the most authority, while family also regularly have the authority to approve attacks. *Manyatta* leaders, warriors and criminals were felt to have authority to approve attacks only sometimes.

An interesting comment in a group interview with *ngimurok* indicates that wider Karamojong values relating to the encouragement of raiding and violence may be changing. The *ngimurok* interview group said that they “no longer do the role of encouraging the raids [instead they] do the work of treating people using herbs and helping those who have failed to get pregnant”. During the consultation phase of the assessment, several *ngimurok* pointed out that before disarmament (i.e. over the last 9–10 years), people used to request blessings for raids and would return to thank them if they were successful. Now, the *ngimurok* are no longer consulted about raids. Instead, they felt that communities were turning against them because their blessings are now blamed for so many youth getting killed during raids or in clashes with the UPDF. These *ngimurok* were now concentrating on herbal medicine, partly to fill voids in state-provided health services but also due to the drop in demand for their raid blessings.

Other *ngimurok* interviewed during the consultation phase also reported that their clients were changing: they now receive students who want good grades in class and people who want blessings to succeed in political careers and win elections. Though anecdotal and untested, these responses may indicate a wider change in social values away from encouraging raids and inter-ethnic violence. It could also indicate a change of mindset amongst *ngimurok* (themselves important social actors) towards discouraging violence.

Conflict Type B: Conflict between the state and Karamojong society

Conflict summary and recommendations for action

THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN PEOPLE IN KARAMOJA AND THE STATE has long been strained, and at times punctuated by specific types of violence. Within the context of the assessment, government respondents tended to emphasise the need to establish law and order, while Karamojong respondents prioritised the need for protecting them and their livestock from attacks. While Karamojong support the idea of a 'gun-free' Karamoja, the way in which disarmament has been carried out – namely using high levels of violence against the Karamojong – has negatively affected Karamojong perceptions of the government. At the same time, respondents were positive about government attempts to increase development in the region and broadly agreed with government development priorities for Karamoja. When probed, respondents also expressed concern that corruption was preventing current development initiatives from reaching their full potential. Respondents also distinguished between central government and local government – expressing a high level of trust in the latter as primary justice providers for instance.

- 1. Strengthen capacities to monitor, report and take action on human rights violations in Karamoja:** Human rights are clearly an issue in Karamoja. In order to effectively address this issue, more support should be provided to actors monitoring and reporting violations, as well as to those in a position to respond to or prevent violations. Firstly, the number of UHRC field offices should be expanded and they should be better resourced. UHRC field offices also need to work closely with other human rights actors in order to accurately document and investigate abuses. Secondly, the UPDF and the Uganda Police Force need to be engaged to take action on reported violations and monitor the training currently provided to staff on human rights to ensure that it actually results in attitudinal and behavioural change. Although potentially contentious and painful at first for some state actors, effectively reducing human rights abuses and

the impunity of staff will ultimately improve the relationship between the state and Karamojong society.

2. **Acknowledge legacies of violence:** It is apparent that state forces, particularly the UPDF, have a legacy of violence in their dealings with Karamojong communities. Whether this violence is lawful or not, it has contributed to severe mistrust, anger, fear and grievances toward the state on the part of the Karamojong. Likewise, armed Karamojong have a history of violence against state actors, which contributes to a context of lawlessness and insecurity, as well as to animosities on both sides. A constructive and sustainable relationship between the state and citizens in Karamoja can only be built if actors on both sides acknowledge these legacies.
3. **Increased sensitisation about the roles and responsibilities of both the state and communities:** There is confusion amongst the Karamojong regarding the roles and responsibilities of the UPDF and the police. Improved community sensitisation efforts would enable greater and more appropriate community engagement on security, but also improve transparency and manage expectations about what security forces can realistically and lawfully do in response to security threats. This process of community sensitisation should also include helping people to understand state-led programmes affecting the region (i.e. the Northern Uganda Rehabilitation Programme [NUREP], the National Agricultural Advisory Services [NAADS], and KIDDP) and how they could influence and provide feedback on such programmes. Increased public participation would not only improve the sustainability and impact of development and governance programmes, but also improve Karamojong perspectives about their relationship with the state. Importantly, sensitisation needs to be a two-way process and not just about the roles and responsibilities of the state, but also about how Karamojong communities and citizens can contribute responsibly and constructively to improved governance, security and social cohesion in partnership with the state.
4. **Support those actors who can successfully mediate between Karamojong society and the state, and create more opportunities for dialogue:** It was clear from the assessment that a number of actors could have a more pronounced role in improving interaction and dispute resolution between Karamojong and the state. The LCs are an obvious linchpin by which Karamojong society connects with the state – are there means of supporting their role? The police also have a relatively high legitimacy rating – how can this be built upon and the police's role in mediating between society and the state be improved? The UHRC also has a core function of ending impunity and mediating on human rights. Improving its legitimacy, credibility and capacity is an important means of ensuring that Karamojong grievances are heard. Dialogue was overwhelmingly seen as a successful means for peacefully resolving disputes and issues that could otherwise result in conflict with state actors. These sentiments could be harnessed if there were more opportunities for 'ordinary' Karamojong to participate in genuine processes of dialogue, decision-making and dispute resolution with the state.

1. Behaviour

CORE DYNAMIC 1.1 State violence against the Karamojong

The level of state violence against Karamojong communities is perceived to be **HIGH**. It is perceived to be mostly perpetrated by the UPDF and characterised by:

- high levels of deaths (predominantly of men) and moderate levels of sexual violence against women;
- use of firearms as the predominant weapon;
- frequent human rights violations (particularly torture and cruel and inhuman treatment or punishment);
- some very poor conditions of detention.

Indicators	Baseline
1.1.1 Experience of a <i>manyatta</i> – member being killed by government actors	Very high (5/5) , predominantly targeting men and predominantly perpetrated by the UPDF
1.1.2 Tools of state violence (as proxy indicator for severity of such violence)	Firearms (5/5) predominate as the tool responsible for death from state violence (followed by <i>pangas</i> and beatings)
1.1.3 Experience of a <i>manyatta</i> member being sexually assaulted by government actors	Moderate (3/5) , primarily targeting women and perceived to be committed almost exclusively by the UPDF
1.1.4 Fear of being attacked by people employed by the government	High (4/5) , with the UPDF and the police being the most feared
1.1.5 People are more afraid of being attacked by state employees than they were two years ago	High (4/5) , suggesting fear of attacks is increasing
1.1.6 People are most afraid of being attacked by...	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ■ people from other ethnic groups – Moderate (3/5) ■ people employed by the government – Very low (1/5)
1.1.7 Experience of theft from government actors	High (4/5) , predominantly perpetrated by the UPDF and targeting: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ■ personal and non-livestock items ■ food ■ livestock ■ money
1.1.8 Recorded number of human rights violations reported to the UHRC	58 cases (2008) 61 cases (2007)
1.1.9 Types of human rights violations experienced or aware of	Main types of human rights violations identified by respondents are: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ■ unlawful violence: beating, genital violence and castration ■ other forms of inhumane or degrading treatment: making people lie in the sun or the rain; forced undressing; forced dressing ■ issues surrounding arrest and detention: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> □ arresting youth/elders and ordering payment for release □ denying food and water to detainees □ arrests without reason during disarmament actions □ forced confessions for owning arms ■ theft, extortion and 'cheating of money'
1.1.10 Experience of a <i>manyatta</i> member being detained by government actors in the last two years	Very high (5/5) , predominantly targeting men, youth and warriors with detentions predominantly being carried out by the UPDF
1.1.11 Detained people suffer torture, beatings or violence	Very high (5/5)
1.1.12 Detainees were properly informed of the reason for their detention	High (4/5)

State violence against the Karamojong

This assessment did not attempt a long-term historical mapping of the violence between the state and people in Karamoja.⁵⁷ Instead we attempted to establish some indicators for the levels, scope and nature of violence as experienced from 2007 to 2009. Clashes between state security forces and Karamojong are regularly reported in the media, but comprehensive data that allows for tracking incidences of violence, crimes and injuries was unavailable (at least to the research team), and therefore the following analysis relies heavily on responses from group interviews and key informants.

Q.31 Has anyone in your *manyatta* been killed in the last 2 years by someone employed by the government?

- Yes – Very high (5/5)
- No – Very low (1/5)

Q.32 Which categories of people were killed?

- Men – Very high (5/5)
- Women – Low (2/5)
- Children – Low (2/5)

Q.34 Which type of government employee were they killed by?

- UPDF – Very high (5/5)
- Police – Very low (1/5)
- ASTUs – Very low (1/5)
- Other (prison warden) – Very low (1/5)
- Local government officials – Never (0/5)

Q.33 How were these people killed?

- Firearms – Very high (most common) (5/5)
- Pangas – Very low (2/5)
- Other – Low (2/5) – including beating (2/5), knives (1/5)
- Spears – Very low (1/5)
- Fists – Very low (1/5)
- Poison – Never (0/5)

Q.18 Which kinds of people employed by the state are you afraid of being attacked by?

- UPDF – Very high (5/5)
- Police – Very high (5/5)
- LCs – Low (2/5)
- ASTUs – Very low (1/5)
- Non-elected government officials – Very low (1/5)
- Other – Very low (1/5)

Almost all groups interviewed in September 2009 had members who reported that government actors had killed someone from their *manyatta* in the last two years, indicating that state violence against communities could be fairly pervasive. Men were most likely to be the victims of these incidences, and in almost all of them, they were reportedly killed by UPDF forces with firearms. It is important to note that the assessment did not explore the reasons for the deaths of these *manyatta* members: they may not necessarily have been the result of the use of unlawful force. However, the purpose of the questions was to begin registering the broad experience of state violence, whether lawful or not. The responses suggest that the Karamojong perceive deadly violence as a significant characteristic of the state's engagement with their communities. Whether or not this violence is lawful, it cannot bode well for the state's prospects for establishing a more positive relationship with Karamojong society. Continuing levels of violence may also strongly reinforce the perception amongst some Karamojong of a latent conflict between them and the state (see Core Dynamic 3.1 below).

The incidence of sexual assault by government actors was reported as high (4/5) among group interviews in Kotido District, but lower elsewhere. Male youth/reformed warriors and *ngimurok* interview groups reported a higher incidence of sexual assault than did women, men or elders interview groups. Women were seen by all interview groups to be the main victims of sexual assaults perpetrated by government actors, while children also infrequently experienced sexual assaults. Men were never reported as victims of sexual assault; however, responses to questions on human rights (see below) show that men do experience some types of gender-based violence or genital mutilation. According to interview groups, UPDF soldiers were exclusively responsible for committing these sexual assaults.

People in Karamoja appear to have a significant fear of being attacked by state actors. Most interview groups reported that they feared being attacked by people employed by the state, with the UPDF and the police both ranked very highly as threats. The perception in group interviews that people are more afraid of being attacked by state employees than they were two years ago was common, perhaps indicating that the fear of attacks by state actors is increasing.

“The warriors who are captured and convicted are not treated fairly. They are usually brutally tortured, some are left half dead and others are taken away from their families without proper explanation as to their whereabouts. The local leaders, especially councillors, are tortured if they try to protest at the way the victims are handled or if they are also perceived to be concealing information. Some of them are forced to confess that they have guns.”

Women's focus group, consultation phase

⁵⁷ More detailed reports on this include op cit Human Rights Watch 2007; op cit UNHCHR 2006; and op cit, Bevan 2008. Ben Knighton argues that the state 'has from the start regarded Karamoja as a problem that could be solved by disarmament' and other forms of force, in 'The State as Raider Among the Karamojong: 'Where There Are No Guns, They Use the Threat of Guns'', *Africa*, 2003, vol. 73 no. 3, p 433. Lastly, the KIDDP itself recognises a significant escalation of violence between the UPDF and Karamojong communities during the 'forced disarmament' phase from May 2006 to 2007 (op cit Government of Uganda 2008, pp 12–14).

Q.20 Who are you most afraid of being attacked by...

- ...people from other ethnic groups – Moderate (3/5)
- ...people employed by the government – Very low (1/5)
- ...other people living in your sub-county – Never (0/5)

However, this fear of attack from state actors needs to be put in relative context. Although fear of being attacked by state employees was apparently high, interview groups responded that they were more afraid of being attacked by people from other ethnic groups when asked to identify which threat was the greatest.

Lastly, interview groups reported a high experience of thefts committed by government actors, rising to very high for those living in Kotido District. Personal non-livestock related property and food were the most commonly stolen items, followed sometimes by livestock and money. Civilian firearms (which are of course illicit), were also noted as infrequently 'stolen' from Karamojong civilians. Interview groups reported that the UPDF were usually responsible for these thefts.

The current human rights situation

Human rights actors interviewed for the assessment found it difficult to summarise the level of human rights abuses in Karamoja. The rate at which abuses are committed varies and the context is very fluid – there can be 20 cases in a month or there can be as many as “four or five cases a day”. In addition, human rights violations go under-reported in Karamoja and gathering evidence is very difficult, mainly because:

- torture victims do not go to hospital for treatment, which makes it difficult to obtain the necessary medical evidence to sustain a case;
- incidents take place far from town, in hard-to-reach areas, and it is difficult for 'rural' people to access Civil Military Cooperation Centres (CMCCs) where they could report incidents, because CMCCs are based in towns not villages;
- ordinary Karamojong do not have a strong understanding of human rights while some even have a negative attitude towards human rights;
- a lack of awareness of the mechanisms available for reporting abuses, in addition to which people are used to sorting out their issues at home or using informal justice mechanisms, while many simply do not feel comfortable reporting matters to the authorities;
- people are not sure whether reporting a case will really help them or if the case will drag on or 'disappear';
- people are unwilling to make complaints, make statements or testify in court for fear of retaliation by the accused (particularly if the accused is a member of the UPDF or the police).

In addition, significant gaps in institutional capacity negatively affect the ability of the state to receive and investigate complaints. There is only one UHRC field office in Karamoja, based in Moroto town. This office has only four full-time staff and three volunteers. Having such a limited number of staff in a region as troubled and as difficult to access as Karamoja presents a major challenge in both reporting and following up on cases. This challenge has been compounded by staffing problems over the course of 2007–8.⁵⁸

Nonetheless, the assessment was able to establish a broad picture of the human rights situation, based on the reports of the UHRC, interviews with UHRC officials and through group interviews with the Karamojong. The UHRC publishes an annual report on human rights cases in Uganda every year. While the report covering 2009 is still in production (and the rate at which such information is released is therefore an issue in itself), information from the 2008 and 2007 Annual Reports are helpful in sketching out the wider human rights situation in the country and Karamoja.

The 2007 Annual Report noted a decrease in human rights cases in Karamoja from 2006. However, the 2008 Annual Report stated that despite a general decrease in the

⁵⁸ Noted in Uganda Human Rights Commission (UHRC), *11th Annual Report of the Uganda Human Rights Commission to the Parliament of the Republic of Uganda* (2008).

number of cases reported nationally, Arua, Gulu and Karamoja⁵⁹ recorded increases in human rights violations. The number of registered human rights cases in Karamoja increased from 61 in 2007 to 89 in 2008. The following types of human rights cases were registered by the UHRC in Karamoja between January and December 2008,⁶⁰ and between January and December 2007:⁶¹

Type of case	Number of cases in 2007	Number of cases in 2008
Freedom from torture and cruel inhuman treatment or punishment	18	30
Rights of children	29	30
Right to life	2	7
Right to education	6	7
Right to personal liberty	2	5
Right to a fair hearing and speedy trial	1	5
Right to property	3	4

Aside from the violations of children's rights, which mainly entailed failure by parents or guardians to take care of or provide maintenance for their children,⁶² the main types of human rights abuses reported in Karamoja relate to the activities of the UPDF, particularly during cordon and search operations carried out as part of disarmament, and to the police. In 2008, cases were registered against the following categories of respondents:⁶³

- Private individuals: 31 cases
- UPDF: 25 cases
- Police: 14 cases
- Prisons: 5 cases
- Government institutions: 1 case

Human rights actors interviewed for the assessment corroborated report findings that a range of human rights abuses occur during cordon and search operations. The standards of conduct by the UPDF are felt to have improved over the last one or two years, including since cordon and search guidelines were agreed in 2007. However, there are still pockets of violations, attributed to 'frustration' among the UPDF, who want to get the job of disarmament done. There are numerous reports of torture and inhuman treatment and unlawful killings occurring during cordon and search operations. In addition, people's maize is taken or their gardens are destroyed by the UPDF. Sometimes food, livestock and money are stolen, while other times granaries or foodstuffs are destroyed.

Aside from cordon and search operations, unlawful killings also happen while in UPDF detention, in prisons and in police cells. Torture and inhuman treatment complaints are also sometimes made against the police. This includes people being beaten and forced to admit to having guns, and use of pepper in the eyes and anus while being held in police cells. Human rights observers also noted state (UPDF or police) violence against women, including intoxicating girls and raping them; and deprivation of the right to personal liberty and lack of access to justice. Long pre-trial detentions often occur, and when trials do take place they often take a long time or matters are not heard.

⁵⁹ The Annual Report refers to registered complaints for Moroto, where the UHRC Karamoja regional office is based. Therefore, data reported for Moroto is for the whole of Karamoja as processed by that field office.

⁶⁰ Op cit UHRC 2008, p 16.

⁶¹ UHRC, *The 10th Annual Report to the Parliament of Uganda of the Uganda Human Rights Commission: A Decade of Human Rights Reporting in Uganda* (Kampala: UHRC, 2007), p 14.

⁶² Op cit UHRC 2008, p 18.

⁶³ Ibid, p 20.

To get a more qualitative Karamojong perspective on the human rights situation, interview groups were asked to reflect on what types of human rights abuses they or fellow *manyatta* members had experienced over the last two years.

Q.38 In the past 2 years, has anyone in your *manyatta* suffered any kind of abuse by government employees, apart from killing or sexual assault? If so, what kinds of abuses?

Unlawful violence:

- Beating – including: making people lie on the top of an anthill while they are beaten or hit with guns
- Genital mutilation – including: castration; ‘putting two sticks on the penis of the man’; tying a rope or bicycle tube on the penis and/or testicles of men during detention or as punishment
- Binding the mouth of men in detention as punishment to force confessions
- “Bombing of the village has blinded some people”

Inhumane or degrading treatment:

- Being forced to put on clothes (mostly a rural phenomenon)
- Public humiliation through undressing
- Dangerous or uncomfortable exposure – including making people lie in the sun or the rain without shirts or sheets; putting people into wells with polluted water; forcing people to dance and sing in the sun
- Making people ‘jump frogs’

Issues surrounding arrest and detention:

- Arresting youth and elders and ordering communities to pay money to have them released (bribery, but possibly also illegal detention in the first place)
- Denying food and water to people who have been detained
- Detention without reason during disarmament
- Forced confessions of illicit arms possession

Forced labour

- Collecting water and firewood for soldiers
- Building huts for soldiers

It is important to note that a few interview groups in Moroto were adamant that human rights abuses and unlawful violence by the UPDF and other government actors were very limited. One *ngimurok* interview group participant in Moroto District said the UPDF sometimes did carry out beatings, but they did not commit any other kind of abuse. One male youth/reformed warrior group interview in Moroto District reported that beating and torture had occurred but only in the past during the phase of forced disarmament. Lastly, one men’s interview group in Moroto District gave very positive reviews of UPDF behaviour in their community, stating that the UPDF only come to their community to “do gun checks”, to “educate people” and “treat the cows”.

Conditions in detention

The 2008 UHRC Annual Report found nationwide challenges in access to food, medical care, water, and education in detention, and that there were challenges of congestion in some prisons, long remands and poor living conditions for the majority of prison staff.

The UHRC found that most of the police cells visited across Uganda lacked basic necessities for detaining suspects. Most detention places at police stations and posts were characterised by limited space, poor ventilation, scarcity of clean and safe water, congestion and poor sanitation. There was usually a lack of detention facilities for women. Children were sometimes detained with adults. The report noted that inmates at police stations were not generally provided with food, which meant that those without relatives who could bring them food faced the likelihood of starvation.⁶⁴ Overall,

⁶⁴ Op cit UHRC 2008, pp 41–42.

The UHRC process for handling human rights complaints

During an interview in October 2009, the UHRC Regional Office in Moroto explained the new process for initiating a tribunal process for alleged human rights violations. In the first instance, not all cases will go to a tribunal – the Commission and parties must first attempt to try to and settle matters amicably. In almost all cases where the UHRC office receives a complaint, UHRC officials listen to the case and then fill out a complaint form including statements and names of witnesses. The UHRC then opens a file and writes a letter to the respondent (the ‘accused’) putting the allegations in writing and asking them to respond within a certain time. The UHRC then sends a reminder and a final reminder according to a pre-determined timetable. While waiting for a response, the UHRC also takes statements from witnesses and conducts investigations. Once the investigation report is sent to the UHRC legal officer for a legal opinion, it is forwarded to the UHRC Directorate of Complaints, Investigation and Legal Services, in Kampala for a hearing. Once lodged in Kampala, the case can then be heard at a tribunal in Moroto.

During tribunals (which can hear multiple cases), the UHRC council introduces each of the complaints, the complainant is called on, their statement taken and then they are examined and cross-examined, after which witnesses are called. The respondent is then able to open their case for the defence, including giving statements and calling witnesses, all of whom are examined and cross-examined. The case is then closed and it is left to the Commissioner to make a decision after the tribunal.

The first tribunal in Moroto took place on 7 September 2009, ran for one week and heard ten cases. Most of the respondents turned up for this first tribunal, apart from two UPDF officials who had been transferred to other parts of Uganda. Most of the witnesses also came – in those instances where witnesses did not attend, the case was adjourned. Overall, the UHRC felt that the first tribunal had been quite positive.

Prior to the UHRC holding tribunals, cases were just kept on file. The lack of tribunals from 2004 (when the Moroto office opened) until September 2009 was mainly because Karamoja was too insecure for the tribunals to be run. Now that the situation has improved, the tribunals have now come to Karamoja. It is expected that tribunals will take place every month in order to deal with the significant backlog of cases.

the Report concluded that, “the conditions of detention prevailing in most police cells deserve urgent attention as they are dehumanising”.⁶⁵

According to interviews with the UHRC Regional Office in Moroto, detention conditions in Karamoja are as poor as or worse than the national average. This situation was also highlighted during the design phase of the assessment as especially contributing to poor relations between the Karamojong and the state.

Overall, the main problem is a lack of resources. UHRC representatives interviewed believed that prison officials treat prisoners very well, and that detention conditions would greatly improve once new facilities had been constructed. Human rights observers noted the following issues regarding detention conditions at police facilities:

- no proper sanitation facilities or latrine pit, so detained people use buckets inside the cells as toilets; these are emptied twice a day;
- prisoners have to wash with dirty water;
- people who are tortured during arrests and have filthy wounds are often denied medical treatment by the police, or the detention clinic is not stocked so they cannot be treated in any case;
- food is provided but it is inadequate, so relatives have to buy and bring in supplies;
- visitors come but they have to wait a long time and the only people who get visitors are usually people who live in the towns near the detention facilities.⁶⁶

Q.40 Which categories of people have been detained?

- Men – Very high (5/5)
- Youth – High (4/5)
- Warriors – High (4/5)
- Women – Low (2/5)
- Elders – Low (2/5)
- Children – Very low (1/5)

Interview groups reported that a high number of *manyatta* members had been detained by government actors in the last two years, with men followed by youth and warriors being the most commonly detained. The UPDF are reported to carry out detentions the most frequently, although sometimes they are carried out by the police and occasionally by ASTUs.

⁶⁵ Ibid, p 40.

⁶⁶ Interviews with human rights observers.

Q.45 Why do you think these people were detained?

- Theft – Moderate (3/5)
- Other – Moderate (3/5), including firearms possession (3/5), jealousy from other communities, killing/adultery
- Participation in a raid – Low (2/5)
- Fighting – Low (2/5)
- Not dressing 'properly' – Low (2/5)
- Political crimes – Very low (1/5)
- Idleness/drunkenness – Very low (1/5)

More often than not, according to group interviews, detainees are properly informed of the reason why they are being detained. Interview groups reported that people were detained for a variety of reasons, mainly theft, firearms possession, participation in a cattle raid and, less frequently, for fighting and not being 'properly' dressed.

Significantly, the perception amongst interview groups that people suffer torture, beatings or violence in detention was very high.

Challenges in addressing human rights violations in Karamoja

Compounding the capacity issues facing the UHCR (described above), the UHRC-led CMCCs, which are intended to support and work with the UPDF to monitor disarmament in Karamoja, have been difficult to resource and maintain. The CMCCs were established in order to involve CSOs and civilians in the disarmament process and are based in every district in Karamoja. Each CMCC is composed of a volunteer from the UHRC, the UPDF, a police officer and a CSO representative appointed by the CSO network in the district. Because of the voluntary nature of participation, not all CMCCs have met as regularly or operated as effectively as they were intended, despite UHRC resourcing and support.

Compounding this lack of effectiveness, in 2008 the UPDF formed its own parallel Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC) structure, with financial support from Save the Children. According to Save the Children, the CIMIC arrangement secured the involvement of high-ranking officials who quickly took important decisions, but this was felt in many ways by the Regional UHRC Officer and other community members interviewed to undermine the role of the UHRC. In addition, the CIMIC structures were managed directly by the UPDF, which compromises the 'neutrality' of the process of holding the UPDF to account. The UPDF utilised the CIMIC structures to gather intelligence and make arrests, contrary to their original purpose of providing a means for people to report complaints freely. The UHRC believes that the CIMIC project "killed the spirit" of joint human rights outreach activities and reporting for UPDF violations in Karamoja. Encouragingly, in recent months, the UPDF has signalled its desire to rejoin the CMCC structures, recognising that Karamojong citizens have not responded enthusiastically to the CIMIC arrangement.

All in all, improving the human rights situation and consequently the relationship between the state and Karamojong society will require increased investment in capacities and mechanisms to ensure the effective monitoring, reporting and investigation of violations, while not encouraging duplicating and competing structures.

CORE DYNAMIC 1.2

Karamojong violence against the state

The level of violence by the Karamojong against the state is perceived by the Karamojong to be LOW.

Indicators	Baseline
1.2.1 Attacks by Karamojong civilians against people employed by the state	Low (2/5) , though seen to be motivated by a variety of reasons
1.2.2 Incidences of civilians having damaged or destroyed any government property or infrastructure in the past two years	Very low (1/5) – in the rare instances of such attacks taking place, the primary targets were schools and cars/tractors

Just as it is important to monitor the levels, scope and nature of state violence against the Karamojong, it is important to understand Karamojong violence against the state.

For the most part, recent Karamojong violence against state actors appears to be infrequent. Interview groups believed that the number of attacks by Karamojong

Q.54 What do you think are the reasons why attacks against the government have taken place?

- Retaliation – Very high (5/5)
- Self-defence – High (4/5)
- To recover livestock – High (4/5)
- To steal property – Low (2/5)
- Other, including recovering guns taken during disarmament exercises – Low (2/5)
- To release detainees – Very low (1/5)
- To destroy property – Never (0/5)

CORE DYNAMIC 1.3
Government programmes contributing to a positive relationship between the state and the Karamojong

civilians against people employed by the state was low over the last two years. Motivations for attacking state employees vary, though attacks appear to be most frequently motivated by retaliation, self-defence or the desire to recover livestock.

For the most part, interview groups were unaware of incidents in their community in which civilians had damaged or destroyed any government property or infrastructure between 2007 and 2009. In those few incidents which had occurred, the main targets were schools and cars or tractors. This low level of incidents was corroborated by interviews with security actors.

There are **HIGH** levels of awareness and belief in the positive impact of government security, development and peacebuilding programmes for the region, but **LOW** actual understanding of, and community participation in, these programmes.

Indicators	Baseline
1.3.1 People have heard about the Government's Northern Uganda Social Action Fund (NUSAF), NUREP, NAADS and KIDDP programmes	Very high (5/5)
1.3.2 Level of local participation in the key Government security, development and peacebuilding programmes for the region	NUSAF – Moderate (3/5) NUREP – Very low (1/5) NAADS – Very low (1/5) KIDDP – None (0/5)
1.3.3 Perception that these programmes have had a positive impact on life and development	High (4/5)

The Government of Uganda (GoU) has initiated a number of development and governance programmes in Karamoja that represent a significant attempt to improve local conditions and build a more positive relationship with Karamojong society. The main programmes are as follows:

- **KIDDP** – The Karamoja Integrated Disarmament and Development Plan is a government programme launched in April 2008 as the latest in a series of attempts by the GoU to address the high levels of arms possession and misuse in Karamoja. It comprises a series of disarmament interventions complemented by efforts to enhance security and address development needs identified as root causes of underdevelopment and armed violence in Karamoja.
- **NUSAF** – The Northern Uganda Social Action Fund is a GoU project financed by a specific investment loan from the World Bank, the UK Department for International Development (DFID) and other development partners. It is a multi-sectoral community demand-driven project that is part of the Peace Recovery and Development Plan (PRDP) implementation. The first phase of NUSAF was marred by implementation challenges and corruption. The government launched the second phase, which will last for five years, in November 2009.
- **NUREP** – The Northern Uganda Rehabilitation Programme was an EU-funded programme aimed at strengthening the self-reliance and protection of local populations in Northern Uganda. It was meant to rehabilitate social infrastructure and improve the capacity of Ugandan stakeholders to respond to conflict and disasters, while promoting reconciliation and reduction of regional disparities through development. The overall budget was 20 million Euros, with an implementation phase ending 31 December 2009.
- **NAADS** – The National Agricultural Advisory Services is a Government of Uganda programme aimed at promoting productive agriculture, particularly in support of poverty reduction objectives. It was launched in 2001 and has a 25 year plan for agricultural development, with phases of implementation in different districts across Uganda.

It is difficult to empirically measure the concrete impact of these programmes at this point in time, since most are medium or long-term processes currently underway or only recently finished. However, focus groups in the consultation phases highlighted that there appeared to be a significant lack of awareness or understanding of these programmes and that this contributed to animosities towards the state. In addition, the beneficiary selection processes for these projects has led to conflict because those people originally consulted during the project development stages are often not the project's eventual beneficiaries. Therefore the assessment sought to gauge current perceptions about these programmes and whether they are felt to have contributed to a more positive relationship between the state and Karamojong society.

“NAADS, NUREP and NUSAF are a very beautiful song we hear on the radio.”

Elders focus group, consultation phase

While almost all interview groups had heard of the GoU's NUSAF, NUREP, NAADS and KIDDP programmes, they were largely unable to express much detailed knowledge or understanding of these programmes. The programme that gained the most recognition – i.e. to which most projects were attributed – was NUSAF. Most interview groups identified an array of projects for which they believed NUSAF to be responsible, including: construction of health centres/clinics, schools, teacher accommodation, latrines, and a sub-county headquarters; loaning money and establishing public credit schemes; extensive borehole drilling and other water source projects; and some livestock support, such as livestock drugs. However, some interview groups indicated that they had heard about NUSAF but did not know what it did or did not think they had received any tangible benefits from it. As one group put it: “NUSAF just came and stopped in the town and did not come to the villages”. These types of comments were more common in Moroto District than in Kotido District.

Only about half of group interviews attributed projects to NUREP, including some construction and rehabilitation projects for boreholes, valley dams, schools, roads and government offices and providing some sports equipment. About half of the interview groups either had not heard of NUREP or were unclear about its activities: “we have only heard of it on the radio, but we don't know what it does”. One focus group participant was wearing a NUREP cap, but indicated that he had simply found the cap on the road. Some interview groups in Rupa and Nadunget sub-counties said most NUREP projects were dominated by the Bokora from the south – they joked that it had been renamed as BOKOREP: the ‘Bokora Rehabilitation Programme’.

Only one interview group referred to a specific KIDDP project, which they thought “built schools for communities”. All other interview groups either had not heard of the KIDDP, did not associate it with any tangible projects or simply equated it with disarmament: “we have heard about the KIDDP because it took away all the guns”. In consultations during the validation and feedback stage, a number of observers suggested that this lack of awareness around the KIDDP could be the result of a number of factors, including that:

- the disarmament components of the KIDDP are the only ones fully underway;
- local people are being excluded from KIDDP processes;
- the KIDDP is not in itself resulting in any new projects on the ground but just providing a ‘framework’ for existing projects;
- the differences between the KIDDP and the PRDP are unclear.

Despite these drawbacks, the general perception in group interviews was that these programmes have had a positive impact on life and development in Karamoja.

Q.123 Do you know people in this sub-county who have participated in these government-led projects?

- Participated in NUSAF – Moderate (3/5)
- Participated in NUREP – Very low (1/5)
- Participated in NAADS – Very low (1/5)
- Participated in KIDDP – None (0/5)

Overall, community awareness of and opinions about the NUSAF, NUREP and KIDDP programmes are mixed. The majority of interview groups were able to list infrastructure projects for which they believed NUSAF or NUREP to be responsible. However, some interview groups (particularly in Moroto) expressed dissatisfaction about the lack of information regarding these programmes. They may have heard of them, but they did not know what they involved and could not identify how their communities had benefited from them. Knowledge about and participation in the KIDDP was almost completely lacking. The government should investigate this lack of public understanding of and participation in these programmes and find ways to enhance it, where appropriate. Increased public participation is an important means of improving not only the impact of programmes, but also their sustainability. It would also demonstrate to Karamojong communities that the state is intent on increasing its positive engagement with them.

2. Systems and structures

CORE DYNAMIC 2.1 Supply and demand of illicit arms

There are MODERATE to HIGH levels of supply and demand for arms amongst civilians in Karamoja, contributing to a higher likelihood that fighting in the latent conflict between the state and Karamojong society will result in fatalities.

The situation is characterised by:

- lack of credible data on arms possession, flows and demand;
- denial by civilians that they own weapons, although gunshots occur weekly and even daily;
- a strong sense amongst civilians that they should not possess guns, but that they still need them to protect themselves and their livestock (mainly from other ethnic groups);
- Kalashnikov/AK 47 rifles are the predominant weapons, possessed mainly by young males;
- it is difficult for civilians to obtain weapons, but they are obtained from rogue soldiers and police, cross-border arms flows and weapons traders.

Indicators	Baseline
2.1.1 Civilians seen in the community with firearms	Almost never (1/5) , suggesting that the level of civilian arms possession was very low
2.1.2 Government estimates of civilian firearms possession	Moderate levels of civilian firearms possession: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ■ no confirmed official statistics, only personal estimations ■ number of weapons estimated in the low thousands
2.1.3 Frequency of gunshots heard in the community	Weekly on average, with almost half of interview groups having heard gunshots on a daily basis
2.1.4 Types of small arms seen in the possession of civilians in the community	Kalashnikov/AK 47 variant rifles were the most commonly seen small arms in civilian possession
2.1.5 Types of small arms collected from communities	Kalashnikov/AK 47 variant rifles were the main types of small arms collected during civilian disarmament
2.1.6 <i>Government perception:</i> who possesses small arms in the community?	Young males aged 18–35, particularly the karachuna , based on who has been disarmed so far
2.1.7 <i>Communities perception:</i> why do civilians feel they need small arms?	Protection from other ethnic group. High 4/5 Protection of livestock. High 4/5 Attack other ethnic groups. Low 1/5 Protection from other people within their community. Low 1/5
2.1.8 <i>Government perception:</i> why do civilians feel they need small arms?	To conduct raids for commercial and cultural reasons, including for status and acquiring cattle for bride price To protect themselves and cattle from raids and attacks from other ethnic groups, as well as to conduct revenge raids and attacks

Indicators <i>continued</i>	Baseline <i>continued</i>
2.1.9 <i>Communities perception:</i> Owning a small arm makes you safer	Moderate (3/5)
2.1.10 <i>Communities perception:</i> Civilians should <i>not</i> possess small arms	High (4/5) , most people felt that civilians should not be allowed to possess guns
2.1.11 <i>Communities perception:</i> sources of illicit civilian small arms?	Top two sources: ■ UPDF or police: Medium (3/5) ■ Weapons traders: Low (2/5)
2.1.12 <i>Government's perception:</i> sources of illicit civilian small arms?	Top two sources: ■ cross-border flows ■ UPDF and police – but only from theft, battlefield captures and during past national crises
2.1.13 <i>Communities perception:</i> how easy it is for civilians to obtain small arms?	Difficult/very difficult for civilians to obtain small arms
2.1.14 <i>Government's perception:</i> how easy it is for civilians to obtain small arms?	Very difficult/impossible for civilians to obtain small arms

Illicit small arms possession defines the capacity for, and potential of, lethal violence⁶⁷ against the state and is at the core of the conflict between the state and Karamojong society. This perspective was reinforced in consultations during the design phase of the assessment. For this reason, illicit small arms are included in this section as an important measure of the conflictual relationship between the state and the Karamojong.

The issue of illicit small arms possession is complex. Rather than focusing purely on possession numbers and flows of arms (or 'supply' dynamics) in Karamojong communities, we developed a number of indicators that were intended to shed more light on the reasons why people possess illicit arms (or the 'demand' dynamics). Understanding demand dynamics is central to developing arms control measures. Even if feasible measures could be implemented to cut off illicit arms supplies and remove all weapons from civilians, this would not address the deep-rooted dynamics that propel demand. Although a vicious circle links supply and demand, a means of supply will always be found as long as there is demand for arms. However, investigating demand-side dynamics is highly challenging. Because civilian arms possession is illegal, conversation about ownership is highly constrained by fear of arrest or sanction. Discussions in many communities indicated a strong reluctance to speak about illicit weapons possession for fear of being turned into the authorities by 'spies' and 'informers'.

'Supply' of illicit small arms

In group interviews, participants reported almost never seeing civilians carrying guns in their communities. In only two group interviews did participants report seeing civilians with any small arms in the last two years.

When asked even more directly about the number of people who possess guns in their communities, 23 out of 25 interview groups replied that no-one possessed a gun (the two exceptions reported that they 'Did not know').

During the validation phase, Karamojong were more forthcoming in discussing weapons possession. Workshops confirmed that, because of the Ugandan government's disarmament processes, civilians do not move around carrying guns freely anymore. This is in and of itself a successful form of arms control. As discussions developed, there were many admissions that some people in communities do still own guns and regularly shoot back when they come under attack during raids.

Q.89 In the past two years, have you seen civilians carrying small arms in your sub-county?

- Never – Very high (5/5)
- Almost never – Very low (1/5)
- Monthly – Very low (1/5)
- Weekly – Never (0/5)
- Daily – Never (0/5)

⁶⁷ For further recent exploration of the relationship between illicit small arms, insecurity and conflict in Karamoja, see op cit Bevan 2008.

Q.91 How many people living in your sub-county do you think currently own a small arm?

- None at all – Very high (5/5)
- Not very many (e.g. only a small number of people have them) – None (0/5)
- Many (e.g. most *manyatta*s have one) – None (0/5)
- Very many (e.g. every *manyatta* has at least one) – None (0/5)
- Don't know – Very low (1/5)

Q.87 How often during the last two years have you heard gunshots in the sub-county where you live?

- Every day – Medium (3/5)
- At least once a week – Very low (1/4)
- Once a month or so – Very low (1/5)
- Almost never – Very low (1/5)
- Never heard a gunshot in last 2 years – Very low (1/5)

Q.92 Over the past two years, which types of small arms have you seen being carried by civilians in your sub-county?

- Kalashnikov/AK 47 rifles – Very low (1/5)
- G3 rifles – Very low (1/5)
- Submachine guns (9mm) – Very low (1/5)
- Light machine gun (5.56 or 7.62mm) – Very low (1/5)
- Heavy machine guns (12.7mm) – Never (0/5)
- Rocket-propelled grenades (RPG) – Never (0/5)
- Mortars – Never (0/5)
- Mines/grenades – Never (0/5)
- Don't know – Very low (1/5)
- Refused to answer – Very low (1/5)
- Blank – Medium (3/5)

Q.96 If you or someone in your sub-county wanted to obtain a small arm, how easy would this be?

- Very difficult – Medium (3/5)
- Difficult – Medium (3/5)
- Easy – Never (0/5)
- Very easy – Very low (1/5)

Furthermore, almost half of all interview groups reported hearing gunshots on a daily basis. Although these could have been shots fired by state security forces or raiders, it represents such a high frequency that it is hard to believe that they do not include a significant number of shots fired from local civilian arms.

Interestingly, although only two interview groups acknowledged having seen civilians with weapons in their communities over the past two years, five interview groups reported the types of small arms they had seen in the possession of civilians. Kalashnikovs and AK variant rifles were the most commonly seen small arms. Although not conclusive in themselves, responses for gunshots and weapon types reinforce the impression that group interview respondents may not have been entirely forthcoming when asked directly about weapons possession.

There are few credible, publicly available official statistics regarding illicit small arms possession in Karamoja. When security actors were interviewed, some claimed that “people are no longer acquiring arms” and “don't have illegal arms”. Others estimated that illicit civilian weapons possession ranged from just several thousand in the region with most being hidden and inactive, to illicit weapons being “all over Karamoja” with some people having been disarmed more than four times. The most recent and perhaps the most accurate statistic we were able to obtain, was that 28,040 arms had been collected as of July 2010, according to the Regional Disarmament Committee Secretariat for Karamoja.

All officials interviewed however, confirmed that civilian disarmament remains a central government priority in Karamoja. Based on the types of weapons collected through disarmament exercises, civilians were thought to possess Kalashnikov/AK 47 variants, G3 and other self-loading rifles and a few ‘homemade’ guns, almost exclusively in the possession of male youths aged 15–35 years.⁶⁸

According to the interview groups, sources within the UPDF and police were the most ready means for civilians to acquire arms; however, the details of how exactly these ‘transfers’ are made could not be explored due to the sensitivity of the issue. Some security actors interviewed vehemently disputed that any state weapons ever make their way illicitly into the hands of civilians in Karamoja. Others suggested that this only occurs when arms are stolen from soldiers and the police; taken from them if they are killed during raids (i.e. as ‘battlefield losses’); or sold on to civilians by police or UPDF deserters. One interviewee pointed out that large numbers of previous government weapon stocks are in the hands of Karamojong civilians not from current “leakage” but as a result of transfers that occurred during previous regime crises. Thousand of arms were looted or passed to civilians from the security services and armed groups in 1979 with the overthrow of Idi Amin, in 1985 when Milton Obote was deposed, and in 1986 when the Uganda National Liberation Army (UNLA) was removed from power. This same interviewee believed that leakage from state stocks now is “minimal” and that it is being “contained effectively”. During further validation consultations, other security actors informally acknowledged that there might be instances of rogue individuals in the UPDF selling ammunition but that this is not the practice of the army as a whole. During the validation phase, community and district representatives also pointed out that raiders often wear new UPDF and police uniforms when they attack, for which there could only be two sources.

Interview groups identified ‘weapon traders’ as the next most prevalent source of illicit arms, but also noted ‘foreign countries’ (Sudan, Kenya) as places where civilians could sometimes obtain small arms. Security actors interviewed confirmed that significant numbers of illicit arms are available across the Ugandan border in Sudan and Kenya.

Despite identifying these various sources, group interviewees and security actors interviewed agreed that it was difficult for Karamojong civilians to obtain illicit arms.

⁶⁸ One interviewee spoke about how weapons were actually family property and that once a man reaches about 45 years of age, he passes on the gun to the young men in the family.

Q.93 Why do you think some civilians might want to own small arms?

- Protection from other ethnic group – High 4/5
- Protection of livestock – High 4/5
- Attack other ethnic groups – Low 1/5
- Protection from other people within their community – Low 1/5

Q.88 Do you think people in your sub-county feel safer if they own a small arm?

- Yes – Medium (3/5)
- No – Medium (3/5)

Q.94 Do you think that it should be legal for a civilian to possess small arms or light weapons?

- Yes – Low (2/5)
- No – High (4/5)

Demand for illicit small arms

Civilian demand for small arms is driven by the need to protect animals and to repel attacks from other ethnic groups. Almost all interview groups (4/5) ranked these as the two main reasons they would want to possess a gun. Very few respondents said they would acquire guns to conduct livestock raids, and other economic activities.

Interviews with security actors also highlighted a wide range of perceived 'demand' dynamics behind civilian possession of illicit small arms. Although not all agreed on this point, many security actors interviewed did not believe that illicit weapons were obtained for self-protection or reasons of security, as they felt that the Ugandan state was or should be responsible for this function. They certainly felt that Karamojong civilians did not need to protect themselves from threats by state forces. Instead, they focused on the social and economic dynamics of raiding: they argued that Karamojong civilians obtain weapons in order to conduct revenge attacks against other ethnic groups and to raid cattle for commercial and cultural reasons, as well as for replenishing depleted cattle stocks.

Despite the demand dynamics described above, which suggest that illicit small arms possession in Karamojong society should be high, group interviews demonstrated that there are mixed feelings towards possession of arms. Only about half of interview groups felt that owning a gun makes you 'feel safer' and most felt that owning a gun should be illegal.

Interestingly, during the validation phase a number of respondents indicated that possession of a weapon significantly decreased your personal security because it made you a target of the UPDF and the police.

CORE DYNAMIC 2.2 Civilian disarmament

Thousands of weapons have been collected and seized since the first civilian disarmament programme was launched in Karamoja in 2001, but after almost a decade of disarmament, high levels of armed violence persist. This makes people in Karamoja feel insecure and has done almost nothing to address the underlying causes of the violence. Karamojong believe that the way in which disarmament had been carried out has increased insecurity, made communities more vulnerable to attack from ethnic groups and involved significant levels of state violence against civilians. Nonetheless, there is significant support for disarmament in principle within Karamojong society. The government could capitalise on this dynamic by consulting communities and finding ways in which to improve the effectiveness of disarmament processes. More consultative and co-operative approaches to disarmament could result in reducing the overall capacity for Karamojong violence against the state and contribute to improving the relationship between the state and Karamojong society.

Indicators	Baseline
2.2.1 Your ethnic group has been 'more disarmed' than neighbouring ethnic groups	High (4/5)
2.2.2 Disarmament has left your ethnic group vulnerable to attack from others	Very high (5/5)
2.2.3 People feel more secure as a result of the disarmament process	Varied , though tending marginally towards 'slightly less secure' (appearing to apply to a slightly greater extent in Kotido District than in Moroto District)
2.2.4 Disarmament operations in the last two years have involved violence against civilians	High (4/5)

<i>Indicators continued</i>	<i>Baseline continued</i>
2.2.5 Government perception of disarmament success	Disarmament has been proceeding well, particularly in the last two years characterised by: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ■ no open carriage of weapons by warriors ■ fewer guns used in raids ■ casualties no longer “flood the hospitals” ■ criminals now moving without bullets
2.2.6 Number of arms collected during ongoing disarmament programme	28,040 arms collected as of July 2010, according to the Regional Disarmament Committee Secretariat for Karamoja
2.2.7 Public support for the idea of trying to create a gun-free Karamoja	Very high (5/5)
2.2.8 Public support for the way Government has been carrying out disarmament programmes over the last two years	Low (2/5) , particularly among youth (1/5)
2.2.9 How disarmament has made people feel towards the government	Mixed feelings towards the government because of the disarmament programme – some people (women) feel positive; others (elders and youth) feel negative towards the government.
2.2.10 Public support for the government to continue disarmament programmes	Very strong (5/5)

At the time of the assessment, civilian disarmament remained at the heart of government responses to violent conflict and insecurity in Karamoja and ‘forced’ disarmament activities remained ongoing across the region. Arms possession and control therefore remain defining elements of the state’s relationship with the Karamojong. The region has long been seen as presenting a challenge to the Government of Uganda in terms of enforcing law and order and maintaining security in the region.

The KIDDP itself recognises that the manner in which disarmament is conducted can be a cause of conflict between the state and Karamojong society: “The intensification of forceful disarmament by government in this current phase of the disarmament campaign [March 2006–March 2007] has only led to a spiralling of not only violent inter-ethnic and intra-community conflicts, but also direct confrontations between the UPDF and armed Karamojong warriors.”⁶⁹

For this reason, disarmament and the way in which it is carried out are important measures of how the government sees its relationship with Karamojong society and the conflict between the two. Karamojong perspectives of government disarmament policy and the ways in which it is carried out could also have a profound impact on their relationship with the state. Moreover, if Karamojong society does not support disarmament or the tactics employed by the state in undertaking it, disarmament will likely fail and Karamojong capacity for violence against the state will remain high.

Current Karamojong perspectives of civilian disarmament

According to the interview groups, civilian disarmament strategies and operations by the authorities have not had the intended ameliorative impact on the Karamojong’s perceived level of threat from inter-ethnic conflict and violence. Within all ethnic groups, there were very strong perceptions that disarmament had taken place asymmetrically (whether intentionally or not) and that their own ethnic group had been disarmed to a greater degree than others. As a result, many firmly believe that disarmament has left them vulnerable to attack from other ethnic groups. During the

⁶⁹ Op cit Government of Uganda 2008, pp 13–14. The way in which disarmament contributed to increasing tension between the UPDF and Karamojong communities during this time period is partly documented in op cit Human Rights Watch 2007, pp 64–66.

Q.100 Do you feel more or less secure as a result of the disarmament processes?

- Much more secure – Very low (1/5)
- Slightly more secure – Very low (1/5)
- No difference – Very low (1/5)
- Slightly less secure – Low (2/5)
- Much less secure – Low (2/5)

Q.99 How has the disarmament made you feel towards the government?

- Happy/positive – Moderate (3/5)
- Indifferent/neutral – Very low (1/5)
- Angry/negative – Moderate (3/5)

district-level validations, some local authorities accepted that certain sub-counties had been more disarmed than others. Katikakile in Moroto was given as an example of a sub-county that had not been disarmed as much as the rest of the district, due to difficulties of access and terrain.⁷⁰

However, whether people feel generally more or less secure overall as a result of disarmament varies. In Moroto District, the extent to which interview groups felt less secure was moderate whereas in Kotido District it was high. Overall, a slightly greater proportion of participants felt that disarmament has made them less secure rather than more secure.

In addition, many interview groups cited examples from the last two years where disarmament operations have involved violence against civilians. Such violence is very damaging to the relationship between the state and Karamojong society.

Group interview responses to the question of whether disarmament has made people feel positive or negative towards the state were mixed, with a moderate number of interview groups answering that disarmament had made them feel happy or positive towards the state. On the other hand, a similar number of interview groups reported that disarmament made people feel angry or negative towards the state.

However, perceptions on this issue varied greatly across interview groups, with disarmament making women the most happy or positive towards the state, and elders and youth least happy:

- among women – High (4/5)
- among *ngimurok* – Moderate (3/5)
- among men – Low (2/5)
- among elders – Very low (1/5)
- among youth – Very low (1/5)

This is an important dynamic to explore further. Karamojong society is not monolithic and there is a basis for building on the positive response of women with regards disarmament. It is equally important to recognise that young and adult men are the most alienated by the government's disarmament approaches and, because they are the ones with the guns, they are likely to continue resisting disarmament – unless a more positive relationship can be established through some of the livelihoods and employment programmes.

Karamojong support for disarmament

The group interviews demonstrated ongoing Karomajong hostility to the disarmament operations that have been carried out so far by the Ugandan state. Support for the way in which state actors conducted disarmament between 2007 and 2009 was low (and particularly low amongst Karamojong male youth).

“If they go to hand in weapons they get beaten. Both the soldiers and the karachuna are thieves.”

Moroto, Chairman LCV, National Feedback Meeting

Q.98 Do you support the way in which Government has been carrying out disarmament operations in the last two years?

- Yes – Low (2/5)
- No – Medium (3/5)
- Refused to answer/Blank – Very low (1/5)

Importantly, while people do not broadly support the way in which the state has been carrying out disarmament, there was almost universal support in group interviews for the idea of trying to create a ‘gun-free’ Karamoja. Additionally, almost all interview groups believed that the disarmament process should continue. These responses strongly suggest that the state needs to adapt its approach to disarmament through a process of consultation with communities, with the aim of improving Karamojong support for and participation in disarmament processes.

⁷⁰ Stated at the validation meeting in Moroto on 2 March 2010.

This would have two positive results: firstly, more effective disarmament could reduce Karamojong capacity for violence against the state (and other people); and secondly, a more co-operative disarmament approach would mean a reduced use by the state of violence against Karamojong society. All in all, these results would likely contribute to an improvement in the relationship between the state and the Karamojong.

Current government perspectives on civilian disarmament

Among security actors interviewed for the assessment, civilian disarmament in Karamoja was thought to have been quite successful. There was a belief that there had been tremendous though gradual change in the levels of weapons possession and armed violence since disarmament programmes began in 2001. Disarmament approaches, led by the UPDF with support from the police, was thought to have been carried out in equal measure across different areas and was ongoing everywhere in the region; interviewees reported that arms were being collected every day and that security was increasing. One actor suggested that the disarmament process had a success rate of collecting “85% of all weapons” in the region so far. Another stated that 27,119 arms had been collected as of 9 October 2009 according to his records. And finally the Regional Disarmament Committee Secretariat said in July 2010 that 28,040 weapons had been collected throughout all disarmament phases in Karamoja.

Aside from numbers of weapons collected, security actors pointed to other indicators of success. Before the disarmament operations began a decade ago, the UPDF and others would regularly encounter large groups of armed warriors; this is no longer the case as raiding groups can now only put together a handful of guns. Even ‘hardened criminals’ were now lacking ammunition. They no longer saw casualties “flooding” the hospitals. The wider opinion of those security actors interviewed was that the last two years of disarmament (2007–2009) had been the most successful and the most common incidents now are ‘criminal activities’, which are not specific to Karamoja.

According to security actors interviewed, civilian disarmament in Karamoja takes place on an ongoing and regular basis under the framework of the KIDDP and was coordinated with others under the KIDDP. Therefore, disarmament was not an on-going ‘operation’, but part of the UPDF’s regular work. There seem to be no specific disarmament strategies or plans: the UPDF responds to events as they arise, and tailors its actions according to intelligence and information collected through civil and military structures, as well as from sources in the community. One local human rights actor interviewed noted that the UPDF is still conducting a lot of ‘cordon and search’ operations, but has shifted to an intelligence-led system utilising informants. The UPDF call this a “popular intelligence network”, whereby disarmament is supposedly community-guided. However, this approach runs the risk of informants being targeted by their communities.

In the past, the UPDF has been criticised for ‘cordon and search’ tactics that have reportedly involved significant disruption of local life, violence against civilians and human rights violations.⁷¹ One security actor interviewed argued that the UPDF’s improved human rights-based operating procedures meant that any continuing human rights violations and incidences of unlawful violence were the consequence of individual negligence and ill-discipline and did not stem from a purposeful strategy of the military as a whole.

Security actors interviewed pointed out that the UPDF had faced significant resistance to civilian disarmament, including violent responses from armed Karamojong. The UPDF regularly exchanges fire with armed Karamojong and there have been deaths on both the government and civilian sides. The UPDF continues to practice ‘cordon and search’ tactics, although these have been modified as armed Karamojong became familiar with the original ‘cordon and search’ tactics and began avoiding the UPDF,

⁷¹ Explored in detail in Human Rights Watch 2007; op cit UNHCHR 2006; and op cit Bevan 2008.

using wilderness 'hideouts'. The UPDF then began occupying those hideouts (including in the mountains) and conducting 'cordon and search' in those areas.

Many security actors interviewed acknowledged that there is only limited support for disarmament among the Karamojong. They recognised that development also needs to occur in order to resolve inter-ethnic conflict and address security issues, including the provision of more roads, water and access to education. Though good schools exist in the region, there are not enough teachers and there is not enough support for education. Encouragingly, some security actors also believed there needs to be greater emphasis on peacebuilding and peace dialogue. Amongst these actors at least, disarmament was seen as important for 'settling' inter-ethnic conflicts, but many felt that the ultimate resolution of those conflicts depends on the Karamojong themselves coming together with their 'enemies' and changing their perspectives: "there is a need for attitudinal change". An equally important challenge is that no parallel disarmament programmes are taking place in neighbouring areas of Kenya or Sudan, enabling ongoing flows of illicit arms across these porous borders.

CORE DYNAMIC 2.3

Provision of security and justice

The availability of security and justice provision in Karamoja is **LOW**. Poor security provision, including border security and protection from cross-border or intra-Karamoja attacks and limited cattle recovery, enables ongoing inter-ethnic violence and fosters Karamojong grievances against the state. The near void of formal justice provision and the inability to resolve outstanding disputes negatively affects the state's relationship with Karamojong society.

The UPDF rather than the civilian authorities (including the police) is seen as the primary provider of protection from attacks by other ethnic groups. However, the perceived effectiveness of this protection is only **MODERATE**. The military are very visible but not very approachable or trusted. Encouragingly, local councillors (LCs) are seen as the primary providers of justice in responding to attacks and disputes between ethnic groups, and trust in the police is **VERY HIGH**. However, the police are not deployed in adequate numbers, are not very visible at the community level and are not seen as providing any effective protection from attacks by other ethnic groups. Perception that the formal courts system delivers effective justice is **HIGH (strong)**; however, traditional justice systems need more recognition as they were considered an equally valid means of achieving justice.

Indicators	Baseline
2.3.1 Who provides protection from attacks by other ethnic groups	UPDF – Very high (5/5) , followed by the police – Moderate (3/5)
2.3.2 Deployment of police as indicator of capacity to provide protection	<p>Target police deployments in Karamoja:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ■ at least 30 police officers per sub-county ■ 4,000 total police personnel in Karamoja ■ specialised units for every district <p>Police deployments in Karamoja as reported in October 2009 (see narrative for more details):</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ■ 21 police posts in 43 sub-counties ■ About 2,000 police personnel in the Karamoja region ■ Police deployment in Kotido District: 168 personnel ■ Police deployment in Moroto: 308 personnel ■ Police have completed recent recruitment drive and more police recruits are training in Masindi
2.3.3 Visibility and engagement of police in the community	<p>Average frequency of seeing police in the community was about once a month</p> <p>Perceived experience of police engaging at the <i>manyatta</i> level was very low (1/5)</p>
2.3.4 The police provide effective protection from attacks by other ethnic groups	Very low (1/5)

Indicators <i>continued</i>	Baseline <i>continued</i>
2.3.5 Deployment of UPDF as an indicator of capacity to provide protection	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ■ Karamoja has one UPDF division ■ Each district has a brigade ■ Each brigade has three battalions ■ A battalion has 736 personnel ■ Each district should therefore have about 2,208 personnel
2.3.6 Visibility of UPDF in the community	Average frequency of seeing UPDF in the community was about once a week
2.3.7 The UPDF provides effective protection from attacks by other ethnic groups	Moderate (3/5)
2.3.8 Level of trust in the police	Very high (5/5)
2.3.9 Level of trust in the UPDF	Moderate (3/5)
2.3.10 Cattle are safer when kept in protected kraals	Moderate (3/5) on average, but diverging perspectives in Moroto District (High 4/5) and Kotido District (Very low 1/5)
2.3.11 Effectiveness of the state in recovering livestock	Moderate (3/5) on average, but with variations in location: people in Moroto District thought the government was doing a good job, whereas people in Kotido District did not
2.3.12 Who provides justice in cases of attacks or disputes between people of different ethnic groups	Local government (5/5) (including elected LCs and non-elected officials), followed by the UPDF (4/5) and the police (3/5)
2.3.13 Number and location of courts	Moroto courts: new dedicated court building, large library in Karamoja Kotido, Abim, Kaabong courts: improvised, dilapidated courts Nakapiripirit courts: no building for court
2.3.14 Deployment of justice personnel in Karamoja	Moroto personnel: Grade I Magistrate; one state prosecutor Kotido personnel: Grade I Magistrate Abim, Kaabong, Nakapiripirit courts: Grade II Magistrates only Closest chief magistrate's court: Soroti Closest state attorney: Soroti
<i>Community perception:</i>	
2.3.15 The government's court system delivers fair and effective justice	High (4/5)
2.3.16 Preference for justice systems	Medium (3/5) for government court system Medium (3/5) for traditional justice system
2.3.17 Willingness to report attacks by the state	Very high (5/5) , and most willing to report these attacks to the police and LCs to seek justice

In comparison to policing and justice elsewhere in Uganda, Karamoja is severely underserved. While this seems to have improved in the last few years, Karamoja remains the most insecure and violence-prone region in Uganda and therefore in serious need of improved security and justice provision. This under-provision was highlighted throughout the consultation phase by the Karamojong as an indicator that the state is marginalising the region, and also as a strong source of Karamojong grievance against state authorities. Contrary to its reputation as a place of lawlessness, most Karamojong interviewed for the assessment were very keen for the state to establish a much more robust rule of law in the region.

Police capacity to provide security and protection

Police overall deployment in Karamoja is approximately 2,000. There are 308 personnel in Moroto District and by June 2009 there were approximately 168 in Kotido District. The intended deployment plan is 30 police per sub-county.

According to local District Police and Regional Police Commanders interviewed in October 2009, the Ugandan Police were implementing plans to deploy a police post and 30 police personnel to every sub-county in Karamoja. At the time of interview, police posts had already been established in 21 of the 43 sub-counties. Any other developed area in Karamoja with a significant population was also expected to get a police post. Every district was reported as having its required specialised units, including crime scene officers and dog sections.

The total target is for 4,000 police personnel to be deployed in Karamoja. As of October 2009, there were 168 police personnel in Kotido District. Although this number has fallen from the previous year, the local commanders expected that more police officers would be deployed soon. A DANIDA report suggests that only 66 police officers were physically present in Kotido as of March 2008.⁷² The possible discrepancy between the numbers of officers physically present in Kotido and the numbers on paper could reflect the high rate at which officers are believed to abscond from deployment in Karamoja. There were 308 police in Moroto District. At the time of the assessment, more police were reportedly being trained in Masindi, following a new round of recruitment. One commander raised the challenge of adequate police accommodation: police currently need to live in the sub-county police posts because they have nowhere else to stay.

In terms of training, interviewees emphasised that police posted to Karamoja are regular police and are trained to normal police standards according to the general training manual and procedures. This includes generic training on the rights of suspects and children's rights. However, police deployed to Karamoja did not receive special training for dealing with the requirements of policing in Karamoja. According to the Regional Police Commander in Moroto, 'the training is usually generic and where references are made to the peculiar conditions in Karamoja, this is often on *ad hoc* basis'. He believes that there is a need for a specially-tailored training curriculum "based on a policing model designed to respond to the local needs and challenges for policing in this unique environment [in Karamoja]".

Police deployment and availability in Karamoja in 2008

- By March 2008, in the entire Nakapiripirit District, the police had only 17 officers and men, including the DPC and Special Branch officers, in a district with 10 sub-counties.
- There are no crime scene police officers and crime scene investigation kits such as finger printing kits and cameras. The study team was informed that sometimes, police just borrow cameras to use at the crime scene. The police in Karamoja do not have a Police Surgeon to carry out post-mortems or examine victims of rape and defilement.
- In all the districts of Karamoja, there were no women police officers in the sub-counties. The few policewomen were stationed at district headquarters. At the main police station in Kotido, for example, there were 5 women police officers by March 2008. The low presence of police-women was constraining when it came to handling issues specific to women and where a policewoman would be preferred to a policeman e.g. in the child and family protection unit. A policewoman is normally required to go arrest and search women. They are also essential in interviewing victims of rape and defilement. Women police officers are required to search women, record statements from women, escort women to hospital, and to keep their property.
- In March 2008, there was one vehicle for the entire police force in Kotido District, which was not enough for policing activities because of the distance from the main station to the sub-counties – sub-county police stations were between 6 and 38 km away from the main station. At the time of the study, a patrol vehicle had been secured for Kotido District. The vehicles available belonged to regional police and the Re-Establishment of Law and Order in Karamoja (RELOKA) programme. By March 2008, the whole of Nakapiripirit District had one operational vehicle for the Police. If the District Police Commander was on official duties outside the district, then no vehicle was available for the entire police service there. None of the sub-counties even had a motorcycle or a bicycle for police work. A police constable in Abim lamented: "There is virtually no transport to go out and carry out investigations. The only motorcycle is broken down and is also not secure to use on road. It is quite difficult to carry a suspect on a motorcycle."

Source: Muhereza F E, Ossiya D and Ovonji-Odida I, *A Study on Options for Enhancing Access to Justice and Improving Administration of Law and Order in Karamoja: Draft 2*, (Kampala: Danida, July 2008), pp 97–103.

72 Op cit Muhereza et al 2008, p 96.

Q.64 How often do you see a police official?

- One or more times in a day – Low (2/5)
- Once a week – Very low (1/5)
- Maybe once a month – Very low (1/5)
- Only rarely – Low (2/5)

Note: the above is based on the October 2009 interviews and reflects both Kotido and Moroto districts

Despite these numbers and plans, the perception of police engagement and capacities is low amongst the Karamojong. Interview groups did not report seeing the police very often in the community – on average about once a month – although there was a strong geographic split in responses. In Moroto District, the police were seen in the community on a daily basis, while in Kotido District police were seen ‘only rarely’. However, during the March 2010 district validation meetings in Kotido, many said that police presence in the district had increased and the police were seen much more frequently than reported in the October 2009 group interviews. This increased presence was felt to be a response to increasing threats of violence and raids from Jie communities.

The impression that the police have low levels of penetration in rural areas was reinforced by interview group perceptions that police engagement at the *manyatta* level was very low.

The perceived role of the police in the community

Beyond the actual operational capacities of the security forces, their perceived role and functions in the community are an important measure of whether they can have a positive impact on levels of inter-ethnic conflict and insecurity. Interview groups were therefore asked to reflect on the role of the police and UPDF in their communities.

The primary positive roles of the police in the community were seen to be:

- keeping law and order;
- arresting “wrongdoers”, criminals and cattle raiders;
- providing protection and security – from criminals and “fighting”, for “food/food distribution”, and also for the protection of women and children.

It was also regularly noted that the police have a role to play in sharing public information, awareness-raising and mobilisation on law, security and human rights issues, as well as addressing criminality. The police were also sometimes seen to be important in uniting people and promoting peace in communities.

The police were also sometimes seen to have an important role in social control functions, including in:

- reducing drunkenness
- “teaching discipline” and guiding against “wrongdoing”
- “fighting adultery”
- enforcing ‘modern dress’ amongst warriors and more traditional people

The terms ‘punish’, ‘judge’ and ‘justice’ were brought up a number of times in discussions about the role of the police, indicating that they often go beyond their strictly policing role and may be overstepping into the territory of the formal justice system. Their responsibility for preventing and investigating crimes was only sometimes noted. Importantly, the recovery of stolen animals and property was only mentioned in a few instances.

The main negative aspects of police behaviour in the community were seen to be:

- ‘doing nothing’ – when crimes were reported or the police arrived at a crime scene, it was felt that they did not do anything constructive
- corruption – “there is no single service without a bribe”⁷³
- police are not properly granted the orders to recover stolen cattle
- in one sub-county, because there are no police deployed there, the police are not seen to have any role whatsoever

⁷³ For examples of police demanding supplementary payments to carry out basic functions, see op cit Muhereza et al 2008, p 103.

Police appear to have some legitimacy in the communities in which they work, which can be built upon and strengthened if they tackle alleged cases of bribery. They are specifically seen as having a security role, although they have little actual capacity to carry this out. However, the group interviews demonstrated that the police in Karamoja have important roles and functions beyond simply security provision, including supporting social practices and peacebuilding. As such, a police force that help people address everyday problems and disputes can significantly contribute to improving the relationship between people in Karamoja and the state.

The UPDF's capacity to provide security and protection

The UPDF structure and scale of deployment allows for easy visibility in the communities. According to the UPDF's Regional Internal Security Officer for Karamoja, each district has a brigade comprised of three battalions. A battalion has approximately 736 soldiers, which means that for the five districts (excluding Amudat, the new district) the region has slightly over eleven thousand men. This figure only exists on paper: it was difficult to ascertain whether this deployment plan has been met, and we were told by the same source that deployment is affected by other factors including desertion due to the harsh conditions of living in Karamoja.

According to recent newspaper reports, the UPDF 5th division has been deployed to Kaabong and Abim districts while the UPDF 3rd division is operating in the "eastern, central [areas] and also part of Sudan and Kenya borders".⁷⁴ According to statements by President Museveni, "The battalions in Karamoja have 200 men each yet they should have 736". He added that since the force is thin on the ground, it cannot handle the exercise adequately.⁷⁵

According to the UPDF Director of Human Rights, UPDF soldiers and officers receive training, awareness-raising and capacity-building on human rights, which he himself leads. Army personnel with key responsibilities such as civil military relations are prioritised for attending these trainings. By October 2009, the UPDF had trained ten battalions and had five left to train. In Karamoja, the army receives one-day 'detach to detach training', which covers human rights, civil military relations, children's rights and protection, gender-based violence, the role of the police and the rule of law. The UPDF follows a 'training of trainers' approach, by training one officer who is able to pass on the training to others. Sometimes they also train police personnel based in the same area. Save the Children Uganda and the African Leadership Institute have also supported human rights trainings for the UPDF.

Despite this positive picture, human rights observers interviewed for this assessment believe that significant challenges remain in maintaining adequate levels of human rights knowledge and respect in the UPDF. Units in Karamoja experience constant transfers of personnel as troops rotate between Uganda, Sudan and the Democratic Republic of Congo. As a result, it is difficult to ensure that UPDF soldiers posted to Karamoja have received human rights training in the context of Karamoja disarmament operations.

Q.70 How often do you see an army official?

- One or more times a day – High (4/5)
- Once a week – Never (0/5)
- Maybe once a month – Very low (1/5)
- Only rarely – Very low (1/5)
- Almost never – Very low (1/5)

Interview groups reported seeing UPDF soldiers in the community very frequently – about once a week on average. Again, there was a strong geographic split in these responses. In Moroto District, UPDF soldiers were seen in the community most often – on a daily basis; while in Kotido District, UPDF were seen 'rarely' or 'almost never'. These differences may be a result of the fact that Moroto houses the UPDF regional division headquarters.

Interview groups perceived the UPDF as only providing moderately effective protection from attacks by outside ethnic groups, and as only moderately trustworthy. This is surprising given that interview groups also regarded the UPDF as the primary

⁷⁴ Op cit Ocowun 2010.

⁷⁵ Op cit Wanyama 2010.

provider of protection from attacks by other ethnic groups. While the UPDF may be perceived as the lead protection and security actor, it is also seen to only have moderate legitimacy and capabilities in actually fulfilling that role. That even the most important security provider is not seen as fully trusted or providing adequate levels of protection suggests there are significant gaps for security provision in Karamoja and undermines the relationship between the state and Karamojong.

The perceived role of the UPDF in the community

The main positive roles of the UPDF in the community were seen to be:

- protecting people and property
- tracking and recovering raided animals
- looking after and grazing animals
- civilian disarmament
- protecting animals

Other roles mentioned by a small number of interview groups included peace promotion and dialogue, and recovering girls who had been abducted by other groups.

A minority of interview groups qualified their statements about the UPDF, suggesting that the UPDF seeks to fulfil these roles but does not always do so successfully. They included comments such as the UPDF “follows [raided] animals but only for a short distance and then comes back” and “the army takes the animals for grazing but then the enemies raid the animals at the grazing ground in the presence of the army”. In addition, a minority of interview groups identified clearly negative UPDF activities within the community, such as “killing people” and “doing nothing, only beating people who cannot protect themselves”. Groups were however, reluctant to discuss these issues further, possibly out of fear of retribution.

Group interview responses about the role of the UPDF in the community present a mixed picture when compared to responses regarding the UPDF’s trustworthiness and capabilities. The UPDF is clearly seen as the primary security provider and fulfils a number of other positive roles. But underlying capacity and trust issues and some history of violence against civilians remain to be overcome if the UPDF is to become more effective in addressing inter-ethnic conflict and insecurity in Karamoja.

“The situation of conflict has worsened as the result of the involvement of the army, this is since the start of the disarmament exercise... The disarmament process is unbalanced; it is very partial. Some regions are completely disarmed while others are not thoroughly disarmed. The counties disarmed feel very vulnerable as they feel so exposed. Those that have not been disarmed do attack without fear, they manhandle the disarmed ones and rape their children. The army is composed of many tribes and some of those tribes like the Iteso, Acholi, Alur, and Bokora have suffered in the hands of the Karamojong. Some soldiers have been heard swearing that they do some things in revenge: ‘We remember the past events, you remember what you used to do to us!’”

Women’s focus group, consultation phase

Protection of livestock

Protecting livestock from cattle raiding was seen as a critical element in addressing inter-ethnic conflict during the consultation phase of the assessment. We therefore investigated the efficacy of the protected *kraal* system. Perceptions of how safe cattle are in protected *kraals* differed across districts, with interview groups in Moroto District strongly feeling that cattle are safer, while those in Kotido felt cattle were only slightly safer.

Similarly, while the perceived effectiveness of the state in recovering stolen livestock was moderate overall, there were major differences of opinion depending on locality.

In Moroto District the perception that the state was doing a good job in the recovery of stolen livestock was very high, whereas in Kotido District it was very low.

“There is corruption in the process of distributing recovered cows: sometimes when cows have been recovered, cows with brands that do not belong to the claiming clan are given away due to bribes. This corruption is mostly in the local leadership even as up as LCV level. Some army officers are also reported corrupt and discriminative, they take advantage of the low level of education and the lack of exposure for the Matheniko”

Women’s focus group, consultation phase

However, the state actors interviewed for this assessment believed that the security situation had stabilised in the past few years and that the protected *kraals* were no longer necessary. In many ways, they felt that the protected *kraal* system was a ‘quick-fix’ rather than a long-term response, and that it had a number of weaknesses. Because the Karamojong sent their children to look after livestock at the protected *kraals*, the *karachuna* did not need to take care of the livestock and were free to engage in raiding.⁷⁶ Secondly, because the Karamojong children could not adequately care for the cattle at the protected *kraals*, and because the UPDF wanted to demonstrate good civil-military relations, the UPDF committed troops, resources and time to caring for the animals. In this way, protected *kraals* were seen to ‘pin down’ the UPDF and diminish their ability to rapidly and flexibly deploy to deter and combat raiders. Ultimately, the protected *kraals* were seen by some state actors interviewed to have actually contributed to increased raiding. For example, there were complaints that Jie communities who placed cattle under UPDF protection were then freed up to “terrorise the Turkana”. During the national feedback meeting, a number of state actors informally acknowledged that protected *kraals* were also being disbanded because they prevented the UPDF from collecting arms from raiders.

“We have been betrayed by the government because protection of both animals and people is very ineffective. And now the government is finishing them off through its negligence and all children in the process are suffering a lot.”

Elders focus group, consultation phase

The consultation and validation phases of the assessment revealed that many Karamojong have reservations about the effectiveness of the protected *kraals* approach. In particular, the *kraals* were seen to result in overgrazing (due to their static nature) and to restrict the ability of owners to access their cows and move them for sale or migration. The recent literature also highlights that protected *kraals* can have a number of negative consequences for livestock. The Feinstein International Center reported that, “The high concentration of animals has resulted in a higher prevalence and more rapid spread of disease, including foot rot and CBPP. Furthermore, the animals are causing environmental damage as they are grazing in limited areas.”⁷⁷

In April 2009, OCHA supported an inter-agency assessment⁷⁸ on protected *kraals* in Kaabong District. The assessment raised several points of concern, notably that the *kraals* resulted in environmental stress (including water points), displacement of people and deprivation of land for agricultural production. It also became more difficult for people to access animal products like meat, ghee and milk, because only specific people were allowed by UPDF orders to enter the *kraals*. In addition, ‘large numbers of children working in the Protected *Kraals* are not attending school; over 60 per cent of school-aged children in visited communities were not enrolled in schools, while between 35 per cent and 45 per cent were forced to drop out in part because they have to take care of the animals.’ Being present in the *kraals* meant the children had

⁷⁶ For a brief overview of how *karachuna* have become increasingly independent and are viewed as a security threat by the state, see Mutengesha and Hendrickson 2008), pp 55–56.

⁷⁷ Op cit Stites et al 2009, p 25.

⁷⁸ Op cit OCHA 2009.

easy access to animal products like milk, but it also made them vulnerable to attacks on the *kraals* or grazing areas.

State actors interviewed reported that while many protected *kraals* had been disbanded, Karamojong civilians still settled their livestock near UPDF barracks, and livestock could be brought to the UPDF if they came under particular threat. While they believed that this reflected an improved overall security situation, it also represents a strategic shift by the state towards becoming more proactive and responsive. They reported that the UPDF was now focused on increasing its ability to rapidly deploy in order to respond to attacks and catch raiders in the wilderness, and on civil-military relations with the Karamojong. This includes providing medical assistance, hospital repair and transportation during peace days but also preventative measures such as assistance in the branding and registration of cattle. The UPDF was also reported to be prioritising civilian disarmament as its fundamental task for contributing to a more secure and peaceful Karamoja.

It is important to note that state security actors involved in the consultation phase, key informant interviews and the national feedback workshop all commented on significant problems they face regarding exaggerations around cattle raiding. State security actors noted many occasions where communities falsely inflated numbers of stolen cattle when they reported raids to the authorities. This was seen to severely complicate recovery efforts because security forces would then mistakenly track for much larger herd sizes than had actually been stolen. This disinformation also generated disappointment in communities when the numbers of recovered cattle ended up being below the false expectations created by inflated reports. In this way, the police and the UPDF felt they often received unfair criticism for failing to properly recover 'ghost cows'.

Capacities for justice provision

Gaps in the provision of justice in Karamoja were identified during design consultations as having a major impact on the relationship between Karamojong society and the state. Overall, there is a critical deficiency of courts, judges and resources in Karamoja and it is safe to say that Karamoja has some of the lowest levels of justice provision in the country. The systemic failure to effectively deliver this crucial public service could significantly aggravate Karamojong grievances with the state.

The assessment attempted to sketch a picture of the existing courts system in Karamoja, relying on interviews with local justice actors for the assessment in October 2009 and a 2008 report on access to justice in Karamoja.⁷⁹

In Moroto, there is a Grade I Magistrate working out of a newly constructed court building, which includes a comprehensive legal library. There is a Grade I Magistrate in Kotido but court is held in the dilapidated district community hall, which can only process some cases. The improvised court has a very small library containing the laws of Uganda Volumes 1–13. Although the government may post a chief magistrate to Kotido soon, cases which require a chief magistrate have to wait for now. Abim and Kaabong courts are also operating improvised courthouses in the dilapidated district community halls. There is no structure for the Magistrate's court in Nakapiripirit and court has sat there only twice since 2007. All in all, the Grade I Magistrates (who are able to hear more serious cases, including violent crimes) are extremely rare in the districts and most judicial functions are superintended by Grade II Magistrates.

Magistrates receive little support to work in Karamoja. They do not have offices and lack the most basic administrative facilities. There are reported to be no state-appointed representatives for the accused and there are no paralegals. There is a state

⁷⁹ Op cit Muhezera et al 2008, pp 110–113. This report is perhaps the most comprehensive study on access to justice and the administration of law and order in Karamoja. The study highlights that the justice needs of the Karamojong are not adequately served by either the formal or traditional systems. It argues that Karamojong traditional justice institutions should be streamlined into the national system but there are significant concerns that some traditional rulings and processes are contrary to the fundamental principles of the rule of law and human rights in Uganda.

prosecutor in Moroto, but no Karamoja districts have a resident state attorney (though there are plans to deploy one) and the closest one is based in Soroti. Courts in Kotido, Abim, Nakapiripirit and Kaabong do not have a vehicle, while Moroto court apparently has a very dilapidated vehicle that is often unusable.

The High Court should sit in Moroto, but it was reported that no chief magistrate has come to the region in at least four years, or even perhaps not since December 2004. Karamoja region does not have a resident High Court Judge, who should be based in Moroto. Those who are charged with capital offences are usually committed and tried mainly in distant Soroti. As a result, ‘hundreds’ of cases are still pending hearing and many people are languishing in prison. Some civil cases have even escalated into criminal cases as plaintiffs, frustrated that their disputes have not been dealt with, have attempted to resolve their cases by unlawful means. Legal representation is very limited in Karamoja, which means that plaintiffs and defendants are often forced to represent themselves. There are reportedly only six major law firms (in Lira, Soroti, Mbale or Kampala) that represent clients from the region, with only one lawyer amongst them who is actually resident in Karamoja.

The lack of adequate access to justice is a major problem. Despite the obstacles described above, the interview groups reported a high ‘yes’ response when asked if they felt that the government’s court system delivers fair and effective justice – when it is working. This is an encouraging dynamic that could be built upon to strengthen relations between the state and the Karamojong.

Q.78 Do you prefer to seek justice through the government’s court system, or through other traditional justice systems?

- Prefer the government court system – Moderate (3/5)
- Prefer traditional justice system – Moderate (3/5)

Traditional Karamojong justice systems and dispute resolution practices exist in parallel to the formal courts, and the majority of the population still have a strong attachment to these systems. Traditional decision-making and justice institutions such as the *akiriket*, or sacred council of elders, decide on issues of critical importance to the community and act as a court in consultation with the community and seers. These decisions are then carried out by the *karachuna*. These and other practices are important mechanisms for achieving justice and resolving disputes, particularly at the community level.⁸⁰

Interview groups did not have a resounding preference for either the formal or the informal justice systems. Interview groups were asked to reflect further on their preferences:

In favour of the traditional system...

Many respondents believed that traditional systems are fairer and promote reconciliation, while the formal system “divides people”. They viewed traditional systems as having greater authority with the people and better ensuring community consultation and equal engagement for everyone. Because these systems use people from the community and are “on the ground”, they are better aware of the situation and what is going on so “known wrongdoers cannot get off like they can through the [technicalities of the] formal system”. There was a strong sense that a bottom-up approach to justice was also the best: “you cannot climb a tree from up to down”. More practically, many felt that the traditional system is faster at solving problems and is less prone to bribery and corruption. Furthermore, formal courts already give the traditional systems credibility as they often ask if the case has first gone through the traditional system. Crucially, there is often no alternative to traditional justice systems since in most areas there are no formal courts.

In favour of the formal system...

Many respondents strongly believed that the formal courts system is more systematic, better structured, regularised and transparent. They believed that the formal courts system is more thorough, gives “safer justice” (i.e. is not violence based) and treats people with equality because it is neutral. Many believed that the formal courts are also more capable than ad hoc traditional systems because judges and officers are properly trained, know more about the principles and processes of the rule law and are full-time professionals. Some respondents also believed that the formal courts were better at ensuring reconciliation and ‘rehabilitating’ people – even if it takes years in jail, respondents felt that this was better at achieving justice, reconciliation and rehabilitation than the traditional system that “just kills”. All in all, many felt that it was morally good to follow laws of the country and that the formal system was the best means of achieving justice and peace for everyone in Uganda.

⁸⁰ For further reference, see op cit Muhereza et al 2008.

These responses are encouraging for two reasons. Firstly, they demonstrate that the formal and traditional justice systems are already intimately connected as the formal courts recognise that many cases in fact move through traditional systems before reaching them. If further measures could be taken to make the inter-connections between the two systems more effective, this could assist in relieving some of the pressure on the formal courts system. Secondly, the formal courts system is well respected and has good legitimacy in Karamojong society. If the state can find the means to get it functioning regularly across all of Karamoja, this would help address Karamojong grievances towards the state and contribute to a significantly more positive view of the state by Karamojong society.

Achieving justice for state violence

Throughout both the community consultations and the group interviews, there was a strong sense that some respondents felt constrained from fully discussing state violence against Karamojong society, presumably due to fear of reprisals. Despite this underlying apprehension, a very high number of interview groups responded that they would report any attack upon them by a state employee. It appears that people in Karamoja are determined and willing to report state violence, turning in the first instance to the police and LCs or other key local government officials, followed by the formal courts, elders or chiefs and the UPDF. Unfortunately, the UHRC ranked as only sixth choice, and CIMIC centres (meant to be the mechanism for managing UPDF relations with Karamojong society) were very rarely reported as a means of redress in the case of state violence.

Respondents explained that they would turn to the police first because the police:

- follow up issues properly and quickly, even characterising the police as “the justice makers”;
- handle things “slowly but surely”;
- keep law and order, investigate why attacks were made and do not just “kill or shoot people like the army does”;
- have power to arrest offenders.

Respondents explained that they would turn to LCs first because LCs:

- are closest to the community and can be easily approached;
- can empower citizens to best handle the cases, advise citizens on how to solve them, or if they cannot then they are able to refer cases to higher levels;
- have access to the “people in power” – if people are arrested then the LCs are the ones that write the report and speak to the responsible authorities;
- are the mechanism by which to forward cases to the police;
- are elected people who are committed to and answerable to the Karamojong people.

Q.81 If someone employed by the government attacked you, to whom would you report the attack?

- Police – High (4/5)
- Local councillors/other non-elected government officials – High (4/5)
- Courts – Low (2/5)
- Senior elders/chiefs – Low (2/5)
- UPDF – Low (2/5)
- Human rights commission – Low (2/5)
- *Manyatta* leaders – Very low (1/5)
- ASTUs – Very low (1/5)
- Church – Very low (1/5)
- *Ngimurok* – Very low (1/5)
- Civil-military centre – Very low (1/5)
- Neighbours/other people in the community – Very low (1/5)
- Church – Very low (1/5)
- Warriors, family, business leaders, vigilante leaders, criminal groups, NGOs – Never (0/5)

CORE DYNAMIC 2.4 Governance factors contributing to conflict between the state and Karamojong society

Karamojong perception that the government understands them, represents them and is doing its best is HIGH. However, this is undermined by HIGH perceptions of government corruption and VERY HIGH perceptions that Karamoja are marginalised compared to the rest of Uganda. Both factors potentially contribute to generating grievances with government.

Indicators	Baseline
2.4.1 The government is doing a good job in trying to ensure that people have access to key resources	Very high (5/5) for food relief and water, but only Moderate for locally grown food, replenishment of livestock and cash/credit.
2.4.2 The government provides enough accurate information about the decisions it makes regarding Karamoja	High (4/5)
2.4.3 The government shares the goals and priorities of Karamojong communities in terms of how they would like to see the region develop	High (4/5)
2.4.4 When the government talks about a project or new service that is coming to Karamoja, these projects and services are actually delivered to your sub-county	Sometimes (3/5)
2.4.5 Government institutions are corrupt	High (4/5)
2.4.6 Karamoja has less access to resources and opportunities than other parts of the country	Very high (5/5)
2.4.7 Level of Karamojong representation within the police force	Low Karamojong representation in the police , but plans and actions are underway to increase this.

Q.110 Do you think that the government is doing a good job in trying to ensure that you have access to...

- Food relief from the UN and other agencies – Very high (5/5)
- Water – Very high (5/5)
- Locally grown food – Moderate (3/5)
- Replenishment of livestock – Moderate (3/5)
- Cash or credit – Moderate (3/5)
- Land – Low (2/5)

Interview groups believed that the government was doing a good job in trying to provide access to food relief and water, though only moderately well in providing access to other key resources such as locally grown food, replenishment of livestock and cash or credit. They did not believe the government was doing a good job in trying to ensure that the Karamojong have access to land.

There was a high perception in group interviews that the government provides people with accurate information regarding the decisions that it makes regarding Karamoja and a high perception that the government shares the goals and priorities of Karamojong communities in terms of how they would like to see the region develop.

“Everything started by people holding pens does not get down to us – the development brought to Karamoja remains in Moroto.”

Elders focus group, consultation phase

Q.127 Do you think that government institutions are honest or corrupt?

- Corrupt – High (4/5)
- Honest – Low (2/5)

Q.125 When the government talks about a project or new service coming to Karamoja, do you see these projects and services being delivered in your sub-county?

- Always – Very low (1/5)
- Sometimes – Moderate (3/5)
- Never – Very low (1/5)

These positive reviews were tempered somewhat when it came to evaluating corruption, actual government delivery at the local level and Karamoja's place within the rest of the country. Most starkly, group interviews perceived the corruption of government institutions to be high. They also felt that they only sometimes saw the actual delivery of promised new projects or services in their sub-counties. There was a very high perception that people in Karamoja have less access to resources and opportunities than do people in other parts of the country.

One final key measure was the degree to which Karamojong themselves occupy positions of governance in the state system – in this case, whether there are any Karamojong in the police. Security actors interviewed in October 2009 conceded that there were very few Karamojong in the police. A recent recruitment drive, which aimed to bring 1,500 Karamojong into the police force resulted in the recruitment of 600 Karamojong (including some women). Some local observers noted that turnout for the recruitment drive was poor and that as a result the government had lowered its normal recruitment standards.

CORE DYNAMIC 2.5

Access to public services

Q.112 Do you think that the government is doing enough to provide the citizens of Karamoja with vital services, such as...

- Health services – Very high (4/5)
- Education – Very high (4/5)
- Roads – Very high (4/5)
- Transport – Medium (3/5)

Most group interview respondents believed that the government is doing enough to provide vital services. This **VERY HIGH** satisfaction rating could suggest that a more positive relationship is developing between the state and Karamojong society.

Indicators	Baseline
2.5.1 The government is doing enough to provide Karamoja with vital services	Very high satisfaction in government delivery of health services, education and roads

The perception amongst group interviews that the government was doing enough to provide vital services such as health care, education and roads was very high. The perception that this was true of transport was moderate. This satisfaction with government efforts is likely to contribute to a more positive relationship between the state and Karamojong society.

It is important to note that during the consultation phase of the assessment, local communities repeatedly claimed that they could not afford the costs of educating their children. Although the state-run primary and secondary education systems in Uganda are meant to be universal and free, respondents gave numerous examples of the different fees and costs associated with 'free' public education (uniforms, stationary, text books, teachers 'fees', etc.), particularly at the secondary level. This appears to affect all communities equally (although it particularly affects rural and more impoverished families) and is a critical source of frustration with the state.

3. Values and beliefs

CORE DYNAMIC 3.1

Karamojong perceptions of conflict with the state

Q.14 How would you describe the relationship between the Karamojong and the Government of Uganda?

- Very good – Low (1/5)
- Good – Low (1/5)
- Bad – Low (1/5)
- Very bad – Zero (0/5)
- No relationship – Very Low (1/5)

The relationship between the Karamojong and the government is perceived differently in different areas: in Moroto District there appears to be a **GOOD** relationship between the Karamojong and the state, whereas in Kotido District there appears to be a **BAD** relationship. In areas where there is a bad relationship, the perception that there is conflict between the Karamojong and government is **HIGH**.

Indicators	Baseline
3.1.1 Relationship and conflict between the Karamojong and the state	Good relationship between the Karamojong and the state , though significant regional differences – a good relationship was reported in Moroto District, but a bad relationship was reported in Kotido District. Of those respondents who thought that the relationship was bad, a high number felt that this relationship was characterised by conflict between the Karamojong and the state (4/5)

Perceptions about the relationship between the Karamojong and the state varied significantly depending on location. In Moroto District, all but one interview group felt that their relationship with the state was either very good or good. In Kotido District, two-thirds of the group interviews felt their relationship with the state was bad. More importantly, of those group interviews that felt their relationship with the state was bad, the perception that this relationship is characterised by conflict was high.

Interview groups were asked to reflect further on the reasons for their respective responses:

The relationship between the Karamojong and the government is good because...

- the government provides food relief
- the government helps educate people and send them to school
- the government builds infrastructure, including schools, hospitals, boreholes, road and health centres
- the government provides water, medicines and animal drugs
- the government helps to bring ethnic groups together and mediates peace meetings
- the government protects us from our enemies and protects and recovers livestock
- NUSAF provides loans

The relationship between the Karamojong and the government is bad because...

- the government kills innocent people and tortures people during disarmament
- the government leaves livestock vulnerable to being stolen by other groups
- of illegal detention
- the government forces us to put on clothes
- selection takes place in terms of who can benefit from scholarships so that not all benefit
- the government lies to communities about the construction of dams and cheats the community with its projects
- NUSAF money was embezzled
- Karamojong civilians attack government soldiers, taking their guns and sometimes killing them

In addition, some respondents were asked to distinguish between different levels of government. Their answers were more nuanced. Most felt positive about central government as they saw them as primarily responsible for the increase in core services like health and education. But when asked about the actions of specific government actors like the security services or the district local government top-level officials, the relationship was described more negatively. This confirms findings from other core dynamics.

Interestingly, responses to the questions focused almost exclusively on the actions of the state. There was very little reflection amongst group interviews about how the actions of the Karamojong might contribute towards a good or bad relationship.

CORE DYNAMIC 3.2

Perceptions of identity

Both the ‘Ugandan’ and ‘Karamojong’ identities are more important to the Karamojong than their specific ethnic identities.

Indicators	Baseline
3.2.1 Ranking of most important and relevant identity	First: Ugandan and Karamojong Third: Ethnic group

An important dynamic of the conflict between Karamojong society and the state is identity. In consultations during the design phase of the assessment, prioritisation of whether one defined themselves as ‘Ugandan’, ‘Karamojong’ or along their specific ethnic identity was felt to partly define fault lines between the Karamojong and the wider state of Uganda.

However, when asked directly to rank how they best described their own identities, most interview groups ranked both their national Ugandan and their wider Karamojong identities equally as their foremost identity. These responses suggest that further effort to promote the inclusion of a cohesive Karamojong society within the umbrella of a greater Ugandan national identity could improve the relationship between the state and Karamojong society.

CORE DYNAMIC 3.3

Values and beliefs around violence and dialogue

The perceived frequency and value of dialogue with the state is **HIGH**, while the perceived acceptability of violence against the state is **VERY LOW**.

Indicators	Baseline
3.3.1 There is regular dialogue with people employed by the government	High (4/5)
3.3.2 Dialogue with the state succeeds in solving matters peacefully	High (4/5)
3.3.3 Violence is acceptable	...not ever acceptable: High (4/5) ...against people employed by the government: Very low (1/5)
3.3.4 Conditions when violence against Karamojong civilians is acceptable	<p>The Police Act 1994 under S29(1) stipulates instances where police officers may use a firearm, i.e. against</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> (a) a person charged with or convicted of a felony who escapes from lawful custody; (b) a person who, through force, rescues another person from lawful custody; (c) a person who, through force, prevents the lawful arrest of himself or of any other person. <p>The Act under S29(3), however, places conditions/ restrictions on the application of the power to use a firearm and guidelines to be followed by police officers as:</p> <p>Resort shall not be had to the use of arms under this section unless –</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> (a) The police officer has reasonable grounds to believe that he cannot otherwise prevent any act referred to in paragraph (a) or (b) of subsection (1) or otherwise effect the arrest; or (b) The police officer has issued a warning to the offender that he is going to resort to the use of arms and that the offender did not heed that warning; or (c) The police officer has reasonable grounds to believe that he or any other person is in danger of grievous bodily harm if he does not resort to the use of arms save that only such force as is reasonable in the circumstances may be used

Q.142 Do you think that it is ever acceptable to use violence against people who...

- ...it is not ever acceptable to use violence against other people – High (4/5)
- ...are from a different ethnic group – Low (2/5)
- ...live in your sub-county – Very Low (1/5)
- ...are employed by the Government – Very Low (1/5)
- Other – Very Low (1/5), including raiders and those who have killed (i.e. 'murderers')

Most interview groups stated that they have regular dialogue with state actors and there was a high perception that such dialogue is a successful means of peacefully resolving disputes and issues that could otherwise result in conflict. These responses indicate that dialogue is highly valued in Karamoja and could be harnessed to contribute positively towards dispute resolution and conflict prevention between the state and Karamojong society.

Interview groups were asked directly if they ever thought that it was acceptable to use violence against other people, whether they were from a different ethnic group, from their own sub-county or were employed by the government. Only one interview group believed that it was ever acceptable to use violence against someone employed by the government. This could indicate that more interaction between people and state structures in Karamoja is a powerful tool for creating more positive relationships. However, a large number of groups left the answer blank and it is therefore difficult to take this as a definitive conclusion.

Conflict Type C:

Conflict and insecurity within ethnic groups and communities

Conflict summary and recommendations for action

CONFLICT AND TENSIONS WITHIN COMMUNITIES present another layer of strained relationships that sometimes feeds broader societal conflicts in Karamoja. Respondents indicate that small quarrels at the household level are very frequent, mostly related to poverty, drought and access to water, and jealousy between individuals or within families. When unresolved, these conflicts sometimes result in violence or even loss of life. However, there is strong support within communities to resolve these conflicts peacefully, through intra-community dialogue or peace meetings. Some reservations were expressed about how successfully the recommendations from peace meetings are implemented, but generally people saw these as a positive way to address conflicts. Respondents also evidenced high support for arms possession to be legally controlled, but did not see arms availability as being a significant factor in shaping intra-community conflict.⁸¹

Local leaders are generally trusted and are often the first port of call to resolve any conflicts or for accessing justice. They were also seen as generally acting in the interests of the communities, although respondents also reported a moderate level of corruption among community leaders, particularly in relation to government projects and programmes. Lastly, respondents felt that their livelihoods were mainly centred on pastoralist or agro-pastoralist activities, and while many are keen to see more support for alternative livelihoods (young men and reformed warriors in particular), they also expressed a need for support to make pastoralist activities more sustainable. Access to other services and resources were only identified as moderately contributing to intra-communal conflicts, with the most contentious being around access to food aid.

⁸¹ Administrative and social structures in Karamoja are as follows: *manyatta* or household level, then parish, then sub-county, then county, then district. The same sub-county, county or district could be made up of the same ethnic group. The term 'intra-ethnic' could therefore refer to an area as big as one or several districts, or as small as a sub-county.

1. **Improve assessment of intra-community conflict:** While ‘inter-ethnic’ conflict is frequently referred to and addressed in conflict and security programmes, there need to be better systems in place to monitor those conflict and security issues that exist within communities in Karamoja. This includes examining all levels of intra- and inter-family and intra- and inter-clan dynamics. The needs and priorities of vulnerable or ‘invisible’ actors (such as women with young children), which are often overlooked, should be included in such assessments. Measuring and understanding the context at the community-level will inform better programme responses and avoid the risk that well-meaning programmes aggravate some of these more ‘invisible’ conflicts – or indeed miss opportunities to help resolve them.
2. **Support and strengthen local dispute resolution mechanisms:** The Karamojong see dialogue as a highly successful means of peacefully resolving disputes at the community level. Their demand for enhancing existing local dispute resolution and dialogue mechanisms should be supported. Moreover, the participation of key local actors in these mechanisms should also be increased. LCs have a crucial role to play in preventing and resolving community-level conflicts and disputes. Elected political actors are seen as important arbiters not only in interacting with the state but also on local matters, and should be engaged either through formal or traditional mechanisms. Similarly, carefully managed linkages between the formal and traditional justice systems would also improve the means and opportunities for Karamojong to resolve local disputes.
3. **Increase transparency, accountability and community participation in local-level decision-making:** There are indications that Karamojong communities distrust the way in which local community leaders manage the state’s engagement with them. This results in dashed expectations on the part of communities, which in turn leads to local grievances and disputes. But it also points to a strong possibility that good central government efforts at improving the lives of ordinary people in Karamoja are being thwarted by corruption or dishonesty at local government levels. This pattern needs to be improved by on the one hand better monitoring of local government performance and on the other hand, greater participation of communities in consultations, prioritisation and monitoring of social service delivery and development programmes. In this effort, both government and non-government actors should be careful not to only consult elites and ‘gatekeepers’ in the communities, but to find a way to engage people from the *manyatta* level as well.
4. **Implement food relief, water and livelihood programmes in a more conflict-sensitive way:** Water access, food relief and livelihoods contribute strongly to conflict at the community-level – even more so than they aggravate inter-ethnic conflict. The solution is not necessarily to provide more of these key programmes but to ensure their distribution is sensitive to local conflict dynamics, and can be implemented in ways that contribute to peacebuilding processes. In addition, food distributions need to be planned in ways that ensure the safety of both distributors and recipients.
5. **Invest in income-generating activities that are labour intensive and target male youth:** As also noted in the recommendations for Conflict Type A, there is a need for appropriately designed initiatives for income-generating activities or ‘make work’ projects, predominantly targeting young men. ‘Labour-intensive’ work would keep young men ‘occupied’ and demonstrate that there are alternative economic options to raiding. This in turn could help inform attitudes towards defining ‘masculinity’ within broader Karamojong society, where many women and men measure a man’s masculinity against his ability to provide cattle for his family through raiding.
6. **Conduct more research and action on sexual violence in Karamoja:** The assessment methodology did not allow us to probe the nature and prevalence of sexual violence in Karamoja. It is clear from discussions that this is, however, a pressing issue. Better understanding is therefore needed of this issue, and organisations who can work to prevent such violence and mitigate its effects should be supported.

1. Behaviour

CORE DYNAMIC 1.1 Violence within the community

Q.21 Has anyone in your *manyatta* been killed in the last 2 years during an attack by someone who lives in your sub-county?

- Yes – High (4/5)
- No – Low (2/5)

Q.22 Which categories of people were killed?

- Men – High (4/5)
- Women – Low (2/5)
- Children – Low (2/5)

Q.23 How were they killed?

- Firearms – High (4/5)
- Pangas – Low (2/5)
- Spears – Very low (1/5)
- Fists – Very low (1/5)
- Poison – Very low (1/5)
- Other – Moderate (3/5) including beating, knives, arrows, sticks, hanging, slaughtering, stoning

Q.47 Which items have been stolen from your *manyatta* by other people living within your sub-county?

- Livestock – Very high (5/5)
- Personal/non-livestock items – Very high (5/5)
- Food – High (4/5)
- 'Other' items – Moderate (3/5) including money – very low (1/5) and poultry – very low (1/5).
- Firearms – Very low (1/5)

The level of intra-community violence within Karamojong communities is **HIGH**. Men are the main casualties of this violence, which is perpetrated primarily with firearms.

Indicators	Baseline
1.1.1 Experience of a <i>manyatta</i> member being killed by someone who lives within the same community	High (4/5) , predominantly targeting men
1.1.2 Which tools of violence are used in attacks	Firearms (4/5)
1.1.3 Experience of theft from within the community	Very high (5/5) , significantly involving the theft of livestock, personal property and food

Inter-ethnic violent conflict is the most visible form of conflict in the Karamoja region. However, the consultation phase of the assessment strongly indicated that intra-community conflict (which in most cases equates to intra-ethnic conflict) was an important dynamic contributing to breakdowns in local-level security and social cohesion. In fact, it is perhaps an even more sensitive issue than inter-ethnic or state conflict. Several interview groups commented that the assessment should “tone down” questions regarding violence and conflict within the community as the issue was too sensitive to discuss openly. This conflict takes many different forms, ranging from organised groups or gangs stealing food relief or cattle (within or between different ethnic groups) to individual acts of fighting, quarrelling, revenge or theft. The overall picture that emerges is one of a society under stress, where competition for key resources like food aid creates division (and sometimes generates violence) and where there are insufficient avenues for resolving these disputes and promoting social cohesion.

“These armed gangs have an organised structure – they are drawn from almost all the counties of Karamoja, they operate as friends with a mission, they are well spread to know what is located in what village. They know which people to attack or to avoid. When they attack people they call names and ask for specific things, ‘Bring the food you got yesterday!’ They are an organised group of criminals”

Women’s focus group, consultation phase

A majority of interview groups had members who reported that someone from their *manyatta* had been killed by an attack from a member of their community (sometimes the same *manyatta*, sometimes another *manyatta* in the same sub-county) in the last two years. Men were the main casualties of these attacks. Firearms are the weapon of choice, making the potential capacity for and lethality of violence very high.

Although the issue was recognised as very important, the group interview method was not suitable for gaining insight into the specifics of sexual assault within communities. Planned questions on the issue were dropped on the advice of Saferworld’s local facilitating partners. Therefore, the assessment was not able to provide a baseline for a crucial indicator of intra-community violence.

For interview groups, the experience of theft from those living in the same area was very high for both livestock and personal non-livestock items and high for food. The theft of firearms reported by respondents was negligible; however, they may be under-reporting this type of theft because it is illegal to possess firearms in the first place.

2. Systems and structures

CORE DYNAMIC 2.1

Supply and demand of illicit arms

There are MODERATE to HIGH levels of supply and demand for arms amongst civilians in Karamoja; both contribute to a high capacity for lethality in intra-community conflict.

The situation is characterised by:

- lack of credible data on arms possession, flows and demand;
- denial by civilians that they own weapons, although gunshots occur weekly and even daily;
- a strong sense amongst civilians that they should not possess guns, but that they still need them to protect themselves and their livestock – mainly from other ethnic groups;
- Kalashnikov/AK 47 rifles are the predominant weapons, possessed mainly by young males;
- it is difficult for civilians to obtain weapons, but they are obtained from rogue soldiers and police, cross-border arms flows and weapons traders.

Indicators	Baseline
2.1.15 Civilians seen in the community with firearms	Almost never (1/5) , suggesting that the level of civilian arms possession was very low
2.1.16 Government estimates of civilian firearms possession	Moderate levels of civilian firearms possession: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ■ no confirmed official statistics, only personal estimations ■ number of weapons estimated in the low thousands
2.1.17 Frequency of gunshots heard in the community	Weekly on average, with almost half of interview groups having heard gunshots on a daily basis
2.1.18 Types of small arms seen in the possession of civilians in the community	Kalashnikov/AK 47 variant rifles were the most commonly seen small arms in civilian possession
2.1.19 Types of small arms collected from communities	Kalashnikov/AK 47 variant rifles were the main types of small arms collected during civilian disarmament
2.1.20 <i>Government perception:</i> who possesses small arms in the community?	Young males aged 18–35, particularly the karachuna , based on who has been disarmed so far
2.1.21 <i>Communities perception:</i> why do civilians feel they need small arms?	Protection from other ethnic group. High 4/5 Protection of livestock. High 4/5 Attack other ethnic groups. Low 1/5 Protection from other people within their community. Low 1/5
2.1.22 <i>Government perception:</i> why do civilians feel they need small arms?	To conduct raids for commercial and cultural reasons, including for status and acquiring cattle for bride price To protect themselves and cattle from raids and attacks from other ethnic groups, as well as to conduct revenge raids and attacks
2.1.23 <i>Communities perception:</i> Owning a small arm makes you safer	Moderate (3/5)
2.1.24 <i>Communities perception:</i> Civilians should not possess small arms	High (4/5) , most people felt that civilians should not be allowed to possess guns
2.1.25 <i>Communities perception:</i> sources of illicit civilian small arms?	Top two sources: ■ UPDF or police: Medium (3/5) ■ Weapons traders: Low (2/5)
2.1.26 <i>Government's perception:</i> sources of illicit civilian small arms?	Top two sources: ■ cross-border flows ■ UPDF and police – but only from theft, battlefield captures and during past national crises

Indicators <i>continued</i>	Baseline <i>continued</i>
2.1.27 <i>Communities perception:</i> how easy it is for civilians to obtain small arms?	Difficult/very difficult for civilians to obtain small arms
2.1.28 <i>Government's perception:</i> how easy it is for civilians to obtain small arms?	Very difficult/impossible for civilians to obtain small arms

Illicit small arms possession is often seen to be at the crux of violent conflict and insecurity in Karamoja, increasing the frequency and potential lethality of inter-ethnic violence.⁸² This perspective was reinforced in consultations during the design phase of the assessment. For this reason, illicit small arms were included as an important measure of inter-ethnic conflict in Karamoja.

The issue of illicit small arms possession is complex. Rather than focusing purely on possession numbers and flows of arms (or 'supply' dynamics) in Karamojong communities, we developed a number of indicators that were intended to shed more light on the reasons why people possess illicit arms (or the 'demand' dynamics). Understanding demand dynamics is central to developing arms control measures. Even if all feasible measures could be implemented to cut off illicit arms supplies and remove all weapons from civilians, this would not address the deep-rooted dynamics that fuel demand. Although a vicious circle links supply and demand, a means of supply will always be found as long as there is demand for arms. However, investigating demand-side dynamics is highly challenging. Because civilian arms possession is illegal, conversation about ownership is highly constrained by fear of arrest or sanction. Discussions in many communities indicated a strong reluctance to speak about illicit weapons possession for fear of being turned into the authorities by 'spies' and 'informers'.

Supply of illicit small arms

In group interviews, participants reported almost never seeing civilians carrying guns in their communities. In only two group interviews did participants report seeing civilians with any small arms in the last two years.

When asked even more directly about the number of people who possess guns in their communities, 23 out of 25 interview groups believed that no-one possessed a gun (the two exceptions reported that they 'Did not know').

During the validation phase, Karamojong were more forthcoming in discussing weapons possession. Workshops confirmed that, because of the Ugandan government's disarmament processes, civilians do not move around carrying guns freely anymore. This is in and of itself a successful form of arms control. As discussions developed, there were many admissions that some people in communities do still own guns and regularly shoot back when they come under attack during raids.

Furthermore, almost half of all interview groups reported hearing gunshots on a daily basis. Although these could have been shots fired by state security forces or raiders, it represents such a high frequency that it is hard to believe that they do not include a significant number of shots fired from local civilian arms.

Interestingly, although only two interview groups acknowledged having seen civilians with weapons in their communities over the past two years, five interview groups reported the types of small arms they had seen in the possession of civilians. Kalashnikovs and AK variant rifles were the most commonly seen small arms. Although not conclusive in themselves, responses for gunshots and weapon types reinforce the impression that group interviewees may not have been entirely forthcoming when asked directly about weapons possession.

Q.89 In the past two years, have you seen civilians carrying small arms in your sub-county?

- Never – Very high (5/5)
- Almost Never – Very low (1/5)
- Monthly – Very low (1/5)
- Weekly – Never (0/5)
- Daily – Never (0/5)

Q.91 How many people living in your sub-county do you think currently own a small arm?

- None at all – Very high (5/5)
- Not very many (e.g. only a small number of people have them) – None (0/5)
- Many (e.g. most *manyattas* have one) – None (0/5)
- Very many (e.g. every *manyatta* has at least one) – None (0/5)
- Don't know – Very low (1/5)

Q.87 How often during the last two years have you heard gunshots in the sub-county where you live?

- Every day – Medium (3/5)
- At least once a week – Very low (1/4)
- Once a month or so – Very low (1/5)
- Almost never – Very low (1/5)
- Never heard a gunshot in last 2 years – Very low (1/5)

⁸² For further exploration of the relationship between illicit small arms, insecurity and conflict in Karamoja, see op cit Bevan 2008.

Q.92 Over the past two years, which types of small arms have you seen being carried by civilians in your sub-county?

- Kalashnikov/AK 47 rifles – Very low (1/5)
- G3 rifles – Very low (1/5)
- submachine guns (9mm) – Very low (1/5)
- Light machine gun (5.56 or 7.62mm) – Very low (1/5)
- Heavy machine guns (12.7mm) – Never (0/5)
- Rocket-propelled grenades (RPG) – Never (0/5)
- Mortars – Never (0/5)
- Mines/grenades – Never (0/5)
- Don't know – Very low (1/5)
- Refused to answer – Very low (1/5)
- Blank – Medium (3/5)

Q.96 If you or someone in your sub-county wanted to obtain a small arm, how easy would this be?

- Very difficult – Medium (3/5)
- Difficult – Medium (3/5)
- Easy – Never (0/5)
- Very easy – Very low (1/5)

Q.93 Why do you think some civilians might want to own small arms?

- Protection from other ethnic group – High 4/5
- Protection of livestock – High 4/5
- Attack other ethnic groups – Low 1/5
- Protection from other people within their community – Low 1/5

There are few credible, publicly available official statistics regarding illicit small arms possession in Karamoja. When security actors were interviewed, some claimed that “people are no longer acquiring arms” and “don’t have illegal arms”. Others estimated that illicit civilian weapons possession ranged from just several thousand in the region with most being hidden and inactive, to illicit weapons being “all over Karamoja” with some people having been disarmed more than four times. The most recent and perhaps the most accurate statistic we were able to obtain, was that 28,040 arms had been collected as of July 2010, according to the Regional Disarmament Committee Secretariat for Karamoja.

All officials interviewed however, confirmed that civilian disarmament remains a central government priority in Karamoja. Based on the types of weapons collected through disarmament exercises, civilians were thought to possess Kalashnikov/AK 47 variants, G3 and other self-loading rifles and a few ‘homemade’ guns, almost exclusively in the possession of male youths aged 15–35 years.⁸³

According to the interview groups, sources within the UPDF and police were the most ready means for civilians to acquire arms; however, the details of how exactly these ‘transfers’ are made could not be explored due to the sensitivity of the issue. Some security actors interviewed vehemently disputed that any state weapons ever make their way illicitly into the hands of civilians in Karamoja. Others suggested that this only occurs when arms are stolen from soldiers and the police; taken from them if they are killed during raids (i.e. as ‘battlefield losses’); or sold on to civilians by police or UPDF deserters. One interviewee pointed out that large numbers of previous government weapon stocks are in the hands of Karamojong civilians not from current ‘leakage’ but as a result of transfers that occurred during previous regime crises. Thousand of arms were looted or passed to civilians from the security services and armed groups in 1979 with the overthrow of Idi Amin, in 1985 when Milton Obote was deposed, and in 1986 when the Uganda National Liberation Army (UNLA) was removed from power. This same interviewee believed that leakage from state stocks now is “minimal” and that it is being “contained effectively”. During further validation consultations, other security actors informally acknowledged that there might be instances of rogue individuals in the UPDF selling ammunition but that this is not the practice of the army as a whole. During the validation phase, community and district representatives also pointed out that raiders often wear new UPDF and police uniforms when they attack, for which there could only be two sources.

Interview groups identified ‘weapon traders’ as the next most prevalent source of illicit arms, but also noted ‘foreign countries’ (Sudan, Kenya) as places where civilians could sometimes obtain small arms. Security actors interviewed confirmed that significant numbers of illicit arms are available across the Ugandan border in Sudan and Kenya.

Despite identifying these various sources, group interviewees and security actors interviewed agreed that it was difficult for Karamojong civilians to obtain illicit arms.

Demand for illicit small arms

Civilian demand for small arms is driven by the need to protect animals and to repel attacks from other ethnic groups. Almost all interview groups (4/5) ranked these as the two main reasons they would want to possess a gun. Very few respondents said they would acquire guns to conduct livestock raids, and other economic activities.

Interviews with security actors also highlighted a wide range of perceived ‘demand’ dynamics behind civilian possession of illicit small arms. Although not all agreed on this point, many security actors interviewed did not believe that illicit weapons were obtained for self-protection or reasons of security, as they felt that the Ugandan state was or should be responsible for this function. They certainly felt that Karamojong

⁸³ One interviewee spoke about how weapons were actually family property and that once a man reaches about 45 years of age, he passes on the gun to the young men in the family.

Q.88 Do you think people in your sub-county feel safer if they own a small arm?

- Yes – Medium (3/5)
- No – Medium (3/5)

Q.94 Do you think that it should be legal for a civilian to possess military style weapons?

- Yes – Low (2/5)
- No – High (4/5)

civilians did not need to protect themselves from threats by state forces. Instead, they focused on the social and economic dynamics of raiding: they argued that Karamojong civilians obtain weapons in order to conduct revenge attacks against other ethnic groups and to raid cattle for commercial and cultural reasons, as well as for replenishing depleted cattle stocks.

Despite the demand dynamics described above, which suggest that illicit small arms possession in Karamojong society should be high, group interviews demonstrated that there are mixed feelings towards possession of arms. Only about half of interview groups felt that owning a gun makes you “feel safer” and most felt that owning a gun should be illegal.

Interestingly during the validation phase, a number of respondents indicated that possession of a weapon significantly decreased your personal security because it made you a target of the UPDF and police.

CORE DYNAMIC 2.2

Provision of security and justice

The provision of security and justice in Karamoja is **LOW**. Poor security provision enables intra-community attacks, retaliatory violence and escalations of community-level disputes. The void of formal justice mechanisms prevents intra-community grievances and disputes from being adequately prevented or resolved.

The police and LCs were seen as the primary providers of protection from attacks and crime perpetrated by other people living in the community. While not very visible and despite their low deployment rates, there is **VERY HIGH** trust in the police and they are felt to provide effective protection from intra-community attacks and crime. The perception that the formal courts system delivers effective justice is **HIGH** (strong); however, traditional justice systems need more recognition as communities are just as likely to turn to these systems when seeking justice.

Indicators	Baseline
2.2.1 Who provides protection from attacks or crimes committed by other people living in the community	Police (4/5) and LCs (4/5) , followed sometimes by the UPDF (3/5)
2.2.2 Deployment of police as indicator of capacity to provide protection	<p>Target police deployments in Karamoja:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ■ at least 30 police officers per sub-county ■ 4000 total police personnel in Karamoja ■ specialised units for every district <p>Police deployments in Karamoja as reported in October 2009 (see narrative for more details):</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ■ 21 police posts in 43 sub-counties ■ About 2,000 police personnel in the Karamoja region ■ Police deployment in Kotido District: 168 personnel ■ Police deployment in Moroto: 308 personnel ■ Police have completed recent recruitment drive and more police recruits are training in Masindi
2.2.3 Visibility and engagement of police in the community	<p>Average frequency of seeing police in the community was about once a month</p> <p>Perceived experience of police engaging at the <i>manyatta</i> level was very low (1/5)</p>
2.2.4 The police provide effective protection from attacks by other people living in the community	High (4/5)
2.2.5 Visibility of UPDF in the community	Average frequency of seeing UPDF in the community was about once a week
2.2.6 The UPDF provides effective protection from attacks by people living within your community	Mixed – Overall, the perception that the army provides effective protection is medium (3/5) , but in Moroto the perception is high (4/5) while in Kotido it is very low (1/5)

Indicators continued	Baseline continued
2.2.7 Level of trust in the police	Very high (5/5)
2.2.8 Level of trust in the UPDF	Moderate (3/5)
2.2.9 Who provides justice in cases of conflict or crimes within the community	Police (5/5) and LCs (4/5) , followed by the elders (3/5)
2.2.10 Deployment of courts in Karamoja	Moroto courts: new dedicated court building, large library Kotido, Abim, Kaabong courts: improvised, dilapidated courts Nakapiripirit courts: no building for court
2.2.11 Deployment of justice personnel in Karamoja	Moroto personnel: Grade I Magistrate; one state prosecutor Kotido personnel: Grade I Magistrate Abim, Kaabong, Nakapiripirit courts: Grade II Magistrates only Closest chief magistrate's court: Soroti Closest state attorney: Soroti
2.2.12 The government's court system delivers fair and effective justice	High (4/5)
2.2.13 Preference for justice systems	Medium (3/5) for government court system Medium (3/5) for traditional justice system

Protection from attacks from within the community

Q.57 At the moment, who do you feel protects you against attacks and crime committed by other people living within your sub-county?

- Police – High (4/5)
- Local councillors – High (4/5)
- UPDF – Moderate (3/5)
- Senior elders/chiefs – Low (2/5)
- *Manyatta* leaders – Low (2/5)
- Church – Low (2/5)
- Neighbours/other people in the community – Very low (1/5)
- Official non-elected government officials – Very low (1/5)
- Warriors – Very low (1/5)
- Family – Very low (1/5)
- *Ngimurok* – Very low (1/5)
- Business leaders – Never (0/5)
- Vigilante groups – Never (0/5)
- Criminal groups – Never (0/5)

When interview groups were asked who protects them from attacks and crime committed by people from within the same community, most answered that the police and LCs were the main security providers, followed by the UPDF. Interestingly, very local actors such as family, traditional authorities (e.g. elders, warriors, *ngimurok*) and local non-state actors (e.g. churches, vigilantes, business people) were perceived as providing very little protection from attacks or crime committed by fellow community members.

Police capacity to provide security and protection

Police overall deployment in Karamoja is approximately 2,000. There are 308 personnel in Moroto District and by June 2009 there were approximately 168 in Kotido District. The intended deployment plan is 30 police officers per sub-county.

According to local District Police and Regional Police Commanders interviewed in October 2009, the Ugandan Police were implementing plans to deploy a police post and 30 police personnel to every sub-county in Karamoja. At the time of interview, police posts had already been established in 21 of the 43 sub-counties. Any other developed area in Karamoja with a significant population was also expected to get a police post. Every district was reported as having its required specialised units, including crime scene officers and dog sections.

The total target is for 4,000 police personnel to be deployed in Karamoja. As of October 2009, there were 168 police personnel in Kotido District. Although this number has fallen from the previous year, the local commanders expected that more police officers would be deployed soon. A DANIDA report suggests that only 66 police officers were physically present in Kotido as of March 2008.⁸⁴ The possible discrepancy between the numbers of officers physically present in Kotido and the numbers on paper could reflect the high rate at which officers are believed to abscond from deployment in Karamoja. There were 308 police in Moroto District. At the time of the assessment, more police were reportedly being trained in Masindi, following a new round of recruitment. One commander raised the challenge of adequate police

accommodation: police currently need to live in the sub-county police posts because they have nowhere else to stay.

In terms of training, interviewees emphasised that police posted to Karamoja are regular police and are trained to normal police standards according to the general training manual and procedures. This includes generic training on the rights of suspects and children's rights. However, police deployed to Karamoja did not receive special training for dealing with the requirements of policing in Karamoja. According to the Regional Police Commander in Moroto, "the training is usually generic and where references are made to the peculiar conditions in Karamoja, this is often on *ad hoc* basis". He believes that there is a need for a specially-tailored training curriculum "based on a policing model designed to respond to the local needs and challenges for policing in this unique environment [in Karamoja]".

Police deployment and availability in Karamoja in 2008

- By March 2008, in the entire Nakapiripirit District, the police had only 17 officers and men, including the DPC and Special Branch officers, in a district with 10 sub-counties. (p. 101)
- There are no crime scene police officers and crime scene investigation kits such as finger printing kits and cameras. The study team was informed that sometimes, police just borrow cameras to use at the crime scene. The police in Karamoja do not have a Police Surgeon to carry out post-mortems or examine victims of rape and defilement.
- In all the districts of Karamoja, there were no women police officers in the sub-counties. The few policewomen were stationed at district headquarters. At the main police station in Kotido, for example, there were 5 women police officers by March 2008. The low presence of police-women was constraining when it came to handling issues specific to women and where a policewoman would be preferred to a policeman, e.g. in the child and family protection unit. A policewoman is normally required to go arrest and search women. They are also essential in interviewing victims of rape and defilement. Women police officers are required to search women, record statements from women, escort women to hospital, and to keep their property.
- In March 2008, there was one vehicle for the entire police force in Kotido District, which was not enough for policing activities because of the distance from the main station to the sub-counties – sub-county police stations were between 6 and 38 km away from the main station. At the time of the study, a patrol vehicle had been secured for Kotido District. The vehicles available belonged to regional police and the Re-Establishment of Law and Order in Karamoja (RELOKA) programme. By March 2008, the whole of Nakapiripirit District had one operational vehicle for the Police. If the District Police Commander was on official duties outside the district, then no vehicle was available for the entire police service there. None of the sub-counties even had a motorcycle or a bicycle for police work. A police constable in Abim lamented: "There is virtually no transport to go out and carry out investigations. The only motorcycle is broken down and is also not secure to use on road. It is quite difficult to carry a suspect on a motorcycle."

Source: Muhareza F E, Ossiya D and Ovonji-Odida I, *A Study on Options for Enhancing Access to Justice and Improving Administration of Law and Order in Karamoja: Draft 2*, (Kampala: Danida, July 2008), pp 97–103.

Q.64 How often do you see a police official?

- One or more times in a day – Low (2/5)
- Once a week – Very low (1/5)
- Maybe once a month – Very low (1/5)
- Only rarely – Low (2/5)

Note: the above is based on the October 2009 interviews and reflects both Kotido and Moroto districts

Despite these numbers and plans, the perception of police engagement and capacities is low amongst the Karamojong. Interview groups did not report seeing the police very often in the community – on average about once a month – although there was a strong geographic split in responses. In Moroto District, the police were seen in the community on a daily basis, while in Kotido District police were seen 'only rarely'. However, during the March 2010 district validation meetings in Kotido, many said that police presence in the district had increased and the police were seen much more frequently than reported in the October 2009 group interviews. This increased presence was felt to be a response to increasing threats of violence and raids from Jie communities.

The impression that the police have low levels of penetration in rural areas was reinforced by interview group perceptions that police engagement at the *manyatta* level was very low. Nevertheless, interview group perceptions that the police are able to protect people from attacks by other people living within their sub-county or community was high.

The police were also perceived as a very trustworthy institution by almost all interview groups. However, these responses were somewhat tempered by accusations of

police corruption as well as clear evidence that there are not enough police personnel deployed on the ground, nor do the police have enough local engagement with communities. However, these responses do suggest that the police may have a high level of *legitimacy* as well as *capability* to provide protection from threats emanating from within the community.

The perceived role of the police in the community

Beyond the actual operational capacities of the security forces, their perceived role and functions in the community are an important measure of whether they can have a positive impact on levels of intra-ethnic conflict and insecurity. Interview groups were therefore asked to reflect on the role of the police and UPDF in their communities.

The primary positive roles of the police in the community were seen to be:

- keeping law and order
- arresting “wrongdoers”, criminals and cattle raiders
- providing protection and security – from criminals and “fighting”, for “food/food distribution”
- and also for the protection of women and children

It was also regularly noted that the police have a role to play in sharing public information, awareness-raising and mobilisation on law, security and human rights issues, as well as addressing criminality. The police were also sometimes seen to be important in uniting people and promoting peace in communities.

The police were also sometimes seen to have an important role in social control functions, including in:

- reducing drunkenness
- “teaching discipline” and guiding against “wrongdoing”
- “fighting adultery”
- enforcing ‘modern dress’ amongst warriors and more traditional people

The terms ‘punish’, ‘judge’ and ‘justice’ were brought up a number of times in discussions about the role of the police, indicating that they often go beyond their strictly policing role and may be overstepping into the territory of the formal justice system. Their responsibility for preventing and investigating crimes was only sometimes noted. Importantly, the recovery of stolen animals and property was only mentioned in a few instances.

The main negative aspects of police behaviour in the community were seen to be:

- ‘doing nothing’ – when crimes were reported or the police arrived at a crime scene, it was felt that they did not do anything constructive
- corruption – “there is no single service without a bribe”⁸⁵
- police are not properly granted the orders to recover stolen cattle
- in one sub-county, because there are no police deployed there, the police are not seen to have any role whatsoever

Police appear to have some legitimacy in the communities in which they work, which can be built upon and strengthened if they tackle alleged cases of bribery. They are specifically seen as having an intra-community security role and the capacity to deliver on this role. Furthermore, the group interviews demonstrated that the police in Karamoja have important roles and functions beyond simply security provision, including supporting social practices and peacebuilding. As such, strengthening police ability to contribute to intra-community conflict prevention would not only

⁸⁵ For examples of police demanding supplementary payments to carry out basic functions, see op cit Muhereza et al 2008, p 103.

mean improving the operational capacity of the police to uphold rule of law and security functions, but also developing the police's ability to engage with Karamojong communities in broader problem-solving or resolving disputes.

The UPDF's capacity and role in providing security and protection

Q.70 How often do you see an army official?

- Once or more times daily – High (4/5)
- Once a week – Never (0/5)
- Maybe once a month – Very low (1/5)
- Only rarely – Very low (1/5)
- Almost never – Very low (1/5)

All in all, the UPDF have a relatively minor role in addressing intra-community conflicts and insecurity. Some interview groups did report seeing UPDF soldiers in the community more frequently than the police – about once a week on average. There was a strong geographic split in these responses. In Moroto District, the UPDF were seen in the community on a daily basis; while in Kotido District, the UPDF were seen 'rarely' or 'almost' never. These differences may be a result of Moroto housing the UPDF regional division headquarters.

Responses as to whether the UPDF protects the Karamojong effectively from attacks and crimes committed by others in their sub-county were mixed. In Moroto District perceptions that the UPDF were effective protectors was high, while in Kotido District such perceptions were rarely reported. Interview groups also perceived the UPDF to be only moderately trustworthy and to have only a moderate role with regard to protection from attacks and crimes committed by others in their sub-county. While the UPDF may be a leading security actor in relation to inter-ethnic conflict and crime, it seems to have only a moderate role at the intra-community level.

Capacities for justice provision

Gaps in the provision of justice in Karamoja were also identified during consultations as having a major impact on intra-community conflict. Overall, there is a critical deficiency of courts, judges and resources in Karamoja and this lack escalates grievances and retaliation between community members and within ethnic groups.

The Assessment attempted to sketch a picture of the existing courts system in Karamoja, relying on interviews with local justice actors for the assessment in October 2009 and a 2008 report on access to justice in Karamoja.⁸⁶

In Moroto, there is a Grade I Magistrate working out of a newly constructed court building, which includes a comprehensive legal library. There is a Grade I Magistrate in Kotido but court is held in the dilapidated district community hall, which can only process some cases. The improvised court has a very small library containing the laws of Uganda Volumes 1–13. Although the government may post a chief magistrate to Kotido soon, cases which require a chief magistrate have to wait for now. Abim and Kaabong courts are also operating improvised courthouses in the dilapidated district community halls. There is no structure for the Magistrate's court in Nakapiripirit and court has sat there only twice since 2007. All in all, the Grade I Magistrates (who are able to hear more serious cases, including violent crimes) are extremely rare in the districts and most judicial functions are superintended by Grade II Magistrates.

Magistrates receive little support to work in Karamoja. They do not have offices and lack the most basic administrative facilities. There are reported to be no state-appointed representatives for the accused and there are no paralegals. There is a state prosecutor in Moroto, but no Karamoja districts have a resident state attorney (though there are plans to deploy one) and the closest one is based in Soroti. Courts in Kotido, Abim, Nakapiripirit and Kaabong do not have a vehicle, while Moroto court apparently has a very dilapidated vehicle that is often unusable.

⁸⁶ Op cit Muhezera et al 2008, pp 110–113. This report is perhaps the most comprehensive study on access to justice and the administration of law and order in Karamoja. The study highlights that the justice needs of the Karamojong are not adequately served by either the formal or traditional systems. It argues that traditional justice institutions should be streamlined into the national system but there are significant concerns that some traditional rulings and processes are contrary to the fundamental principles of the rule of law and human rights in Uganda.

The High Court should sit in Moroto, but it was reported that no chief magistrate has come to the region in at least four years, or even perhaps not since December 2004. Karamoja region does not have a resident High Court Judge, who should be based in Moroto. Those who are charged with capital offences are usually committed and tried mainly in distant Soroti. As a result, ‘hundreds’ of cases are still pending hearing and many people are languishing in prison. Some civil cases have even escalated into criminal cases as plaintiffs, frustrated that their disputes have not been dealt with, have attempted to resolve their cases by unlawful means. Legal representation is very limited in Karamoja, which means that plaintiffs and defendants are often forced to represent themselves. There are reportedly only six major law firms (in Lira, Soroti, Mbale or Kampala) that represent clients from the region, with only one lawyer amongst them who was actually resident in Karamoja.

The lack of adequate access to justice is a major problem. Despite the obstacles described above, the interview groups reported a high ‘yes’ response when asked if they felt that the government’s court system delivers fair and effective justice – when it is working. This is an encouraging dynamic that could be built upon to resolve intra-community conflicts and disputes and strengthen social cohesion.

Q.78 Do you prefer to seek justice through the government’s court system, or through other traditional justice systems?

- Prefer the government court system – Moderate (3/5)
- Prefer traditional justice system – Moderate (3/5)

Traditional Karamojong justice systems and dispute resolution practices exist in parallel to the formal courts, and the majority of the population still have a strong attachment to these systems. Traditional decision-making and justice institutions such as the *akiriket*, or sacred council of elders, decide on issues of critical importance to the community and act as a court in consultation with the community and seers. These decisions are then carried out by the *karachuna*. These and other practices are important mechanisms for achieving justice and resolving disputes, particularly at the community level.⁸⁷

Interview groups did not have a resounding preference for either the formal or the informal justice systems. Interview groups were asked to reflect further on their preferences:

In favour of the traditional system...

Many respondents believed that traditional systems are fairer and promote reconciliation, while the formal system “divides people”. They viewed traditional systems as having greater authority with the people and better ensuring community consultation and equal engagement for everyone. Because these systems use people from the community and are “on the ground”, they are better aware of the situation and what is going on so “known wrongdoers cannot get off like they can through the [technicalities of the] formal system”. There was a strong sense that a bottom-up approach to justice was also the best: “you cannot climb a tree from up to down”. More practically, many felt that the traditional system is faster at solving problems and is less prone to bribery and corruption. Furthermore, formal courts already give the traditional systems credibility as they often ask if the case has first gone through the traditional system. Crucially, there is often no alternative to traditional justice systems since in most areas there are no formal courts.

In favour of the formal system...

Many respondents strongly believed that the formal courts system is more systematic, better structured, regularised and transparent. They believed that the formal courts system is more thorough, gives “safer justice” (i.e. is not violence based) and treats people with equality because it is neutral. Many believed that the formal courts are also more capable than ad hoc traditional systems because judges and officers are properly trained, know more about the principles and processes of the rule law and are full-time professionals. Some respondents also believed that the formal courts were better at ensuring reconciliation and ‘rehabilitating’ people – even if it takes years in jail, respondents felt that this was better at achieving justice, reconciliation and rehabilitation than the traditional system that “just kills”. All in all, many felt that it was morally good to follow laws of the country and that the formal system was the best means of achieving justice and peace for everyone in Uganda.

⁸⁷ For further reference, see op cit Muhereza et al 2008.

These responses indicate that prospects for building a more responsive and accessible community-level justice system are encouraging. Most importantly, they indicate that a number of legitimate options exist for Karamojong to address intra-ethnic and community-level violence, disputes and conflicts. If greater synergies could be built between the formal state and traditional systems, this could contribute positively towards intra-ethnic and community cohesion.

Community perceptions of the main avenues for seeking justice in cases of intra-ethnic conflict

Q.73 What actors would you go to in order to get justice if you were in conflict with someone else who lives in your sub-county, or if someone in your sub-county committed a crime against you?

- Police – Very high (5/5)
- Local councillors or non-elected government officials – High (4/5)
- Senior elders/chiefs – Moderate (3/5)
- *Manyatta* leaders – Low (2/5)
- Courts – Low (2/5)
- Human Rights Commission – Low (2/5)
- Neighbours/other people in the community – Low (2/5)
- UPDF – Very low (1/5)
- Warriors – Very low (1/5)
- Church – Very low (1/5)
- Business leaders – Very low (1/5)
- *Ngimurok* – Very low (1/5)
- NGOs – Very low (1/5)
- Vigilante groups – Very low (1/5)
- Criminal groups – Very low (1/5)
- ASTU – Never (0/5)
- Civil-military centre – Never (0/5)

Interview groups were asked who they perceived to be the primary providers of justice for conflicts or crimes within ethnic groups. Police and local government officials (both elected and non-elected) were considered to be the primary providers of justice, followed by traditional authorities such as elders. The formal courts were not seen as major justice providers in these cases (most likely due to the fact they are practically non-functioning), while family, warriors, *ngimurok*, local non-state actors and local state actors (CIMIC centres, ASTUs) were perceived as providing almost no justice in dealing with conflict or crimes within ethnic groups.

Interview groups identified LCs (primarily LCIs but also LCIIIs) as the first point of contact in seeking justice when in conflict with someone from within the same community and ethnic group, predominantly because:

- it is the role of the LCI to handle cases and solves conflicts at village level and, if not solved, to forward cases to other/higher authorities within government
- it is the role of the LCI to handle cases and solves conflicts at village level and, if not LCIs are the closest to the people and easiest to approach
- it is the role of the LCI to handle cases and solves conflicts at village level and, if not LCIs can easily consult with the elders to manage disputes

Other types of traditional actors that would be approached first (though in fewer instances than the LCs) are *manyatta* leaders and the senior chiefs, and the police.

It is interesting to note that although people said that they would report their community conflicts and disputes to the police in order to seek justice, they do not usually go directly to the police. Instead, they do so through the person of the LCI, after trying to resolve the matter at the local level first.

CORE DYNAMIC 2.3

Access to key resources and public services

Karamojong feel that there is conflict within their communities over access to food relief and water, which is exacerbated by perceptions of unequal access to these resources within communities and broader ethnic groups.

While there is little perceived inequality in the access to key public services, instances of unequal access can directly contribute to contention with local community leaders and a breakdown of social cohesion.

Indicators	Baseline
2.3.1 Others in the community/sub-county have greater access to key resources than you	High (4/5) for food relief and Moderate (3/5) for water and replenishment of livestock
2.3.2 Community members come into conflict over access to key resources	High (4/5) for food relief and Moderate (3/5) for water
2.3.3 Others in the community/sub-county have greater access to key public services than you	Low (2/5)

Q.106 Do you think that other people in your sub-county have more access to the following things than you do?

- Food relief from the UN or other agencies – High (4/5)
- Water – Moderate (3/5)
- Replenishment of livestock – Moderate (3/5)
- Land – Low (2/5)
- Cash or credit – Low (2/5)
- Locally grown food – Low (1/5)
- Other – Very low (1/5), including seeds, hoes, chicken, goats

Q.107 Do you think people living in your sub-county come into conflict with other people living in your sub-county over access to...

- Food relief from the UN or other agencies – High (4/5)
- Water – Moderate (3/5)
- Land – Low (2/5)
- Replenishment of livestock – Low (2/5)
- Locally grown food – Very low (1/5)
- Cash or credit – Very low (1/5)
- Other – Very low (1/5), including seeds, hoes, chicken, goats

Group interview responses strongly indicated that unequal access to some resources does contribute to conflict at the community level. Firstly, group interviews perceived unequal access to food relief within their communities to be high and also believed that conflict over food relief within the community was high. Subsequent community and district meetings during the validation phase confirmed the significance of community-level conflict over food relief. Secondly, interview groups perceived unequal access to water to be lower, and only moderately believed that access to water caused community-level conflict.

Development actors interviewed reaffirmed perceptions that access to key resources contributes to intra-community conflict and a breakdown of social cohesion within communities. Almost all development actors interviewed highlighted food relief as a source of conflict and violence both between and within ethnic groups. They have witnessed fighting at food distribution sites and youth grabbing food in a very aggressive manner at the end of food distributions. Raiders from the same ethnic group sometimes steal ration cards and food items, and people are also attacked when carrying their food relief home from the distribution sites. Sometimes food distributions have to be postponed because of insecurity, and on occasion food deliveries have been suspended due to attacks on NGO staff. One interviewee reported that thefts from community granary stalls had increased and people felt they had to store their food either at homes or in schools to keep it secure.

Development actors also observed that food relief and aid delivery in general had led to significant friction and tensions at the community-level. Many local men have complained to them that “all the aid goes to women” and that this causes inter-family and local conflicts. Food security is such a sensitive issue that they have seen instances of mob justice and violence when someone is accused of stealing food. Moreover, some development actors reported a significant build-up in tension between the local government and NGOs delivering food relief because formerly the local government used to organise – and benefit from – the food distributions.

Water scarcity was also identified as a source of conflict, both between and within ethnic groups, by development actors. Resettlement in the fertile areas has also caused conflict and tensions over land.

“Those boreholes that are functional register very long queues and people end up fetching water at insecure times of the night. Lokwakwa village has two boreholes supposed to serve six manyattas, but one has been taken over by the primary school and the other by the army barracks.”

Ngimurok focus group, consultation phase

Q.113 Do you think that other people living in your sub-county have more access than you do to these services? (e.g. health, education, roads, transport)

- Yes – Low (2/5)
- No – Moderate (3/5)

During the consultation phase, communities raised the issue of unequal access to public services as a major element of tension and conflict within communities. There was a recurring theme that some local government and local community leaders ensured that their family and supporters received favourable access to health care, education, infrastructure and other key public services. However, these accusations were not corroborated in group interviews.

These responses suggest that Karamojong do not feel there to be significant inequalities in the access to public services in Karamoja. When such inequalities did occur, group interviews felt that this contributed to conflict in the community by:

- creating grievances with local government officials who are seen to favour their families and supporters with more services;
- creating ‘hatred’, misunderstanding and a breakdown of confidence between citizens and their local government officials and/or community leaders;
- dividing people in the community who have to share these services.

“Water points are far apart and difficult to walk to because of insecurity. The nearest water point is four hours to go there and come back. In the dry season, there are fights because people are many that are coming from far. In the past, they would walk very early in the morning, but it is difficult these days.”

Male youth focus group, consultation phase

The sharing of water points within communities was raised in several instances as an example of local contention over unequal or problematic access to public services. Access to local water points needs to be better and more equitably managed to avoid crowding, which leads directly to tension and conflict within communities.

CORE DYNAMIC 2.4

Livelihoods

Karamojong perceptions that current pastoralist and agro-pastoralist livelihood practices do not contribute to inter-ethnic conflict are contradicted by evidence that suggests these practices are closely associated with conflict. The answer to this is not simply livelihoods diversification, but more support to sustainable pastoralist practices that in turn could contribute to wider peacebuilding efforts.

Indicators	Baseline
2.5.1 Do current livelihoods contribute to peace or conflict	Livelihoods contribute to peace – Moderate (3/5) Livelihoods contribute to conflict – Low (2/5)
2.5.2 There are efforts to diversify livelihoods in communities	High (4/5)

Elements of pastoralist and agro-pastoralist lifestyles (or the frustration of traditional pastoralist lifestyles) were highlighted during the consultation phases as core causes of intra-community conflict in Karamoja.⁸⁸ The assessment attempted to explore these issues further.

Interview groups reported pastoralism and agricultural production as the dominant livelihoods in the region.⁸⁹

Although this assessment does not claim to offer an empirical study of livelihoods and economic activities, these answers are a reasonable indication that cattle-keeping and agriculture are seen as the dominant means for survival in the minds of the Karamojong. This could reflect the fact that economic diversification is still limited in Karamoja and/or that these options are not perceived to be as important or as rewarding as pastoralist and agricultural livelihoods.

Most interview groups did not think that current Karamojong livelihoods contributed to conflict; in fact, slightly more groups thought that they contributed to peace.

The need for ‘alternative’ livelihoods and the diversification of livelihoods in Karamoja is often cited as important for both the economic development of the region, but also for reducing reliance on livestock and subsequently reducing levels of conflict and insecurity.⁹⁰ There was a strong perception amongst interview groups that there are efforts to diversify livelihoods in Karamojong communities. However, there were strong responses during the validation phase that “conflict was not created by livelihoods but by unequal distribution of resources in the community”. Community members raised the question of “how to support pastoralism while working for equality?” This links back strongly to responses in ‘Core Dynamic 2.3: Access to key resources and public services’.

Q.133 What are the main livelihoods of this sub-county?

- Pastoralism (based primarily around keeping cattle) – High (4/5)
- Agriculture (based primarily around growing crops) – High (4/5)
- Other – Moderate (3/5), with charcoal making, firewood collection and general labour being the main other livelihoods
- Agro-pastoralist (both keeping cattle and growing crops) – Low (2/5)
- Trade or industry – Low (2/5)

Q.134 Do you think that these current forms of livelihood are contributing to peace or conflict in Karamoja?

- Contributing to peace – Moderate (3/5)
- Contributing to conflict – Low (2/5)

⁸⁸ For a brief overview of how pastoralist socio-cultural dynamics contribute to conflict in Karamoja, see op cit FEWS NET 2005, p 14 and pp 35–39.

⁸⁹ It is interesting to note that during the group interviews and validation meetings, community respondents did not understand pastoralism itself to be a ‘livelihood’; instead, keeping livestock and cattle was simply understood to be their way of life, while livelihoods consisted of all other income-generating activities.

⁹⁰ Because of the perceived centrality of alternative livelihood issues in conflict and insecurity in Karamoja, “Support the Development of Alternative Means of Livelihood” makes up Programme Component 4 of the KIDDP, (Government of Uganda 2008).

'Alternative' livelihoods

The government and international development actors are engaged in numerous 'alternative' livelihood promotion programmes in Karamoja, many of which are targeted at reducing dependency on livestock. Underlying many of these programmes is the argument that reducing dependency on livestock will lead to a consequent reduction in the conflict and raiding associated with livestock-keeping. It is also believed that developing other means for making a living will increase general prosperity and provide a more settled way of life, thereby consolidating peace and security.⁹¹

Amongst interview groups, there was a strong perception that the development of alternative livelihoods has the potential to contribute to a reduction in both inter-ethnic and intra-community conflict. When asked about the actual or expected impacts of education and employment projects on conflict in Karamoja, participants thought that they:

- constructively brought people together:
 - "adult education encourages people from different communities to interact"
 - "it has a positive effect – the quarrying which was conducted in Rupa made people come to work together"
 - "it has improved the relationship between people in the sub-county and encouraged peaceful co-existence"
 - "group work will encourage people to work together to earn a living"
- kept people occupied:
 - "it brings peace because it makes people satisfied, when people have things to do then they keep busy"
 - "bricklaying keeps people busy and away from raiding"
 - "children go to school and interact with members from different communities. They then get disinterested in other forms of activities that would cause conflict"
- reduced incentives for raiding and theft by reducing inequality and insufficient access to resources:
 - "most of the conflict has been over resource-based concerns, if they all earn a living then they would envy no other"
 - "if everyone has access to the sufficient food, theft will be reduced"

During the consultation phase, 'reformed warrior' and male youth focus groups made it very clear that they did not want the government and other actors to give up on them or discount their willingness to be productive. They listed many livelihood ideas, such as opening stores, working in building trades, working as labourers and providing services. They felt that they had energy, ideas and some skills, but not the start-up opportunities or resources – which is why they "just sit under trees".

While alternative livelihoods were generally seen as important and positive in relation to reducing conflict, some interview groups emphasised that support to cattle-based livelihoods continues to be of paramount importance. They suggested that livestock and pastoralist livelihoods should be strengthened through support to cross-breeding and improved animal nutrition projects. They implied that 'hatred' and conflict would be reduced if Karamojong communities could get assistance to improve the quality and health of their livestock.

Although the majority of group interview responses suggested that alternative livelihoods were seen as contributing to a reduction in conflict, some warning notes were also sounded, including recognition that:

- improved trade in the region may lead to an increase in demand for stolen or raided cows or create new opportunities for raiding;

⁹¹ For a review of the pastoralist 'livelihood debates', see op cit Powell 2010, pp 7–8.

- increased levels of food and money in the community could lead to increased opportunities and incidences for theft and looting (although this contradicts comments from other groups that an increase in food would likely decrease levels of theft);
- everyone must be included in income-generation or alternative livelihood projects, otherwise this will lead to complaints that people have been left out, and to an increase in tension.

When discussing alternative livelihoods, interview groups focused primarily on traditional education, vocational training and employment or ‘make work’ schemes, such as bricklaying or quarrying. Activities such as collecting firewood and charcoal were perceived more as ‘coping strategies’ rather than livelihoods and had only been taken up because of the insecurity associated with cattle-keeping. These activities were not seen as viable alternative livelihoods and some interview groups reported that these activities themselves involved security risks.

A strong theme was present in all interviews with development actors, namely that implementing alternative livelihood programmes presents significant challenges, and that these merit greater consideration. Firstly, many believe that alternative livelihoods simply cannot replace pastoralism in many parts of Karamoja, particularly in the ‘dry belt’. The basic ecology of much of the terrain will never be conducive to agriculture and other activities. As a result, livestock-keeping will remain the only sustainable means of making a living in these areas. More than anything, pastoralism was seen not simply as a means for ‘making a living’, but a complete social, cultural and economic life system that could not be instantly transformed.

Secondly, development actors felt that government and some external actors were attempting to sideline pastoralism through the promotion of alternative livelihoods. The government has established a ‘model village’ in Nadunget to promote sedentary and agricultural ways of life.⁹² The government’s Food Security Action Plan mentions reducing the number of livestock in Karamoja, while the Poverty Eradication Action Plan (PEAP) and the Plan for the Modernisation of Agriculture (PMA) say very little about promoting pastoralism. This was offered as one reason why the population in the green belt is increasing: many resources are being invested into the green belt, whereas in the dry belt there are only peace and HIV/AIDS programmes.

While no empirical evidence was found to back up these perspectives, a very clear message came out of interviews with development actors: decision-makers need to recognise that they cannot stop the Karamojong from owning cattle or dramatically curtail the Karamojong pastoralist lifestyle. In fact, it was felt that more resources should be invested into supporting sustainable development and management of livestock – managing livestock better would mitigate its contribution to conflict in Karamoja. Although development actors supported the need for economic diversification, they believed that you cannot shift people completely and immediately from pastoralist to other livelihoods and that programmes supporting these alternatives must be better chosen and more carefully planned.

⁹² The ‘model village’ is a parish where the government is offering low cost housing to promote modern settlements, as well as providing other incentives such as farm tools and other agriculture inputs.

3. Values and beliefs

CORE DYNAMIC 3.1 Perceptions of security and conflict

Q.1 Do you think that there are any conflicts between people, or groups of people, who live within your sub-county?

- Yes – High (4/5)
- No – Low (2/5)

Q.4 Do you fear being attacked by other people who live in your sub-county?

- Yes – High (4/5)
- No – Low (2/5)

Q.5 Are you more afraid, or less afraid, of being attacked by people living in your sub-county than you were two years ago?

- More afraid – Moderate (3/5)
- No difference – Very low (1/5)
- Less afraid – Low (2/5)

Many Karamajong believe that conflicts exist within their communities, and fear attacks from within the community. Conflicts are sparked by a wide array of issues, but are driven primarily by hunger, persistent drought, poverty and unresolved quarrels. Inter-personal disputes, though 'hidden', are often a significant source of tension and conflict within the community.

Indicators	Baseline
3.1.1 Perception that there are conflicts between people, or groups of people, who live within your community	High (4/5)
3.1.2 Fear of being attacked by other people who live in your own community	High (4/5)
3.1.3 More afraid of being attacked by people living in your community than two years ago	Moderately more afraid of attack

Most interview groups reported that some form of conflict existed within their communities. At the same time, the perceived fear of attack from other people in the community was high, although there was only a moderate perception that the threat of attack had increased between 2007 and 2009. These responses suggest that the level of violence – or fear of violence – within communities in Karamoja is very high.

Interview groups reported that generally, conflicts occurred within the community over:

- the theft of personal property and food
- theft and/or raiding of livestock
- food and food distribution
- family and domestic quarrels
- debts and credit schemes
- revenge for 'cheating' or adultery

Some interview groups also reported conflict within communities because of competition to access government projects, competition for work and because some people within the community were suspected of being 'spies' for disarmament operations.

Further discussing these responses, interview groups felt that the deep-rooted causes of conflicts within communities were hunger, persistent drought and lack of access to water, poverty, and jealousy and petty quarrels between people, when these were not properly resolved.

Notes from children's focus groups

Children's relations with parents: "Parents force us to go for firewood, if we refuse we are beaten and sometimes denied food to eat... We are denied education, especially the girls – normally the parents say that when the girls go to school they become prostitutes. Those girls who are in school are not given scholastic materials such as pens and books, which forces them to go collect firewood to earn money to get these items... When the father sells a cow, we are not given any share yet we look after the animals. Instead the father takes the money for drinking or buys kutu kuto [i.e. local brew]."

How children have been affected by conflict and insecurity: "Many have been orphaned. Those who have lost their parents have been taken to the missionaries of charity for feeding... Our friends have lost lives... Conflict has caused hunger because even the food we get from WFP is looted at night by the enemies... Other children have dropped out of school because the schools are far away and they fear being attacked coming back from school."

While the assessment focused on public dynamics and the 'macro-level', it is important to recognise that family and personal disputes contribute significantly to conflict within communities. The consultation phase, group interviews and validation meetings

identified a wide mix of inter-personal disputes within families, between families and between community members. ‘Child neglect’ was specifically raised in a number of instances as an important driver of tension, and one that can escalate into open conflict. Mothers often file complaints that fathers are not providing adequately for the care of their children. These complaints are sometimes even brought to the UHRC, which responds by inviting parents and families to mediation processes and attempts to agree memorandums of understanding between the parents about their obligations.

Recent research by Muhereza et al into improving access to justice in the Karamoja region provides a full spectrum of intra-community conflicts and inter-personal disputes.⁹³ These range from quarrels over family, land, and theft, to disputes over adultery, marriage, domestic violence, drunkenness, clan lands, cattle raiding, curses and witchcraft. The authors also reported a number of different levels of intra-household conflicts and disputes:

“Within households conflicts can arise between husband and wife [or wives], between children, between co-wives or other relatives. Children may fight each other in the course of chores like fetching water. There is a lot of negligence of families by husbands and abandonment of the fathers’ role. Older women observed a difference in the past ‘Men/fathers looked after their children – grew cotton, sent children to school, provided everything, did not drink and get drunk’. In all the communities it was said most homes have many orphans and widows due to raiding. The Jie observed ‘orphans are traumatized, lack food and turn wild.’”⁹⁴

CORE DYNAMIC 3.2

Values and beliefs around violence and dialogue

Dialogue within the community is very common and its value considered to be VERY HIGH, while the perceived acceptability of violence against people who live in the community is VERY LOW.

Indicators	Baseline
3.2.1 Experience of regular dialogue with other people within your community	Very high (5/5)
3.2.2 Dialogue with people from within your community succeeds in solving matters peacefully	Very high (5/5)
3.2.3 Acceptability of violence	Violence is not ever acceptable: High (4/5) Violence is acceptable against people who live in your community: Very low (1/5)

Q.142 Do you think that it is ever acceptable to use violence against people who...

- ...it is not ever acceptable to use violence against other people – High (4/5)
- ...are from a different ethnic group – Low (2/5)
- ...live in your sub-county – Very low (1/5)
- ...are employed by the government – Very low (1/5)
- Other – Very low (1/5), including raiders and those who have killed (i.e. murderers)

Overall, interview groups reported engaging in regular dialogue with other people living within their communities and there was a very high perception that dialogue is a successful means of peacefully resolving disputes and issues that might otherwise result in conflict. These responses indicate that dialogue is highly valued in Karamoja and could be harnessed to contribute positively towards dispute resolution and conflict prevention within communities.

Interview groups were asked directly if they ever thought that it was acceptable to use violence against other people – from a different ethnic group, from their own sub-county, or those employed by the government. Only a very low number of interview groups thought that it was ever acceptable to use violence against someone who lives in the same community. This could indicate that there are strong social norms against using violence within the community, which could be invoked during peacebuilding processes. However, a large number of groups left the answer blank and it is therefore difficult to take this as a definitive conclusion.

⁹³ For full details of such conflict and dispute typologies, see op cit Muhereza et al 2008, pp 59–60.

⁹⁴ Ibid, p 60.

Cross-cutting recommendations: Practical action to address conflict at all levels

BECAUSE THERE ARE A LARGE NUMBER OF OVERLAPPING DYNAMICS between the three Conflict Types, this section outlines cross-cutting recommendations for taking practical action to address conflict at all three levels.

These recommendations are organised into four groups: A) protection from violence; B) policing and justice provision; C) civilian disarmament; and D) peace dialogue. They aim to provide a set of detailed, specific and practical suggestions for decision-makers relating to all three Conflict Types.

A. Protection from violence

Protection from violence and the provision of security are major concerns of the people in Karamoja. The findings of the assessment suggest that the provision of security might be improved if the state adopted more people-centred and co-operative approaches to security and responded more directly to the expressed priorities and needs of Karamajong communities. Karamajong communities frequently said that they felt as though they were the targets, rather than the beneficiaries, of state security operations.

Recommendations for improving protection from violence include:

1. **Conduct a strategic review of Karamoja security approaches:** The assessment findings raise questions about some of the security approaches in Karamoja, including the effectiveness of cordon and search tactics and protective *kraals*, the lawful use of force by state security actors, and the reach and location of UPDF deployments. Significant shifts have occurred in the government's approach, with much more emphasis on the police's role and on 'community policing' strategies. However, these early gains must be protected and further expanded by regular reviews and updates between the military, police and civilian authorities in Karamoja, including feedback from communities. Every effort should be made to prevent UPDF and police violations of human rights.

2. **Review and improve livestock protection and recovery tactics:** The protection and recovery of livestock also needs to remain a priority for security forces, and the recent deployment of the Anti-Stock Theft Units (ASTUs) in Moroto District should be carefully monitored to see how effective they are. Cattle tracking, reporting and monitoring mechanisms need to be improved. Specific suggestions include: improving the rapid response capacity of the UPDF and/or ASTUs to raids, so that “raiders [are not] given time to enjoy what they have raided”; stressing the importance of recovering all or as many animals as possible; maintaining accurate records about raids and recovery efforts and sharing these with communities.
3. **Increase the number of Karamojong personnel in security decision-making and management roles:** Greater recruitment of people from Karamoja into the police – particularly into the ASTUs – has been taking place. Due to conditions in the region, entry requirements had to be lowered for this recruitment. It is however, important to get more Karamojong into the security services and moreover, eventually into management positions. Resources should be dedicated to ensure further education opportunities for Karamojong in the armed forces to enable career growth and promotion.
4. **Co-ordinate central or collective grazing areas for all groups:** Increased security in the region has already to some degree started opening up former ‘no-go’ areas. This should be built upon by working with communities to identify better management and sharing of grazing areas, which could then be protected/overseen by the security services. This would improve the health of cattle, but also help to build trust between ethnic groups and between them and the state security services.
5. **Improve communication and relationships between the UPDF, police and local communities:** The UPDF and the police have taken some steps towards better relationships with communities in Karamoja, including through the police adopting a community policing approach. These are positive steps, and need to be expanded upon and monitored so that good initiatives are in fact implemented in practice and relationships with communities built up over time. This could include involvement from the security services in peace dialogue meetings (if appropriate), establishing clear consultation structures with communities across the region (not just in major centres) and working with local CSOs and the UHRC to ensure any violations by security personnel are dealt with quickly and feedback provided to the affected communities.

B. Policing and justice provision

Recommendations for improving policing and justice provision include:

1. **Recruit and appropriately train more police, and increase their deployment across Karamoja:** On paper, the government is already committed to increasing police deployment and making the role of the police more prominent in the region. These commitments should be followed through. Police need to be permanently stationed at the village level, and conduct regular patrols. This would address perceptions that villages are more insecure at night than during the day, increase local confidence in police capacity and enable the police to better understand and build relationships with each community. Recruiting people from Karamoja – women in particular – will help in this regard, as will more specific training for police for working in Karamoja.
2. **Increase resources for the police:** The current low level of resources for police posted to Karamoja means that community members themselves describe a police posting to Karamoja as “punishment”. Improved facilities and resources would help greatly in improving the attitude, commitment and motivation of police serving in Karamoja, so that the police will no longer be so eager to “run back to Kampala”. Improved police posts, transportation, detention facilities and administrative resources are all needed. Improved police accommodation was raised by all participants in the assessment, with suggestions that there should be better provision of the ‘uniport’ accommodation buildings that the police use elsewhere in Uganda.

3. **Strengthen and regularise community-based policing activities:** A core tenet of community-based policing is good local public awareness about the role of the police, the judiciary and the UPDF; access to justice; the differences between civil and criminal cases; and other law and order issues. However, community-based policing should go beyond public awareness. It should involve greater and more regular access to the police, right down to the *manyatta* level. The aim should be to create a situation where-by communities and the police work together to solve problems affecting public safety in a preventive fashion, rather than the police reacting to incidents as they occur. These activities should enable the police to become more service-oriented, accountable to the public and focused on the priorities of the communities they serve.
4. **Greater police collaboration with civil society:** Closer police links with CSOs would help to build greater trust in the police and to make them more accessible. This would entail CSOs actively encouraging the police to accompany them to the field and inviting police involvement in programmes that touch on aspects of community safety, security and conflict prevention. This would reinforce the fact that police can make a constructive contribution to a wide range of local issues, not just 'enforcement'.
5. **Increase justice provision and linkages between formal and traditional systems:** While the formal courts system is largely well respected and has relatively good legitimacy in Karamojong society, its coverage of the region is still sparse. The state needs to continue to expand the formal courts system across all of Karamoja. This would contribute to a significantly more positive view of the state within Karamojong society. Moreover, a functioning justice system could contribute to resolving aspects of inter-ethnic and intra-community conflict in the region. Secondly, linkages between the formal courts system and the traditional mechanisms that actually process most disputes in the first instance, need to be improved. This needs to be approached carefully, but further measures to increase the inter-connections between the two systems would make justice provision in the region much more effective.

C. Civilian disarmament

It is important to recognise that the state's current attempts at disarmament will likely continue to be met with violence to some degree. But responses in the assessment also indicate support for a 'gun-free' Karamoja, thereby strongly suggesting that the state needs to adapt its approach to disarmament through a process of consultation with communities and taking into consideration the following prerequisites:

1. **Better understand the demand dynamics behind small arms possession and use:** Despite the widespread public support for fewer arms in circulation in Karamoja, the reasons for gun ownership also need to be addressed. This means continued engagement with various sections of Karamojong societies – and taking into account differences between groups and regions – in order to understand people's reasons for wanting to keep their arms. These could vary from security to cultural or social reasons, and attitudinal change therefore needs to involve a range of civilian actors (community leaders, women's groups, civil society, etc.). A first step might be creating a dialogue forum for discussing arms possession, without threat of sanction to those involved. This needs to be part of a process of comprehensively engaging communities, women, youth, *ngimurok*, elders and leaders, to understand different perspectives and motivations regarding gun ownership and disarmament options.
2. **Ensure that all ethnic groups feel safe enough to disarm:** Most Karamojong believe that the different ethnic groups within Karamoja have not been disarmed equally and this has created severe security vulnerabilities. To address this, disarmament should target all ethnic groups at the same time. There was also strong recognition that no amount of disarmament within Karamoja will have any lasting positive effect if the borders with Kenya and Sudan are not made properly secure from cross-border raids and arms supplies. Ultimately, confidence in and compliance with disarmament would be higher if adequate security could be guaranteed to Karamojong communities –

disarmament will gain momentum, “when someone who surrenders their gun already has protection.”

3. **Strengthen data collection and analysis of incidents involving small arms:** More small arms incident data needs to be collected and analysed, including data on collected/seized weapons, gunshot deaths and injuries, gun sightings, reported gunshots, and so on. The development of appropriate disarmament and security strategies will be significantly compromised without comprehensive and credible data of this kind.

A revised approach should include:

1. **Increased community consultation and participation:** Communities and their representatives – including local leaders and *manyatta* leaders, the police, peace committees, and NGOs – should be more involved in planning and conducting disarmament. This entails improved civil-military relations, more peace meetings and intensive peace education so that people who possess guns become willing to give them up – as many have already done. Special efforts should be made to engage youth, as well as those who currently encourage raiding and arms possession (including *ngimurok* and women). Interview groups specifically recommended that LCs should be more involved before disarmament operations are carried out because they have information on who has arms and can facilitate consultation with communities.
2. **Target individuals not communities:** There was strong sentiment that the UPDF should “follow guns not people” and not punish whole communities because certain individuals possess guns. Respondents suggested strengthening UPDF deployments in areas where there are known gun flows so as to eventually cut off supply. They also suggested the UPDF should stop depending on witnesses who provide ‘false accusations’ and use more rigorous intelligence and means of information gathering.
3. **Create a civilian gun ‘hotline’:** There was a suggestion that a contact ‘hotline’ would be useful for civilians to call if they want to report a gun. They could call in, stay safe and allow the police to respond. While some form of UPDF telephone line exists, community members felt that a hotline managed locally at district level by the police or civilian authorities (who were felt to be more approachable than the military), would be more effective.
4. **Carefully consider providing disarmament incentives:** The government should consider providing material incentives to those people who voluntarily disarm (such as money, ox-ploughs, etc.) or providing income-generating and other community projects to those communities that voluntarily disarm. Communities felt this would make the desire for guns and use of guns less attractive. This is a challenging endeavour, as people are already competing for access to resources. But respondents also felt that the guns they surrender have a price, and that they are not ‘reimbursed’ for the expense they made in acquiring them. While weapon ‘buy-back’ schemes have a very chequered history and there are numerous examples where the provision of material incentives for disarmament have created dangerous unintended consequences, there have also been examples where appropriately developed incentives have been thought to contribute to successful voluntary weapons collection exercises. Therefore, incentives should not be dismissed outright but considered very carefully.
5. **Improve accountability of weapons collection:** People should be given certificates and fully registered when they hand in guns so it is known who has already disarmed. Although people may cheat the system and keep additional arms or re-arm, this would reduce harassment and accusations of non-compliance. This would also help in creating reliable data on numbers of weapons collected, from which area, which in turn could provide a means of analysing the small arms situation in Karamoja (including tracing of supply, distribution of civilian firepower, etc.) and can also be used to improve transparency around where collected weapons end up (i.e. a check on weapons ‘leakage’).

6. Conduct disarmament with the accompaniment of impartial and independent

observers: Communities very clearly and strongly emphasised that disarmament should be conducted without torture, beating, shooting of civilians, detention or theft of property. This could be better ensured if impartial and independent observers were on hand to advise the UPDF and the police, and to prevent incidents of violence.

D. Peace dialogue

Assessment participants argued strongly for a shift away from *ad hoc* peace meetings towards more comprehensive and co-ordinated processes focused on longer-term peace dialogue. This more sustainable approach should build confidence, establish relationships, test preventative measures and eventually begin to transform conflicts. However, it is clear that peace meetings and dialogue processes present a number of challenges and can result in unintended negative impacts. Not enough research and monitoring are being conducted to systematically evaluate the concrete impacts of these activities, especially over the long term. It is not clear how these processes can deal more directly with issues of raids, guns and violence or how agreements and resolutions can be better upheld, monitored and enforced. Although peace dialogue processes seem to very important they need to be implemented with caution.

Recommendations for improving peace dialogue processes include:

- 1. Increase and regularise meetings:** An increase in the frequency and regularity of peace meetings (monthly meetings and even ‘continuous dialogue’ processes were suggested) would provide the basis for more sustainable lines of communications and dispute resolution mechanisms, rather than the *ad hoc* or crisis talks that take place at present. However, it is equally important that peace dialogue processes are better linked to existing local governmental and traditional decision-making mechanisms. This would ensure a wider stakeholder base and enable agreements to be better followed up through the support of both governmental and traditional authorities. It is important to note that increased governmental engagement and official support (through LCs, local administration, the police and UPDF) would not mean that peace processes are ‘taken over’ by the government, but that government would simply be included as a stakeholder in any peace processes.
- 2. Actively involve key participants:** Peace meetings are often controlled by ‘gatekeepers’ who “come for the breakfast and travel money” while blocking other more crucial actors from participating. *Karachuna* and warriors, often key spoilers to peace processes, are usually left out of peace meetings and dialogue processes; their participation should be actively sought. Elders and *kraal* leaders who are “not acting peacefully”, and women and *ngimurok* who encourage this type of behaviour should also be targeted for inclusion. Lastly, increasing children’s involvement in peace meetings could be an important means to build a more sustainable basis for conflict transformation. Children’s participation in peace promotion work could even become part of the school curriculum.
- 3. Improve transparency and information-sharing about dialogue processes:** There is a great need to improve wider community awareness of the content and results of peace meetings and dialogue processes. Greater awareness would improve confidence in the processes and contribute to commitments being upheld. Communities should be informed about how meetings are organised; improved community feedback and validation mechanisms should be established both during and after meetings; and government, NGOs, traditional authorities and communities should co-ordinate to communicate results and expectations.
- 4. Link dialogue processes to practical initiatives:** Dialogue for its own sake is not sustainable. Therefore, these processes also need to be directly linked to practical activities or initiatives that concretely contribute to peacebuilding. This could include income-

generation activities, co-operation in the joint use of resources and services, and sporting or cultural events.

5. **Promote more opportunities for inter-personal exchange:** Opportunities to freely meet with members of different ethnic groups (and sometimes even different members from within the same community) and to engage security and local authorities on equal terms are rare and valuable. They are also felt to be crucial building blocks for the Karamojong to establish and improve relationships between ethnic groups, with state institutions and within their own communities. Although they may not have immediate concrete results and need to be managed carefully to avoid unintended negative results, there should be increased support to create more opportunities for these exchanges.

Annex 1: Assessment methodology

Introduction

This assessment was conducted as part of Saferworld's 'Promoting Peace and Security in Karamoja' programme. The Karamoja context is extremely complex and shaped by a range of conflict and security dynamics, all linking to different governance, social, cultural and development issues.⁹⁵ It was not possible for this initial assessment to exhaustively address all of these dynamics. Instead, the assessment sought to establish and measure a limited but robust set of baseline indicators that best capture the priority needs of Karamoja stakeholders and denote general trends in the conflict and security situation over the last two years (roughly the two-year period from October 2007 to October 2009).

This assessment aims to inform the work of all peacebuilding, security and development actors engaged in Karamoja, by:

- Highlighting community members' experiences of, and perspectives on, conflict and insecurity, so as to enable programming which responds to, and is sensitive towards, their context and needs.
- Increasing understanding of the region and promoting greater investment of resources into efforts to address priority needs and opportunities for peacebuilding and human development.
- Providing a 'baseline' assessment of the conflict and security situation in Karamoja, against which Saferworld and other actors can monitor changes in the context and seek to track the impact of their work.⁹⁶

Approach and methodology

This assessment sought to establish and measure a limited but robust set of baseline indicators that best capture the priority needs of Karamoja stakeholders and denote general trends in the conflict and security situation over the last two years (roughly the two-year period from October 2007 to October 2009).

The assessment was conducted in the districts of Moroto and Kotido, which were deemed to be the best locations for a test case of the assessment methodology. Both districts experience a variety of conflicts and include people from a range of ethnic groups, as well as a variety of economic and livelihood contexts – for example, Rengen and Panyangara sub-counties are agro-pastoralist areas where people engage in both agricultural activity and the keeping of animals, whereas Lokopo Sub-County is in the green belt and is therefore primarily agricultural. The two districts were also relatively accessible and secure locations in which to conduct the research and test the methodology. It was felt that conducting the initial assessment in these two districts would be the best means of generating information that would have broad relevance across the whole region.


A vital feature of the assessment is that it adopted a participatory and needs-based approach throughout the process, starting at the way the assessment was designed, and moving through all the research and feedback phases. The process was supported by two community-based organisations, Action for Poverty Reduction and Livestock Management in Karamoja (ARELIMOK), based in Moroto District, and the Warrior Squad Foundation (WSF), based in Kotido District.

The assessment focused on three sub-counties in Moroto District, namely Rupa and Lokopo (which moved to the new Napak District in July 2010) and Loptuk and Naitak-wae parishes of Nadunget Sub-County, and seven sub-counties in Kotido

⁹⁵ For further reference to the wider Karamoja context, see op cit Powell 2010.

⁹⁶ Saferworld currently plans to conduct a second assessment in 2011.

District, namely Naponga, Kotyang, Rengen, Panyangara, Rikitea, Loposa and Kamuru. The assessment was conducted over several phases to enable building up relationships and getting to know various stakeholders while gathering important information, described in the diagram below.



The first step was a literature review, conducted in mid-2009 to capture existing data and analysis about the region. This review was published in March 2010, and covered the development situation and livelihoods opportunities/vulnerabilities; small arms control, supply and demand; governance, security, rule of law and access to justice; levels and forms of armed violence; society and culture; and capacities for conflict prevention and resolution. The review highlighted some contradictions, but also some core areas of agreement among different authors.

Consultation process (June 2009)

The research team then started the field research by conducting mostly group consultations at the *manyatta* (household) level in June 2009 to frame the key issues. A variety of people were consulted, including women, elders, youth and reformed warriors, children, male and female *ngimurok* (soothsayers/traditional healers) and civic leaders. In total, 300 people were consulted in this way, and in addition key interviews were held with key government, civil society and international actors engaged in Karamoja – some based in the region and others in Kampala. This approach enabled the research team to draw out the key conflict and security dynamics prioritised by Karamojong themselves, supplemented by the views of those working with people in the region.

The assessment measures conflict and security dynamics for the period from October 2007 to October 2009. This period was selected for a number of reasons. Firstly, a one-year period was too short a timeframe to obtain reasonable responses from community-consultations and group interviews. Conceptions of time in Karamajong society are linked to seasons and events and do not correspond to annual calendars in any case. It was felt that a rough span of two years would be more adequate in encapsulating the 'recent past' as it might be conceived by Karamajong society. Secondly, the process of undertaking the assessment is too intensive to be accomplished on an annual basis and subsequent assessments will only take place biannually. Therefore, a two-year period also provides the best period of analysis from a project implementation perspective.

Designing the analytical framework (July–August 2009)

On the basis of this consultation process, Saferworld developed an analytical framework for the assessment. This framework identified a conflict typology consisting of three conflict types in Karamoja:⁹⁷

⁹⁷ The assessment utilised the definition that conflict "is a relationship between two or more parties who have, or think they have, incompatible goals". This definition is drawn from Mitchell C., *The Structure of International Conflict*, Macmillan, London, 1981.

Linkages between conflict types

Though obviously interconnected, the assessment did not attempt to synthesise analysis of all three conflict types into one over-arching conflict analysis. There are however, significant overlaps and links between them. Future updates of the assessment will seek to investigate these further.

Conflict Type A: Conflict and insecurity between ethnic groups The type of conflict cited most frequently by respondents living in or working on Karamoja is that between ethnic groups, often expressed through inter-ethnic cattle raids and other armed raiding.

Conflict Type B: Conflict between the state and Karamajong society Tense and distrustful relations and sporadic armed violence between state forces and the Karamajong, coupled with the historic marginalisation of Karamoja, demonstrate an enduring ‘latent conflict’ between the state and Karamajong society.

Conflict Type C: Conflicts and insecurity within communities High levels of conflict exist within Karamajong communities and ethnic groups, and social cohesion at the community level is challenged in a number of ways.⁹⁸

The majority of existing conflict and security literature on Karamoja focuses on inter-ethnic conflict. However, the consultation phase clearly highlighted that the two other conflict types are of great importance. When describing Karamajong society and the Ugandan state as being in a condition of latent conflict (Conflict Type B), the assessment is not suggesting that the Karamajong have organised forces or that the two parties are on the verge of war. Instead, the consultation phase highlighted that the relationship between the two parties is characterised by significant tensions, animosities, grievances and fear. As a consequence, there are periodic outbreaks of armed violence involving state actors and citizens in Karamoja, which contribute to a context of enduring insecurity and mistrust, and which have continued in the months since the assessment.


Similarly, though often not evident to external actors, the consultation process highlighted high levels of tension and disputes within communities, which undermine stability and cohesion and occasionally cause violence or open conflict (Conflict Type C). These are important dynamics to take into account for any community-focused interventions.

The three identified conflict types (A, B and C) were used as the basis for the assessment framework. Each conflict type was broken down into a set of ‘core dynamics’ – i.e. dynamics which seemed to have a significant bearing on each particular conflict type. Within each conflict type, the dynamics⁹⁹ were grouped in terms of:

Behaviour Behaviours and actions causing, related to or a consequence of conflict and/or peacebuilding.

Systems and structures Political, economic, social and cultural systems or structures causing, related to or a consequence of conflict and/or peacebuilding.

Values and beliefs Values, beliefs, attitudes, ideologies and world views causing, related to or a consequence of conflict and/or peacebuilding.



⁹⁸ The UNDP Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery specifically examined the issues of ‘social cohesion’ in a concept paper researched in 2009. They found that there are two principal dimensions to strengthening social cohesion: 1) “reducing disparities, inequalities and social exclusion” at the community level; and 2) “strengthening social relations, interactions and ties”. McLean A, *Community Security and Social Cohesion: Towards a UNDP Approach* (UNDP BCPR unpublished paper, 2009), pp 21–22. The Karamoja context poses significant challenges to addressing both of these dimensions.

⁹⁹ This categorisation is drawn on Johan Galtung’s ‘conflict triangle’. See op cit Galtung 1990.

Utilising this ‘conflict triangle’ is useful because it enables us to go beyond examining the directly visible and physical behaviours of conflict and insecurity in Karamoja. While direct physical violence or responses to that violence are important measures of levels of conflict and insecurity, they are not the only dynamics involved. Even if all inter-ethnic cattle raiding could be in Karamoja could be stopped, this would still not resolve the deep-rooted causes of conflict between different ethnic groups.

‘Systems and structures’ were included in the analysis of each conflict type in order to examine how the processes and institutions that govern life in Karamoja also drive conflict and insecurity – or can contribute to peacebuilding. For example, civilian disarmament was identified in the consultation phase as a process that affects conflict at multiples levels in Karamoja: it is intended to decrease the capacity of Karamajong to engage in armed violence, but the disarmament process has also resulted in some cases of human rights violations that fuel the latent conflict between Karamajong society and the state. Peace meetings enable inter-ethnic and intra-community dialogue and dispute resolution, but in some cases they may also falsely raise expectations and undermine confidence between groups.

‘Values and beliefs’ were also included in the analysis of each conflict type. People’s cultural values, attitudes and beliefs are crucial in defining how they view the world and behave and interact with others. Values and beliefs are often at the very core of conflict but are also the most difficult dynamics to measure.

Each conflict type (A, B and C) was broken down into a matrix of core dynamics and indicators.

Example – Core Dynamics and Indicators

Conflict A: Conflict and insecurity between ethnic groups

1. Behaviour	Core dynamic 1.1	Indicator 1.1.1
		Indicator 1.1.2
		Indicator 1.1.3
	Core dynamic 1.2	Indicator 1.2.1
		Indicator 1.2.2
		Indicator 1.2.3
	Core dynamic 1.3	Indicator 1.3.1
		Indicator 1.3.2
		Indicator 1.3.3
2. Systems and structures	Core dynamic 2.1	Indicator 2.1.1
		Indicator 2.1.2
		Indicator 2.1.3
	Core dynamic 2.2	Indicator 2.2.1
		Indicator 2.2.2
		Indicator 2.2.3
	Core dynamic 2.3	Indicator 2.3.1
		Indicator 2.3.2
		Indicator 2.3.3
3. Values and beliefs	Core dynamic 3.1	Indicator 3.1.1
		Indicator 3.1.2
		Indicator 3.1.3
	Core dynamic 3.2	Indicator 3.2.1
		Indicator 3.2.2
		Indicator 3.2.3
	Core dynamic 3.3	Indicator 3.3.1
		Indicator 3.3.2
		Indicator 3.3.3

The analytical framework described here does not exhaustively capture every conflict and security dynamic in Karamoja. However, the core dynamics and indicators were identified, prioritised and developed directly out of a consultative process with Kara-

mojong stakeholders rather than being drawn from an externally imposed and pre-determined set of priorities. The analytical framework goes beyond direct physical violence to examine a broad spectrum of the systems and values that contribute to conflict and insecurity in Karamoja. On this basis, Saferworld believes that the dynamics and indicators examined in the assessment represent a robust cross-section of the core conflict and security issues in Karamoja.

Data collection phase (August–December 2009)

The assessment utilised data from three sources to measure the core dynamics and indicators:

- **25 community-level group interviews** were held in Moroto and Kotido districts in August and September 2009, involving 300 Karamojong participants from the following categories: adult men; adult women; elders; male youth and reformed warriors; and *ngimurok* (traditional healers/diviners).
- **27 key informant interviews** were held in October 2009 in each district with:
 - local civil administration officials and representatives;
 - development actors, including representatives of UN agencies and national and international NGOs;
 - security actors, including representatives of the Police, UPDF, district internal security offices, and security focal points from international agencies; and
 - human rights observers, including representatives of the Uganda Human Rights Commission (UHRC), UN agencies and national and international NGOs.
- available **existing primary and secondary data**, such as the UHRC annual reports.

It was agreed with respondents that their names would not be cited in the report, due to the often sensitive nature of the information provided.

The group interview responses cannot be used as a precise statistical representation of Karamojong perception or ‘opinion’. Although a randomised household survey could provide statistically representative results for the whole population, undertaking such a survey was deemed as impractical for an assessment of this scope and resources. Instead, structured group interviews offered the most practical means for generating some form of representative response from Karamojong society. They included all major stakeholder categories, enabled geographical representation across the two target districts and provided enough coverage to claim a credible level of representation of local perspectives and experiences. Group interviews also provide some peer check on ‘over-reporting’, which can occur when utilising methods that are reliant upon self-reporting events. While they do not provide precise statistical representation, the combined responses of the group interviews adequately point out the main directions and tendencies from which to measure the relevant core dynamics and indicators for each conflict type. **Therefore, group interviews provide major ‘sign-posts’ and a ‘barometric’ means for measuring conflict and insecurity in Karamoja that, when the assessment is repeated, should highlight major shifts over time.**

Compilation and analysis (January–June 2010)

Collected data was compiled into a database and matrix under each indicator. The indicators were then assessed and compared to establish a basis of analysis for each core dynamic, which were themselves assessed together to provide an overall analysis of the current level and scope of each conflict. A preliminary analysis of each conflict was drafted for the validation phase of the process (see below), which was then revised and refined based on that feedback to become the basis of this final report.

Validation and feedback phase (March 2010)

Importantly, Saferworld ‘backed up’ the assessment by conducting a series of community- and district-level validation meetings in Moroto and Kotido districts in March 2010, as well holding a national feedback workshop in Kampala on 29 March 2010. Community-level and district validation participants were asked to interrogate the findings, analysis and recommendations of the assessment to ensure that they genuinely reflected their perspectives. Participants at the validation meetings were also asked to reflect upon the results and suggest practical recommendations that could be made to government, civil society, international and community actors to improve responses to conflict and insecurity in Karamoja. The national feedback meeting was held to give actors at the national level an opportunity to engage with and question the findings. Discussions at the national meeting also illustrated how many different perspectives exist on conflict and security in Karamoja and the need for more regular sharing of analysis among key actors involved in the region.

Community validation workshops: Community-level validation workshops were held in March 2010. In Moroto, a total of 36 people drawn from the 18 group interviews conducted in September 2009 participated in these workshops. In Kotido, 24 people selected from the 12 group interviews took part.

District validation meetings: District-level validation meetings were in both Moroto and Kotido in March 2010. Community members, district officials, members from the local and international civil society organisations and the UN agencies operating in Karamoja all took part.

National feedback workshop: Saferworld convened a national feedback workshop on 29 March 2010 in Kampala to review the preliminary findings and analysis of the assessment. This was not ‘validation’ since participants had not taken part in the original group and key informant interviews. Participants included representatives from the Office of the Prime Minister and the Ministries of Defence, Water and Environment, Local Government and Agriculture. Representatives from the UPDF, the Ugandan police, Uganda Prisons Service, the Internal Security Organisation, the National Focal Point on Small Arms (Ministry of Internal Affairs) and the UHRC all took part. Ugandan civil society groups were represented by Centre for Conflict Resolution (CECORE) and the Uganda Joint Christian Council (UJCC). Also present were the Irish and Norwegian Embassies, the WFP and OCHA and representatives from the INGO community.

Presentation of the findings, analysis and recommendations

For each conflict type (A, B and C), an overall conflict summary is provided, followed by some specific recommendations for action related to that particular conflict. This is followed by the findings and analysis for each core dynamic and the indicators related to each.

Findings for most of the indicators were ‘quantified’ to some degree by presenting results in the form of an index ranging from 1 (‘Very low’) to 5 (‘Very high’). This makes it possible to present perceptions and normally qualitative responses in a more standardised manner so that changes can be measured over time.

The 1 to 5 scoring reflects the frequency with which the group interviews gave a particular response. To illustrate:

- no group interview responses out of all 25 Interviews = index score of 0/5, or ‘Never’
- 1–5 group interview responses out of all 25 Interviews = index score of 1/5, or ‘Very low’
- 6–10 group interview responses out of all 25 Interviews = index score of 2/5, or ‘Low’
- 11–15 group interview responses out of all 25 Interviews = index score of 3/5, or ‘Moderate’

- 16–20 group interview responses out of all 25 Interviews = index score of 4/5, or ‘High’
- 21–25 group interview responses out of all 25 Interviews = index score of 5/5, or ‘Very high’

For example, as indicator 1.1.1 under Conflict Type A (Conflict and insecurity between people of different ethnic groups), a core dynamic was identified on ‘armed violence between people of different ethnic groups’, and one of the indicators used to measure this dynamic was ‘experience of a *manyatta* member being killed by an attack by someone from another ethnic group’. This indicator has been given a ‘baseline score’ of ‘5/5 – Very high’. This is because 24 out of the 25 groups interviewed respondents responded ‘yes’ to Question #26: ‘Has anyone in your *manyatta* been killed in the last 2 years during an attack by a person from another ethnic group?’

CORE DYNAMIC 1.1

Armed violence between people of different ethnic groups

Indicators	Baseline
1.1.1 Experience of a <i>manyatta</i> member being killed by an attack from another ethnic group	Very high (5/5) , with victims being of all genders and ages

As another example, under Conflict Type B (Conflict between the state and Karamojong society), a core dynamic was included on ‘Civilian disarmament’, and one of the indicators used to measure this dynamic was ‘Public support for the way Government has been doing disarmament over the last two years’. This indicator has been given a ‘baseline score’ of ‘2/5 – Low’. In this case, it was scored ‘2 out of 5’ because only 10 out of the 25 group interviews responded ‘yes’ to the relevant question, namely: ‘Do you support the way the government has been doing disarmament in the last 2 years?’

The purpose of this indexing is used for the purpose of expanding the scale and number of group interviews as part of future assessments. For example, if the total number of interview group is expanded threefold to 75, total responses can still be broken down into fifths out of the total 75 and then compared with previous baseline responses. Not reporting the exact number or percentage also avoids the results being misinterpreted as statistically representative, which they are not.

Cross-cutting recommendations: Practical action to address conflict at all levels

Because of the large degree of overlap between the dynamics of the three conflict types, cross-cutting recommendations were also formulated for taking practical action to address conflict at all three levels. These are listed at the end of the report and have been organised into four groups, relating to: A) protection from violence; B) policing and justice provision; C) civilian disarmament; and D) peace dialogue processes.

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Saferworld works to prevent and reduce violent conflict and promote co-operative approaches to security. We work with governments, international organisations and civil society to encourage and support effective policies and practices through advocacy, research and policy development and through supporting the actions of others.

COVER PHOTO: Karamojong women participate in a focus group discussion in Moroto District during the Karamoja conflict and security assessment. © KATIE HARRIS



UK OFFICE

The Grayston Centre
28 Charles Square
London N1 6HT
UK

Phone: +44 (0)20 7324 4646

Fax: +44 (0)20 7324 4647

Email: general@saferworld.org.uk

Web: www.saferworld.org.uk

KENYA OFFICE

PO Box 21484-00505
Adams Arcade
Nairobi
Kenya

Phone: +254 (0)20 273 3250/

+254 (0)20 273 6480

Fax: +254 (0)20 273 6283

UGANDA OFFICE

PO Box 8415
4th Floor, NIC Building
Pilkington Road, Kampala
Uganda

Phone: +256 (0)414 231130/

+256 (0)414 231150

Registered charity no. 1043843
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