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City limits: urbanisation and vulnerability in Sudan

Port Sudan case study

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Acknowledgements

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Acronyms/abbreviations

ACF	Action Contre la Faim
AU	Administrative Unit
BRAC	Bangladesh Rural Advancement Committee
CBO	community-based organisation
COR	Commission of Refugees
CPA	Comprehensive Peace Agreement
CSO	civil society organisation
ESPA	Eastern Sudan Peace Agreement
ESRDF	Eastern Sudan Reconstruction and Development Fund
GoS	Government of Sudan
HAC	Humanitarian Aid Commission
IDP	internally displaced person
IGA	income-generating activity
IRC	International Rescue Committee
MoH	Ministry of Health
NCP	National Congress Party
NDA	National Democratic Alliance
NGO	non-governmental organisation
SAP	Structural Adjustment Programme
SPLM/SPLA	Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army
SRC	Sudanese Red Crescent
UXO	unexploded ordnance
WDA	Women's Development Association

Figure 1: Map of Port Sudan

Source: Adapted from Pantuliano, 2002: 25.

Chapter 1
Introduction

This case study of urbanisation in Port Sudan is part of a wider study on urbanisation in Sudan, commissioned by the Department for International Development (DFID). The study aims to explore the growing phenomenon of urbanisation in the country, focusing in particular on Nyala, Khartoum, Port Sudan and Juba. The overall aims of the study are as follows:

- To deepen understanding of the drivers of urbanisation in different parts of the country, in relation to the broader economic, political and security context.
- To analyse the consequences of rapid urbanisation, socially, economically (paying particular attention to urban livelihoods) and environmentally, and in terms of urban infrastructure and the provision of services.
- To assess the implications of rapid urbanisation in terms of the vulnerability of urban populations to future hazards and shocks, as well as development opportunities.
- To identify how the international aid community can best engage with changing settlement patterns in Sudan, and the implications for humanitarian and development programming in the future.

This study explores the process of urbanisation in Port Sudan and the challenges and opportunities it presents. In particular, it aims to deepen understanding of the drivers of urbanisation in Port Sudan; analyse the consequences of rapid urbanisation in terms of livelihoods, basic services and infrastructure; explore the particular vulnerabilities of urban populations; and outline options to support vulnerable groups.

The report argues that the exponential growth of Port Sudan's population, driven by recurrent waves of displacement resulting from drought, conflict and rural poverty, has not been matched by increased job opportunities. The great majority of displaced people in Port Sudan live in highly precarious conditions with poor or non-existent access to basic services and livelihoods. Responding to their multiple vulnerabilities calls for the prioritisation of their needs in urban development and planning by government authorities. Donors and UN agencies should jointly support the authorities in this and, in partnership with local actors, increase their strategic focus and coordinate their efforts in the region, and in Port Sudan in particular.

1.1 Study details and methodology

This study draws extensively on earlier work by members of the team as well as other HPG researchers, complemented by findings from new fieldwork conducted by a team of local researchers. An in-depth literature review on patterns of urbanisation, displacement and vulnerability among rural and urban populations in Port Sudan and Red Sea State was conducted. While the majority of the sources reviewed were in English, a limited number of sources in Arabic were also studied. In general we found very little recent material on Eastern Sudan or Port Sudan.

The initial research team comprised two experienced international researchers, one local team leader and four local researchers based in Port Sudan. The fieldwork in Port Sudan started at the end of April 2010 with a profiling exercise undertaken by the team of local researchers. This included visiting nine neighbourhoods (*deims*) in Port Sudan to identify locations where in-depth fieldwork could subsequently take place. These *deims* included Baghdad, Atbay, Philip, Al Qadisya, Ungwab, Umm Al Qura/Al Qadisya and Alaskandaria. During this two-week exercise the team conducted a number of interviews with local chiefs, members and chairmen of Popular Committees, teachers and health/medical staff, to inform them about the study and gather preliminary information on the *deim*, particularly in relation to:

- population groups (socio-economic status, period of residence and reason for arrival);
- main economic activities;
- urban status (fully planned, illegal settlement, IDP/refugee camp, etc.); and
- any significant environmental or security issues.

Despite trying to secure access to Port Sudan for several weeks, the two international researchers were ultimately denied permission to visit by the Sudanese authorities, and as a result were unable to carry out in-depth fieldwork in the locations profiled in the city. This prompted the reorganisation of the research team. A senior Sudanese researcher with longstanding experience in Port Sudan and Red Sea State (Dr Hassan Abdel Ati) was recruited, together with a researcher from the University of Red Sea State (Dr Mohamed Idriss), to oversee the local research team, conduct the analysis and contribute to the drafting of the report. A two-day workshop was organised and facilitated by the two international researchers in Khartoum, to introduce the research team to the methodology, discuss the findings of the profiling exercise and agree on the details and logistics of the fieldwork. The two international researchers also conducted a limited number of interviews in Khartoum with representatives of local and international NGOs, academics, researchers and UN agencies. Fieldwork was undertaken by local researchers in nine *deims* in Port Sudan.

The main aim of the additional fieldwork was to gather further information on migration, changes in leadership, the urban

economy, access to land, services and employment for different groups, as well as the risks associated with different livelihood strategies. Interviews were planned with representatives of government ministries (including Social Welfare, Finance, Labour, Physical Planning, Health and Water), the port authorities, Popular Committees and representatives from private companies, labour unions, professional associations and other civil society organisations. As the international researchers were unable to undertake fieldwork and the senior Sudanese researcher only had limited availability at the time of the study, it was difficult to gather more up-to-date information and gain a more in-depth understanding of key issues and trends on the ground. As a result this study relies more on secondary, rather than primary, data. It is nevertheless hoped that the findings of the study will help inform and stimulate further in-depth research on urban vulnerabilities in Port Sudan.

Chapter 2
History and drivers of urbanisation in Port Sudan

2.1 Context and history

Port Sudan was founded in 1905 to replace the old port of Suakin, which was considered unable to accommodate the increased maritime traffic resulting from the expansion of agricultural schemes (Perkins, 1993). As Port Sudan was created on a totally new site, the British administrators of the Anglo-Egyptian Condominium enjoyed total freedom in the design and planning of the city, shaping Port Sudan according to strict ethnic and social divisions (Pantuliano, 2000). When Port Sudan was established, the population consisted almost entirely of immigrants from elsewhere in Sudan and overseas, particularly Arabs and Greeks (Mustafa, 1991: 16). The Beja, the main indigenous group of Red Sea State, were not encouraged to settle because they were not considered to have the potential to form a 'reliable and disciplined workforce' (Perkins, 1993: 123). The British justified their policy because of the Bejas' tendency to return to their homes in rural areas as soon as they had earned a sufficient sum of money, or if they could see no immediate prospect of work (National Record Office, CRO 2/36/7217, quoted in Pantuliano, 2000). As a result, Beja migration to Port Sudan did not begin until the 1930s.

Migration into the city increased after the Second World War as the Sudanese economy expanded (Pantuliano, 2000). Beja migration increased following independence in 1956, and during the 1960s and 1970s the implementation of large agricultural schemes in what was then Red Sea Province, industrial development outside Khartoum and the start of large-scale livestock exports to the Gulf all contributed to the expansion of port activities and demand for manual labour in Port Sudan. The city attracted scores of migrants from all over Sudan and West Africa, lured by the prospect of job opportunities in the port, the railway and the rapidly expanding service sectors. Port Sudan also became an important transit point for African pilgrims going to Mecca for the Hajj. Meanwhile, repeated famines in rural areas of Red Sea State in 1948, 1955 and 1969–73 forced an increasing number of Beja into Port Sudan in search of work or assistance. While in the late 1940s only 2% of the population of Port Sudan was estimated to be Beja (Al Shami, 1958), by the end of the 1960s the Beja represented more than 50% of the urban population (Pantuliano, 2000). The city's area also expanded, from 12km² in 1950 to approximately 288km² by 1970.[1] The 1970s also saw a major refugee influx of approximately 120,000 people from Eritrea and Ethiopia (Forman, 1992).

1 British Foreign Office Report, Trade of Port Sudan for the Year 1906.

By the mid-1980s, Port Sudan's ability to absorb increasing numbers of migrant workers was coming under strain. The port was mechanised and employment opportunities started to decline. Meanwhile, in 1984–85 a devastating famine in Sudan, including in Red Sea State, decimated the livestock of the Beja and Beni Amer, with reported losses of up to 90% (Pantuliano, 2000), pushing an increasing number of destitute Beja pastoralists into Port Sudan. This pattern continued in the 1990s, with further droughts in 1990–91 and 1995–96. Meanwhile, conflict in the south and west of Sudan caused a mass influx of IDPs, who took up residence in the fast-growing illegal settlements on the fringe of the town. A survey conducted in 2000 found that 30% of IDPs living in Port Sudan were from Red Sea State, 40% from West Sudan, 20% from the South and the remaining 10% from northern and central Sudan (Abdel Ati, 2000). Further conflict in eastern Sudan in 1995–2006 prompted another large influx of IDPs, mainly Beni Amer from South Tokar and Agig. The Ethiopia–Eritrean conflict in 2000–2001 saw further influxes, as did the war in Darfur from 2003.

After the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) in 2005, youth in particular came to Port Sudan in search of a better life. There is no evidence of significant returns to Southern Sudan and the Three Areas following the peace agreement.

2.2 Port Sudan today

Estimates of the population of Port Sudan today vary widely. According to the 2008 census (CBS, 2008), the population stands at 399,140, representing 28.6% of the population of Red Sea State, 29.5% of its households and 71.7% of its urban population. However, 2004 estimates of the state population indicate that the city represents about 50% of the total, and unofficial estimates in independent surveys and reports in the 1990s put the population at anywhere between 500,000 and 1.2 million (Forman, 1992; van Breukelen, 1990, in Pantuliano, 2000).

Port Sudan is a distinctly multi-ethnic city. Northern Sudanese and other minorities, including Egyptians, Yemenis, Indians, Syrians and Greeks, as well as Fallata and Hawsa from West Africa, have been residents from the start. As we have seen, an increasing number of Beja have also taken up residence in the city. The three main Beja groups are the Bishariyyn, the Amar'ar/Atmaan and the Hadendowa (Pantuliano, 2000). Other groups include Beni Amer and Rashaida from Eastern Sudan, IDPs from Southern Sudan, the Nuba Mountains and Darfur and refugees from Eritrea and Ethiopia.

Chapter 3
The policy context

Eastern Sudan has long been one of the most marginalised areas of the country. During the Anglo-Egyptian Condominium, adverse administrative and political policies and the encroachment of agricultural schemes into pasture reserves laid the foundations for the decline of the Beja pastoral economy and the progressive weakening of their livelihood system (Babiker and Pantuliano, 2006; UNDP, 2009). Similar policies were followed by the Sudanese government after independence; access to grazing land was restricted by the damming of the River Atbara for irrigation in the New Halfa agricultural scheme. Government policies have continued to undermine pastoralist livelihoods, which are seen as environmentally destructive and not economically viable. More generally, the Beja have been excluded from policy formulation and political power (Babiker and Pantuliano, 2006).

The struggle for greater devolution of power and more equitable sharing of resources, development and investment in the East intensified in the immediate aftermath of independence in 1956. The Beja Congress, an indigenous political movement, was established in October 1958 to further the political representation of the region's main ethnic group and address the longstanding marginalisation of the East (Babiker and Pantuliano, 2006; ICG, 2006). Failure to resolve historical grievances, exacerbated by land expropriation during the early 1990s, led to the militarisation of the Beja Congress in 1995. In February 2005 the Congress united with the Rashaida Free Lions and representatives of other small ethno-political groups belonging to the Shukriya and the Dabaina to create the Eastern Front.

The conflict with the central government finally ended with the Eastern Sudan Peace Agreement (ESPA), signed in October 2006. The ESPA's objectives included economic, cultural and social development, poverty eradication, investment and job creation. One of its central pillars was wealth sharing, with agreed principles for equitable and fair distribution of financial resources between the central government and the three eastern states (Red Sea, Gadarif and Kassala) (Yasin, 2008). However, without the political will to strengthen governance systems and promote transparency and accountability in planning, budgeting and policy implementation, translating the ESPA's objectives into concrete gains for the Beja remains difficult (UNDP, 2009). For example, under the ESPA the central government should have provided $100m as an initial payment into the Eastern Sudan Reconstruction and Development Fund (ESRDF) in 2007, and then $125m in the following years until 2011 (Yasin, 2008). By the end of 2009, however, less than 10% had actually been disbursed to the three states.

Decentralisation has yet to make significant progress and there has been little real devolution of competences and resources

(Babiker and Pantuliano, 2006). A number of key informants said that only around 10% of port revenues accrue to Red Sea State (see also Ahmed, 2009). Some investment has nonetheless taken place, including infrastructure projects such as roads and electricity in Port Sudan and other centres, the establishment of a state-funded Food for Education programme and the creation of 30 'model villages' in rural areas.[2] Starting in 2006, ten such settlements have been created in the Halaib, Sinkat and Durudeb localities of Red Sea State. The villages, consisting of prefabricated dwellings with access to basic services, are seen as yet another manifestation of the longstanding government policy to settle the nomadic Beja. Although the main objective of this initiative has been to cluster communities in order to facilitate the delivery of services such as health, education and veterinary care, the remote locations of the villages, far from grazing areas and with extremely limited access to alternative livelihood opportunities, have been among the key reasons behind the failure of this initiative to attract Beja in any significant numbers.

The head of Red Sea State is the *Wali* (Governor), who until this year was appointed by the President of the Republic.[3] In consultation with federal authorities the *Wali* appoints Commissioners for the different localities. Similarly, other governance bodies such as Popular Committees were until recently officially appointed by the authorities rather than democratically elected (Babiker and Pantuliano, 2006). Despite the adoption of a federal system in 1994, the political leadership of Red Sea State is controlled by the central government and is based on tribal affiliation rather than the genuine representation of group interests. In order to ensure tribal balance, the Red Sea State *Walis* have appointed a Hadendowa as Commissioner in Port Sudan, and a Beni Amer as Commissioner in Kassala.

While on paper the Interim Constitution approved after the signing of the CPA in 2005 sets out the provisions and legal underpinnings for popular participation in policy-making and for the democratic election of legislative bodies, in practice local communities continue to be excluded from policy- and decision-making processes at federal, state and local levels. For example, while the Red Sea State 5-Year Strategic Plan 2007–2011 should provide the overall strategic direction for government investment and expenditure, its implementation is hampered by budgetary constraints, lack of sufficient and timely disbursements and poor coordination and unclear divisions of roles and responsibilities across national, state and local levels of governance (UNDP, 2009). The lack of genuine devolution of power, resources and representation at the local level is also contributing to poor investment in services and infrastructure.

2 See http://www.sudanvisiondaily.com.
3 The first direct election of *Walis* took place in April 2010, alongside presidential elections in Sudan.

Chapter 4
Governance and leadership in Red Sea State and Port Sudan

4.1 State and locality administration

Since the mid-1970s, Red Sea State has undergone several changes in status – as a council, province, region and state. Until 1992 Red Sea was a Province within Eastern State, divided into seven Districts: Halaib, Rural Port Sudan, Sinkat, Haiya, Durudeb, North Tokar and South Tokar. The Province had a single Commissioner who reported to state ministries in Kassala, and each District had Rural and Urban Councils which reported to the Commissioner. Government administrative divisions changed in 1992 when a more decentralised administration was introduced. Eastern State was sub-divided into Red Sea, Kassala and Gedaref States, and Red Sea State was further divided into four Provinces: Halaib, Red Sea, Sinkat and Tokar. Each Province had its own Commissioner, to which Rural and Urban Councils reported.

Following the signing of the CPA in 2005, the Interim National Constitution established three levels of government: federal, state and local. To meet the demands of this new arrangement the four Provinces of Red Sea State were sub-divided into eight localities (Port Sudan, Sinkat, Halaib, Haya, Awlib and Gunub, Suakin, Agig and Tokar). A year later the eight localities became ten, with Halaib splitting into Halaib and Gebeit al Ma'adin, and Haya into Haya and Durudeb, in order to better reflect power-sharing arrangements between different tribal groups. Each locality is headed by a Commissioner who reports to the *Wali*. Internally, the localities should be divided into Administrative Units (AUs), each with an elected Legislative Council which in turn elects an executive body, but these are not yet operational. The AUs should exercise a wide range of responsibilities covering political, security, financial and socio-economic issues, including education, public health and public works. Although responsibility for delivering basic services such as education, health and water supplies has been decentralised, control of budget management remains largely at the state level.

In each AU, community matters are administered directly by the *lajna sha`biya* (Popular Committee), an elected body of around ten volunteers who normally serve a two-year term. The Popular Committees combine political and administrative roles. Their numerous responsibilities include monitoring and supervising the performance of service departments and external organisations operating within their boundaries, providing services and mobilising communities to accomplish specific self-help projects. They are also responsible for supporting the police in the enforcement of law and order in their neighbourhoods. The Popular Committees work closely with the localities, which use them to gather and disseminate information, collect fees and distribute rationed goods and *zakat* (Islamic alms) to the needy. The Committee head is appointed by the government and is thus usually a government supporter. This enables closer government control at community level. Popular Committee members also receive government training, including political orientation (Jaspars, 2010).

The Popular Committees were created when the Salvation Revolution government led by the National Islamic Front (NIF) rose to power in June 1989. The committees, known as 'Popular Committees for Salvation' or 'Salvation Committees', were formed in all of the residential areas of Port Sudan. In order to regain power, Beja tribal leaders were the first to claim seats in these newly formed political bodies. During the 1990s the Salvation Committees gained particular prominence in urban areas, where they oversaw the distribution of relief rations and the issuing of residence certificates. Popular Committees retain an important role, particularly in the illegal settlements on the fringes of Port Sudan. When IDPs or migrants occupy a plot of land, they create a Popular Committee as a means of gaining recognition for the settlement and to represent their interests with the authorities. In areas where IDPs have settled alongside indigenous groups, formal leadership is usually left to the locals; while IDPs are represented in Popular Committees, they manage their internal affairs separately. Nuba and Southern IDPs are usually represented by their Sultans, though they also elect courts and councils to resolve disputes and manage local issues.

4.2 The Native Administration system

In Eastern Sudan customary institutions have traditionally exercised considerable power over tribal affairs, and have played an important role in mediating conflict through customary arrangements known as *silif* (also known as *galad* – see below). However, over the last two decades the power and influence of the Native Administration seems to have been considerably weakened, particularly in urban areas.

Until the 1970s Native Administrators played an important role in urban areas, especially in Port Sudan, maintaining security and running social affairs, including the supervision of economic activities such as the organisation of port workers through the *kella* labour system (see Chapter 5). However, the restructuring of the Native Administration

system by Jaafar Nimeiri's regime in the early 1970s produced a new structure loyal to the central government. The failure of these new leaders to advance the interests of the Beja and advocate for policies conducive to their livelihoods has led to a steady decrease in their power and influence, particularly in urban areas. In Port Sudan and other urban centres in Red Sea State, the Native Administration appears to have lost its leadership to new, younger and urban educated elites whose authority is not based on tribal loyalty (Pantuliano, 2005). The new leaders have in the past been sympathetic to the cause of the Beja Congress and the Eastern Front, and have demanded greater involvement of local communities in power and resource sharing and in local decision-making processes.

4.3 The role of civil society

Active societal participation has always been part of the Beja's culture of mutual support centred around the rebuilding of the herd, the revitalisation of the pastoral economy and the resolution of conflicts over resources. The establishment of the Beja Club in 1950 and the Beja Education Fund in the mid-1950s marked the beginning of modern civil society in the Red Sea area. Both organisations were run by educated Beja and

depended exclusively on local contributions.[4] Meanwhile, tribal associations in Port Sudan provided assistance to new migrants and job seekers, supporting the education of students and overseeing other tribal affairs.

With the exception of the Sudanese Red Crescent (SRC), civil society organisations (CSOs) in the modern sense of the term were virtually unknown until the end of the 1990s. With the expansion of the work of INGOs in Red Sea State over the past two decades, however, their numbers have exploded; at present over 420 CBOs and NGOs are officially registered with the Humanitarian Aid Commission (HAC),[5] in addition to 24 cooperatives, 20 trade unions and professional associations and 18 cultural groups. Over two-thirds of these organisations are based in Port Sudan.

A number of factors appear to have led to the fast growth of CBOs in Port Sudan, including the acute need for services in both rural and urban areas, prompted by the deterioration of the pastoral economy, increased unemployment, rampant poverty and the inability of the government to provide adequate basic services; high (but misplaced) expectations of the CPA and the ESPA; government restrictions on international organisations, forcing them to work increasingly through local partners;

Table 1: CSOs: distribution by type of activity planned and implemented

Areas of Intervention	Activities planned		Activities implemented	
	No. of orgs.	%	No. of orgs.	%
Income generation/credit programmes	14	25.9	25	46.3
Education	20	37.0	23	42.6
Health	11	20.4	11	20.4
Training & capacity-building	10	18.5	13	20.1
Water	3	5.6	9	16.7
Awareness raising	11	20.3	7	14.0
Cultural activities	3	5.6	7	13.0
Environment & natural resource management	8	14.8	6	11.1
Other social services	3	5.6	5	9.3
Peace-building	2	3.7	5	9.2
Fishery development	4	7.4	3	5.6
Women's empowerment	7	13.0	2	3.7
Relief operations			2	3.7
Media	1	1.9	–	
Disaster prevention	1	1.9	–	
Other	15	27.8	13	24.1

Source: COWI, 2008: 18.

4 Trade unions of workers, farmers, professionals and students' associations started in Port Sudan during the 1950s as part of the liberation movement, but they became a particularly influential force in resisting military regimes during the 1960s and 1970s. They were dissolved by the Salvation regime in 1989 and re-established as close allies of the government.
5 In 2006 the HAC decided to transform all tribal associations into area-based CBOs, each representing one or more communities.

and the rise of ethnic politics, which has seen humanitarian assistance and development work become major tools in the competition for political power. The expulsion of 13 INGOs in March 2009 has increased the emphasis on working with CBOs and local NGOs.

A recent study on the capacity of local organisations in Red Sea State (COWI, 2008) concludes that:

- About 67% of CBOs in the state are concentrated in Port Sudan, and were formed or supported by INGOs. Most represent women or IDP groups in squatter areas and low-class residential zones.
- Urban CBOs focus on education, health, capacity-building, income generating activities (IGAs) and credit programmes (see Table 1).
- Most CBOs run very localised activities and interact more with their supporting INGOs than with other CBOs.

- Although over 25% of CBOs state that they are involved in networking, human rights, institution-building and fundraising, none appears to be effectively engaging in such activities.
- With few exceptions, the leaders of most rural CBOs reside in Port Sudan.
- Women's involvement in the leadership of CBOs is very limited and largely tokenistic.
- In the absence of their own resources and because of a lack of state support, CSOs/CBOs are dependent on INGOs. The departure of supporting agencies following the expulsions in 2009 has forced most urban CBOs to stop working.

State authorities exercise substantial control over civil society, and there are significant constraints on CSOs, CBOs and NGOs regarding activities related to democratic transformation, the empowerment of community groups, human rights, advocacy and education.

Chapter 5
The urban economy and livelihoods

Port Sudan was completed in 1909 with a total government expenditure (on the town and the harbour) of £914,320.[6] The port immediately attracted a large volume of trade, with the main imports being cotton goods, provisions, timber and cement. Exports included primary products such as gum Arabic, cotton, ivory, sesame, dhurra and goat skins, in addition to minerals and salt from Gebeit and Mohammed Qol.

Following the Second World War, the Sudanese economy expanded thanks to increased demand for its exports. During the 1960s the national government embarked on an ambitious development programme, further increasing the scale, variety and sources of trade passing through Port Sudan. The growth of the port and its economy continued until the early 1970s. In Port Sudan, government institutions and Sudanese and foreign firms invested in industrial, commercial and service activities, attracting job seekers and migrants from all over Sudan. Northern and Central Sudanese dominated managerial positions, skilled labour, clerical jobs and the trade sector, while the local Beja monopolised the loading and unloading business in the port.

The national economy began to decline in the late 1970s, partly as a result of the adoption of Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs). Agricultural exports declined and several publicly-owned industrial plants closed down. Outside Port Sudan, the Gebeit gold mines were closed and electricity and fuel shortages led to the shutting down of several factories. The job market in the town contracted. Economic problems worsened in the 1980s, and exports virtually stopped. Meanwhile, the combination of drought, famine, war and political instability led to a sharp decline in port activities and related services. Several factories and trading companies closed under the pressure of heavy taxation and energy shortages, or transferred their operations to Khartoum. The economic crisis was accompanied by the start of large-scale population displacement to Port Sudan following the drought and famine of the mid-1980s, causing a huge expansion in squatter settlements and exacerbating unemployment and humanitarian need.

After two decades of stagnation, oil extraction starting in the late 1990s led to a new period of rapid economic growth. A 1,500km pipeline linking Heglig in Southern Kordofan to Port Sudan was constructed in 1999. Today, the Port Sudan Sea Corporation, the Bashair 1 and 2 oil export ports, the Sudan Duty Free Zones and the Aryaab Gold Mines represent the backbone of the Red Sea State economy (UNDP, 2009). As discussed above, however, much of the port of Port Sudan as well as the Duty Free Zones are administered at federal level, and the bulk of revenues appear to remain with the centre. The town's population, especially the poor, have not profited from the boom because many companies employ Northern Sudanese or foreign workers, and invest in sectors that require skilled workers. Since the mechanisation of the port, core industries centring on the port system have faced severe cutbacks, prompting large-scale redundancies (UNDP, 2009). As discussed below, Beja dock labourers have been particularly affected and thousands have lost their jobs. The creation of the Bashair ports has also led to the displacement of some Beja communities and the confiscation of their agricultural and grazing lands by the government. The Aryaab Gold Mines appear to have caused some environmental damage and pollution (Abdel Ati, 2000).

Following the appointment of a new *Wali* in 2005, the Red Sea State government embarked on an urban renewal programme as part of a comprehensive strategic plan. The plan is giving priority to investment and tourism,[7] and so is primarily targeting areas close to the seafront. The plan may involve the relocation of people living in residential areas, especially in low-class quarters and public buildings close to the sea. The urban renewal programme has involved a reorganisation of the market, pushing some petty traders out to the peripheries of town where demand for their products is lower. In addition, many of the newly rich invest in property, pushing up rental prices for others.

5.1 Urban livelihoods

Port Sudan has always been attractive to migrants and displaced people because the job opportunities it offers tend to require little or no skills, such as loading and unloading in the port, the service sector (transport, catering businesses) or the informal sector. A general pattern in the distribution of the population across various occupations has developed over time. Commercial activities were, and remain, largely controlled by northern Sudanese, Egyptians, Indians, Syrians and Greeks; northern Sudanese also control jobs as senior civil servants, merchants and business managers (Pantuliano, 2002). The Beja, in contrast, are almost entirely dependent on manual jobs at the port. A small number have also traditionally run coffee shops, though the coffee shops that are springing up in the newly developed areas along the seafront are largely owned by non-Beja groups. Construction work is dominated by migrants from Southern Sudan and the Nuba Mountains, and the informal sector and petty trade are predominantly in the hands of migrants from Darfur and Hawsa. This has reinforced and consolidated the old pattern of settlement in the town (see below).

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6 British Foreign Office Report, Trade of Port Sudan for the Year 1906.

7 A road connecting Port Sudan with Egypt has also been completed.

For most migrants and IDPs (including those from the South and East) work opportunities are limited due to a lack of appropriate education and skills. The Beja in particular suffer from lack of education. Work in the informal sector mostly involves wage labour and petty trading. A survey conducted in Red Sea State in 1998–99 revealed that over 70% of those employed were casual workers or in the informal sector (Abdel Ati, 1999). Petty trade in the informal sector employed about 20% of the working population, while skilled workers and those in public sector and professional jobs constituted only about 9% (14% of heads of surveyed households) (Abdel Ati, 1999). Average monthly income for the surveyed households in Port Sudan in 1999 was 13,841 Sudanese Dinars (equivalent to SDG 138 now, or $57), well below the estimated average household's subsistence requirements. Income levels varied hugely within the surveyed population. Those working in the informal sector have no security of tenure, no way of ensuring payment and no government body to turn to if mistreated.

Pantuliano (2002) describes in more detail the livelihoods of Beja from Halaib in Port Sudan. When they first came to Port Sudan in the 1950s, the Beja worked almost exclusively as casual stevedores in the port (mainly Amar'ar/Atmaan). By 2000, economic life in Port Sudan was still centred largely around the port system, providing both daily wage labour and permanent work. Since 1951, stevedoring jobs have been based on the *kella* system (gangs of workers affiliated by kinship ties, each with their leaders or *rais*). The job system within the gang is hereditary. Work depends on the daily requests of the shipping companies and is assigned to the *kellas* on a rotating basis. This system also serves as a safety net for new arrivals in the town. Although officially only 14 registered workers are supposed to work in a *kella*, non-registered *diwab* (lineage) members are often allocated work because they are in need of cash. As such, this provides an important link between urban and rural populations (Pantuliano, 2002).

Work opportunities through the *kella* system have declined dramatically since the modernisation of the port, which has led to a staggering 32,000 redundancies (UNDP, 2009). A fall in imports has also contributed to a reduction in the availability of work. Beja dockworkers interviewed for this study complained that, since 2000, they have only been able to get one shift per month. In parallel with dwindling job opportunities, competition in the labour market has risen sharply. The weakening of the pastoral economy and growing vulnerability in rural areas of Red Sea State have pushed an increasing number of Beja into Port Sudan. The large influx of IDPs from Darfur, the Nuba Mountains and Southern Sudan into Port Sudan over the last two decades has put further strain on the job market in the city.

The Beja are engaged in a large number of secondary activities, from animal rearing and charcoal selling to water vending, portering, milk selling, coffee making and hairdressing (Pantuliano, 2002). Most supplement their income with seasonal cultivation, investment and business revenues, internal transfers and remittances, asset sales and indoor/home activities (Abdel Ati, 1999). Most households also reduce consumption to make ends meet, and many have had to move to cheaper residences. Fieldwork for this study showed that those living in Baghdad *deim*, the largest squatter settlement in Port Sudan, ate only two meals a day.

Many Beja keep some livestock in town, or with relatives in their areas of origin. Most still describe themselves as pastoralists even if they do not own livestock. Pantuliano (2002) identified three types of 'town pastoralists': those who work in town with the aim of making enough money to regain a pastoral livelihood; those for whom livestock-keeping is one amongst many, mainly urban, livelihood activities; and those for whom engagement in the urban economy represents livelihood diversification, whilst herds are maintained at home. Most Beja migrants retain some links with rural areas, with weaker ties among those born in town and those who have developed successful urban careers. The strongest links are with young men who come to town only temporarily. For others, links range from short social visits to sustained economic interaction (e.g. selling livestock or other rural goods on behalf of kin or looking after livestock in rural areas). Such urban–rural links are supported through a range of institutions and associations, including the Beja Club, the Dabayawa Club, the Beja Area Students Association, the Beja Women's Society and the Taqadumm Community Development Centre, which function as meeting places for urban and rural Beja and offer support to newcomers to town (Pantuliano, 2002).

As explained above, the poorest have not benefited from the urban renewal programme implemented since 2006, which has been almost exclusively focused on investments to spur tourism rather than on genuine efforts – both at policy and practice levels – to develop the poorest neighbourhoods of the city and facilitate access to the labour market for the poor. Most of the new job opportunities that have opened up in Port Sudan require skills that are not commanded by the local poor. For unskilled migrants and IDPs, employment remains limited to lowly paid and marginal activities. Many are forced into illegal or criminal activities, such as prostitution and alcohol selling. The poorest have little access to credit as they do not have collateral such as land or livestock.

The main economic activities in the nine *deims* surveyed in this study are shown in Table 2.

Table 2: Economic activities for populations in different *deims*

Residential quarter	Ethnic groups	Main economic activities
Atbay	Beja (mainly Hadendowa)	Wage labour/handicrafts
Baghdad (Port Sudan's largest squatter settlement)	Mixed: Darfurians, Beni Amer, Beja, Nuba and Southerners	Wage labour/handicrafts. High levels of prostitution
Ungwab (Al Aman)	Beja (mainly Hadendowa); some Darfurians	Wage labour – mainly in port, construction/handicrafts Links with rural areas Darfuri working as cooks in local restaurants, tea selling Also in feed lots for livestock exports
Philip	Nuba and Southerners	Wage labour – builders, mechanics, domestic servants, petty trade/handicrafts. Women sell alcohol
Dar Al Salaam	Fallata and Hausa, Beja, Beni Amer, North Sudanese	Wage labour/handicrafts
Al Qadisya	Beni Amer	Wage labour – water selling/handicrafts
Deim Sawakin	Fallata and Hausa	Wage labour – traders, merchants, traditional healing
Transit	Northern Sudanese	Wage labour/business/trade, government employees Petroleum companies
Deim Madina	Northern Sudanese, educated Beja	Wage labour/business – currency exchange (with Gulf States), wholesale trade (camels), tourism, government employees

Chapter 6
Land and urban settlement patterns

6.1 Changes in the population composition of Port Sudan

Port Sudan falls within the tribal *dar* of the Atman, who claim ownership of the land and compensation for any major development project (e.g. the ports). However, according to the 1925 Land Ordinance and the 1970 Unregistered Land Act, all unregistered lands belong to the state.[8]

Port Sudan is one of the few towns in Sudan designed and planned from the beginning. The British authorities built the town in a semicircle layout stretching from the harbour to the centre and expanding westwards. The city was divided into four residential areas, drawn up along strict ethnic and occupational lines (Forman, 1992; Pantuliano, 2000):

- First-class area (city centre or *Wasat el Madina*): the inner zone, closest to the sea, inhabited by the British authorities. It comprised government offices, public buildings and the market area and had excellent services (e.g. water and electricity supplies and broad tarmac roads), a spacious layout, solid and expensive buildings and a small park.
- Second-class area (*Hay El Agareeg*): inhabited by foreign merchants (Indians, Greeks, Turks, Egyptians), it also benefited from good infrastructure and a supply of water and electricity.
- Third-class area (*Hay Al Asama* and *Deim Madina*): designed for senior Sudanese civil servants originally from Northern Sudan, and rich Sudanese merchants. Plots of land were smaller than those in zone 1 and 2 (300m²), only the front building facades were made from permanent materials, few roads were paved and water and electricity connections were rare.
- Fourth-class, the Native Lodging Areas: this accommodated all other urban dwellers, the majority of whom were casual labourers working in the port and on the railway, mainly of Sudanese, Yemeni and West African origin. Living conditions in these areas were generally precarious, plots were small (100m²), residents had no title to land and houses were built of disposable materials such as sacking, wood and flattened tin. No water and electricity connections were available and water was supplied by sellers on donkey carts. Some of the original *deims* dating back to the city's earliest days were Deim Abu Hashish, which housed dockers from Northern Sudan; Deim Jabir, inhabited by casual workers of West African origin; Deim Yemen, where Yemeni labourers resided; and Deim Al Arab, the enclave of Beja dockers.

8 Registered land in Sudan is limited to the riverine areas in the northern region and up to Gezira State. Residential plots are allotted on long-term leases and the state maintains the right to confiscate land for public use.

The four-zone classification was amended by the Town Planning Section of the Department of Civil Affairs in 1957, although it continues to inform the physical and social appearance of Port Sudan. Planning of new areas as well as the upgrading of old unofficial ones has taken place continuously since the 1960s (Pantuliano, 2000).

What has been peculiar to Port Sudan, unlike other towns, is that the fourth-class residential areas were officially and intentionally planned purely on ethnic and/or occupational lines. This was done under the pretext of reducing tensions and possible conflict between tribal groups moving to the town, though the main aim was to secure the supply of manual labour for the port. Studies by Gutbi (1991) and Orabi (2005), as well as the present study, all confirm that the pattern of settlement along occupational lines has in the last two to three decades been replaced by settlement along tribal/ethnic lines, especially in the low-class and squatter settlements. This is partly because of the strong rural–urban interface in Red Sea State, where temporary rural-to-urban migration has long been a key strategy used by Beja pastoralists to mitigate the problems caused by rainfall variability (Abdel Ati, 1999). For the Beja this has also to do with the traditional governance system, as the tribal *majlis* (council) is usually held where the leaders reside.

Over the years the phenomenon of ethnic clustering, started by the British authorities as a means to control and organise the labour force, has become a way to preserve tribal identity. The trend was reinforced by the rise of ethnic politics in Sudan during the 1990s. Ethnic clustering was originally encouraged by the municipality: a maximum of 48 households could be given the right to adjacent plots in planned settlements (Gutbi, 1991). Today the phenomenon of ethnic clustering is particularly prevalent amongst groups of pastoral origin, both as a means of security and an entry point to city life. Despite efforts to modernise Port Sudan, the central Deim Al Arab area maintains a strongly rural character and an exclusive Beja identity. Many Amara'ar and Hadendowa who were originally based in Deim Al Arab have expanded into Hay Al Tagadum, Al Wihda and Ungwab, adjacent to Deim Al Arab, creating a large ethnic cluster in the heart of the city.

Modest changes to this practice can be observed in increasing number of *deims* of mixed ethnicity. While the majority of the population in Ungwab are Beja, with more than 5,200 Hadendowa and Amara'ar/Atman families living there, around 1,750 families from West Darfur and North Kordofan have also taken up residence (study data). In 1991, most Beni Amer were clustered in Dar el Naim, Dar Al Salaam and Walli (Gutbi, 1991). Since 2000, Beni Amer are also found in Umm Al Qura, Shager

and Al Qadisya (Abdel Ati, 2000). Al Qadisya is a replanned third-class area housing approximately 1,000 Beni Amer IDPs displaced by conflict in South Tokar in 1997 (study data).

While Beja IDPs are heavily concentrated in the northern and central parts of town, IDPs from Western and Southern Sudan are generally clustered in southern and south-western areas, in both planned and unplanned zones. Nuba IDPs from Southern Kordofan constitute the largest single ethnic group among the displaced in Port Sudan. They were relocated to the southern part of the town after conflict with the Beni Amir in 1986. Nuba and Southerners have traditionally settled in Habila, Al Inghaz and Al Sadaqa residential quarters (Gutbi, 1991). Today, Nuba and Southern IDPs are also found in Deim Philip, Dar Al Salaam and, in small numbers, in Al Qadisya (study data).

Hawsa and Fallata, who lived predominantly in Jaber and Hay Al Shagra in the southern part of town in the 1980s (Gutbi, 1991), are also found in Sawakin and Dar Al Salaam (study data). The spatial distribution of Eritrean and Ethiopian refugees has also changed over the years. Whilst by 1983 they were mainly concentrated in Asoteriba camp (Forman, 1992; Schultz and Schultz, 1983), today refugees are found scattered in several *deims* including Dar Al Salaam, Sawakin, Quria and Elnour (study data). Two of the newest and largest irregular settlements in Port Sudan are Baghdad and Atbay, which were both established in the early 1990s, and together are estimated to house a population of over 13,000 (study data). Residents of Baghdad are of mixed origin, and include Darfurians, Beja, Nuba and Southerners.

Even when a *deim* is not dominated by a single tribe, there tends to be a heavy concentration of a particular ethnic group. This pattern of settlement amongst the lower classes appears to have contributed to the rural character of most residential areas, and has reduced interaction between indigenous groups and other segments of the population. The few middle- and upper-class residential areas in Port Sudan display greater heterogeneity.

6.2 Patterns of urban growth

Since the 1980s the growth of Port Sudan has been driven by unplanned settlements much more than by urban planning and allocations of residential plots. The physical barriers of the Red Sea to the east and the mountains to the west have forced the north–south expansion of the city. Although since 1989 urban planners have envisaged that all settlements in the city would be planned and that no squatter settlements would be allowed, the authorities have been unable to keep pace with rapidly escalating housing demand (Gutbi, 1991). According to Forman (1992), 40% of Port Sudan's population lived in irregular unclassified areas in 1992, but by 1996 this number had risen to an estimated 60% (Pantuliano, 2000). Unfortunately, the study was unable to collect sufficient data to arrive at a reliable estimate of the percentage of the urban population living in informal areas today.

When IDPs and migrants arrive in Port Sudan, they join their fellow tribesmen if they arrive as families or in small groups, or establish their own irregular settlement if they come in larger groups. Once people have lived in a new settlement for a year or so they usually elect a Popular Committee to represent them and ensure recognition of the settlement by the authorities. Popular Committees transmit a request for replanning of the area so that basic services can be provided. The replanning process involves the registration of the population, undertaking a survey of the area and drawing maps, the allotment of plots (200–300m²) on a lease basis, construction of roads and the allocation of open spaces for the establishment of services such as school buildings and health clinics.

Until the settlements are recognised by the authorities, occupants have no title to land and are at risk of eviction. If the land is already allotted (as in the case of Baghdad), whether to private owners or government authorities, occupants are given a short eviction notice, usually one month. If people settle in an unplanned area they are given longer notice, usually three to six months. Relocated communities are often moved to unplanned areas on the outskirts of the city (e.g. Laloba), with extremely poor services and livelihood opportunities. These communities have attracted the attention of NGOs including Oxfam GB and Save the Children UK, but their work was curtailed when they were expelled in 2009.

Chapter 7
Infrastructure, services and the environment

The findings from this study indicate that, with the exception of a limited number of urban dwellers in the better-off residential areas, the great majority of Port Sudan's people live in abject poverty, with very poor and in some cases non-existent basic services and infrastructure. Our field visits in the poorest *deims* revealed appalling living conditions. Many live in poorly ventilated, overcrowded, squalid shacks made of straw mats, sacks and flattened tin cans, with no sanitation. Many families are so poor that they cannot afford mattresses and are forced to sleep on the bare floor. In addition to fewer income-earning opportunities, migrants living in illegal settlements face higher living costs and pay more for basic services. This section presents an account of the current level of basic services in Port Sudan.

7.1 Education

While it is difficult to obtain an exact estimate, the findings of this study indicate that only a very small number of children from poor families living in unplanned areas of Port Sudan attend primary school. Primary schools are mostly found in the planned areas of the city. A general reluctance to build permanent school buildings in squatter settlements has been mainly attributed to the likelihood of eviction and the consequent need to move school structures (Forman, 1992). Among the *deims* that were the focus of this study, Baghdad is the only one without a school. Interviews and FGDs with communities in Baghdad *deim* revealed that, in order to attend school, children are forced to travel, either on foot or by bus, to nearby neighbourhoods such as Al Nur and Al Qadisya. For many households the SDG 1 ($0.42) return bus fare to reach the nearest school is a very expensive and often unaffordable cost and represents a significant obstacle to enrolment and retention in schools. Respondents in Baghdad added that, while some children can walk to the nearest school, many are weakened by hunger and cannot walk the distance. Children have reportedly fainted on the way to school because of malnutrition; these children inevitably drop out as parents cannot afford to pay the daily bus fare. A recent baseline study found that children from the poorest *deims* usually drop out of school at grade 3 or grade 7 (Save the Children UK, 2008). The same study noted that many children enrolled in school left before the end of classes in order to work, and many had to work during school holidays.

While primary schooling should be free, additional expenses include building and classroom maintenance, water supplies and extra-curricular classes, which are covered by a monthly fee per pupil. Public primary schools are supported and administered by parents' associations, which also decide on the level of these monthly fees. In the poorest *deims*, the fees are lower than in better-off deims. In Deim Philip, for example, monthly school fees are on average SDG 10 ($4.27) per month per pupil, while in Deim Madina they are SDG 50 ($21.37). Communities also complained that, in the poorest neighbourhoods, the lack of good teachers was a problem as good ones preferred to work in better-off areas where they could earn higher salaries thanks to the incentives paid by pupils' families. In Deim Philip the parents' association told us that it had recently increased the monthly school fee in the hope of attracting better-qualified teachers.

Babiker and Pantuliano (2006) note that, while Beja communities wish to use *TuBedawye* as a language and a form of cultural expression, they prefer Arabic as a means of instruction as they believe that it would allow them to overcome some of the historical isolation of Beja communities and increase access to economic opportunities. Many interviewees however felt that not using *TuBedawye* during the first years of primary school puts Beja children at a disadvantage as against children of Arab origin, and is one of the key reasons for high drop-out rates amongst the Beja (*ibid.*).

Most refugee children have access to primary and secondary education at a school established by Eritrean refugees (Haroun and Ismail, 2010). There is also a school at the Ethiopian Club located in Transit *deim*, which is attended by over 70 students (UNHCR, 2010). Refugees pay the same fees as Sudanese (*ibid.*).

7.2 Health

Health services have long been unable to meet the needs of the rapidly expanding population of Port Sudan (Forman, 1992). Today the best health facilities are found in Deim Madina and Transit. As Table 3 shows, in the poorest planned *deims* such as Baghdad and Atbay there are no health facilities. Very limited external support is available; one notable exception is MSF, which offers reproductive healthcare in Taqaddum Hospital in Deim Al Arab.

In April 2010, the World Health Organisation (WHO) reported an outbreak of dengue fever in Port Sudan: over 2,100 cases were logged, with nine deaths. WHO, in collaboration with the State Ministry of Health, has been working to control the outbreak, strengthen the surveillance system and boost health education (UN RSCO, 2010).

Table 3: Health centres and primary healthcare units in the *deims* surveyed

Deim	Health centre	Primary healthcare unit
Atbay	No	No
Baghdad	No	No
Ungwab (Al Aman)	Yes	Yes
Philip	Yes	No
Dar Al Salaam	Yes	No
Al Qadisya	No	No
Sawakin	Yes	Yes
Transit	Yes	Yes
Deim Madina	Yes	Yes

Source: Study data.

Lack of access to health and other basic services, overcrowding and poor sanitation are among the main causes of health problems in the poorest *deims*. Nutritional surveys conducted in Red Sea State have generally included both urban and rural populations, so it is difficult to get an accurate, detailed picture. There does not appear to be a consistent approach, although in general the focus seems to be on rural populations. When urban populations are included, Port Sudan tends to display much lower rates of acute malnutrition. For example, in 1997 the prevalence of acute malnutrition was 6.6% in Port Sudan and 21.3% in rural Red Sea State (<80% WFH) (MoH/Oxfam, 1997). In 2006, a separate survey conducted in each Red Sea State locality found 19.7% prevalence of acute malnutrition in Port Sudan locality. However, the findings are discussed specifically in relation to the rural population of Port Sudan locality and the methods do not specify whether the urban population was included (MoH/UNICEF/Oxfam, 2006). In 2009, a Ministry of Health (MoH)/UNICEF survey reported that Port Sudan locality had a prevalence of acute malnutrition of 5.4% (<2 Z-scores). The average acute malnutrition rate for Red Sea State at that time was 17.7% (MoH/UNICEF, 2009).

There could be several explanations why the prevalence of malnutrition in Port Sudan is lower than in the rest of Red Sea State. Despite the appalling conditions in many of the unplanned and squatter settlements in the town, people are still closer to health centres than in rural areas, and there are opportunities to find work, albeit marginal and low-paid. Rural populations, particularly in remote areas, have very limited access to health and other services; for those who have lost most of their livestock life is extremely difficult and often just within survival thresholds. This is particularly the case with women and children left behind when the male head of the household leaves to find work in the town. In many cases these families are abandoned if the man cannot find work or earn sufficient income to send something home. These issues will need further investigation.

While no data is currently available on HIV prevalence in Port Sudan, risky sexual behaviour together with acute levels of deprivation, marginalisation and lack of access to basic health and other services, particularly in squatter areas and among IDPs and refugees, mean that the risk of HIV/AIDS infection is extremely high (Lake and Wood, 2004; IRIN, 2008). Moreover, high levels of mobility and the geographical proximity of Eastern Sudan to Eritrea and Ethiopia, where the HIV infection rate is thought to be about twice that of Sudan, significantly exacerbate the risk of infection and spread (IRIN, 2008). Kassala and Port Sudan are major transport hubs of goods and people, as they are located on the busy roads that connect the Red Sea coast with Khartoum. An estimated 50,000 people, including a large number of truck drivers, travel along the Khartoum–Port Sudan road every day (Lake and Wood, 2004). Several people told us that truck drivers frequently visit sex workers, putting them at particularly high risk of HIV infection. The experience of HIV transmission patterns in other countries is that infection tends to spread first among high-risk groups, and then from them to the rest of the population. As discussed below, work aimed at preventing the spread of the disease is ongoing, and HIV/AIDS awareness-raising has been included in a number of NGO interventions in Port Sudan.

Table 4: Main diseases in the surveyed *deims*

Deim	TB	Malaria	Anaemia	Pregnancy-related illnesses	Waterborne diseases
Atbay	✔	✔	✔	✔	✔
Baghdad	✔	✔	✔	✔	✔
Ungwab (Al Aman)	✔	✔	✔	✔	✔
Philip	✔	✔	–	✔	✔
Dar Al Salaam	✔	✔	–	✔	✔
Al Qadisya	✔	✔	✔	✔	✔
Deim Sawakin	–	✔	–	✔	✔
Transit	–	–	–	–	–
Deim Madina	–	–	–	–	–

Source: Study data.

Tuberculosis remains a widespread and acute public health hazard. Beyond case detection and treatment, one of the most effective interventions is to prevent HIV infection in people already infected with tuberculosis. This reduces the likelihood that latent tuberculosis will progress to its active form (WFP, 2007). Strong collaboration and coordination between HIV and TB control programmes is crucial to ensure more comprehensive and effective care and prevention (*ibid*.).

7.3 Water and sanitation

Khor Arbaat aquifer, located 30km north-west of the city, is one of Port Sudan's two main sources of water (RSPOC, 2007, in Ahmed, 2009; UNDP, 2009). From Khor Arbaat water is pumped into a reservoir from where it is distributed through a piped network serving Class 1 and 2 residential areas (just a quarter of the city) (RSPOC, 2007, in Ahmed, 2009). The network is very inefficient. Corrosion and scaling of the pipes as a result of water hardness and high silt content mean that an estimated 40% of water is lost in transit, while poor cleaning and disinfection of the system carry high risks of water contamination (*ibid*.). Two desalination plants constitute Port Sudan's other source of water. However, desalination is costly, irregular and suffers from continuous breakdowns because of electricity cuts and pump maintenance. Depletion of the Khor Arbaat aquifer has accelerated over the past ten years as a result of increasingly high demand for water driven by the rapid growth of the city, together with scarce rainfall because of frequent droughts (*ibid*.). Taken together, Khor Arbaat and Port Sudan's desalinisation facilities produce 65,000m^3 of water a day, far short of the the city's estimated needs 200,000m^3 (UNDP, 2009).

Communities and key informants cited water shortages as the most pressing concern for poor urban residents. Irregular settlements and replanned areas are not served by the pipe network and rely on tanked water and water sellers on donkey carts. A survey conducted in 2000 in *deims* with a high concentration of IDPs showed that water was the most expensive item for these families (Abdel Ati, 2000). Interviews conducted for this study in Al Qadisya indicated that the cost of one 20-litre jerry can of water purchased from water vendors was on average SDG 1 ($0.42). During the summer months, however, the price rises to SDG 2–3 ($0.85–$1.28). Given that a household of five needs two to three jerry cans a day for drinking and washing, monthly expenses for water during the summer in the poorest *deims* of the city can be SDG 200–300 ($85–$128). However, in the better-off *deims*, where water is supplied through the pipe system, the cost is significantly lower. Interviews in Deim Madina and Transit indicated that families only paid a monthly connection fee of SDG 20.

Sanitation is another problem in the poorest *deims*. Open defecation is standard practice in unplanned settlements (and in some planned ones as well). This is a long-standing health hazard. In 1983, it was observed that only a very small number of households in Dar Al Salaam had latrines, and that 'streams of urine and waste [were] blocking the narrow passes between the yards' (Schulz and Schulz, 1983: 46). Poor sanitation is also a function of cultural practice: the Beja believe that latrines are inhabited by evil spirits known as *jinn* (Arabic) or *winay* (*TuBedawye*). Despite the fact that the large majority of the Beja are Muslim, old animistic beliefs in spirits and other divinities are common. These spirits are believed to be organised into the same segmentary lineage structure as the

Figure 2: Water costs and income levels in selected *deims*

Source: Abdel Ati, 2000.

Beja themselves, and are thought to be present in 'marginal places' (Palmisano, 1991: 67, quoted in Pantuliano, 2000) like graveyards, old house courtyards, empty or decrepit homes, walls and toilets. The Bejas' refusal to use latrines (especially women, who think that *jinns* will make them barren) has in the past prompted specific development programmes (e.g. by Save the Children UK in El Wihda) designed to educate people on the use of toilet facilities, but these have generally had little success (Pantuliano, 2000).

Sanitation problems are also caused by inadequate solid waste management. Dumping is widespread throughout the city. In Baghdad *deim*, for instance, garbage is thrown into the streets, providing a breeding ground for mosquitoes and flies. It is estimated that 5km² of land in Port Sudan is covered with a layer of mixed waste up to 1m thick (UNEP, 2005). The largest uncontrolled waste disposal site is approximately six kilometres from the city centre. Dumped waste includes clinical waste (syringes, catheters, blood packs, drugs and bandages), plastics and paper, abattoir and food waste and septic tank solids and liquids. Dogs, goats, cattle and camels, as well as crows, kites and vultures, feed on the waste. Waste is burned and recycled by a resident group of waste pickers, IDPs originally from Kordofan who live in dire conditions on-site (UNEP, 2005).

Chapter 8
The social consequences of urbanisation and urban vulnerability

Despite the significant revenues generated by the port and large-scale agriculture projects in rural areas, Red Sea State has long suffered from acute levels of vulnerability and poverty (UNDP, 2009). The large influx of IDPs, refugees and migrants during the 1980s and the decline of urban livelihood opportunities have put significant pressure on the wellbeing of residents of Port Sudan. A survey in 1999 found that over 55% of Port Sudan's population was affected by urban poverty, with children dropping out of school and households experiencing a fall in their social status (Abdel Ati, 1999). People in the poorest neighbourhoods continue to suffer from widespread vulnerabilities. The great majority of communities interviewed for this study live in abject poverty, and are confronted with a range of threats and risks that significantly threaten their wellbeing.

8.1 Risky livelihood strategies in Port Sudan

In Port Sudan food insecurity, lack of services such as education and healthcare and high rates of unemployment, particularly among young people and IDPs, have forced the poorest and most vulnerable to resort to risky and illegal activities to make ends meet (Schulz and Schulz, 1983; Pantuliano, 2005; UNDP, 2009). Displaced Nuba women in Port Sudan illegally process and sell alcohol (Baldo et al., 1995; Forman, 1992). Interviews with Southern and Nuba women in Philip and Umm al Qura *deims* indicated that brewing and selling alcohol from their houses is still the main source of income for many families, particularly female-headed households. Many women have been imprisoned for illegal brewing. For a first offence they are usually jailed for between three and six months. If caught a second time they face up to one year in prison. Children up to two years old are allowed to stay with their mothers in jail, while older children are usually looked after by relatives.

Commercial sex work has long been a source of livelihood for refugee women across Port Sudan. During the 1980s Port Sudan was home to an estimated 8,000 commercial sex workers, more than 90% of them of Eritrean or Ethiopian origin (Rogge, 1985). The findings of our study indicate that acute levels of deprivation and unemployment are increasingly pushing not only refugee women, but also other female urban dwellers, into commercial sex work. In Philip, Umm al Qura and Baghdad *deims* respondents told us that, while commercial sex workers were mainly found amongst IDP women from Darfur and Southern Sudan, a number of Beja and Nuba IDP women had been forced into sexually

exploitative situations. Interviews in Al Qadisya revealed that women engaged in sex work preferred to see their clients elsewhere in the city, rather than in their *deim*.

In Baghdad *deim* respondents noted that the lack of livelihood opportunities has forced men to abandon their families as they are no longer able to provide for them. Their wives are left to fend for themselves and their children. Women who lose or become separated from their husbands come under a huge amount of financial pressure and are highly likely to resort to sex work to earn a living, or be subject to exploitative labour conditions. Respondents said that women earned between SDG 3 and 4 ($1.28 to $1.70) per sexual encounter. Entering casual sexual relationships in return for money and other forms of financial support appears to be an increasing trend among female university students, to cover tuition fees and other expenses.

8.2 Changes in women's roles

Over the years the process of urbanisation has prompted some changes in the role of women, both at household and community levels. Women have been increasingly exposed to new economic and cultural opportunities, and some have started to work outside their household (Pantuliano, 2000). A 2000 study noted that most of the migrants' wives interviewed in Port Sudan found life in the city much more enjoyable than in their areas of origin and argued that their workload had fallen since moving to the town, even among those who had started to work outside the household (*ibid.*). Beja women interviewed for the same study noted that they enjoyed more freedom in the city than in their areas of origin, and that more education opportunities were available to them and their children (*ibid.*). Women interviewed for this study also told us that their role had changed and that they were increasingly involved in livelihood activities. For example, Beja women in Ungwab told us that, in the 1980s, it was unthinkable for Beja women even to go to the market, let alone engage in any productive activity outside the household, whereas today an increasing number are working as cleaners, nurses, midwives and teachers. Some are involved in activities not traditionally associated with women, including road construction and maintenance.

A number of key informants interviewed for this study noted that, among Beja tribes, the Hadendowa have remained the most conservative. Despite living in Port Sudan for decades, they are often reluctant to adjust their traditional social and

cultural norms to the urban lifestyle. The fact that Hadendowa communities usually oppose women's participation in productive livelihood activities outside the home has been widely cited as a key driver of urban vulnerability and food insecurity at household level (Abdel Ati, 1999).

8.3 Changes in social institutions

The lives of the Beja in rural areas have always been regulated by customary law (*silif*), and lineage (*diwab*) membership has long underpinned the management of water resources and grazing land. Such customary arrangements have also been replicated in urban contexts. For example, residential dwellings in Port Sudan follow *diwab*-based arrangements, and *silif* still controls the economic and social relations of urban Beja (Pantuliano, 2002). However, it is increasingly clear that these arrangements have undergone profound changes over the decades to adapt to urban conditions. For example, customary arrangements such as gifts of livestock (*tait*) or livestock loans to poorer households (*yahamot*) no longer make sense in the urban context, where livestock holdings are very limited. In Port Sudan these arrangements have been replaced by different forms of loans such as a *kella* shift at the port and financial support to rural relatives when they come to the city (*ibid*.). Economic support is also given through *silif* to the poorest members of the community, though this aspect of *silif* is being increasingly challenged in Port Sudan, where economic conditions among many Beja groups are poor and people find it difficult to share any part of their meagre and irregular income with other members of the *diwab*.

Whilst the economic dimensions of *silif* have been undermined, cultural dimensions remain strong. People still make remarkable efforts to contribute money to celebrate weddings, births and funerals whenever related households are involved, especially if they belong to the same *diwab*. These social occasions appear to have assumed greater significance for migrants in Port Sudan than for people in rural areas, since they constitute a means of cohesion and unity for the Beja in the town. Some of these occasions are said to transcend political and sub-tribal divisions amongst the Beja (Pantuliano, forthcoming).

The attachment to *silif* values does not seem to differ on the basis of age or gender, nor does it appear to be affected by long-term residence in urban centres, although elders complain that moral rules are no longer being strictly observed by younger generations. For all groups it is evident that, even if it has become difficult to fulfill economic obligations and political stances differ, the *silif* system has not lost importance altogether. Rather, it seems that its cultural dimension has been emphasised and *silif* has assumed a specific role in defining the identity of the Beja in the urban milieu, where their weak economic position makes them feel marginalised by other groups (Pantuliano, forthcoming).

Chapter 9
External assistance in Red Sea State and Port Sudan

The earliest international engagement in eastern Sudan coincided with the response to the Eritrean and Ethiopian refugee influx in the 1970s, when an estimated 120,000 people crossed the border and settled in Red Sea State (Forman, 1992). The famine that struck Sudan and other countries in the Horn of Africa during the mid-1980s prompted a major relief operation in Darfur, Kordofan and Red Sea State. Food insecurity escalated in 1984, but aid agencies and the government were slow to respond in Red Sea State, despite the fact that relief convoys destined for western Sudan passed by famished Beja migrants camped along the roadside (Cutler, 1986).

By 1985, over 25 international relief agencies were operating in Red Sea State. WFP and Oxfam GB were key actors: WFP distributed food rations and Oxfam undertook needs assessments and monitored food aid distributions (Vaux, 1991). In 1986 a decision was taken to exclude towns from the food aid programme (Darcy, 1991) in an effort to discourage migration from rural areas. The food aid operation became 'food for recovery', whereby food aid was intended to allow herds to recover. Although food distributions finally ended in 1989, the drought that hit Red Sea State in 1990 prompted another international relief operation. Relief operations have in fact continued on a regular basis since then, and have constituted the main form of assistance to people in Red Sea State (Pantuliano, 2007).

By the late 1990s agencies had started to take more developmental approaches. For example, Oxfam established CBOs and Village Development Committees. Community development projects have included micro-credit, agriculture and livestock development, women's education, vocational training, income generation and HIV/AIDS awareness. In 2003 Oxfam began a 12-year pastoral development programme covering water, markets, livestock, health and education, and in 2005 the agency successfully piloted a cash for work programme in Tokar (Bush and Abdel Ati, 2007). An integrated livelihood and food security programme began in 2008 but was halted when Oxfam was expelled in 2009 (ACORD, 2010).

Actions to influence policy or strengthen governance in Port Sudan and more broadly in Red Sea State have been limited despite work by Oxfam, ACORD and others to strengthen civil society and empower the Beja by facilitating informal links between community organisations and the government.

DANIDA supported a three-year programme called 'Poverty Alleviation-Oriented Governance Program for the Red Sea State' in 2005–2008, involving UNDP, government ministries and local partners. The programme had two components: the provision of technical assistance and training to state authorities, and building the capacities of non-state actors – civil society, the private sector, CBOs and local communities – to influence legislative and policy reform and play a role in the implementation of local development interventions (Pantuliano and O'Callaghan, 2006). By 2010, the UNDP programme still did not include Port Sudan.

Programmes focusing on Port Sudan have been extremely limited. Oxfam's urban programme targeted IDPs from Nuba and the South, including establishing Women's Development Associations (WDAs) to strengthen poor women's capacities through health and education services, revolving funds, business support and training. An evaluation of the programme in 2009 concluded that it had succeeded in increasing women's income, improving their skills and raising living standards (Nur, 2009). The expulsion of Oxfam and other international agencies, including SC-UK, IRC and MSF-France, has had a significant impact on programmes in Port Sudan, as Oxfam and IRC were supporting 25 CBOs, most of them in Port Sudan. SOS Sahel took over some of Oxfam's projects in rural areas, and ACORD, one of the few international agencies remaining in Port Sudan, is considering supporting some WDAs in Port Sudan (ACORD, 2010).

ACORD has a project which focuses on supporting urban–rural linkages between Halaib and Port Sudan. As such, only migrants from Halaib are targeted with assistance. ACORD started its involvement in Port Sudan in 1984, with a Small Scale Enterprise Programme targeting refugees and other vulnerable groups through micro-credit and business skills support. The programme was successful in helping selected individuals develop businesses in areas like retailing, catering and water vending and supporting home improvements (roofing, fencing and latrines) (Pantuliano, 2000). The programme began to wind down in 1998, when ACORD supported the establishment of PASED, a local organisation which is now the largest micro-credit provider in Port Sudan. In the second half of the 1980s ACORD developed a second programme in Halaib Province to support the Beja population in the area. The two programmes were entirely separate, to the point that ACORD's Port Sudan staff only visited their sister programme in 1997. A new, integrated rural–urban programme began in early 2000, and continues today.

Another international organisation still operating in Port Sudan is WFP, but its activities in the town are limited to feeding programmes for vulnerable groups, including rations

for families containing HIV/AIDS patients and supplementary feeding for malnourished children. WFP's main focus is on rural Red Sea State; school feeding, for example, is only conducted in rural areas. Having worked in Red Sea State for the past 35 years, WFP is now hoping to develop a longer-term strategy linked to the agency's move away from food aid to food assistance. Rather than continuing to run a parallel system of repeated emergency and recovery food distributions, WFP intends to become more involved in technical support and capacity-building to assist the government's food security programmes. The strategy will aim to assist the Red Sea State government in identifying the most vulnerable, creating a wider base of support and financial assistance for food security programmes in Red Sea State and providing technical assistance in procurement, vulnerability analysis, logistics and monitoring (WFP Port Sudan, 2010).

Assistance to refugees living in Port Sudan has declined dramatically over the past three decades. In the early 1980s a number of international agencies were involved in the provision of services for urban refugees. UNHCR financed scholarship schemes for commercial and technical education, Ockenden Venture promoted vocational training and an employment placement service for semi-skilled refugees and CARE International implemented its USAID-funded water project in UNHCR's Asoteriba refugee camp. The camp, which by the early 1990s was home to several thousand Eritrean refugees, had compounds made of concrete blocks, two primary schools, a regular bus service, weekly rubbish collections, a women's centre and a kindergarten (Forman,

1992). A local organisation, SudanAid, provided medical staff to six clinics in areas with large numbers of refugees (Schulz and Schulz, 1983). Today, no refugee camps exist in Port Sudan and UNHCR provides no assistance to refugees other than the determination of refugee status, supported by the Commission of Refugees (COR).

The evolution of international humanitarian and development programming in Red Sea State over the past three decades mirrors what has happened in other parts of the Horn of Africa. Since the mid-1980s international engagement has largely taken the form of regular and repeated humanitarian aid, targeted largely at rural populations. Initiatives have generally been technical or programme- rather than policy-related. Despite three decades of support to pastoral populations in the rural areas of Red Sea State, international assistance has not succeeded in stimulating recovery or supporting the pastoral economy. The fact that Port Sudan has doubled in size since the mid-1980s, largely because of the forced migration of pastoralists from the Red Sea hills, demonstrates that assistance in rural areas has failed to prevent the gradual erosion of pastoral livelihoods. Meanwhile, support in urban areas has been extremely limited and has done little to improve the participation of the most vulnerable in the urban economy. Since the urban population is now in the majority in Red Sea State, more serious engagement in urban contexts is needed by international actors. Much more inclusive employment opportunities are required in Port Sudan, but this will call for engagement not only at the technical and programmatic level, but also in terms of policy, alongside greater and more equal participation in local governance.

Chapter 10
Conclusions and recommendations

Since its creation in 1905, Port Sudan has experienced exponential population growth. Beginning in the 1980s, growth has been driven by recurrent displacement in a context of poor governance, decreasing job opportunities and deepening social and economic insecurity. A minority of urban dwellers of Northern Sudanese, Greek, Indian and Yemeni origin control professional jobs in the public sector and in the oil, construction and service industries, and live in the well-serviced, better-off residential areas in the centre of the city, such as Deim Madina and Transit. A large proportion of the population comprises people displaced by conflict or drought-related food insecurity, who live in squatter settlements in the poorest areas of the city. Displaced populations include former Beja pastoralists, IDPs from conflict-affected areas such as Tokar, Darfur, the Nuba Mountains and South Sudan and refugees from Eritrea and Ethiopia. The findings of this study show that displaced communities in Port Sudan live in shockingly precarious conditions, facing abject poverty and unable to meet basic needs. Their housing is inadequate and they lack access to water; basic services and sanitation are poor or non-existent, and they are exposed to a wide range of health hazards including malaria, tuberculosis, diarrhoea, malnutrition and HIV/AIDS.

The people of Red Sea State are experiencing what has been variously termed a chronic famine (Howe and Devereux, 2004), a chronic food crisis (Darcy and Hoffman, 2003) and a protracted crisis (Harmer and Macrae, 2004). This means that the population has been experiencing high levels of acute malnutrition and food insecurity on a regular basis for a number of years, as well as ongoing threats to livelihoods. In the rural areas of Red Sea State income is estimated to be $93 per year, and a staggering 92% of the population is thought to live beneath the dollar-a-day poverty line (UNDP, 2005, in UNDP, 2009). Chronic poverty and ongoing threats to livelihoods in the rural areas of Red Sea State mean that urban migration will continue.

The rapid rate of population growth in Port Sudan has not been matched by greater job opportunities in the port and the oil and construction sectors. The Bashair 1 and 2 oil export ports and the oil companies in Port Sudan employ foreigners for white-collar occupations and South Asians for manual jobs. The mechanisation of the port in 1999 and the large-scale redundancies that followed have had a detrimental impact on the urban livelihoods of the Beja, who traditionally worked as stevedores. These negative developments for the poorest and most vulnerable communities have taken place in parallel with waves of displacement into Port Sudan since the 1980s. As such, job opportunities have dwindled as demand has grown and the job market has become increasingly competitive. For

the great majority of displaced people living in Port Sudan, the informal sector offers the only way to generate even a meagre income. The most vulnerable see no other option than trades such as commercial sex work and alcohol sales, or sending their children to work to contribute to household income.

The decentralisation process that has been underway since independence has not been accompanied by any meaningful devolution of power or resources from the centre to sub-national levels. Rather than being underpinned by genuine democratic processes and norms, the governance systems of Red Sea State are characterised by strong control from the centre, a need to ensure tribal balance in key government posts in order to minimise tribal tensions and a lack of accountability to local constituencies. The lack of representation of the disenfranchised displaced populations in government structures underpins their sense of neglect in urban renewal plans, which are largely centred on improving the already better-off neighbourhoods of the city. In fact, urban authorities appear not to be giving sufficient attention to the neediest neighbourhoods, partially in an attempt to discourage more people from moving to Port Sudan, and encouraging people already in Port Sudan to return to their places of origin. This tactic is not however being matched by improvements in the rural areas of Red Sea State, which remain profoundly underdeveloped.

In recent years, international assistance in Red Sea State has dwindled, a trend exacerbated by the expulsion of international NGOs in 2009. What limited assistance has been provided has largely focused on rural areas, despite the fact that over half of the total Red Sea State population resides in urban Port Sudan. The forced migration of Beja pastoralists from the rural areas of Red Sea State to Port Sudan in the mid-1980s indicates that assistance has not succeeded in addressing the underlying causes of the erosion of the pastoral economy, and has failed to stimulate its recovery. Assistance has largely comprised short-term but regular large-scale humanitarian assistance or small-scale development projects of a technical nature. Issues of policy and governance to improve livelihoods have been neglected. The international community needs to reflect on its lack of success in Red Sea State and develop a new approach.

10.1 Recommendations

Since the expulsion of international NGOs the number of international actors working in the East in general and in Port Sudan in particular has decreased dramatically. As such, the role of UN agencies that still have access and operations in Port Sudan has acquired increasing prominence, and should

be expanded. In light of the current political situation and the access problems confronting international NGOs, the following recommendations are mainly targeted at UN agencies, international donors, government agencies and local NGOs. A key recommendation to the government is that access for INGOs in Red Sea State should be improved if assistance and services are to be made adequate to address the chronic emergency that faces both the urban and rural population in the state.

The government
- Translate existing national policies into effective decentralisation. In line with the ESPA's objectives, the government should prioritise efforts aimed at translating decentralisation policies into a genuine devolution of power, competences and resources from the centre to the three Eastern states and local municipal authorities. Support to meaningful political, administrative and fiscal decentralisation mechanisms must be seen as an important component for promoting stability and accelerating local development. In particular, a more equitable distribution of resources and the promotion of transparency and accountability in budget planning and allocation can help redress long-standing grievances and the chronic marginalisation of the East.
- Develop a Master Plan for Port Sudan. The last comprehensive Master Plan for the city was drawn up in the 1970s. There is an urgent need to undertake a comprehensive and accurate mapping of land use and develop a Master Plan that can address the needs of the rapidly expanding population. Public housing projects should also be initiated to provide affordable housing to the urban poor.

UN agencies and local NGOs (and the government where appropriate)
- Deepen understanding of rural and urban vulnerabilities. The fact that more than half of the Red Sea State population now resides in Port Sudan should encourage bolder efforts to address the acute needs of urban populations. UNICEF should continue its joint work with the MoH to update nutrition surveys. These surveys should include both urban and rural populations, and should allow comparisons between the two. Similarly, WFP and the state government's food security information systems need to include both urban and rural populations. This will allow for a better understanding of the multiple factors that create vulnerability in Red Sea State and of the linkages between urban and rural livelihoods.
- Retain emergency capacity. Given the scale of the crisis and the limited capacity for development in Red Sea State at present, emergency capacity needs to be retained to respond to any future acute humanitarian crisis. This includes both government institutions as well as UN agencies (e.g. WFP and UNICEF). Emergency capacity needs to include more than food aid, so that acute malnutrition and food insecurity are addressed rapidly and efficiently through a combination of interventions to improve food

security, the health environment and social support systems. In addition, food security information and early warning systems need to be revived and strengthened. This is becoming even more important in the face of climate change and the more frequent episodes of drought already being experienced in Red Sea State.
- Prioritise water supply and access. Lack of or poor access to water is perhaps the most acute need among urban residents in Port Sudan. Working jointly with government agencies, efforts should be undertaken to improve the efficiency of the current network piping system and expand its scope. It will also be necessary to manage the resources of the Khor Arbaat aquifer more efficiently and increase its capacity. Ultimately, efforts should aim at reducing the cost of water for the poorest households, thereby freeing up resources for other purposes, such as education or health.
- Improve education. Access to basic services such as healthcare and education is extremely limited for the most marginalised populations living in squatter and irregular settlements in Port Sudan. In *deims* where no schools are available because of difficulties in building permanent structures in unplanned settlements, temporary buildings should be supported. Efforts should also be made to minimise the cost of going to school. Given the priority people give to education, supporting pupils to meet these costs would not only improve access but would also improve livelihoods as the income released through reducing expenditure can be used to invest in livelihoods. Experience elsewhere has shown that providing vouchers to meet education costs can be an effective response.
- Improve healthcare. The poorest settlements in Port Sudan have limited or no health services. Addressing this is a matter of priority. Rather than setting up parallel programmes, there may be opportunities to strengthen the Ministry of Health, building on lessons from other parts of Sudan (e.g. Darfur). Working in partnership with the MoH, agencies such as UNICEF and WFP could step up efforts to promote and support tuberculosis treatment and prevention programmes, and explore the possibility of extending targeting in Port Sudan to include tuberculosis-infected individuals. Support for healthcare and education should not be limited to Port Sudan, but needs to cover the whole of Red Sea State.
- Enhance livelihood opportunities. It is crucial to promote activities aimed at enhancing the self-reliance of the thousands of displaced people and migrants in the poorest neighbourhoods of Port Sudan, particularly young people and female household heads, in order to increase their participation in the productive sectors of the economy. Facilitating access or providing education and vocational and technical training, both in formal and non-formal institutions, to build and strengthen their skills is especially appropriate in this context to promote alternative livelihood opportunities. Efforts aimed at enhancing livelihood opportunities should be based on an in-depth analysis and robust information on market demand and the urban economy to tailor training opportunities so that they

address potential gaps in the labour market. Furthermore, livelihood support should be based on an understanding of and, where appropriate, support for existing livelihood strategies. Enabling wider access to financial services, including savings, money transfers and loans as well as entrepreneurship training, could provide vital start-up money and skills for small-business investments. It is clear that all these activities require long-term engagement. Long-term development actors such as UNDP could work jointly with the government and urban authorities to promote and support these activities, building on successful experiences such as that of ACORD/PASED.

- Support urban–rural linkages. Rather than seeing urban livelihoods as separate from the rural economy, the links between the two need to be recognised and supported. One of the key ways in which this is traditionally done is through clubs and civil society organisations. These organisations and networks should therefore be supported regardless of whether they are involved in any 'formal' assistance activities.

- Support the return of conflict-displaced people. Despite the CPA and ESPA, few of the conflict-displaced have returned to their home areas. For the Beja originating from Tokar, this appears to be because their land is still mined and there are no basic services in their area of origin. A de-mining programme in South Tokar and Agig, together with improvements in basic services and the strengthening of local economic and productive capacity, could therefore induce a much higher number of Beni Amer communities to return.

- Support should also be provided to those displaced from Southern Sudan who are interested in returning to their areas of origin but lack information on conditions in areas of return, including around access to land and livelihoods opportunities. The Southern Sudan referendum planned in January 2011 may spark renewed interest in a return to the South and it is important to ensure that support for the meaningful reintegration of these communities is planned in advance, building on the lessons from the return and reintegration process to date (Pantuliano et al., 2008).

- Strengthen CBO and local NGO capacity. Since the expulsion of international NGOs in 2009, the shortfall in service provision and assistance in urban Port Sudan has widened further. It is crucial to harness and improve the capacity and outreach of local organisations such as local NGOs and CBOs. UN agencies such as UNDP would be well-placed to promote activities aimed at strengthening their resource base and their management, financial and targeting skills. These activities should be initiated in close consultation with NGOs and CBOs to gain an in-depth understanding of their objectives, activities and scope, in order to support their specific needs. At the same time, capacity-building activities should aim at enhancing the role that civil society organisations can play in linking up with government structures, representing and formulating collective demands and conveying requests and preferences to decision-makers. This could be a positive step forward in facilitating civil society engagement with government authorities and strengthening the relationship between decision-makers and marginalised urban communities.

International donors

- Increase the strategic focus in Eastern Sudan. Profound underdevelopment, acute humanitarian need and chronic food insecurity make Eastern Sudan one of the most marginalised and vulnerable areas of the country. With issues of impartiality in mind, international donors and UN agencies should urgently increase their strategic focus and multi-sectoral efforts in the East to meaningfully and more efficiently respond to humanitarian needs and prevent and alleviate human suffering. The Donors' Conference on Eastern Sudan in Kuwait in December 2010, coordinated by UNDP, could provide a useful platform for further action. Such efforts must be premised on an in-depth understanding of the socio-political context of the region, and should be undertaken in partnership with local actors with longstanding experience and presence in the East. Finally, it is crucial to ensure that efforts are strategically coordinated to support and maximise the impact of advocacy activities, which should accompany the increasing focus on the East.

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Annex 1
Timeline of key events

20th Century
- 1905–1909 Establishment of Port Sudan and inauguration of first docks.
- 1931 Start of Beja migration to Port Sudan to work in the port.
- 1948 Famine in rural areas of Red Sea State.
- 1955 Famine in rural areas of Red Sea State.
- 1956 Independence of Sudan.

1970s
- 1969–73 Famine in rural areas of Red Sea State.
- 1975 Construction of Khartoum–Port Sudan tarmac highway.
- 1977 Oil pipeline (import).
- 1978 Structural adjustment programmes (SAPs) begin.

1980s
- 1984–85 Famine in rural areas of Red Sea State and mass inflow of IDPs.
- 1985 First wave of IDPs from Western Sudan.

1990s
- 1990 Tensions in Port Sudan between Nuba and Beni Amer.
- 1990–91 Famine in rural areas of Red Sea State.
- 1990 Start of tribal-based IDP camps (squatters) in town.
- 1991 Modernisation of the port begins.

- 1992 Transfer of port customs revenues from Port Sudan to Khartoum.
- 1992 Transfer of passenger port to Swakin.
- 1992 Opening of Port Sudan Airport.
- 1993 Mass influx of IDPs from Southern Sudan.
- 1994 Establishment of Red Sea State; Port Sudan declared capital of RSS.
- 1995 Start of the Eastern conflict.
- 1997 Influx of IDPs from South Tokar and Agig.
- 1998 Port Sudan oil refinery stops production.
- 1998–2000 Ethiopia–Eritrea war and mass influx of refugees.
- 1999 Completion of mechanisation of the port; establishment of Sudan Free Zones; establishment of Bashaer 1 Oil Port

2000s
- 2003 Lay-off of manual labourers at the port.
- 2005 Establishment of Bashaer 2 Oil Port.
- 2006 Donor Conference for East Sudan.
- 2006 Settlement of Rashida in Port Sudan.
- 2009 New highway to Khartoum via Atbara.
- 2009 Expulsion of INGOs inc. Oxfam, IRC and SCF UK.
- 2009 National and State elections

Source: study data.