

South Sudan Monitor

November 2011



Sunrise in Juba by Lauren Hutton

Urbanisation and violence: a post-conflict state of affairs?

The majority of post-conflict countries experience a rapid escalation in urban violence and crime, political and non-political, after the conclusion of hostilities. In South Sudan the predominant focus has been on violence and conflict between the South and the North, threats by actors in neighbouring countries such as the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA), inter-ethnic violence, political militia activities, cattle-raiding, fighting over land, abductions and killings – the latter two frequently as a part of cattle-raiding or land disputes. There is however, significantly less attention paid to increasing urban violence, its sources and identifying measures to address it.

Juba's expansion since the CPA has been dramatic – it has exploded in terms of population growth from what was previously three *payams* to stretching out into at least five. The population figures for Juba are not exact and estimates vary considerably, from as high as 1 million to the government refuted census figure of 230,195. However, an estimate that many are working from is a population of 500,000 to 600,000.¹ As in most post-conflict societies, the reasons for the rapid urbanisation of Juba are many: critically perceived better employment opportunities and delivery of variety of services.² However, this is not always what they find. Young men in particular are drawn towards urban centres. Sometimes their families

¹ Martin E and Mosel I, 'City limits: urbanisation and vulnerability in Sudan. Juba case study.' HPG ODI, 2011, pp.3-4.

² Ibid. p.4.

Urbanisation and violence...cont.

move with them, but frequently they move on their own. This results in an increase of young unemployed males without their family or wider group network who have limited to no means of providing for themselves – coupled in many cases with unrealistic expectations of what life in an urban centre such as Juba can provide. Among the ones who find work the wages are very low; combined with a steady increase in living costs, particularly pronounced since December 2010.

Police authorities in South Sudan's capital of Juba have intensified night patrols and imposed restrictive movements after midnight, in a bid to strengthen security days after four people were killed in three separate incidents... The tightening of security is seen as direct response to the public outcry after several crimes were carried out by groups wearing either police or military uniforms.

<http://www.sudantribune.com/South-Sudan-police-imposes.39900>

Violence and crime has escalated in Juba, but also in other cities including Torit and Bor. One study found that in these three cities people reported robberies at gunpoint and murder/killings as key threats to their security (the killings were unrelated to other forms of crime and violence such as cattle-raiding).³ Concern around alcohol intake and how this affects behaviour among young males, South Sudan Police Service (SSPS) and Sudanese People's Liberation Army (SPLA) representatives has been raised several times in communities in state capitals. Many associate security threats with alcohol abuse, which is perceived to increase interpersonal violence such as assault, robberies and domestic violence.⁴ The intensity of violence is exacerbated by the prevalence and availability of small arms in the urban communities.

Commonly in post-conflict urban contexts with large numbers of unemployed, disenfranchised young men gangs have a tendency to form; examples range across the globe from Timor-Leste to Haiti. Rapid urbanisation combined with lack of services and unemployment and distance to family and broader communal ties frequently leads youth to seek a substitute for the absence of these factors in their lives. South Sudan is no exception and in Juba and Torit especially there has been an

increase in urban gangs – some of these may have a political agenda, others do not.

Harassment, robberies and killings are often attributed to youth gangs, especially in Juba and Torit, by local authorities and communities.⁵ The increase in violence and crime in state capitals not only affects personal safety and security, but also potentially business investment.

In other contexts where the international support has paid limited attention to rapid urbanisation, and subsequent rise in urban violence and crime, the results have been an escalation in violence. To avoid this in South Sudan international support needs to more consistently assist the Government of South Sudan in addressing the consequences of rapid urbanisation to prevent further increases of instability and violence in the urban centres. There are many challenges and demands to be met in South Sudan, however, urbanisation and violence needs to become a priority. Not to do so will have consequences that will significantly arrest the development of urban centres. 

Disarmament begins in Unity State

At the start of November 2011, the disarmament campaign in the tri-state areas of Warrap, Lakes and Unity moved to weapons collections in Mayandit and Panyijar in Unity. Working with local state and traditional authorities, the SPLA have been conducting civilian disarmament in Warrap and Lakes since September 2011. The focus of the disarmament continues to be on cattle rearing communities in counties close to or bordering neighbouring states. Inter-state cattle raiding in this area is a prime source of insecurity and frequently fuels violence between communities competing for access to water and pasture. The current disarmament campaign is being conducted at the end of harvest season and before the dry season heightens scarcity of food and water.

For Unity State, the current disarmament campaign is being conducted against the backdrop of increasing insecurity due to the re-emergence of the South Sudan Liberation Army (SSLA). There was hope that following an amnesty agreement with Peter Gadet Yak, the SSLA would integrate into the SPLA. However, towards the end of October 2011, clashes between the SSLA and the SPLA, especially around Mayom County threatens the security of communities. Disarmament in Unity State has not focused on areas where rebel militia remain a problem but rather on the cattle communities bordering Warrap and Lakes.

³ Saferworld and Safety and Access to Justice Programme, 'South Sudan community policing study. Data report.' 2011, p.7.

⁴ Ibid.

⁵ Ibid. p.8.

Countering the LRA, what options for South Sudan?

Between June and August 2011, a total of 92 attacks by the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) were recorded in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), South Sudan and Central African Republic (CAR)⁶. Four of these attacks occurred in South Sudan, leaving one person dead, one wounded and nine people abducted⁷. The humanitarian impact cannot be counted in fatalities alone as the scourge of the LRA is felt in the terror inflicted on communities forcing people to flee their homes, sacrificing livelihoods and pushing themselves further into poverty. There are an estimated 70 000 people displaced by the LRA in South Sudan⁸.

The cult-like figure of Joseph Kony, the kidnapping of children and campaigns of brutality against vulnerable populations have made the LRA one of the best known militia groups in the world. Kony and his forces have navigated political and security dynamics across Uganda, South Sudan, DRC and CAR for the past 30 years; surviving by playing on perceptions of marginalisation and operating on peripheries. In South Sudan, the LRA has had a presence since at least the 1990s, fighting in Eastern Equatoria against the SPLA, with Kony even taking up residence in Juba in the early 2000s. Throughout the years, the LRA has found support in South Sudan from some elements opposed to or disillusioned by the SPLM/A and from communities with no alternative but to co-operate.

From 2006-2010, there were several military operations and political engagements aimed at removing the LRA from South Sudan. There has been mixed success as the LRA has been dislodged from Eastern Equatoria and from parts of Western Equatoria. Current indications are that Kony and his loyalists are moving into CAR and are based near the border with Western Bahr el Ghazal (WBEG). Officials from WBEG claim that LRA combatants have attacked civilians at least five times in the last two months⁹. In the latest attack on 4 September 2011 in Deim Jallab in Raja

County, six people were abducted when a group of 80 LRA crossed from CAR¹⁰.

Given the cross-border operations and sometimes enabling regional political dynamics, there have been repeated calls for regional approaches to counter the LRA. In June 2009, in a meeting in Kisangani, there was an agreement for military co-operation between CAR, DRC, Uganda and South Sudan against the LRA. Under the auspices of the Africa Union (AU), the same states signed another agreement to increase military co-operation in Bangui in October 2010. Then in June 2011, a second regional meeting on the LRA was convened by the AU which included senior representation from CAR, Chad, DRC, South Sudan, Sudan and Uganda. The AU meeting included discussions with strategic partners including the United Nations, European Union and United States of America.

This meeting concluded with the design of a Mission to be authorised by the AU to counter the LRA. This Mission would be composed of:

- Regional Task Force – the security element with a headquarter staff
- Joint Coordination Mechanism – strategic and political element to coordinate the efforts of the AU, the countries concerned and the support of partners
- Joint Operations Centre

The regional ministerial meeting took place 6-8 June 2011 and put forward the recommendation for the AU Mission to the heads of state summit in July 2011. However, the LRA was not tabled by the Peace and Security Council for discussion at summit, so there has been no official sanctioning of the AU Mission yet.

On 14 October 2011, President Obama announced the deployment of 100 military advisors to assist in regional efforts to counter the LRA. This US deployment provides a surge of military, logistics, intelligence and diplomatic support to rejuvenate regional efforts. The regional military initiative has, for the most part, been left to the Ugandan People's Defence Force (UPDF) with a presence in South Sudan and Northern Uganda. As the LRA have shifted more into CAR and western parts of South Sudan, the current positions of the UPDF counter-LRA forces perhaps serve as a potential deterrent but lacks rapid response capacity given the vast areas of operation and flexibility of LRA movements. Kinshasa has also deployed its 391st battalion to key LRA affected areas in the DRC¹¹.

⁶ OCHA, *LRA Regional Update: DRC, CAR and South Sudan: June-August 2011*. Available online

http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/map_1044.pdf

⁷ *Ibid*

⁸ *Ibid*

⁹ Small Arms Survey, *Lord's Resistance Army Update as of 10 October 2011*, www.smallarmssurvey.org/pdfs/facts-figures/armed-groups/southern-sudan/HSBA-Armed-Groups-LRA.pdf

¹⁰ *Ibid*

¹¹ www.enoughproject.org/blogs/efforts-end-lra-falter

Countering the LRA...cont.

These regional efforts come at a critical time for South Sudan as the LRA have begun staging incursions into WBEG to use the current harvest season to replenish their food supplies. The government will be challenged to mount a security response given limited policing and military capacities and the large distances to cover on poor roads. The lack of response capacity was highlighted in a December 2010 report from the South Sudan Bureau for Community Security and Small Arms Control: "In Boromedina and Soppo *payams*, Raja County, Western Bahr el Ghazal State, which is three hours away from Raga, respondents mentioned that when the LRA attacked it took the police ten days to bring reinforcements because they did not have a police vehicle." Poor road and communication networks contribute to delayed responses as does poor morale amongst some police and military due to irregular payment of salaries.

These factors point to the need for South Sudan - if the government chooses to mount a security operation as part of the regional initiative - to mobilise a task force with specific duties to target LRA-affected areas through offensive and defensive operations. There is an SPLA base in WBEG at Mapel but given the mixed progress with defence transformation there are significant questions that would be asked of an SPLA deployment of this nature. Similar to concerns about the DRC military (*Forces Armées de la République Démocratique du Congo – FARDC*) bringing the SPLA into confrontation with civilians is a risk when there is a lack of specialised counter-insurgency training, problems of command and control and irregular pay and lack of regular supplies. For both the SPLA and the FARDC, the military tradition is one of guerrilla warfare in which certain supply functions were maintained through linkages (voluntary or exploitative) with communities in which they were based or passed through. Part of the professionalisation includes developing armed forces that have logistical capacity to sustain deployments. This is a costly endeavour requiring well-planned supply lines and the necessary infrastructure to move goods and people. Especially in the remote areas where the LRA operate, this would be a major challenge to the SPLA. If the LRA continue to threaten food supplies and insecurity prevents communities from pursuing regular agricultural activity, having to feed an SPLA deployment could drive people further into food insecurity and increase the potential for conflict on various levels.

It seems that regardless of the SPLA's direct involvement, a regional operation of sorts will be

launched against the LRA before the end of 2011. A key concern will be how communities in South Sudan can be more resilient against the potential negative impacts that such confrontation will bring? An SPLA deployment, although one of the only security options for the government, comes with significant risk to community security and should only be considered if regular pay and increased food supplies can be guaranteed. Should this be a possibility, the task of the SPLA deployment would need to include specific reference to ensuring the protection of civilians and a focus on rapid response operations to chase down LRA insurgents.

Outside of an SPLA deployment, the government could work at local and regional levels to provide support to counter-LRA operations. At local level, communities could become more engaged in providing information about movements and emphasis should be placed on more timely information flows from communities in South Sudan to the proposed Joint Operations Centre or some similar structure. Communities in LRA-affected areas in South Sudan should be made aware of the military operations against the LRA and should be encouraged to participate through information sharing and increased patrols. This can be done as a partnership between police and communities to overcome some of the personnel deficits in the police.

If any kind of coordinated regional approach is going to achieve success against the LRA it will have to include not only political and military engagement but also engagement in the communities most affected. The LRA has survived through exploiting perceptions of marginalisation. Any state sanctioned actions against the LRA that causes increased community insecurity could fuel existing ethnic rivalries in South Sudan to the detriment of longer-term stability. 

People's Perspectives on Peacemaking: LRA Report

Conciliation Resources and Saferworld project for the European Commission conducted research in areas affected by the LRA in Uganda, DRC, CAR and South Sudan. The research sought to gain a 'people's perspective' on the conflict by involving those most affected, including community representatives, civil society leaders and LRA returnees, in reflection on the conflict and national and international responses to it. Available at:

www.c-r.org/our

work/uganda/documents/PPP_LRA_policybrief201110.pdf

Moving from fragility to development: an agenda for South Sudan

From 18-19 October 2011, a Ministerial Retreat of the g7+ met in Juba in preparation for the 4th High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness to take place in Busan, South Korea in November-December 2011. The g7+ consists of 17 fragile states working together since 2010 to influence the manner in which aid is delivered and to present unified positions to influence mainstream development paradigms. This forum was hosted in Juba at a time when national and international partners in South Sudan are formulating programming and approaches to meet the overwhelming socio-economic and developmental challenges in the new state.

Sitting at the lowest end of most development indices, emerging from a protracted civil war and now faced with spiraling inflation and serious food and fuel shortages, South Sudan presents an urgent case for getting development right. And getting development assistance in Africa right has been challenging the international community since the end of colonialism.

The g7+ brings a new voice to the table of global development and aid effectiveness debates. The critical issue being put on the table by the g7+ is that aid is too often channeled into fragile states through systems outside of government structures, enabling the creation of parallel systems of governance and working contrary to efforts to create accountable, functioning state institutions. They are calling for national governments to be placed at the centre of development planning and delivery to embody local ownership and build effective state institutions.

“How we spend money as a government, and how our development partners spend money in our countries, is critically important to our success, given the scale of need across our nation.”

President Salva Kiir Mayardit, address to g7+ meeting in Juba on 19 October 2011

However, as shown most effectively through the years of direct budget support to Mobutu's Zaire in the 1970s and 1980s, improving the flow of aid through government structures alone will not result

in improved service delivery and changed livelihoods. There are questions that need to be asked not only about the structures but the substance of these structures. Directing the flow of aid through governments will in theory assist with local ownership, enable accountability and support the development of a functioning state. But directing large amounts of money through weak institutions with limited capacity and experience of service delivery and based on networks of patrimony and relationships built through elite, ethnic and liberation alliances can enable biased governance practices and the selective sharing of development gains. This is and has always been the fundamental question regarding aid effectiveness in many African states: how can international aid be used to support the development of states if there is a fundamental problem with the type of state which is being engaged?

This challenge has led through the years to more aid being channeled to supporting civil society, accountability and oversight, rule of law and democratisation programming such as support to elections. The central assumption being that if there are more democratic institutions, practices and actors, then a legitimate state partner can emerge capable of implementing inclusive political processes and participatory and transparent governance practices. The g7+ recognises the importance of state-society relations as evidenced in the July 2011 Monrovia Principles which emphasise that “constructive relations between state and society are at the heart of successful peacebuilding and statebuilding.”

The g7+ has put forward a draft ‘New Deal’ to be tabled at the Busan conference in December which in some ways tries to bridge the gaps between building states and building resilient societies. There are three core components to the New Deal, which the g7+ proposes to be implemented as a trial from 2012-2015.

- (1) Peacebuilding and statebuilding goals (PSG) – using goals, targets and indicators to identify peacebuilding and statebuilding priorities that inform the development of national plans and strategies and can be used to monitor progress. The PSGs would also create a coherent platform around which funding and aid can be structured.
- (2) FOCUS – building on the PSG concept, the second pillar of the New Deal focuses on supporting country-led and locally owned transitions out of fragility through:
 - F:** Independent and inclusive *fragility assessments*
 - O:** The development of *one inclusive strategic framework*

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C: Signing *compacts between national and international partners* to enable coordination, joint prioritisation, and the choice of appropriate aid instruments and funding allocations

U: *Using the PSGs* to monitor progress

S: *Supporting political dialogue and leadership*

(3) TRUST – improving systems for how aid is delivered in accordance with priorities identified in above pillars through:

T: increasing *transparency* through publishing how national and international funds are spent on peacebuilding and statebuilding, including strengthening national systems for accountability such as budget and public financial management systems

R: using multi-stakeholder mechanisms to *reduce and manage risks*

U: *using country systems* and institutions including support to capacity building for fiduciary and administrative systems

S: *strengthening capacities* through better support for management within the state institutions, but also for effective and inclusive political dialogue

T: increasing the *timing, flexibility and predictability of the delivery of aid*

We need to make sure that aid builds our capacity as a government, rather than undermining it. We need to make sure that aid strengthens our systems, instead of replacing them. Most critically, we need to make sure that the Government is in the driver's seat when it comes to managing the support offered by the International Community.

President Salva Kiir Mayardit, address to g7+ meeting in Juba on 19 October 2011

The PSG concept and FOCUS pillar are reminiscent of development trends such as poverty reduction strategies and repeat calls for improved strategic planning for development, but this time packaged as peacebuilding and statebuilding. This remains an important part of improved programming and emphasis should be placed on the process through which assessments, strategic frameworks and compacts are developed. Interestingly, as part of the third pillar, TRUST, the focus on strengthening capacities makes a direct appeal for increased use of South-South learning

and limiting the use of external technical assistance. How to better provide technical assistance is a key challenge to the international community as the development sector in some fragile contexts is characterised by a reliance on consultants, skilled but inexperienced staff and short-term rotations.

Surrounding the discourse of aid effectiveness - choreographed as it is by donor and recipient governments – the political obstacles to the effectiveness of aid are seldom frankly raised. If more than 50 years of development practice in Africa has taught us anything it is that there will always be a new trend and new paradigms to try and grapple with the inequalities and ineffectiveness of national political and economic systems that exist in a fundamentally unequal international political economy. But perhaps, in the year of global revolution, with clear shifting of global power centres and the shaking of the foundations of the global economic order, there is a chance for the voice of fragile states to be heard and to affect the flow of aid. At this point both power and responsibility shifts towards them: such Governments, including South Sudan's, will have to show real commitment to changing political and economic behaviour if the new, carefully monitored paradigm, is to show fruits of success. 

Partnership principles

Development assistance should:

Be **Government-owned and -led**;

Be **aligned with Government policies** as set out in the South Sudan Development Plan (SSDP) and Budget Sector Plans (BSPs);

Use Government systems and institutions for public financial management (PFM), policy and service delivery, including at the State level;

Be **predictable**, over both the short and medium term;

Be **coordinated** and harmonised through sectoral mechanisms;

Be **managed for results** with project outcomes tracked alongside sectoral policy outcomes;

Be based on the principle of **mutual accountability**.

Aid Strategy for the Government of South Sudan, Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning, August 2011

New state, new partners: Relations between China and South Sudan

Chinese actors have played an important role in peace and conflict dynamics between and within Sudan and South Sudan over the past two decades. They have influenced the trajectory of development and conflict significantly through economic investment, trade, infrastructural development and military co-operation. With shifting political alliances affecting Chinese relations in Khartoum and economic imperatives for increased engagement with a newly independent South Sudan, as with other international actors, China's relations are adapting to the changed geostrategic and geopolitical context.

The relationship between South Sudan and China is a pragmatic one: maintaining and further developing oil infrastructure is dependent on Chinese companies as key partners in the concession holding consortia and with China as the primary consumer of Sudanese exported oil, it is very much a mutually beneficial relationship. China will have a central role to play in further developing the national capital base from which much-needed development can be funded. South Sudan holds a big attraction for China because of its resources and as a market for goods and services that is not yet fully exploited.

"There's a bright future for China and South Sudan and for our relationship... Our two economies are there for each other and we want to see good co-operation in such areas like agriculture, infrastructure construction, oil production."

Yang Jiechi, Minister for Foreign Affairs People's Republic of China during his first visit to South Sudan, 9 August 2011

For South Sudan the potential benefits of deepening ties with China include:

- (1) Political support – China has significant international influence conferred by its economic prowess and a permanent seat on the Security Council. Should relations between Juba and Khartoum, especially around the border and the Three Areas, further deteriorate, moves towards international action from the United Nations could be used to influence Khartoum. The influence of China on Khartoum's behaviour is often perceived as a



key source of leverage not yet fully exploited for conflict resolution purposes.

- (2) Military co-operation – China is a major exporter of military equipment. With the extensive defence transformation being undertaken in South Sudan, there is the potential for increased technical support and weapons trade.
- (3) Development – China is a key development partner assisting with infrastructure projects and potentially providing critical support to the development of key infrastructure including roads, hospitals, schools and transport facilities such as harbours and airports. On 24 October 2011, a US \$30 million deal to support health, education, and agriculture and water supply projects was signed.
- (4) Ownership – because China does not attach conditions to its aid, the Government of South Sudan is able to exercise increased ownership of the projects and products. Chinese involvement in development also provides Juba with a wider choice of donors contributing to a more diversified marketplace of development aid.

One of the common criticisms of Chinese support to countries emerging from conflict in Africa is that development and infrastructure projects tend to favour the use of Chinese labour and thus do not entail a sufficient dividend for local employment and skills transfers. Chinese engagement in economic development often takes the form of projects implemented by the Chinese private sector financed by state-backed loans. How to channel development funds in a manner that supports Chinese national interest (in terms of economic growth for companies and employment opportunities) and enables the development of local industry is required. However, given the skills shortages in South Sudan, dependence on external skills will remain a reality to some degree. This is similar to the challenges facing other international actors to make aid more effective.

Investment in development and infrastructure projects will help to improve the perception of Chinese actors, with many people believing that they enabled conflict around the key oil infrastructure areas during the civil war and reaped

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undue benefits from oil at the expense of local communities' needs and development priorities. Although there has been support from Chinese companies to the construction of roads, hospitals and schools in the oil producing areas, there remains a negative perception about the role of oil companies. There remain gaps in how such development initiatives are conducted in that they often fail to bring the local community on board and to understand the issues that divide the actors, or the societies, in which they are implemented.



Training centre in Bentiu, Unity State to enable more local employment in the oil sector by Larry Attree

In order to maximise the gains for the people of South Sudan, relations between South Sudan and China need to inculcate conflict-sensitive approaches to take opportunities to stimulate the local economy and provide employment opportunities. Through such measures development initiatives can become central to changing conflict dynamics and contributing to the stability and resilience of societies. The Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs already encourages Chinese economic actors to do risk assessments and this provides scope for engagement with local communities that could become the bedrock for more conflict-sensitive approaches that run through the entire cycle of the Chinese actors' engagement. However, ultimately responsibility to ensure that Chinese engagement is beneficial to community development lies with the Government of South Sudan. Increased transparency and a more robust regulatory environment (for example,

on environmental responsibility and taxation) are tools that the government can use.

"As a newly independent nation we definitely need a country like China to help us in development of our infrastructure, of our agriculture, vocational system and many areas."

Deng Alor, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Republic of South Sudan during visit of Chinese Foreign Affairs Minister in August 2011

With oil revenue from existing installations expected to decline in the next 5-10 years and pressures to diversify the South Sudanese economy, the partnership between China and South Sudan can become central to maintaining stability in South Sudan and continued economic growth for China. Chinese companies possess proven logistical capacity to support South Sudan to diversify its economy through the financing and delivery of fast-tracked infrastructure development. In the area of infrastructure, China plays an essential role that many other international actors are unwilling or unable to play. As South Sudan needs to simultaneously pursue development and security programming moving from a very low base of accessibility, mobility and infrastructure, the support of China and a range of other international partners is required. 

China's growing role in peace and security in Africa

In January 2011, Saferworld released a report assessing China's growing role in Africa and its effect on factors that drive conflict and those that promote peace. Key issues detailed in the report include: (1) China's bilateral relations with African states are largely determined by its principles of non-interference in the domestic affairs of other countries. (2) China as a major supplier of conventional arms to African states. (3) Chinese troop contributions to UN peacekeeping missions in Africa. (4) The role of China in post-conflict reconstruction through its economic engagement.

Report available at:

www.saferworld.org.uk/smartweb/resources/view-resource/500

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