

# Post-Independence South Sudan: the challenges ahead

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## Abstract

The Comprehensive Peace Agreement and the process of independence of South Sudan have left unsolved some key issues that might in the end endanger the full peace process. In particular, unresolved issues over citizenship, Abyei, border and the sharing of resources (oil revenues and Nile waters) represent issues over which confrontation with Sudan can escalate. For what concerns Nile waters, they potentially expose South Sudan to risks of conflicts also with other regional actors, including Egypt. South Sudan will have to focus on state and nation building, deepening peace building, preventing conflict, improving security, and bringing about a process of rapid economic development to reduce poverty in order to secure the gains obtained through independence.

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(\*) The opinions expressed herein are strictly personal and do not necessarily reflect the position of ISPI.

## Introduction

The history of the Sudan was characterized by population movements both into and out of it. In the North, the slow penetration of large numbers of Muslim Arabs, well under way by the beginning of 15<sup>th</sup> century, led to the integration of the region into the larger pan-Islamic world<sup>1</sup>. The process of cultural and ethnic assimilation was a two-way process: it led, on the one hand, to the Arabization and Islamization of large numbers of Sudanese peoples and, on the other, to the integration of Arab immigrants<sup>2</sup>. The influence of Islam and Arabic culture on the Southern Sudan was negligible. The expansionist energies of the Nilotes (Nilotic speakers) from the south succeeded in arresting the southward march of the Arabs as well as the spread of Islam<sup>3</sup>. Indeed the Nilotes, especially the Shilluk and the Jieng, posed a serious threat to the northern Muslim states until the end of the 18<sup>th</sup> century<sup>4</sup>. Today, the north is presented as Arab and Muslim, and the south as African and Christian. Thus, the frontier that separates them becomes increasingly defined in religious and ethnic terms.

The territory of the Republic of South Sudan comprises all lands and air space that constituted the three former Southern Provinces of Bahr el Ghazal, Equatorial and Upper Nile in their boundaries<sup>5</sup>. The Republic of South Sudan is bordered by Sudan in the north, Ethiopia in the east, Kenya and Uganda in the south, the Democratic Republic of Congo in the southwest, and the Central African Republic in the west<sup>6</sup>. South Sudan is governed on the basis of decentralized democratic system and is an all embracing homeland for its people. It is also a multi-ethnic, multi-cultural, multi-lingual, multi-religious and multi-racial society.

Currently, South Sudan has a population of 8.3 million, according to the 5<sup>th</sup> Sudan Population and Housing Census (2008), of which 1.4 million live in urban areas, compared to 6.9 million in rural areas. The population is therefore currently predominantly rural (83%) and dependent on subsistence agriculture. South Sudan is a young country with half (51%) the population under the age of eighteen and 72% under the age of thirty<sup>7</sup>.

Most South Sudanese are engaged in agriculture and grazing activities while oil and the public sector dominate the formal economy<sup>8</sup>. Unemployment and underemployment are very high with little formal sector employment. Oil provides 98% of the public sector revenue and almost all foreign exchange earnings, although South Sudan promotes the diversification the economy by developing other sources of public

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<sup>1</sup> B.A. OGOT *et al.* (eds), *Africa from the Sixteenth to the Eighteenth Century*, in *Unesco General History of Africa*, Paris, Unesco Publishing, 1999, p. 89.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibidem.*

<sup>3</sup> *Ibidem.*

<sup>4</sup> *Ibidem.*

<sup>5</sup> Sudan, Abyei arbitration, <http://reliefweb.int/node/317681> (accessed 9 July 2011).

<sup>6</sup> R.L. HILL, *A bibliography of the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan from the earliest times to 1937*, London, Oxford University Press, 1939, p. 56.

<sup>7</sup> Southern Sudan Centre for Census, Statistics and Evaluation (SSCCSE), <http://www.goss-online.org/magnoliaPublic/en/Independant-Commissions-and-Chambers/Center-for-Census-Statistics-and-Evaluation.html> (accessed 19 August 2011).

<sup>8</sup> Author's interview with Officials at the Ministry of Agriculture, Juba, August 18, 2011.

revenue, and expanding employment opportunities. A core component of this growth remains the building of the Government's non-oil revenues in the coming period which includes developing the Nile water.

This report is based on extensive research and interviews conducted in Juba in August 2011 and desk research of both primary and secondary resources. It provides an overview of pre and post-independence South Sudan's political, economic, social development and security, which continue to be a critical challenge to securing a peaceful separation between North and South Sudan, and to the formation of a stable new state. To gain a sense of the range of conflicts around natural resources in Sudan, the author reviewed existing records such as government archives; conducted interviews with politicians, state government officials, and Native Administration leaders; and investigated findings in the field. Interviews also served to examine people's knowledge about government natural resources policies and their perceptions of the roles played by government and the Native Administration in conflict management and resolution.

## 1. Historical Context

The Sudan has gone through two harrowing civil wars since its independence from British colonial rule in 1956. The Anyanya I war lasted until March 1972, when the Addis Ababa Peace Agreement<sup>9</sup> signed with General Nimeiri granted limited autonomy to the South<sup>10</sup>. What is now known as Southern Sudan experienced decades of relative peace and a degree of development subsequent to the signing of the Addis Ababa Agreement, with the support of the international community, and faith based organizations, especially Churches. However, the Northern policies towards the South consisted also of ongoing marginalization and Islamisation, accompanied by the introduction of Sharia Law by Nimeiri in 1983 and they prompted Southerners to rise up once again against the Northern regime.

On May 16, 1983, a group of soldiers led by Colonel John Garang de-Mabior mutinied against the Sudan Army. This historic rebellion led eventually to the formation of the Sudan Peoples' Liberation Army (SPLA). Throughout the 1980s the SPLA/Movement, received much support from the neighbouring countries<sup>11</sup>. Though, John Garang was confronted with increased internal opposition, which culminated into an attempt to overthrow him on August 28, 1991<sup>12</sup>. This revolt led by some commanders failed but resulted in a split of the liberation movement. In an attempt to divide and rule, the Khartoum government supported the rebellious faction militarily as well as financially and this led to many clashes between the SPLA/M and the opposition. Even so, in 2002, the South Sudanese were reunited<sup>13</sup>.

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<sup>9</sup> Addis Ababa Agreement, 1972, [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Addis\\_Ababa\\_Agreement](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Addis_Ababa_Agreement) (accessed June 11, 2011).

<sup>10</sup> Sudan, <http://www.cmi.no/sudan?id=8&Sudan> (accessed August 19, 2011).

<sup>11</sup> Author's interview with a confidential SPLA source, Juba, August 16, 2011.

<sup>12</sup> *Ibidem*.

<sup>13</sup> *Ibidem*.

The consequences of the war were grave, including gross violations of human rights. Large parts of the population were displaced and all socioeconomic systems were disrupted<sup>14</sup>. Hospitals, schools and roads were all destroyed. In 2003 the SPLA/M and the Khartoum government agreed on a ceasefire that led to the signing of the CPA (Comprehensive Peace Agreement) in 2005. This brought to an end to the 22-year conflict between the North and the South. Although some insecurity remains, Southern Sudan is relatively peaceful today.

### 1.1 Overview of Conflicts in South Sudan

Understanding South Sudan's complex of conflicts is an essential step in establishing the linkages between conflict and stability in the region. South Sudan's history of marginalisation has produced a complex web of dynamics that often provokes conflict. There are varying views on the causes that relate to all conflicts in South Sudan. Therefore, it is important to underly some general issues, which relate to all conflicts in Southern Sudan, and there are specific factors underlying some particular conflicts. Historical methods of conflict mitigation and resolution by respected leaders, where negotiation of land, grazing and water rights need to be shared, have fallen foul to the manipulation of armed malevolence for personal gain<sup>15</sup>. In addition, too many people, particularly the young people in villages, are in possession of small arms<sup>16</sup>. Rule by the force of a gun has replaced rule by respect for values and by the decree of those in authority, whether it is the judge, the chief, the parents or the policeman or woman<sup>17</sup>. Given the years of conflict, many people, particularly in rural areas, feel they are distanced from the normal services provided by the government in general and their security and rule of law institutions in particular<sup>18</sup>.

The situation is also exacerbated by ambiguity over the separation of powers between the law enforcement organs and the fact that most civilians are armed. The presence and uncontrolled use of firearms by civilians remains a serious concern. The issue of protracted war has brought a culture of violence and proliferation of small arms, which in turn is perpetuating more violence<sup>19</sup>. Like any systematic change, removing firearms from one community while allowing the neighbour to keep theirs may not reduce violence but bring it about – such plans need careful negotiation and implementation, with appropriate measures to overcome any real or perceived imbalance of security in either community until the disarmed new context becomes accepted all round<sup>20</sup>.

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<sup>14</sup> M.O. BESHIR, *The Southern Sudan: Background to Conflict*, Khartoum, Khartoum University Press, 1970, pp. 37-55.

<sup>15</sup> J. DOUGLAS, *The Root Causes of Sudan's Civil Wars*, Bloomington, Indiana University Press, 2003, p. 142.

<sup>16</sup> K. HOMEWOOD - E. COAST - D.M. THOMPSON, *In-migrants and exclusion in east African rangelands: Access, tenure and conflict*, «Africa», vol. 74, no. 4, pp. 499-510.

<sup>17</sup> *United Nations Sudan Joint Assessment Mission Report*, vol. III, Cluster Reports, March 18, 2005.

<sup>18</sup> *Ibidem*.

<sup>19</sup> D. FRANCIS, *War of Visions: Conflict of Identities in Sudan*, Washington, DC, Brookings Institution, 1995; A.I. WADI, *Perspectives on Tribal Conflicts in the Sudan*, Khartoum, University of Khartoum, IAAS, 1998, p. 26.

<sup>20</sup> *Ibidem*.

With the advent of independence, it remains a challenge to provide sufficient security. Fear that there is an insufficient provision of security can lead communities to take up arms in order to provide the level of security they think they need. Many institutions are still learning their roles and responsibilities and will take time to overcome these concerns after so many years of conflict. Many ex-combatants were asked to fill the ranks of related rule of law and local government agencies, mostly without time to train them properly or allow them to gain experience in a peaceful context. Now, they face increased pressure to perform, sometimes with the continuing pressure of delivery in a conflict environment.

In addition, the strong and active tradition of heavy dependence on cattle as the source of livelihood persists. Although cattle are used for many purposes such as payment of dowry, income source, food, wealth etc, performing a single traditional marriage would cost a family up to an average of 100 heads of cattle and this is very costly to an average family household, thus resulting into cattle raids and counter raids, flaring insecurity<sup>21</sup>. Therefore, the urge for young men to get married propels them in cattle raids and conflict with other communities<sup>22</sup>. Poverty has made cattle rustling a function of apparent “wealth” acquisition and enhancement of economic and social status. In the circumstances there is a clear lack of sustained economic activities in all the states and communities fall back on cattle. Schools, road and health facilities are poor and communities lack means of income generation.

Another area of concern includes lack of economic opportunities that remains difficult, particularly in rural areas, to make a living in South Sudan; economic opportunities are still limited. Most are employed in traditional agriculture, animal husbandry, forestry, commerce and low-level trade, crafts, construction and services. The economically important oil sector generates little employment for South Sudanese. Some of the reasons cited for the lack of progress include:

- The scarcity of infrastructure, and thus of land served by roads, water points and accessibility to markets.
- Unclear land tenure policies, rules and practices.
- The challenge of providing security and rule of law, thereby enforcing rules and decisions and resolving conflicts peacefully.
- The territorial and symbolic role of land in inter-communal disputes, which are often making a claim on administrative resources<sup>23</sup>.

Claims over land now appear to have been intensified in some areas because of speculation on its future value, and on the possibility of it bearing minerals.

The above causes show that conflict in South Sudan is a complex and multi-dimensional process. In many cases the above factors act together to build pressures, which if not mediated, spill over into conflict.

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<sup>21</sup> A.I. WADI, *Perspectives on Tribal Conflicts in the Sudan*, Khartoum, University of Khartoum, IAAS, 1998, p. 41.

<sup>22</sup> *Ibidem*.

<sup>23</sup> Author's interview with Officials at Ministry of Cooperative and Rural Development, Juba, August 17, 2011.

## 1.2 South Sudan Referendum

The South Sudan Referendum Commission made the final results of the referendum public in Khartoum on February 7, 2011. The world's newest country has been born with confirmation that southern Sudan were almost unanimously for independence from the North<sup>24</sup>. This referendum was conducted in fulfilment of the requirement of the CPA. The South Sudan referendum was the most vital element of the CPA. Meanwhile, the two governments of North and South Sudan have begun the process of disengaging national institutions to form two separate and independent countries as well as to look to the challenges and expectations that lie ahead.

However, general fears are being expressed about what the political situation of the new state after independence. Some observers call it a failed state in waiting that will be marred by political instability and ethnic tensions<sup>25</sup>. There is no doubt that the peace agreement has kept its main promise to stop the war between the Government of Sudan and the SPLM/A. South Sudan and the North have mostly kept the peace. Ending the war is a great achievement; better security and communication have remarkably improved the lives of Southern Sudanese. Nevertheless, the peace agreement has been likened to a cease-fire, since a number of difficult issues have been postponed to future negotiations.

The main protagonists in the referendum from both the National Congress Party (NCP) and Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM) have not agreed yet on several post-referendum issues. Critical components of those negotiations cover citizenship, Abyei, oil revenues, Nile water sharing, and borders among others. Unless resolved, these outstanding issues will continue to cause tensions. The necessity for the future sovereign Sudanese states to cooperate and to build and maintain two economically viable states is fundamental in order for political, economic and social development to take place in the region.

The signing of the CPA, in Nairobi Kenya ushered in a new era of hope for South Sudan. Since that date the three arms of Government: the Judiciary, the Executive and the Legislature have worked ceaselessly to build institutional capacities thus preparing Southern Sudan for the greater role of becoming a new nation<sup>26</sup>. The SPLA has also worked hard to transform itself into a modern National Army. The six years since the signing of the CPA has also resulted in the formation of requisite institutions such as the Human Rights Commission, the Anti-Corruption Commission, the Auditor General's Chamber, the Peace Commission, and others<sup>27</sup>.

The SPLM, as the current ruling party, urges the participation of other political parties in government and representation in parliament<sup>28</sup>. It has also spearheaded a number of dialogues with Sudanese political parties and civil society, including kings, chiefs and community leaders to bring about national reconciliation and healing for sustainable

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<sup>24</sup> D. SMITH, *Soudan referendum results conformed*, «the Guardian», February 2011, (accessed March 19, 2011).

<sup>25</sup> *Ibidem*.

<sup>26</sup> Author's interview with a confidential SPLA source, Juba, August 17, 2011.

<sup>27</sup> *Ibidem*.

<sup>28</sup> *Ibidem*.

peace<sup>29</sup>. GoSS has, together with the 10 State Governors, held annual Governors' Forums to address developmental issues at state level. It has also embarked on Public Service Reforms aimed at bringing about a lean but efficient and effective Civil Service in the post-CPA period<sup>30</sup>.

The six years since 2005 South Sudan also paved the way for tangible peace building and conflict prevention. Donor countries, United Nations agencies, the international and national Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) have worked diligently to ensure that security, roads, health, education, and agriculture are prioritized<sup>31</sup>. With all the above achievements and hard work, Southern Sudan is now poised to reap the benefits befitting a new nation state. Overall, most provisions of the CPA have been implemented. The Interim Constitution of Southern Sudan (2005) and the interim constitutions of the ten States of Southern Sudan have been promulgated and are operational. On the basis of these constitutions, most institutions have been established and are functional.

While the above accomplishment is rewarding, as Southern Sudan moves from semi-autonomous to independent state, tensions are high with fears of internal insecurity and external aggression. There was no violence associated with the January 2011 referendum process, but there has been serious displacement and violence in three main areas since. The escalating tensions in Jonglei, Malakal and Abyei provide a reminder of how quickly violence can erupt and the devastating impact it can have on the livelihoods of people barely recovering from decades of civil war. These three areas remain key flashpoints for current and future violence and the response of national and international actors to the violence being perpetrated there will have a defining influence on the security context of a newly independent state.

### 1.3 The Mekelle Memorandum

In June 2010, the CPA parties signed a Memorandum of Understanding in Mekelle, Ethiopia that committed them to a discussion of the post-referendum issues and outlined its modalities<sup>32</sup>. Such talks would be grounded in the peace agreement but not constitute a renegotiation of it. A joint negotiating team was established, with six members from each party. Four clustered working groups were also established: (1) Citizenships, (2) Security, (3) Financial, Economic, and Natural Resources, and (4) International Treaties and Legal Issues – to review potential arrangements on each issue and feed in to a joint high-level negotiation team. Each group had three to five negotiators from each party and was supported by technical experts as requested<sup>33</sup>.

The talks were bilateral, with an option to request the facilitation of the African Union High-Level Implementation Panel (AUHIP) or other external technical assistance when deemed necessary. According to the facilitator's terms of reference, AUHIP presence

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<sup>29</sup> *Ibidem*.

<sup>30</sup> *Ibidem*.

<sup>31</sup> *Ibidem*.

<sup>32</sup> The Mekelle Memorandum, [http://www.ethioembassy.org.uk/news\\_archive/mekelle\\_memo.htm](http://www.ethioembassy.org.uk/news_archive/mekelle_memo.htm) (accessed May 13, 2011).

<sup>33</sup> *Ibidem*.

in direct negotiations would require the request of both parties, but the panel could initiate discussions, raise issues with either party, provide technical and political advice and be proactive in making proposals<sup>34</sup>.

However, substantive negotiations were limited and there was little progress to report. Working groups were handicapped by the interconnection of issues, minimal sequencing of the agenda and the absence of strategic directives from the parties. The SPLM had too little technical expertise and felt access to information was controlled by their NCP counterparts in government. Requests for disclosure, particularly regarding oil statistics and other economic issues went largely unanswered.

Indeed, significant hurdles remain before peace in South Sudan can be assured for the long-term. Any future peace agreements between the South Sudanese government and dissident elements will face serious challenges in their implementation and remain vulnerable to security threats from spoilers. Ultimately, confidence-building and addressing the root cause of conflict in the South takes time and action, and cannot be achieved simply through paper contracts.

During the CPA period of 2005-2011, negotiators believed that more time would be needed to complete the various negotiations up to a compromise allowing the original timetable to go ahead, as the South wishes, with outstanding matters to be resolved after independence. Both sides are aware that the Eritrea and Ethiopia went to war not just over a disputed border but because of wider issues, especially financial and trade questions, not fully thought through at separation.

These obstacles toward peace are primarily the responsibility of South Sudan's leaders, but the international community also has a supporting role to play. Having helped broker the CPA in 2005 and usher in a historic vote for independence, the international community has had a history of positive engagement with Sudan; it should capitalize on these efforts to see the peace prevail in South Sudan for the long term. Mitigating threats from militias will necessitate not only reconciling and integrating dissident elements, but structural changes to the army and government themselves.

Foreign interference and assistance prolonged these, but external involvement has also been vital in Sudanese peace processes. This was the case with the CPA; the peace process that culminated in the agreement was led and hosted by the neighbouring countries through the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD)<sup>35</sup>, with support for further afield, in particular the United States, United Kingdom, South Africa and Norway. These countries have now intensified their involvement in discussions of post-CPA arrangements. This landmark achievement which was followed by the adoption of an Interim Constitution brought peace to most of the country for the first time in a generation<sup>36</sup>.

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<sup>34</sup> *Ibidem*.

<sup>35</sup> J. YOUNG, *Sudan IGAD Peace Process: An Evaluation*, May 30, 2007, p. 14. The IGAD "Declaration of Principles" was the first suggestion of self-determination by an international body. It also affirmed recognition of Sudan's racial, ethnic, religious and cultural diversity, avowed political and social equality and insisted on the separation of religion and state.

<sup>36</sup> Author's interview with SPLA transformation Advisor, Juba, August 16, 2011.



South Sudan has drawn international attention because of the long referendum process. The CPA provided for a referendum six years after its signing in 2005. The CPA also implied that Southern and Northern Sudan would function as two countries during the interim period of 2005-2011<sup>37</sup>. However, there is potential for serious social, political and military challenges to the Government of Southern Sudan (GoSS) even after independence, which could complicate the process of state formation in the newly independent state.

As South Sudan focuses on recovery and development, the country faces a number of key challenges. Recent tensions in north-south border regions have also highlighted several security issues that constitute potential flashpoints for renewed conflict, including the environmental impacts of the oil industry and the management of the country's water resources. Security will continue to attract substantial resources in the early years of independence as DDR (Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration) programmes continue and there is a transition to a more streamlined defence force<sup>38</sup>. Similarly, as returnees are resettled, and food security improves, the need for humanitarian assistance is expected to decline as well<sup>39</sup>.

## 2. Key Issues

There are still key issues that need to be ironed in the newest African state. The challenge that the post-independence South Sudan issues brings is immense and the strategies to address that challenge are complex and slow. The main protagonists in the referendum from both the NCP and SPLM have not agreed yet on several post-referendum issues including citizenship, Abyei, oil revenues, Nile water sharing, and borders among others.

### 2.1 Citizenship

The complex part is that the CPA did not clearly spell out the fate of Southerners living in the North after separation. There are southerners in the North and also there are northerners in the South. According to some estimates there are over two million Southerners living in the North<sup>40</sup>. With the referendum on January 9, 2011 there was naturally the fear of the unknown as to what would happen to southerners in the North since the South boldly voted for independence. Noises from prominent northern leaders of denying southerners in the North basic services if the South chooses independence have not yet come true.

It stands to reason that NCP will predictably argue that Southerners in the North will forfeit their Sudanese citizenship; hence rights of employment, ownership, residency and entry to North Sudan could all be revoked. More so the critical challenge is with regards to the many Southern citizens who are employed by various state institutions,

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<sup>37</sup> African Union Archives, *The Comprehensive Peace Agreement Between The Government of The Republic of The Sudan and The Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Sudan People's Liberation Army* (document is in the author's possession).

<sup>38</sup> *Ibidem*.

<sup>39</sup> *Ibidem*.

<sup>40</sup> U. LEASSING, *South Sudanese Find Their Way Home Slow Going*, «Reuters», September 28, 2011.

particularly in the military and police force. How the status of Southern citizens will be settled and what are the mechanisms that will be adopted by both the NCP and SPLM to overcome some of these and other associated issues are questions that remain unanswered. In addition, many political and military leaders are now coming back to Southern Sudan after years of working in the North or abroad. The way the SPLM-led government handles this entire process will to a large degree define the nature of the post-independence state in Southern Sudan.

The proposed agreement affirmed that no person's nationality or citizenship would change during the CPA period, regardless of the referendum outcome<sup>41</sup>. Citizens would remain entitled to live anywhere in the country, and their rights as such would remain intact. In the event of secession, a person's status would not be determined until a new state was established in the South after the end of the CPA interim period in July 2011, new citizenship and nationality laws were established in that state, and existing laws were clarified in the Northern state<sup>42</sup>. After these conditions were met, a constitutionally protected transitional period would ensue in which a person might freely choose to retain or acquire citizenship in either state.

The text was largely compatible with a previous SPLM proposal and grounded in state practice and international law. The NCP instead proposed that any person deemed eligible to vote in the referendum would be limited to Southern citizenship and would lose citizenship rights in the North. The question is what might such a policy mean for Northerners in the South? Since the policy appeared inconsistent with existing citizenship laws, was it not a slippery slope with potential implications for many groups in the North?

Therefore, it would be helpful for the international community to monitor the treatment of southerners in the North and the treatment of northerners in the South. Above all it should be part of the undertaking that the North and the South should agree on the safety and welfare of all Sudanese. Dual citizenship may be suggested as the solution. The danger here, however, is that people may have divided loyalty in contrast to being a citizen of only one country. It may be argued that when southerners in the North are given dual citizenship this may not alter their loyalty to the South and so southerners in the North may still suffer harassment. On the other hand dual citizenship may improve North-South relations in the long term. Another solution is for the North and the South to have special relations. This means that northerners in the South do not need to take southern citizenship but will be treated equally with their southern counterpart. This should also apply to southerners in the North. In the special relations northerners and southerners may not need a passport to cross their common international borders either by air, land or sea. As part of the special relations peaceful co-existence should be for dividends to the North and the South.

Finally, the North and the South have a lot to gain by being good neighbours in harmony with each other. People need to move on from conflicts of the past to the future of opportunities to turn the region into a land of prosperity for all. The masses both in the North and the South have the same basic needs for a better and higher

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<sup>41</sup> *Ibidem*.

<sup>42</sup> African Union Archives, *The Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA)*..., cit.

standard of living. This is the challenge to the North and the South. Nonetheless it is hoped common sense will prevail.

## 2.2 Abyei

Located between Northern Bahr al Ghazal, Warrap and Unity states to the South and Southern Kordofan to the North, Abyei is geographically, ethnically and politically caught between North and South. It is home to the Ngok Dinka, while Misseriya nomads migrate seasonally through the territory. The Misseriya belong to a group predominantly Arab Muslim, named Al Baggara. The Dinka Ngok belongs ethnically and racially to the South, and are predominantly Christian<sup>43</sup>. Abyei has long been and remains a flash point, where land, nomadic grazing rights, security and oil contribute to volatility. By way of a protocol, the CPA granted the disputed territory special administrative status under the presidency and its own January 2011 referendum to decide whether to continue that status within the North or become part of the South which is now postponed indefinitely<sup>44</sup>. Just as Abyei threatened to spoil CPA negotiations in 2004, it became clear the issue might prevent an agreement on post-independence arrangements if left unresolved.

Moreover, Misseriya feared that secession of the South possibly including Abyei could result in a loss of grazing rights, thereby threatening their way of life that was practiced for centuries. Some in Khartoum have stoked such concerns and encouraged the Misseriya to fight for participation in the Abyei referendum. The conflict involves the Dinka Ngok ethnic groups supported by the SPLM and the Misseriya ethnic groups supported by the government of Khartoum. The two groups compete over which has rights to the territory and essentially the right to grazing and water resources.

While conflicts between these groups were managed relatively successful in the past through customary land tenure systems, this is less and less the case today as a result of larger herds, reduced water and pasture, instability and prejudices stirred up by the war, and a proliferation of arms among herders<sup>45</sup>. In addition, patron-client politics, weak natural resource management and development policies, and top-down government institutions have encouraged ethnic polarization and social divisions.

Moreover, the Abyei issue is considered the key point to a lasting peace between North and South Sudan. Abyei is a fertile region that has oil deposits between North and South Sudan. However, Abyei's future is very much up in the air, and observers worry the region could again erupt in civil war. Fear is pushing the Ngok Dinka, the town's dominant ethnic group, to consider declaring Abyei part of the South, even though they know that such a move might provoke the North to try to take Abyei by force.

If Abyei's status is left unresolved, the area will be caught between two nations, possibly triggering a return to conflict in Sudan. The 2005 peace agreement, which ended the war, promised the people of Abyei their own referendum on whether to be part of the North or South. The Abyei referendum was supposed to be held

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<sup>43</sup> M.A ABDALLA, *Abyei Natural Resources Conflict Situation Report*, Institute for Security Studies, 2010, p. 1.

<sup>44</sup> Crisis Group Briefing, *Defining the North-South Border*, September 2, 2010.

<sup>45</sup> Various author's discussions with a staff of the Embassy of South Sudan, June 2011.

simultaneously with the main Southern referendum<sup>46</sup>, but the two sides failed to agree on who was eligible to vote. As a result, the Abyei referendum has been postponed indefinitely.

Currently, the situation in Abyei has the potential to degenerate into conventional armed confrontation with increased force mobilization by the armed forces of the North and South. However, there is real concern that the conventional forces can be drawn into a stalemate position and militias and other spoilers are used by both Khartoum and Juba to perpetrate violence in an effort to influence the political situation.

There is still a lot of uncertainty regarding the possibility of holding the referendum in Abyei. The Dinka Ngok had a meeting and issued a statement according to which they would organize their own referendum if it does not take place and they would not allow Misseriya groups to use grazing lands. In parallel, the Misseriya have decided to set up their own government<sup>47</sup>. These developments were described as very worrying. Similarly, it was feared that a separate resolution or agreement between the parties on the referendum in Abyei outside of the CPA would create a precedent to deal with other CPA items separately. These potential tensions will require close monitoring and contingency planning by the African Union (AU) early warning bodies in close coordination with relevant regional and international bodies to ensure early warning and early action, might it be humanitarian, security, technical, political or economic. Increased clashes could push relations between NCP and SPLM to breaking point. As the single most volatile post-independence issue between the two CPA parties, the Abyei dispute could block or derail the negotiations.

Following clashes in January 2011 between Missiriya militia forces and a Joint Integrated Police Unit (JIPU) that left over 30 dead, two meetings were organized to improve the situation<sup>48</sup>. The first was held on January 13, 2011 between Missiriya and Ngok Dinka elders to discuss migration routes through the area. The elders agreed in principle that the Missiriya would be allowed to pass through Abyei in search of pastures as long as blood compensation was paid for Ngok Dinka deaths that occurred during the last migration season and migration routes through the area. As of the beginning of March 2011, the Misseriya have offered to pay the compensation, but there is no agreement on the grazing routes<sup>49</sup>. Despite this, Missiriya have continued entering Abyei and are currently grazing their cattle around the Ragaba es Zarga, a river running through the territory, approximately 30 km from Abyei town. As they press further south, the absence of a grazing agreement will become increasingly problematic.

Furthermore, hence, nothing guarantees the ethnic groups involved in the Abeyi case can be mobilized to secede from South Sudan and create yet another new state, especially since the southern population hopes that secession will bring about a quick improvement in the quality of life and expectation present in most secessionist regions,

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<sup>46</sup> African Union Archives, *The Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA)*..., cit.

<sup>47</sup> *Misserya forms alternative government for Abyei*, «Sudan Tribune», December 4, 2010.

<sup>48</sup> *Ibidem*.

<sup>49</sup> *Ibidem*.



This is the first time for the two countries to sign an agreement over the borders since South Sudan independence in July 2011. The Minister disclosed that establishing the corridors aims at easing the interconnection between the people of the two countries, affirming that the concerned parties in both countries will continue their work in the demarcation process<sup>55</sup>. For his part, the South Sudanese Minister of Defense described the meeting as successful adding that it is the first meeting between the two countries to discuss the bordering issues, stating the good relations between the two nations<sup>56</sup>.

### 3. Sharing of resources

#### 3.1 Oil Revenue

Chinese and Indian companies dominate oil production in South Sudan but according to Amum, the secretary general of the SPLM and negotiating team, which has been meeting with their Khartoum counterparts in Addis Ababa, he hopes that South Sudan's disassociation with Khartoum will allow more Western companies to invest and have a presence there<sup>57</sup>. «There's a lot of interest from companies from the Western world... the pariah nature of the Sudanese system made it politically difficult for Western companies to be engaged»<sup>58</sup>.

The sharing of oil revenue is an important contestation. Both the North and South Sudan depend heavily on oil revenues, and independence alerted resource ownership and current wealth-sharing arrangements<sup>59</sup>. Oil was not addressed in great detail in the CPA talks. There should have been some level of agreement before the referendum, not only because both economies need uninterrupted revenue, but also in order to sustain the confidence of oil companies in their existing investments.

Norway has been providing technical support and advice on petroleum sector management, assisting the National Petroleum Commission in preparation for an audit, and supporting assessment of prospects in the face of declining production<sup>60</sup>. It has engaged both parties on models for cooperation and optimisation of economic potential.

In addition, the AUHIP document proposed a joint review of all government assets and liabilities and principles for equitable allocation; it agreed to fully fund and complete the Popular Consultations processes in Blue Nile and Southern Kordofan before the CPA interim period; it committed to principles for a soft North-South border including a joint funding mechanism to promote cross-border activities; and it put forward a series of

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<sup>55</sup> *Ibidem*.

<sup>56</sup> *Ibidem*.

<sup>57</sup> *Sudan's oil fee demand forces South to consider new pipeline*, C:\Users\User\Desktop\Post referendum Sudan\Sudan's oil fee demand forces South to consider new pipeline - Sudan Tribune Plural news and views on Sudan.mht (accessed September 11, 2011).

<sup>58</sup> *Ibidem*.

<sup>59</sup> Oil is responsible for roughly 60% of the Government of Sudan's revenues. *Sudan Economic Report*, Bank Audi sal-Audi Saradar Group, December 2009.

<sup>60</sup> *Ibidem*.

less binding principles on security, water and continuation of joint exploitation of oil resources<sup>61</sup>.

While South Sudan enjoys a certain degree of autonomy by having its own legislature, security forces and control over governmental revenues, a separation between the two regions would mainly lead to an increase in the oil revenues that South Sudan receives, consequently lowering profits from oil exploration for the North. Yet, the South possesses no infrastructure to sell its oil on the world market, as all of these are located in the North. It barely has any paved roads, making it impossible for trucks to carry its oil, and there is no pipelines connecting its oil fields to other countries. Hence, the issue of wealth sharing might prove to be difficult to negotiate, and the destiny of Sudanese oil exploration unclear.

Perilously, the territorial division proposed by the referendum runs along the conflict lines of the three decade civil war, a historical fact which weights on the relationship between both players. Due to the heavy militarization of the border, even small skirmishes might trigger a broader conflict, especially around the town of Abyei which is supposed to have its own referendum to decide whether to stay with the North or the South.

Currently South Sudan is totally dependent on Port Sudan located in the North<sup>62</sup>. Therefore, for the next five years South Sudan will have to rent the Northern oil pipeline, refineries and facilities at Port Sudan to sell its oil. In the meantime, South Sudan officials insisted that building an oil pipeline through Kenya to the Indian Ocean may be more cost effective than paying the transport and refinery fees demanded by North Sudan. Furthermore, under a 2005 peace deal South Sudan shared its oil wealth 50-50 with Khartoum for six years. Since southern independence a new deal has been hard to come by. Sudan's president has threatened not to allow South Sudan to use its infrastructure unless it pays \$32 a barrel<sup>63</sup>.

South Sudan, which began negotiations by offering less than half a dollar per barrel, says it will not accept customs fees above \$7 per barrel for oil from new oil fields and \$4 per barrel from existing ones<sup>64</sup>. If not handled diplomatically this could trigger a wave of unrest, raids and attacks on the South.

### 3.2 Nile waters

The Nile is the longest river basin in the world stretching about 6,825 km (about 4,320 miles). It is estimated that the Nile River carries 84 billion cubic meters of water. The Nile has ten riparian states: Burundi, Egypt, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Kenya, Democratic Republic of Congo, Rwanda, Sudan, Tanzania, and Uganda. The birth of the new state will affect the political dynamics of the Nile countries by becoming the eleventh riparian state that shares the Nile water. It is predicted that it would increase regional

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<sup>61</sup> African Union, *African Union High Level Implementation Panel on Sudan*, Khartoum, November 15, 2010, [http://www.africa-union.org/root/ar/index/AUHIP\\_Statement1.pdf](http://www.africa-union.org/root/ar/index/AUHIP_Statement1.pdf) (accessed December 7, 2010).

<sup>62</sup> Author's interview with Professor Samson S. Wassara, University of Juba, South Sudan, Juba, August 17, 2011.

<sup>63</sup> *Ibidem*.

<sup>64</sup> *Ibidem*.

competition for the same water. During the field research in Juba the author raises the following questions: how this new situation will affect the 1959 Nile Water Agreement between Egypt and the Sudan? Would the independent South ask for a share of the 18.5 cubic meters of water allotted to Sudan in that agreement or as a new riparian country would it join other upper riparian states in their collective stand against the old treaties by signing the Cooperative Framework Agreement (CFA)?

About 14% of the Nile waters pass through Southern Sudan to the north and Egypt. Some billion cubic meters more could be extracted from the Southern Sudan where it is currently lost to evaporation. Yet the CPA does not deal in any detail with Nile waters. Despite the CPA's neglect of Nile waters, recent developments have led six of the upper riparian states including Ethiopia, Kenya, Rwanda, Uganda, and Burundi to sign the new Nile water sharing agreement known as the Cooperative Framework Agreement in Entebbe, Uganda on May 14, 2010<sup>65</sup>. Upon its ratification by the respective legislatures of the signatory countries, the CFA will be binding to all members of the Nile Basin Initiative (NBI). The Nile Basin Commission will be established upon ratification of the CFA instrument by a majority of six member states<sup>66</sup>. This has made it inevitable that Nile waters issues would be included in the post-independence arrangement.

Another area of concern for South Sudan, Sudan and Egypt alike will be the resumption of work on the Jonglei Canal. After the initial implementation on the 1978 project and after two-thirds of the canal had been dug, a series of SPLA attacks forced suspension of the work in 1984. The emergence of the South as an independent state would have a dramatic effect.

Though water and sanitation services and electrification have received priority attention due to their impact on poverty, growth and human wellbeing, currently only 55% of the population has access to improved sources of drinking water and sanitation remains a challenge with 80% of the population not having access to any toilet facilities<sup>67</sup>. The Nile is the only resource of water for the entire population in and around Juba and the major water facility is under function due to electric shortages and outdated machinery that needs constant maintenance<sup>68</sup>. This led to unregulated water pumping from the Nile at both individual household levels and commercial levels as a whole. Despite this concern there is no data available to measure the amount of water withdrawn from the Nile.

Regarding how the Nile's water sharing would be solved, the Undersecretary of the Ministry of Water Resources highlighted that the Nile water issue can only be tackled effectively through regional and international cooperation and a continuous efforts by

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<sup>65</sup> Y. ARSANO, *Negotiations for a Nile-Cooperative Framework Agreement*, in *ISS Occasional Paper 222*, (January 2011), p. 5.

<sup>66</sup> Nile Basin Initiative, [http://www.nilebasin.org/newsite/index.php?option=com\\_content&view=article&id=70%3Aburundi-signs-the-nile-cooperative-framework-agreement-pdf&catid=40%3Alatest-news&Itemid=84&lang=en](http://www.nilebasin.org/newsite/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=70%3Aburundi-signs-the-nile-cooperative-framework-agreement-pdf&catid=40%3Alatest-news&Itemid=84&lang=en) (accessed July 17, 2011).

<sup>67</sup> Author's interview with Undersecretary of the Ministry of Water Resources and Irrigation and chief negotiator on CFA, Juba, August 17, 2011.

<sup>68</sup> Author's interview with Officials at the Ministry of Energy, Juba, August 18, 2011.



individual states<sup>69</sup>. He further indicated that the Nile Basin states should enter negotiations to divide the Nile to everyone's benefit and to support cooperation over common interests. South Sudan is committed to cooperate with Egypt and North Sudan and Ethiopia on a project-by-project basis. South Sudan believes that this can be achieved as a parallel approach: the project track and the CFA track<sup>70</sup>.

As far as the CFA is concerned and the possibility of South Sudan's signing: to date South Sudan has only an observer status on the NBI and cannot be a part of the signatory party, but once the state is fully established, it will decide its position on the agreement<sup>71</sup>. In regards to the 1959 Agreement, South Sudan supports a fair distribution of the Nile water and clearly stated that it is entitled to and expects a share of the 18.5 billion cubic meters of water that was allotted to Sudan, the argument being South Sudan was part of that process and could play a significant role including the construction of the Jonglei Canal that is located in its territory<sup>72</sup>.

In addition, responding to a question about how the Nile Waters issue would be solved in case of secession, Pagan Amum, secretary general of the SPLM, told *al-sharq al-awsat* that the Nile Basin states should enter negotiations to divide the Nile to everyone's benefit; to agree on how to manage water to ensure that all rights are protected; to protect the Nile itself from disaster; and to support cooperation to attain common interests<sup>73</sup>. In regards to the possibility of Southern Sudan signing the CFA in case of secession, Amum said: «We support fair distribution of the Nile waters, but we are not a state yet, and we will decide our position on this agreement should we become a state. This is a question that must wait until 2011»<sup>74</sup>.

A water crisis may well develop between North and South. Once agricultural projects in the South are rehabilitated, they will need water. Water consumption would also increase with the return of displaced people and refugees.

Southern Sudan will not be able to change the facts of geography, nor the direction of the flow of the Nile River, nonetheless their position will have a tremendous impact on the politics of the Nile and the disputed sharing of Nile waters. Sudan, Egypt and the group of upstream countries would all work hard to bring the new state into their camp.

The issue of South Sudan secession is a sensitive one to Cairo largely owing to its impact on the Nile Water Agreements and the possible reallocation of shares. Sudan and Egypt may reconsider their position regarding inclusion of inherited right in the CFA. Egypt and Sudan may want to cooperate with other Basin states in accordance with international law.

Southern Sudan could also assume the role of mediator between the upstream and downstream countries for fair distribution of water and enhancement of basin-wide cooperation rather than collective standing with one side or the other. Egypt will

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<sup>69</sup> *Ibidem*.

<sup>70</sup> *Ibidem*.

<sup>71</sup> *Ibidem*.

<sup>72</sup> *Ibidem*.

<sup>73</sup> Interview with Pagan Amum..., cit.

<sup>74</sup> *Ibidem*.

continue discussions with other riparian countries and cooperate to build a bridge and reach a final agreement that will satisfy all the Nile Basin countries.

As a Nile-valley neighbour to the North, Egypt will inevitably be affected by Sudan's political transition. It is important for the development of the whole region that Egypt finds a way to continue constructive interaction with political forces in both Northern and Southern Sudan<sup>75</sup>. The Sudan is building new dams with the support from China, a country over which Egypt has little influence. It has been predicted that by the end of 2010 Sudan will be using its entire water allocation under the 1959 treaty, thus disposing of any surplus flowing North to Egypt.

Furthermore, an independent South Sudan reopens the issue of the Jonglei Canal, which is intended to benefit Sudan and Egypt by bypassing the South; John Garang, the late SPLM leader, favoured the canal in principle, but political sentiments in a newly separate South Sudan are far from clear. It appears that the immediate situation will be one in which Egypt and Sudan still stand together in regard to CFA, since Sudan is not likely to benefit under a new agreement. However, the way in which South Sudan sees Jonglei is less clear: Egypt suggested that it could recognize the separation of the South in return for its support of the status quo on the division of the waters, but the South will also have to consider its relations with upper riparian states neighbours and their position on the CFA. In addition to the Jonglei canal itself, there are reports of Egyptian engineers working on smaller scale operation related to improved water management and flow on tributaries of the White Nile, especially the Bahr al-Ghazal. Moreover, on August 9, 2006 Egypt and South Sudan signed a memorandum of understanding regarding technical support, assessment of water project including forecasting flood and drought, and restudies of the Jonglei Canal<sup>76</sup>.

The Egyptian minister of Irrigation and Water resources visited Southern Sudan in April 2007 to confirm his government's commitment to this agreement. A joint delegation from the national ministry of Irrigation and the South Sudanese government also visited Egypt. According to press accounts, that visit resulted in a memorandum of work on the Jonglei Canal<sup>77</sup>. Completion of the Jonglei Canal would increase Egypt's share of Nile waters. On May 9, 2010, the Egyptian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Ahmed Aboul Gheit, and Omar Suleiman, the Egyptian Chief of Intelligence, visited Khartoum and Juba to emphasize Egypt's strategic interest in the security, unity and stability of Sudan<sup>78</sup>. «We will do everything in our power to save the unity of Sudan», Abul Gheit told reporters in Khartoum after talks with President Beshir<sup>79</sup>.

Various means are being used to strengthen the Egyptian position in the South in case of secession, including investments in development projects. In July 2010, Egypt announced a \$300 million grant for building potable water complexes, drilling thirty

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<sup>75</sup> J. GLASSMAN, *Nile Water*, «Journal of African History», vol. 33, iss. I, 1999, pp. 149-50.

<sup>76</sup> «Sudan Tribune», April 18, 2007.

<sup>77</sup> *Ibidem*.

<sup>78</sup> *Ibidem*.

<sup>79</sup> Sudan Watch, *High Level Egyptian Officials Visit Khartoum and Juba-Egypt urges Sudan unity ahead of referendum*, May 9, 2010, <http://sudanwatch.blogspot.com/2010/05/high-level-egyptian-officials-visit.html>. (accessed May 25, 2011).

wells, setting up river ports, and upgrading electricity and water networks<sup>80</sup>. New programmes in the South have included numerous university scholarships for Southerners, as well as support for schools, hospitals and water projects in the region. Indeed some have even remarked that Egypt has done far more «to make unity attractive» for the South than the North has done<sup>81</sup>.


Egypt is working to bring the independent Southern state around the collective stand of Sudan and Egypt against other riparian countries. This, however, raises the question of whether an independent South's interests would be better served by cooperation with neighbouring upstream riparian countries or by cooperation with Egypt and Sudan. The Egyptian position would also be affected by relations between the new Southern state and the North: if North-South relations deteriorate, Egypt would need to consider its own interests.

#### 4. Recommendations and Conclusions

Indeed, during the first years of independence South Sudan will have to focus on state and nation building, deepening peace building, preventing conflict, improving security, and bringing about a process of rapid economic development to reduce poverty. Improved security and sustained peace should improve people's wellbeing directly

<sup>80</sup> Egypt to grant South Sudan \$300 million for water and electricity projects, «Sudan Tribune», July 12, 2010, <http://www.sudantribune.com/Egypt-to-grant-South-Sudan-300,35639> (accessed May 22, 2011).

<sup>81</sup> H.A. HASSAN - A. AL RASHEEDY, *The Nile River and Egyptian Foreign Policy Interest*, «African Sociological Review», vol. 11, no. 1, 2007, pp. 25-27.



while underpinning efforts to reduce poverty. Security matters for the business environment and the confidence that is important to local and international investors.

In addition, the new nation must consolidate the institutional and governance mechanisms developed during the CPA interim period. Good governance, includes transparency and accountability, builds confidence, stability and the credibility of government. The top priority for independent South Sudan should also include actions that improve and expand social services; and rural development built on infrastructure expansion. There is also a need to focus on establishing and strengthening the basic principles of professionalism as applied to the operation of government systems and administration.

Moreover, water and sanitation services and electrification will also need priority attention due to their impact on poverty, growth and human wellbeing. Both will need resources to continue expanding access to these basic services and to strengthen operations and maintenance.

The research findings suggest that the starting point for South Sudan is the need to address the key nation building, state building and peace building objectives of a new nation recovering from conflict. Insecurity was highlighted in consultations as a continuing concern and has numerous causes, including clashes between communities over cattle and access to grazing land, breakdown of cultural values and norms, the availability of arms, and lack of economic opportunities. The consequences of insecurity include large number of displaced persons, continuing food insecurity, disruption to social services and increased poverty.

Despite the international community efforts, significant hurdles remain before peace in South Sudan can be assured. Any future peace agreements between the South Sudanese government and dissident elements will face serious challenges in their implementation and remain vulnerable to security threats from spoilers. Ultimately, confidence-building and addressing the root cause of conflict in the South takes time and action, and cannot be achieved simply through paper contracts.

South Sudan is a poor region, despite its abundant natural resources, largely due to protracted conflict. Most South Sudanese are engaged in agriculture and grazing activities, oil and the public sector dominate the formal economy. Unemployment and underemployment are very high with little formal sector employment. Oil provided 98% of public sector revenue and almost all foreign exchange earnings. Therefore, South Sudan needs to diversify the economy, develop other sources of public revenue, and expand employment and livelihood opportunities. A core component of this growth will be building the Government's non-oil revenues.

It is difficult to search for any positive, credible aspect to make one believe that referendum and the road to secession will go smoothly and without any bumps. Historically, Sudan has been the stage of one of the longest and bloodiest conflicts of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, giving its population a specific historical background and a strong argument to secede. The challenge that the post-independence issues brings in South Sudan is immense and the strategies to address that challenge is complex and slow. Mitigating threats from militias, though, will necessitate not only reconciling and integrating dissident elements, but structural changes to the army and government

themselves. These obstacles toward peace are primarily the responsibility of South Sudan's leaders, but the international community also has a supporting role to play. Having helped broker the Comprehensive Peace Agreement in 2005 and usher in a historic vote for independence, the international community has had a history of positive engagement with Sudan, it should capitalize on these efforts to see the peace prevails in South Sudan for the long term. The momentum toward peace in South Sudan is now, and this momentum must be maintained.

In addition, people in the South will need to feel there is a peace dividend. If they do not, there is a serious risk of a resurgence of violence. In the mid term, large-scale, bottom-up and locally-led peace-building efforts will need to be encouraged in the South and in border regions by a coordinated international community committed to the search for models avoiding old style condominium as well as ethnic or religion based local governance. Citizenship models, community-level governance, and sound approaches to disarmament and small arms proliferation will need to be developed by South Sudan itself.

Moreover, the findings of this research suggest that measures are needed to reform the process of natural resource management, making land use planning more comprehensive, building on local livelihood systems, and increasing public spending on infrastructures. In addition, sustainable property rights on farmland and on mobile resources should be redefined and informal conflict management mechanisms restored to the extent that this is possible.

It is also important that any current external engagement with Sudan must recognize the need to adopt both a historical approach and a holistic pan-Sudan perspective which take into account the dynamic interconnections between the country's multiple interlocking conflicts. Sudan is Africa's largest country and features great racial, religious, and cultural diversities. It is not sufficient to focus on only one of Sudan's regions, or merely on the relations between north and south, or between Darfur and the rest of the country. Furthermore, Sudan has significant regional interconnections with neighbouring states in the Horn of Africa, East, Central, and North Africa, as well as the Middle East. Sudanese ownership of the CPA is critical, but external third-party actors can play positive roles. History has shown that effective implementation of policy goals within Sudan can depend on a convergence of purpose between internal Sudanese political constituencies and regional and external actors.

Finally, natural resource management and rehabilitation are not only fundamental prerequisites to peace-building in the South Sudan, but they must become a national priority if the country is achieved long-term social stability and prosperity.

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