
A UN-INSTRAW Background Paper

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Associazione Diaspora e Pace (ADEP) is an association of Somali women living Italy that works for the empowerment of Somali women, both in Somali and as migrants in the Diaspora, in collaboration with the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and local authorities.

Women, Peace and Security in Somalia:
Implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 1325
A UN-INSTRAW Background Paper
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<tr>
<td>AMISOM</td>
<td>African Union Mission to Somalia</td>
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<td>ARPCT</td>
<td>Alliance for Restoration of Peace and Counter-Terrorism</td>
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<td>ARS</td>
<td>Alliance for Re-Liberation of Somalia</td>
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<td>CSO</td>
<td>civil society organisation</td>
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<td>CISS</td>
<td>Coordination of International Support to Somalia</td>
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<td>COSIC</td>
<td>Council of Somali Islamic Courts</td>
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<td>FAO</td>
<td>Food and Agriculture Organization</td>
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<td>FGM</td>
<td>female genital mutilation</td>
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<td>ICU</td>
<td>Islamic Court Union</td>
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<td>IGAD</td>
<td>Intergovernmental Authority on Developments</td>
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<td>IOM</td>
<td>International Organisation for Migration</td>
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<td>JNA</td>
<td>Joint Needs Assessment</td>
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<td>NGO</td>
<td>non-governmental organisation</td>
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<td>OCHA</td>
<td>United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs</td>
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<td>SIDA</td>
<td>Swedish Agency for International Development Cooperation</td>
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<td>SNA</td>
<td>Somalia National Alliance</td>
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<td>SSDF</td>
<td>Somali Salvation Democratic Front</td>
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<td>SWDO</td>
<td>Somali Women's Democratic Organisation</td>
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<td>TFC</td>
<td>Transitional Federal Charter of Somalia</td>
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<td>TFG</td>
<td>Transitional Federal Government of Somalia</td>
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<td>TFI</td>
<td>Transitional Federal Institutions of Somalia</td>
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<td>TFP</td>
<td>Transitional Federal Parliament of Somalia</td>
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<td>TNA</td>
<td>Transitional National Assembly</td>
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<td>UNDP</td>
<td>United Nations Development Fund</td>
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<td>UN-INSTRAW</td>
<td>United Nations International Research and Training Institute for the Advancement of Women</td>
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<td>UNSC</td>
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1. Background

This background paper aims to provide a background to the issues that will be discussed at the International Conference on Gender and Peace in Somalia: Implementation of Resolution 1325, held in Dar-es-Salaam, Tanzania from 2 to 4 September 2008. This conference, co-organised by the United Nations International Research and Training Institute for the Advancement of Women (UN-INSTRAW) and the Associazione Diaspora e Pace (ADEP) and financed by the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Italian Embassy in Nairobi, concludes the project of the same name.

The paper presents an overview of the Somali conflict and peace process from the perspective of Somali women, considering especially the implementation of the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325 on Women, Peace and Security (Resolution 1325) in Somalia. It gives a short introduction to Resolution 1325 and to the UN-INSTRAW/ADEP project, followed by a context-specific analysis of women's roles in Somali culture and society. Section three gives a historical background of the conflict and of the participation of women's organisations in ongoing peace and state-building processes. Section four looks at the roles of men and women in the Somali Diaspora, and the relations between Somali women of the Diaspora and women still living in Somalia, and concludes with a brief discussion of the International Conference.

The background paper focuses on the peace and State-building processes in Southern and Central Somalia, in addition to a gender-sensitive analysis of Somali Transitional Federal Institutions (TFI). The political development and gender policies of the authorities of Puntland and Somaliland will therefore be considered in less depth. The paper is based on a desk review and on the outcomes of two seminars held in Italy within the framework of the project, the first one in Milan on 23-24 February 2008 and the second in Bari on 3-4 May 2008.

1.1 Introduction

Since Siad Barre's regime collapsed in 1991, a highly chaotic civil war has plagued Somalia. The country has been without an effective government for more than seventeen years and the war has left the civilian population to suffer endless waves of violence. Only the north-western region of Somaliland, which has claimed its independence, and the autonomous region of Puntland in the Northeast, have relatively functioning public administrations. More than one million people are internally displaced, and even more people have left the country to resettle in other countries of Africa, the Persian Gulf, Europe, Australia and North America.

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The humanitarian crisis caused by the war has made Somalia one of the poorest countries in the world, with almost half of the population living on less than a US$1 a day and with a life expectancy of no more than fifty years. The birth rate is more than six children per woman, and on average forty-five women die every day in childbirth, while one out of four children die before the age of five. Somalia has the lowest primary school enrolment in Africa, especially for women: the gross enrolment rate of girls is only 15% (in comparison to 27% for boys) and female adult literacy rates are almost half of male adult literacy (27% for women compared to 50% for men).

The situation in Somalia has worsened dramatically in recent years; in particular the current global food crisis has hit the country hard. The Somali shilling fell by 136% during spring 2008 and food prices have gone up exponentially over this same period, forcing Somalis to pay over five times more than last autumn for basic products such as rice and oil. In vast areas of Somalia, more than 24% of people were suffering from acute malnutrition by the end of spring 2008, and some parts the country were already very close to famine. In May, the UN Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO) reported that 2.6 million Somalis needed food assistance, a number that is expected to reach 3.5 million by the end of 2008 if the humanitarian situation does not improve.

In addition, the armed clashes between government forces and their Ethiopian and American allies, and armed opposition groups, have contributed to the humanitarian crisis. Over 60% of the population of Mogadishu has been displaced since November 2007 as a result of the fights against the Islamic Courts, also known as the Islamic Court Union (ICU) and later as the Council of Somali Islamic Courts (COSIC). The most recent peace agreement, signed on 9 June 2008, has not yet brought about the stability Somali desperately needs. The parties to the agreement – the Somali Transitional Federal Government (TFG) and the main faction of the armed opposition group Alliance for Re-Liberation of Somalia (ARS) which includes leaders of the Islamic Courts – have both taken part in almost daily clashes during the last months. In August, the conflict took an even worse turn as ten ministers of the TFG resigned due to Prime Minister Mr. Nur Hassan Hussain's dismissal of the mayor of Mogadishu, an ally of Somalia's President Mr. Abdullahi Yusuf. This political crisis has not improved the severe insecurity of Somalia, as people are continuing their daily struggle for survival and the numbers of assaulted, injured and killed civilians continue to rise.

Sexual and gender-based violence is widespread in Somalia. It is difficult to determine the number of cases of sexual violence in any society, and even more so in times of war. However, it is certain that Somali women are exposed to extremely high risks of rape, forced marriage, female genital mutilation (FGM) and other forms of gender-based violence. Survivors of sexual violence can count on little hope for support or redress due to the lack

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5. OCHA 2006, p. 47.
of functioning state institutions, including both the health and security sectors. The stigmatisation of rape also keeps many women from reporting violence to traditional clan-based or religious justice mechanisms, where they exist. Women's organisations have taken on the main responsibility for meeting the basic needs of society, such as health care, education and trade. Women are traditionally the caretakers, and hence responsible for bringing up new generations of Somalis, a role of ever greater importance in a country where 44% of the population is younger than fifteen years of age. Women also continue to support the basic infrastructure of society by investing in agriculture and small businesses, contributing to a flourishing local economy despite the lack of state institutions. Somali women have also engaged actively in the peace process by building bridges over clan affiliations, even if they have only been marginally included in official institutions and structures.

The International Organisation for Migration (IOM) estimates that there are up to three million Somali nationals living abroad, though this does not include the new generations of the Somali Diaspora and those who have been naturalised in their new home countries. The Somali Diaspora has become an essential actor in both the Somali civil war and in the peace process, including the women of exile communities. However, developments within the Somali Diaspora, alongside those in Somalia, have created a gap between the culture of exile and in-country Somalis. This gap also exists between women in Somalia and women of the Diaspora, as well as between women of different Somali Diaspora communities due to the differences in opportunities offered to Somalis in various countries. A common ground for confrontation and understanding must be created if Diaspora women's engagement in the peace process is to reflect both their own priorities, and the needs of women in Somalia.

For several years, women of the Somali Diaspora have been trying to forge a more active role for themselves in terms of supporting women's participation in the Somali peace process. The UN-INSTRAW/ADEP project “Gender and Peace in Somalia: Implementation of Resolution 1325” has for the first time taken Resolution 1325 as a stepping stone for promoting the role of women of the Somali Diaspora in Italy. The work of the project has shown that it is of great importance to work for Diaspora women's participation both in the Somali peace process and with Somali women's grassroots organisations, since Diaspora women need to be included in all levels of governance work in Somalia.

Many women activists live between Somalia and a foreign country such as Kenya, Italy, Canada, or the United Kingdom. This generates an active networking process between women's groups in and outside of Somalia, though usually on an informal basis. The current TFG has set up a Ministry for Gender, Development and Family Affairs. The Transitional Federal Charter (TFC) states that at least 12% of the Transitional Federal Parliament (TFP) should be made up of women, though only a part of this small quota has actually been filled. Much remains to be done in order to engage more women – both as candidates and as voters – in the national elections currently scheduled for 2009.

1.1. **UN Security Council Resolution 1325**

In October 2000, the United Nations Security Council adopted Resolution 1325 on Women, Peace and Security (Resolution 1325). This Resolution has been considered a small charter

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15. IOM Somalia.
16. UN Security Council Resolution 1325 (2000) is outlined according to the following 18 paragraphs:
   - Increase the representation of women in decision-making for the prevention, management and resolution of conflict and peace processes;
   - Increase the participation of women at decision-making levels in conflict resolution and peace processes;
in itself for the women's movement regarding the roles of women in war and post-conflict situations. The main issues addressed by Resolution 1325 can be summarised by the "three P's:" Protection of the human rights of women and girls during times of armed conflict, Prevention of gender-based violence, and the equal Participation of women in peace-building and reconstruction processes. The adoption of Resolution 1325 was certainly a breakthrough, since it was the first Security Council Resolution to address gender issues and the role of women. With this Resolution, the UN's executive body for the maintenance of peace and security takes a clear stand for the need to ensure women's security in armed conflict; for the recognition of the vital role of women in post-conflict resolution and reconstruction; for gender-responsive disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration processes; against the impunity of perpetrators of sexual violence; and for women's empowerment and inclusion in peace-building processes.

One post-conflict country that has taken Resolution 1325 into account in many parts of its peace-building processes is Liberia, largely as a result of the commitment of current president Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf. For example, the Office of the Gender Advisor (OGA) of the United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) has a specific mandate to mainstream gender in UNMIL's activities. In addition, the OGA also collaborates with the Liberian National Government, women's NGOs and the UN System including UN-INSTRAW for the implementation of Resolution 1325. Regarding women's political participation, the OGA has for example provided leadership training for potential women candidates. Together with the Liberian Women's Initiative (a local NGO) and its leader Etweda "Sugars" Cooper, the OGA has also advocated for the nomination of 30% women candidates in political parties. Moreover, the Liberian Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) has established a Committee on Gender, including UNMIL, UNIFEM, women's NGOs and the Liberian Ministry of Gender. The Committee intends among other things to work for greater female participation in the TRC process and to develop a TRC gender policy document.

Another example of the implementation of Resolution 1325 in Africa is the work of the UN

- Increase the appointment of women as special representatives and envoys;
- Expand the role of women in field-based operations as military observers, civilian police, human rights and humanitarian personnel;
- Incorporate gender perspectives into peacekeeping operations and ensure that field operations include a gender component;
- Provide training guidelines and materials on the rights and needs of women to Member States and incorporate gender perspectives into national training programmes;
- Increase voluntary financial, technical and logistical support from Member States for gender-sensitive training efforts;
- Adopt a gender perspective in negotiation and implementation of peace agreements, including attention to the special needs of women and girls, support local women’s peace initiatives, and ensure protection and respect for the human rights of women and girls;
- Ensure respect for international law applicable to the rights and protection of women and girls;
- Adopt special measures to protect women and girls from gender-based violence;
- End impunity and prosecute those responsible for genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes, including those related to sexual and other violence against women and girls;
- Ensure respect for the civilian and humanitarian character of refugee camps and settlements and take into account the particular needs of women and girls;
- Consider the different needs of female and male ex-combatants and the needs of their dependants in disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) initiatives;
- Give consideration to the potential impact on civilians, and the special needs of women and girls, and appropriate humanitarian exemptions, in measures adopted under Article 41 of the UN Charter;
- Ensure that Security Council missions take gender considerations and rights of women into account, including through consultation with local and international women’s groups;
- Invite the Secretary-General to carry out a study on the impact of armed conflict on women and girls, the role of women in peace-building and the gender dimensions of peace processes and conflict resolution and submit a report to the Security Council;
- Request the Secretary-General to include in his reporting to the Security Council progress on gender mainstreaming throughout peacekeeping missions;
- The Security Council remains actively seized of the matter.

Population Fund (UNFPA) in Côte d’Ivoire, where Centres of Excellence have been created to sensitise the local population about sexual and gender-based violence, in collaboration with women lawyers. To make sure sex-disaggregated data exist for the purpose of planning programme activities, UNFPA and the Ministry of Women and the Family of Côte d’Ivoire have undertaken a study on the various forms of violence perpetrated during the armed conflict.21

Together with the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW), adopted in 1979 by the UN General Assembly, Resolution 1325 is a strong international tool for the promotion of gender equality and women's empowerment in the context of peace and security. Moreover, on 19 June 2008 the Security Council adopted Resolution 1820 for the “immediate and complete halt to acts of sexual violence.” This Resolution reinforces Resolution 1325 in its mandate to protect women and girls from gender-based violence in times of conflict, noting that “women and girls are particularly targeted by the use of sexual violence, including as a tactic of war to humiliate, dominate, instil fear in, disperse and/or forcibly relocate civilian members of a community or ethnic group.” However, for women to actually be protected from violence and participate actively in peace negotiations and state-building processes, the rhetoric of these resolutions must be put into practice.

The full implementation of Resolution 1325 is not an easy process. Most actors in conflict and post-conflict settings, from the warring parties and peacekeeping forces, to international organisations and peace negotiating delegations, usually have a strong male bias against the inclusion of women, or indeed any non-traditional actors. If the gender dimensions of conflict and peace-building situations are not taken into consideration, and women's voices are not heard in these processes, the impact on the fragile peace may be very negative. For example, the many women's grassroots organisations in Somalia have much experience to share in the peace-building process to ensure a sustainable peace. Likewise, gender relations in Somalia have changed due to the appearance of more female-headed households, among other things, and women's new priorities must be heard and considered for the sustainable and inclusive reconstruction of Somali society.22

Governments, international organisations, civil society and other actors within peace-building processes therefore need to prioritise the inclusion of women in their work to ensure a sustainable peace. To that end, national action plans for the implementation of Resolution 1325 are a good example of how to proceed in this direction. For this purpose, UN-INSTRAW has developed a guide to the development of national action plans, Securing Equality, Engendering Peace: A guide to policy and planning on women, peace and security (2006), and the Institute provides awareness-raising and capacity-building on its practical application.23 UN-INSTRAW works among other things to promote the full and sustainable implementation of Resolution 1325 through research, advocacy and capacity-building to support governments and women's organisations in their attempt to integrate a gender perspective in peace and State-building processes.

In relation to Somalia, it is still too early to outline a National Action Plan for the implementation of Resolution 1325, since there is no central authority that can ensure and monitor its execution. Likewise, as international organisations for emergency relief are

21. UNFPA June 2007
forced to withdraw due to the high levels of violence against aid workers, UN agencies and NGOs have increasing difficulties to guarantee the support needed for Resolution 1325, for example to provide protection for displaced women and girls. What can be done at this stage of the armed conflict is to promote Somali women's organisations and their agency for peace, both inside and outside of Somalia. The first paragraph of Resolution 1325 "...urges Member States to ensure increased representation of women at all decision-making levels in national, regional and international institutions and mechanisms for the prevention, management, and resolution of conflict." To promote Somali women's role in decision-making processes of the emerging Somali State, action must be taken on many fronts. The work of numerous Somali women's grassroots organisations must be taken into account, as well as women's associations of the Somali Diaspora. Likewise, the political will of the Somali Transitional Federal Government must be secured, and women's political participation as both voters and candidates promoted in order to ensure fair, inclusive and democratic elections in the future. If these many factors can be combined and interlocutors can meet to discuss their various roles to promote women's participation in the peace- and State-building processes in Somalia, a big step on the way will have been achieved for the implementation of Resolution 1325 in Somalia.

1.2. Gender and Peace in Somalia: Implementation of Resolution 1325

UN-INSTRAW is working to implement the project Gender and Peace in Somalia: Implementation of Resolution 1325 in collaboration with the Italy-based Associazione Diaspora e Pace (ADEP), with financial support from the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Region of Puglia, the Province of Milan and the Municipality of Bari. The project aims to promote the implementation of Resolution 1325 in Somalia through continued collaboration between women's associations in Somalia and Somali women's groups from the Diaspora living in Italy, to promote women's political participation in peace- and State-building processes in Somalia and to ensure a sustainable implementation of Resolution 1325. In September 2008, an international conference will be held in Dar-es-Salaam, Tanzania, in order to establish a forum for dialogue between women activists in Somalia, women's associations of the Somali Diaspora, the Somali Transitional Federal Government and the international community.

The initiative for the project began at an international conference, organised in Rome on 13 June 2007 by the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the members of ADEP. The aim of the conference was to discuss how Resolution 1325 can be adapted to the situation in Somalia and to put greater international focus on the role of Somali women in Diaspora communities, in this particular case in Italy. Representatives from various organisations participated in the conference, among them a number of UN agencies (UNIFEM, UNICEF, UN-INSTRAW and UNHCR), government agencies, NGOs and Somali civil society organisations (CSOs) based in Italy. During the conference it was noted that in order to improve Somali women's situation in Italy, the situation of all Somalis must be improved, through measures such as recognising the status of statelessness of Somalis, accepting Somali identity documents and establishing a diplomatic representation for Somalis in Italy. The conference also concluded that a national programme for Somali women in Italy is needed, as well as solid support mechanisms for the second and third generations of exile Somalis.

As part of the implementation of this project, UN-INSTRAW supported the establishment of the Associazione Diaspora e Pace (ADEP) in Italy, which was formally constituted in April

2008. ADEP is made up of seven women of Somali descent living in various parts of Italy, and aims to promote the empowerment women in Somalia and recognize protect the rights of Somali women in Italy. The members of ADEP have been working together since the beginning of 2007

ADEP was the main organiser of the two project seminars held within the framework of the project, the first in Milan on 23-24 February and the second in Bari on 3-4 May 2008. These seminars aimed to create a forum for women of the Somali Diaspora in Italy and to engage them in the discussion concerning the peace and state-building processes in Somalia. The Seminars focused on what women of the Diaspora can do both for women in exile communities and in Somalia. In total more than sixty people participated in addressing key issues of concern to Somali women's situation in Italy, as well as the impact of the clan system on the Diaspora, the importance of Resolution 1325 for Somali women, and the real possibility for women to participate in the current state-building process in Somalia. The conclusions drawn from the Seminars include:

- Women of the Somali Diaspora need to organise themselves at the local level to raise awareness concerning Resolution 1325 and its implementation in Somalia at the grassroots, provincial, national, regional and international level.
- The road map of the Project must include more women of the Somali Diaspora to represent as many voices and opinions as possible, and thereby promote the political empowerment of Somali women in exile.
- The women of the Somali Diaspora need to dialogue and debate with women living in Somalia and address the reality on the ground, to make sure that the direction of the Project supports the political participation of women in Somalia.
- Somali women must be empowered and recognised as political actors outside the dynamic of clan affiliations.
- The Somali TFG must abandon the "4.5 Formula" (see Section 2.3).
- The specific problems that the Somali Diaspora community faces in Italy must be addressed. These issues include in particular:
  - Difficulty in obtaining official documents such as passport, birth certificates, proof of education, criminal records etc.;
  - Need to support the second generation of Somalis, as well as older generations;
  - The legal situation of Somali asylum seekers.

ADEP suggested the creation of a Permanent Working Group to adequately address these specific difficulties of the Somali Diaspora in Italy, in collaboration with the three Italian Ministries of Home Affairs, Foreign Affairs and Welfare.

These Seminars laid the groundwork for the Dar-es-Salaam conference by initiating a dialogue and networking process among Somali women in Italy and identifying their main priorities vis-à-vis their situation in Italy and their participation in Somali peace- and State-building processes.

2. The Somali conflict and peace process

2.1. Post-colonial Somalia

After more than 80 years of colonial rule under the Italians in the South, and the British in the North, Somalia gained its independence in 1960. The Somali Youth League (SYL) was
the largest nationalist organisation opposing the colonists, and women’s agency within the SYL played an indispensable role in the mobilisation process for political independence and decolonisation.25

After his coup d’état in 1969, Siad Barre seized power and established a regime that lasted until the State collapse in January 1991. President Barre began his leadership by declaring Somalia a socialist republic and he established ties with the Soviet Union. He also invested heavily in the social development of Somalia, prioritising public work programmes, literacy campaigns and banning clanism. However, President Barre eventually became a harsh dictator who used blatantly undemocratic methods and human rights violations to oppress the Somali people, especially from 1976 onwards with the creation of the one-party system ruled by the Somali Revolutionary Socialist Party (Xisbiga Hantiwadaagga Kacaanka Soomaaliyeed – or XHKS – in Somali). In terms of women’s rights and roles in society, Barre was initially a pioneering force who promoted Somali women’s emancipation and empowerment in a way that had never been seen in Somali society, and which unfortunately has deteriorated rapidly since Barre’s fall in 1991. To promote women's political participation, Barre’s government created the Somali Women's Democratic Organisation (SWDO) which consolidated women's influential role in Somali politics under the Barre regime.26

Barre tried to replace the customary law Xeer and religious Sharia law with secular, public legislation. He re-interpreted Islamic law to promote gender equality,27 and female enrolment in public schools was boosted. The number of women joining the work force rose dramatically, especially within professions such as clerks, teaches and nurses.28 Barre’s government improved women's legal status by adopting a Family Law in 1975, which stated that men and women are equal partners in marriage. Even if this law reasserted the legal role of men as patrias familias,29 it was an important push for the advancement of Somali women and their role in society. Barre moreover guaranteed women's participation at all levels of responsibility within the public sector, both in military and civil positions.

From the end of the 1970s, Barre embraced more aggressive politics, relying heavily on military repression and on the clan culture (which he had earlier outlawed). In 1977, Barre went to war against Ethiopia with the intent to occupy the southern region of Ogaden and thereby unite the Somali lands that had been divided by the colonial powers. However the Ogaden War was not so much a clan conflict as it was a front of the Cold War: the Soviet Union and Cuba switched their support from Somalia to Ethiopia, while the US never gave Somalia the helping hand it had first promised. Somalia's defeat in Ogaden left Barre without the authority he had previously exercised. The Somali people's distrust in their leader and the oppression of the military regime lead in the 1980s to continuous insurgencies, supported by Ethiopia, especially from the rebel Somali Salvation Democratic Front (SSDF). Barre met this opposition with more brutality against the civilian population. In 1988, the Northern Province known as former British Somaliland began a full secession war against the government. By 1989, Barre had also lost the support of the major clans of the southern provinces. In December 1990 and January 1991, the opposition party United Somali Congress (USC), mainly composed of the Hawiye clan of southern Somalia and led by General Farah Aidid, overthrew Barre.

29. Bryden & Steiner 2000, p. 31-33.
2.2. The Somali conflict from 1991 onwards

In May 1991, Somaliland declared its independence (though it was not recognised by the international community), later followed by the declaration of autonomy of the northwestern province of Puntland in 1998, and the Bay and Bakool regions in southern and central Somalia in 1999. The remaining part of southern Somalia, however, fell into civil war as conflicts emerged between clans – in particular between the USC of the Hawiye clan and the Somali Patriotic Movement (SPM) of Siad Barre’s clan Darod - and within clans, such as the Abgaal and the Habar Gidir factions within the Hawiye, mainly in the regions of Lower Shabelle and Juba. In combination with droughts throughout Somalia, the prolonged armed conflict created a humanitarian disaster. From this point onwards, until the establishment of the first Transitional Government in 2000, Somalia was without any form of recognised public authority. The two factions of the USC – the Abgaal-Hawiye and the Habar Gidir-Hawiye – developed into two distinct political and military entities. The Habar Gidir, led by General Farah Aidid, opposed the creation of a Transitional Government, which was supported by the Abgaal-Hawiye. During the early 1990s, these two armed groups turned Mogadishu into a war zone in order to gain control over the city.\(^{30}\)

In April 1992, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) adopted Resolution 751 establishing the UN Mission in Somalia (UNOSOM I), which was largely unsuccessful in securing humanitarian operations in the country. Instead, the USA-led militaryUnified Task Force (UNITAF) alleviated the situation momentarily with "Operation Restore Hope" between December 1992 and May 1993. At the Operation's withdrawal, UNISOM II was set up by UNSC Resolution 814 in order to establish a secure environment throughout the country, this time endowed with enforcement powers under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter. Again, UNISOM II did not succeed in its aim and it suffered extreme losses. In 1993, the deaths of twenty-four Pakistani peacekeepers and eighteen American troops confirmed the suspicions of those who had been sceptical of the deployment of UNISOM II from the beginning.\(^{31}\)

At the mission's withdrawal in 1995, UNISOM I and II were to be remembered as among the worst-managed peacekeeping operations in history, both for the number of casualties they suffered and for the violence committed by the peacekeepers themselves. The UNISOM missions were among the first peacekeeping operations that became widely known for the many cases of rape, torture and abuse of civilians committed by peacekeeping personnel. News agencies reported that peacekeepers from Belgium, Canada, Italy and Pakistan were found to have taken part in grave human rights violations and obscene forms of violence. Instead of protecting the civilian population and attempting to secure peace, peacekeepers were adding to the indiscriminate violence that Somalis, and especially women, were already facing. "Trophy-photos" were found of Canadian troops that had tortured a sixteen-year-old boy, and of Italian soldiers who had tortured and brutally raped a woman.\(^{32}\) These and other atrocities committed by UNISOM troops were not revealed by the UN nor by the deploying armies, but by news agencies,\(^{33}\) and little or nothing was done to prosecute these crimes. The Italian military punished twelve peacekeepers for abuse of civilians according to internal institutional procedures, but no criminal charges were filed against the soldiers.


\(^{31}\) Raffaelli 2007.

\(^{32}\) Graybill 2002.

accused of rape. UNISOM personnel were also found to have taken part in sexual exploitation including buying sexual favours from Somali women.\textsuperscript{34}

After the international community left Somalia, fighting continued between the clan-affiliated leaders of armed opposition groups, especially between Ali Mahdi’s Somali Salvation Alliance (SSA) and General Farah Aidid’s Somalia National Alliance (SNA). In 1996, General Aidid was killed and was succeeded by his son. While the northern part of Somalia, consisting of the autonomous provinces of Puntland and Somaliland, has found a precarious internal stability despite recurring territorial conflicts,\textsuperscript{35} Central and Southern Somalia have continued to suffer from chronic instability, crisis and conflict. By the end of the 1990s however, the peace process that had so far rendered little or no result started to gain a slow but positive momentum.

2.3. The Somali peace and State-building processes

At the Conference on National Reconciliation, held in Addis Ababa (Ethiopia) in March 1998, women were officially recognised for the first time in the Somali peace process. The Transitional National Council, which was created at the Conference, required that one third of its regional delegations be composed of women.\textsuperscript{36} The agreement, which was based on power-sharing between the fighting faction leaders, was however short-lived. From May to October 2000, the first Somali Peace and National Reconciliation Conference was held in Arta (Djibouti), with support from the Intergovernmental Authority on Developments (IGAD). During this historic peace conference a Somali Transitional National Government (TNG) was created, and Somali women finally won a place at the negotiating table.

The TNG was established according to a clan-based power-sharing scheme, called the “4.5 Formula.” Since the clans are the traditional decision-making bodies of Somali society, the formula was predicted to have greater success in finding a balance point between the warring factions in the Somali conflict. The formula gives equal quotas for representation in government to the four major clans – Darod, Hawiye, Dir (including Isaaq) and Rahanweyn – and a half-point to be shared by the numerous minority clans, often called the “Fifth Clan.” This controversial formula forms the basis of current attempts to reconstruct Somali public institutions. To give a simplified overview of the general opinions, opponents of the “4.5 Formula” usually claim that the current organisation of the government and its roots in the clan system will undermine peace and state-building processes rather than promoting a democratic system in the long run. Supporters usually claim that the Formula is the only possible compromise that can facilitate a sustainable peace, and that the clans must share power to create stability. However, any government is, in many people's opinion, better than no authority at all, and the existence of a Transitional Government is an important first step towards peace and democracy, particularly in view of the upcoming November 2009 elections and future democratic elections.\textsuperscript{37}

Exclusive male participation in peace negotiations was further emphasised by the “4.5 Formula,” as clans are mostly led and represented by men.\textsuperscript{38} To break through this male bias, the Somali NGO Save Somali Women and Children (SSWC) proposed that a “Sixth Clan”\textsuperscript{39} would attend the peace negotiations. This ad-hoc clan was made up exclusively of

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\textsuperscript{34} Graybill 2002  
\textsuperscript{35} VOA 11 July 2008  
\textsuperscript{36} Nakaya 2003, p. 466.  
\textsuperscript{37} UN-INSTRAW Project Seminar Report (Milan, 23-24 February 2008)  
\textsuperscript{38} Anderson 2005, p. 2.  
\textsuperscript{39} Elmi 2004, p. 2.
women from all the major clans, and its name symbolises the political act of women declaring their “clanlessness” by forming yet another clan beside the four main ones and the smaller cluster of minority clans. Represented by Asha Hagi Elmi, the president of SSWC and currently a member of the Transitional Federal Parliament, Somali women were finally given a voice in the peace process. As a result, women were granted twenty-five seats in the Transitional National Assembly (TNA), to be equally divided between the clans.40

Due to various opposition groups, the TNG created at the Arta Conference had limited ability to establish a de facto authority. The absence of Somaliland, Puntland and some Southern Somali leaders of armed opposition groups from the peace negotiations also weakened the outcomes of the Conference, and the TNG was only capable of upholding partial control over the capital, Mogadishu. The peace negotiations continued in May 2001 at the National Commission for Reconciliation and Property Settlement, which also failed to reconcile the conflicting parties. At this point, the Somali peace process had seen more than thirteen peace conferences since 1991, though little in the way of concrete results had emerged from this process.

As a result of the continuous support of IGAD, a second Somali Peace and National Reconciliation Conference was held in Eldoret (Kenya) in 2002. The Conference lasted until September 2004, and had by then changed location to Mbagathi in Nairobi. These two-year long peace talks brought about ground-breaking results. For Somali women, the Conference was a historic event, since it was the first time a Somali woman, Asha Hagi Elmi of the “Sixth Clan,” became an official signatory to a peace agreement. As a result of the reconciliation between the Transitional National Government and its earlier opponent the Somalia Reconciliation and Restoration Council (SRRC), the TNG was replaced with a Transitional Federal Government (TFG). The TFG has a mandate of five years, which will expire in November 2009 when political elections are planned. The Transitional Federal Parliament (TFP) was also created at the conference, with 275 members distributed according to the 4.5 Formula. This means that the major clans have 61 seats each, and the so-called “Fifth Clan” shares 31 seats amongst themselves. In October 2004, the TFP elected the leaders of armed opposition groups and former president of Puntland, Mr. Abdullahi Yusuf, to become the new President of Somalia. President Yusuf immediately appointed Mr. Ali Mohammed Ghedi as Prime Minister of the first TFG.

The second Somali Peace and National Reconciliation Conference also adopted a temporary constitution in February 2004, called the Transitional Federal Charter (TFC). This document is an important first step for governance and human rights protection in Somalia. However, many of the articles of the TFC seem to be the direct result of diplomatic and political bargaining. Article 12 of the Charter, for example, states that at least 12% of the Parliament shall be women. The Islamic delegates had initially set a maximum limit of 6% women members of parliament (MPs). At the Arta Conference, this quota was set at no more than 10.2%. After long and intense talks, the delegates finally agreed upon 12% in Eldoret-Mbagathi.41 The TFP has still not succeeded in filling this quota, however. As of August 2008, there are 23 women in the TFP, accounting for only 8% of parliamentarians. The TFP will most probably continue to be unable to fill this quota if action is not taken to promote Somali women's political participation, as both candidates and as voters. Much needs to be done during the next eighteen months in order to engage more women in Somali politics and ensure that they have a strong voice and presence at the November 2009 elections.

The TFC will need to be examined from a gender perspective before a permanent Somali Constitution can finally be adopted. First of all, the quota of 12% women in Parliament would need to be increased to at least 30% in accordance with international norms, if not 50%. The gender parity quota must also be implemented from top to bottom within all Somali public institutions in addition to Parliament, at the national and local levels. The current quota does not account for decision-making or public bodies at the local level throughout Somalia's regions, provinces and municipalities, but only applies to the national Parliament. Moreover, there is a need to reconsider Article 10, paragraph 2 of the TFC, which states that “[e]very person of Somali origin shall be entitled to citizenship [...] provided that: a) He/she was born in the Somali Republic; or b) His/her father is a citizen of the Somali Republic.” Somali patrilineal culture is enshrined in the TFC to the point that Somali Diaspora women cannot provide their children with Somali citizenship, in cases where the father is of a different nationality.

In order to promote longer-term reconciliation in Somalia, the TFG has embarked upon a Reconstruction and Development Programme. In February 2005, former Prime Minister Ghedi and representatives of the international community agreed to let the United Nations Development Group and the World Bank lead the Programme, together with Somali stakeholders. With support from Italy, Sweden, Norway, the European Commission and the UN, a Joint Needs Assessment (JNA) was conducted in order to identify the key issues to be addressed in the Reconstruction and Development Programme. The JNA focused on six main areas: governance, safety and rule of law; macro-economic policy; infrastructure; social services and protection of vulnerable groups; productive sector and environment; and livelihoods and solutions for the displaced.22

The United Nations Development Fund for Women (UNIFEM) and local Somali women's groups provided important input to the JNA from a gender perspective, drawing from experiences of similar processes in Afghanistan, Sudan and Liberia.43 For this purpose, a Somali Gender Expert Group Meeting on the Post-Conflict Joint Needs Assessment was organised in June 2006 in Nairobi (Kenya) by IGAD, the Swedish Agency for International Development Cooperation (SIDA) and UNIFEM. The Gender Expert Group Meeting concluded, among other things, that monitoring mechanisms should be established for the gender-specific commitments enshrined in the Transitional Federal Charter, that its quota of 12% women for national Somali decision-making structures should be implemented, and that female staff should be recruited for the JNA and the implementation of the Reconstruction and Development Programme. The Expert Group Meeting also underlined that coordinated international support, such as the Coordination of International Support to Somalia (CISS), should be gender-responsive in all its decisions and actions. To follow up on the recommendations for the gender mainstreaming process of the JNA, a Symposium was organised in Kampala (Uganda) in February 2007 to bring together more than 140 delegates from Somali civil society and women's groups, government representatives, international organisations and other stakeholders working for a gender-responsive outcome of the Somali Reconstruction and Development Programme. These initiatives for women's empowerment within the framework of the Programme are important, though the final results of this gender mainstreaming process have yet to be seen. The main challenge is to turn the rhetoric of peace and cooperation into practice for Somali women, which is an often daunting task.

42. United Nations & World Bank Coordination Secretariat
2.4. The return of armed conflict

The TFG has been recognised by most Western governments, yet its *de jure* powers still have not been translated into *de facto* control over Somali territories. In June 2006, the Islamic Courts announced that they had taken control of Mogadishu. The armed conflict that broke out between the Islamic Courts and the allied Ethiopian and Somali government forces arguably weakened the TFG's position. This was especially due to internal conflicts within the government regarding opposing views of the peace talks with the Islamic Courts. However, conflicts with the allied forces of Ethiopia and the TFG on the one hand, and with the leaders of armed opposition group Alliance for Restoration of Peace and Counter-Terrorism (ARPCT) on the other hand, lead to the downfall of the Islamic Courts' control of Mogadishu. By January 2007, the TFG was nominally in charge of Mogadishu again. In reality, however, peace in the capital was far from secured, and the city is currently in the hands of factions of the Islamic Courts and alliances of leaders of armed opposition groups.

Since the collapse of the Somali state in 1991, the role of religious factions as providers of security and of basic services such as health and education has become increasingly important. This is reflected in popular support for the Islamic Courts and their control of certain areas of the country, especially of Mogadishu in 2006. The initially non-clan organisation of the Islamic Courts has been an important feature of their popularity. Conflicts within the Courts, however, as well as the use of violent militias, have in part led to their current weakened position. The Islamic Courts have developed a fairly conservative interpretation of women's roles based on Islamic *Sharia* law. Nevertheless, the security and social services that the Courts have been able to provide have been welcomed by many due to the continued lack of public infrastructure and services. For example, some Koranic schools have recorded as high as 40% female students, which is a much higher proportion than other schools, where the gender imbalance is usually striking.

The momentum gained by conservative forces within the Islamic Courts and other pro-Islamic groups, is having significant influence on State-building processes, including the interpretation of women's role in the construction of a new Somalia. This can be seen in the Transitional Federal Charter, which states for example that “Islamic *Sharia* shall be the basic source for national legislation.” During the period in 2006 when the Islamic Courts were in control of Mogadishu, *Sharia* law was strictly applied. Cinemas and sports stadiums were closed, and women could only go outdoors in the company of a male relative. People who opposed the new rules were harshly treated by the Islamic Courts militias, and the situation resembled that of a military regime. The relative security that the Islamic Courts have been able to ensure carries with it the sacrifice of individual choice and freedom. This should be taken into account, as Islamic forces continue to have a strong hold on Somali society, and present a perpetual threat to the creation of stable secular state institutions and the achievement of gender equality and women's empowerment.

In January and February 2007, the Security Councils of the African Union and the United Nations respectively approved the deployment of the African Union Mission to Somalia (AMISOM). The mission has been criticised for being too small, and for not having a strong enough mandate to protect civilians. The Islamic Courts moreover oppose the mission, as they do not want the deployment of any foreign forces in Somalia. AMISOM's current

47. Byrden & Steiner, p. 4-5.
mandate, which was due to expire in August 2008, was extended in May 2008 by Resolution 1816. However the future of the peacekeeping force is uncertain as neither the AU nor the UN seem to prioritise the issue, even if the UN Secretary-General stated in April 2008 that he plans to send a new 27,000-strong multinational peacekeeping force to the country. Meanwhile, the UNSC has also extended the mandate of the group tasked with monitoring the arms embargo in Somalia, which has been continuously violated since it was adopted in 1992.

In November 2007, President Yusuf nominated Mr. Nur Hassan Hussein as the Prime Minister of Somalia. Prime Minister Nur Adde, as he is known, started his term by creating a cabinet with fewer ministers. Since January 2008, the TFG accounts for eighteen ministers, of which the majority hold foreign citizenship. Before the current political crisis that saw half the cabinet resign at the beginning of August, there was only one woman, Khadija Muhammad Dirie, heading the Ministry of Gender, Development and Family Affairs.

In the Northern part of Somalia, since January 2005 the Government of the autonomous north-eastern state of Puntland has had a well-developed Ministry of Women, Development and Family, headed by Affairs Asha Gelle Dirie. In late 2006, the Ministry published a gender policy framework with goals and strategies for achieving gender equality in Puntland. The Government of the independent state of Somaliland also has a Ministry of Family and Social Development, headed by Ms. Fadumo Adumo Sudi as Minister. The Constitution of Somaliland, adopted in 1997, contains a specific article on The Rights of Women (article 36), declaring that “1. [t]he rights, freedoms and duties laid down in the Constitution are to be enjoyed equally by men and women save for matters which are specifically ordained in Islamic Sharia,” leaving an open possibility for interpretation, especially as paragraph 2 sustains “the right of women to be free of practices which are contrary to Sharia and which are injurious to their person and dignity.” The article underlines the right of women “to own, manage, oversee, trade in, or pass on property in accordance with the law” (para. 3) and their right to “home economics and to have opened for them vocational, special skills and adult education schools” (para. 4).

The situation of civil war has become increasingly complicated, now involving a large number of armed groups, including the allied troops of the TFG and of the Ethiopian government, factions of the UIC, the clan-affiliated leaders of armed opposition groups, and roaming militias and criminals. In addition, the autonomous region of Puntland and the breakaway Somaliland in the North have their own security forces, and the United States air force and AMISOM also have armed personnel present on Somali territory. The fundamental question is whether the presence of these armed groups, including those who are deployed in the name of peace, reduce current tensions or if they merely create more confusion and fighting in Central and Southern Somalia. What is certain is that the security situation in Somalia continues to be one of the most unstable in the world, and that the Transitional Government is largely powerless to do anything about it.

3. Women in Somali society

3.1. Clan, class and gender in Somali culture

49. Deen 8 April 2008.
50. UN Security Council 29 April 2008.
52. http://www.somalilandlaw.com/Somaliland_Constitution/body_somaliland.constitution.htm#Chapter1
Somali society has long been unified by two key features: religion and language. Somalia was the first African country to adopt Islam, and the vast majority of Somalis are Sunni Muslims. The Somali language went from being exclusively oral to a written language in 1972, and it is the mother tongue of almost the entire population.

Clan affiliations are another important characteristic of Somali culture. Over the centuries, clans have provided a system for conflict resolution and protection for the population, regulating social interaction and organising society. As the Somali scholar Abdurahman M. Abdullahi writes, “...clan divide is neither evil nor good, rather a neutral and natural social setting prevalent in many societies[...] This neutral entity could be utilized either in a positive way or in a destructive manner.” However, the political instrumentalisation of the clans in the competition over resources and power, used during the post-colonial period by the Somali Youth League and later by Siad Barre's regime, created strong forms of clan-based discrimination and conflict. When Barre was overthrown in 1991 and the civil war began, conflicts between clans had in fact already been fermenting for decades.

The Somali clan system is based on six main “clan families:” Darod, Hawiye, Dir, Isaaq, Digil and Mirifle (the two last families are together often called Rahanweyn). Each family breaks down into a number of clans and sub-clans. In Somali, the expression “who are you, and what do you know?” (free translation of “yaa taqan iyo maxaad taqan?”) refers allegorically to the significance of the clans as a means of identification of family and profession. Clan affiliation is inherited from the father and once married, women are included in their husband’s clan. When someone dies, he or she is considered to belong to their mother’s clan in death. Women can hence belong to more than one clan over their lifetime. This clan diversification could be a source for hope as it does not polarise Somali society, yet this positive impact has so far proven to be mainly a hypothesis. It should however be considered that clan affiliation is not necessarily the root cause of the conflict itself. The clans have rather masked the importance of other issues, such as conflict over land and resources. A thorough understanding of these different tensions and how the interact is fundamental to addressing and eliminating the ongoing violence and begin building a sustainable and inclusive peace.

The outbreak of civil war brought indiscriminate slaughter, rape, and pillage upon the civilian population in Somalia. Sexual violence was and still is used as a common weapon of war and to punish enemy clans. Clan affiliations provide people with intra-clan assistance and vital safety nets in the anarchy of civil war, especially for women and children that are being protected by their clans. However, once a woman is left alone to head a household outside her clan territory, the risk is she will enjoy much less protection if she belongs to a minority group or a less powerful clan. Women who live in the many refugee camps in Somalia and in neighbouring countries are at an especially high risk of attacks and violence. Women married into a different clan than that of their fathers have a greater chance of being protected, as they can seek refuge either among their own clan or among that of their husband (which is also that of their children). Yet women living in these mixed clan relationships due to exogamous marriages often live with the Somali civil war in their own

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homes, as sons have fought their maternal uncles, and husbands have fought their fathers-in-law.\textsuperscript{60}

There is next to full impunity for perpetrators of sexual violence in Somalia.\textsuperscript{61} Any possible remedy for the abuses mostly depends on clan-based support. Domestic violence against women in exogamous marriages is more likely to be addressed, as the honour of her father's clan is at stake. If the husband and the father are of the same clan, it is much less likely that her rights will be respected or protected. In some areas of Somalia, traditional and Islamic justice systems are also being implemented, with clear impacts on women's legal situation and recourse. For example, the level of equity and justice of the forms of redress that are offered to women is doubtful, as for example any financial compensation will be paid only to male family members. Although both UNSCR Resolution 1325 and Resolution 1820 stress the importance of ending impunity for sexual violence, Somali women have no institutions on which to rely for the implementation of this mandate. It is likely that the participation of more women representatives in the Somali peace process would result in the exclusion of gender-based crimes such as sexual and domestic violence “...from amnesty provisions in the context of conflict resolution processes,” as requested by Resolution 1820.

In the various traditional Somali legal systems, women are protected and controlled by their male counterparts, and their capacity to make decisions is highly limited. The Islamic \textit{Sharia} law has long co-existed with the unwritten Somali customary \textit{Xeer}. According to the \textit{Xeer}, women are always under the jurisdiction of a man – her father, another male relative, or her husband. When a woman commits or falls victim to a crime, it is her male guardian who will either give or receive compensation (\textit{Xaal}) for the violation. The price to pay in compensation for assaulting a woman is usually half of that for a male victim. Women do however have the right to property and to inherit, which is provided for by \textit{Sharia} and not a common legal feature in other African countries. The land rights of women are fundamental to ensuring their livelihoods and economic independence, both for themselves and their families.\textsuperscript{62} However, the implementation of women's formally-recognised rights to property and inheritance is an entirely different question.

Part of the Somali population is nomadic, with the majority working with agriculture and fishing and a small portion living in major cities. There are considerable differences between rural and urban ways of life, yet women are always the primary caretakers for children and elders. Women in nomadic households traditionally care for livestock by herding, feeding and milking, and collect water and wood. In the agricultural areas, women work both in the fields and taking care of farm animals. In the cities, women are expected to take care of the house and family, and to rely economically on their husbands.\textsuperscript{63} Many women under Siad Barre's regime however attended university and led independent lives.

The civil war has brought about radical changes in gender roles and the division of labour in Somali society. The massive displacement of the civilian population has forced men and women into new roles and responsibilities. As men have forcibly or voluntarily taken up arms, women have taken on a wider range of work, including businesses within the local economy. Many of the daily responsibilities of rural women, especially collecting wood and water, put them at extreme risk of attack. The overwhelming occurrence of sexual violence

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\textsuperscript{60} Gardner 2004, p. 162.  \\
\textsuperscript{61} Human Rights Watch/Africa 1995.  \\
\textsuperscript{62} Izumi 2007, Lastarria-Conhiel 2005  \\
\textsuperscript{63} Nur 2002, p. 9-10. 
\end{flushleft}
stigmatises women, and many rape survivors find it difficult to get married. Girls who have undergone FGM and who have survived rape are often re-infibulated to improve their chances of finding a man who will not reject them. FGM is very common in Somalia and UNICEF has estimated that 90% of Somali women have undergone this mutilation, commonly performed on girls around seven years of age. The procedure is not a religious obligation as is often believed, but a cultural practice which is thought to ensure the virginity of women until they marry. There is a great difference in attitudes toward FGM between women living in urban and in rural areas. Women living in the cities are more prone to reject the practice, and FGM in urban areas is more likely to be performed in a medical clinic under anaesthesia. In rural areas, however, FGM is considered essential to ensuring the honour of a woman and her family, and the hygienic conditions of the operation are often very bad, many times performed with an old razor blade, knife or piece of glass.

The state collapse has had a dramatic impact on the roles of men as providers and breadwinners, as many Somali men have been left without jobs. Those men that have not joined the armed conflict are often left to despair due to high unemployment rates and difficulties adapting to new male gender roles that convert women into breadwinners as well. Many men spend their time chewing khat, a locally-grown herb with a stimulant effect that generates a slight state of bliss. As the effect of the herb only sets in after some time, khat is usually consumed in a group and associated with a tea- and coffee-drinking ritual and long hours of talking. It is a predominantly male pastime, mainly because the effects of the herb are considered shameful for women as they have the responsibility for children and household maintenance. Khat chewing often ends up occupying most of the day, and many other responsibilities tend to be neglected. As a consequence, high unemployment rates, khat and the continuous stress of the crisis combine to generate a vicious circle where men cannot live up to the expectations of their traditional gender roles and no new constructive male roles are created.

The difficulties of adapting to the continuous state of emergency, and to changes in male and female roles and responsibilities have put great strain on both men and women, and the traditional norms for what is male and female are no longer applicable. As stated by Judy El-Bushra, "'gender' is not so much about differences between men and women but about the divergence between the ideals which men and women are expected to live up to (identities) and the realities which individual men and women actually live. Understanding these differences (between different masculine identities, and between different feminine identities) helps to understand power dynamics within a society [...]." An analysis of changing gender roles can lead us to understand more about the distribution of power within Somali society. In fact, new responsibilities have opened up for women to take a more active role in society at large, not only in the economy and within the household, but also in peace and state-building processes. Peace-making has also become a chance to challenge and change traditional gender roles and to gain from the crisis that the civil war has brought about. However, the challenges to women's emancipation during the war have been many. Conservative Islamic norms and ethics have found fertile ground in Somalia during the last decades and have not been especially beneficial to women's empowerment.

64. El-Bushra & Sahl 2005, p. 48-49.
65. US Department of State June 2001; UNICEF
67. Ibid., p. 111.
3.2. Somali women: between war-making and peace-building

The last seventeen years of civil war in Somalia have caused continuous waves of famine and humanitarian crisis for the whole population. The greatest burden, as in most situations of armed conflict, has been born by Somali women who endure extreme levels of insecurity. Assaults, looting, killing and rape have become part of every-day life in central and southern Somalia. In addition to the physical and mental harm that rape causes, it also entails a strong social stigmatisation for women. For women who have undergone FGM, which is the case for most Somali women, sexual violence brings with it an even greater risk of exposure to sexually transmitted diseases such as HIV/AIDS, and to other diseases like tetanus. In addition, the combination of a strongly patriarchal society, growing feminisation of poverty, and low female literacy rates limit the ability of Somali women in vulnerable communities to participate in public decision-making processes. Many households are headed by women, as families have been scattered by displacement and fighting. The armed conflict also puts great strain on marriages, and divorce is yet another reason why many women are left as the only caregiver and breadwinner in many families.

The new roles and responsibilities that women have had to shoulder during the civil war in order to sustain their families and the local economy have created the possibility to forge connections among women across clan lines. Since 1991, a great number of women's grassroots associations and umbrella organisations have been created. These groups work both within and across clan affiliations, regions and socio-economic status. In today's Somalia, they account for a great part of basic assistance such as health care, education, vocational training for women and much more. The volume of women's organisations has provided Somalia with a fundamental, though alternative and ad hoc, infrastructure for collective survival.

Somali women have a greater possibility of breaching traditional clan identities than men, since they often belong to more than one clan. As a representative of the “Sixth Clan” (see section 2.3), Asha Ahgi Elmi said, “I was divided in two. My birth clan rejected me because my husband was from a clan they were fighting [...] I realized the only identity no one could take away from me was being a woman. My only clan is womanhood.” During the chaos of the civil war in the 1990s, women's groups engaged in the promotion of peace in various ways across Somalia. In many cases, women took a firm stand at the local level against the armed conflict between clans or warring factions. For example, in the Somali region of Bari in June 1994, women's NGOs organised public demonstrations to prevent violence between two rival factions of the Somali Salvation Democratic Front (SSDF); in Somaliland from 1994 to 1996, the Women's Peace Group of the Committee of Concerned Somalis organised marches and prayer meetings to promote peace during the conflict; and in Boosaaso in 1996, the Women's Association for Social Advancement contributed to stabilising security by setting up a police force of 300 men.

However, gender often yields to other social identities such as class or clan. Especially at the beginning of the conflict, women were engaged on various sides of the warring parties, and contributed to fuelling the violence by cooking, funding, and mentally supporting clan militias, and by encouraging male family members to take up arms. These conflicts have lived on in the work of Somali women's NGOs. As noted by Bryden and Steiner, many
women's groups have in fact found themselves in bitter (though mostly non-violent) conflicts with sister groups of other clans, regions and/or political opinions. “Despite shared values and objectives, Somalia’s many women's groups have so far failed to organize themselves effectively around a common agenda. [...] Women's groups tend to mirror the social and political divisions of the broader Somali society.”

The true challenge for Somali women's organisations is to implement the rhetoric and conclusions of the many meetings, expert groups and seminars that have been held during the last decade to promote greater collaboration between women's groups.

The significant efforts of women's local organisations however risk confining women's action to the non-public sector, keeping them from engaging in national politics and the creation of a stable and sustainable public sector. Gender equality is an urgent priority within the official structures of the Somali Transitional Federal Institutions and particularly in ongoing preparations for the November 2009 elections, to ensure the implementation of Resolution 1325 and its mandate to promote the increased female representation at all decision-making levels in Somalia. The establishment of Somali political parties is only beginning, but as political groups are being set up it is of paramount importance to include women in this process, rather than trying to insert them at a later date. Likewise, women need to be adequately informed about the elections and encouraged to exercise their right to vote according to their own choices once the elections are held.

4. Women's roles and peace-building in the Somali Diaspora

4.1. Resources and challenges of the Somali Diaspora

During the last seventeen years, millions of Somalis have fled the country in an attempt to escape the civil war. However, the Somali Diaspora existed even before the State collapse in 1991. Barre's regime, the Ogaden War and the civil war in 1988 drove many to settle in neighbouring countries such as Ethiopia, Yemen or Saudi Arabia, or further away in Canada, the United States and Europe. It is difficult to estimate how big the Somali Diaspora is, especially since many have taken the citizenship of their new home country, and because the definitions of immigrants vary in the different countries' statistics. Estimates from the International Organisation for Migration (IOM) indicate that there are up to three million Somali citizens living abroad. If one includes the great number of naturalised Somalis, and the second generation of the Diaspora that has grown up with both the Somali culture and that of the host country, estimates indicate that the Somali Diaspora accounts for almost the same amount of people as Somalia itself, or approximately 8-9 million people.

The economic activities of the Somali Diaspora are a significant source of income, both for Diapora households and businesses and for Somalia itself. The Somali trust-based money transfer system xawaala brings up to US$1 billion per year into Somalia, and an estimated US$750 million is sent to Somali households as remittances every year, an impressive amount in comparison to far richer developing countries such as Senegal, which received just over US$500 million (or 242 billion Senegalese Francs) in 2003. The Somali Diaspora has become an essential actor in both the Somali civil war and in the peace process. The

76. IOM Somalia.
77. Nenova & Harford 2004, p. 3.
78. IOM Somalia.
79 Sarr, Demba Fall and Khairy Coulibaly April 2008
remittances sent by exiled Somalis are utilised primarily to support the civilian population in their struggle for survival, though a significant amount also funds war expenses. Since members of the Diaspora often have a higher level of education than their peers in Somalia, exiled Somalis have played a key role in the State-building process. As mentioned, more than half the ministers of the current Transitional Federal Government, and many members of the Transitional Federal Parliament, hold foreign citizenship. The internet has proven to be an essential forum for discussion for the Somali Diaspora, with the World Wide Web home to many Web sites in Somali and other languages spoken by the Diaspora (primarily English), where exiled Somalis exchange their opinions on issues regarding the situation in Somalia and in Diaspora countries.

By definition, Diaspora cultures are hybrids of old and new. Diasporas adapt the norms and habits from the country of origin in a more or less flexible and fluid manner to those of the new country. Yet, as the immigration debate of the last decades has emphasised, combining different cultures is a challenging task. This challenge applies especially to the Somali Diaspora; with its many intersecting identities generated by the civil war, the moment of arrival in a new country, clan affiliation, religion and gender, among others. For example, the “old” Somali Diaspora communities that emigrated before 1991 have been receiving “new” streams of refugees due to the civil war. The level of integration of the “old” Somali communities with the new culture will differ from the integration of the “new” Somali communities and create layers and potential conflicts within the Diaspora. Urbanised and more international Somalis are a distinct group that differ in many ways from the less-worldly rural refugees of the last decade, having often no more than their native language in common.

The different perceptions of the significance of the clans are another intersecting factor between various communities of the Diaspora, and with Somalis in Somalia. When the state collapsed, the old clan system based on norms and rules of coexistence also disappeared. Nowadays in Somalia, clans are used to justify acts of indiscriminate violence that respond only to the law of the strongest. The Diaspora, on the other hand, is still used to the old values of the clan culture, which are meant to solve and settle conflicts, not justify new ones. In some Diaspora communities, the clans have only a marginal importance. Within the Somali Diaspora in Italy for example, when someone dies, all Somalis of the city gather to mourn regardless of clan affiliation. When someone has returned from a visit to Somalia, members of all clans from the Diaspora meet up to hear about the situation in the country. When new refugees arrive in boats along the Italian coast, the community is there to help them, without asking about their clan affiliation. All Somalis are born with the clan as a point of reference, but within these Diaspora communities it is not a more important part of their identity than family name or city of birth.

However, while the old role of the clans as a conflict-resolution mechanism has perished in Somalia, the new perception of clans as a pretext for antagonisms is also having an impact on the Diaspora. The new clan conflicts that are at the root of the civil war are sometimes exported by migrants, creating clan-based sub-communities within some Somali exile communities. Within parts of the Somali Diaspora, clan affiliations have in fact become taboos that members avoid discussing, since it may provoke conflict and suspicion, even among friends. When Somali refugees arrive in Europe they are often forced to indicate to which clan they belong. This system of categorisation feeds hostile feelings, as members of the Diaspora are forced to bring the conflict with them even to their country of arrival.

81. UN-INSTRAW Project Seminar Report (Bari, 3-4 May 2008 and Milan, 23-24 February)
4.2. Changing gender roles among the Somali Diaspora

The development of new gender roles is an important facet of Somali exile communities. Gender relations are one of the greatest challenges for members of the Diaspora, as new gender roles intersect with traditional Somali interpretations of male and female. This is especially true for Somali communities in Western cultures. In countries where social welfare benefits are high, such as Canada, the United Kingdom, the Netherlands and the Scandinavian countries, immigrant women are often more empowered by the new system. State benefits and housing allowances are often registered in the woman’s name, which gives women a new control over household income and spending in relation to what they used to have in Somalia, and in relation to their male relatives. In addition, women of the Somali Diaspora benefit from the interest-free loan system *shalongo*, which is similar to an informal microcredit system.\(^{82}\) *Shalongo* circulates large amounts of money (estimates say up to €20,000 per year, per person) between a fixed number of women, who have to repay the loans within an agreed period of time. The combination of these informal financial networks for women and the official state allowances targeting women, have created a completely new role for Somali women as breadwinners.

In contrast to women’s new gender roles, many women complain about men being incapable of adapting to the new culture, and hiding from unemployment and the challenges of the new country by chewing *khat* and keeping to themselves. Somali Diaspora men complain about women not respecting the old gender roles, and adapting too swiftly to the new culture. In the words of Nauja Kleist, a Danish expert on the Somali Diaspora, “…[t]he inability to realise the gender ideal of the male breadwinner, the lack of recognition of status and competences – perhaps combined with a loss of authority in the family – might be experienced as misrecognition as a man.”\(^{83}\) One of the outcomes of the difficulties of adapting to changing gender roles are growing divorce rates within the Somali Diaspora.\(^{84}\) As noted by Abdi M. Kusow, “[t]he contact between the two systems of social understanding creates a social and gender schizophrenia. […] Somali men and women are nurturing the seeds of their social and communal destruction.”\(^{85}\) In desperate attempts to resolve the difficult problem of integrating and adapting to new gender roles, many Somali families in the West decide to send their children either directly back to Somalia, or to other Muslim countries such as Egypt.\(^{86}\)

On the other hand, in countries such as Italy, where State benefits are very low or even non-existent, the situation of the Somali Diaspora is very different. Due to its colonial past, Italy was one of the main recipient countries of Somali refugees at the beginning of the Somali crisis in 1991-92. Many Somali refugees, however, decided to move on to other countries where it was easier to cope and settle down. Thus, Italy today accounts for a lesser part of the Somali Diaspora. Most Somalis in Italy were already living there at the time of the State collapse in Somalia, or they had strong bonds to Italy in the form of family or work. Since little help is given by the Italian State, Somali women have had to work to survive. As a result, most Somali women in Italy are professionally active, many as caretakers for older people. Few Somali women in Italy wear a *hijab*; though it is difficult to determine if this is mostly due to the secularised character of the Italo-Somali community, or if it is a result of discrimination against Muslim women wearing headscarves in the Italian

\(^{82}\) Hassan 2002, p. 3.  
\(^{83}\) Kleist 2008, p. 318-319.  
\(^{84}\) Mukhtar 2007.  
\(^{85}\) Kusow 2007, p. 38.  
\(^{86}\) Kusow 2007, p. 40.
job market. Little research has been done so far on the Somali Diaspora in Italy in general, and even less on women in particular. There are a few examples of ongoing studies within this field, though no results have been published yet.

In addition to the challenge of the Italian job market and the almost non-existent state benefits, the Italian legal situation is one of the most complicated for the Somali Diaspora. Somali citizens cannot receive a permit of stay for longer than twelve months at a time, of which six months is spent waiting for a permit renewal. This puts Somali citizens in Italy in a legal limbo in which it is difficult to satisfy any of the basic survival needs, such as finding a job or renting an apartment. In addition to this, all Somali passports have been invalidated since 1999, yet the Italian State has not granted Somalis the rights of statelessness. As an identification card, Somalis are given a “travel document” with a maximum validity of twenty-four months, considerably affecting their freedom of movement both inside and outside of the European Schengen Area. Somalis do not have diplomatic representation in Italy, which makes them even more vulnerable to lengthy and unjust bureaucratic procedures to obtain official certificates of birth, marriage, or death. Moreover, since foreigners are not allowed to vote in Italy, Somalis have not voted since the last free elections in Somalia in 1968. Due to the current situation in Somalia, the political elections of November 2009 may not be held as planned. In that case, it is difficult to say when Somali citizens living in Italy and in countries with a similar situation will next have the ability to vote.

4.3. Relations between women of the Diaspora and women in Somalia

The developments within the Somali Diaspora, alongside the ongoing armed conflict in Somalia, have created a growing gap between the culture of exile and in-country Somalis. As mentioned, the impact of seventeen years of exile has changed women's and men's gender roles considerably. Somali Diaspora women live between the newly-found possibilities of emancipation, and the great pressure to live up to traditional female roles. Men of the Somali Diaspora generally have a more difficult time integrating than their female counterparts, and they often find it hard to adapt to the changing roles of women. At the same time, the political landscape of Somalia has seen the quick growth of conservative Islamic movements that have reversed women's development and put a full stop to their empowerment.

In general, members of the Somali Diaspora have a solid educational background, and they are accustomed to law and order and to the presence of a democratic state. In contrast to this, the education system in Somalia is next to non-existent, and the war has created a new generation that only know how to kill and how to survive. People in Somalia have in fact learned to manage their lives without a State structure to support them. Hence, the two cultures of Somalis in Somalia, and Somalis of the Diaspora, have developed in very different directions. When Somalia finally returns to peace, the country will have acquired much that is new, both from the Diaspora, with its high level of education and culture of democracy, and from the people who remained in Somalia during the war, with their capacity to survive. However, for this to happen, bridges need to be built between in-country Somalis and the Diaspora. As a first step in this direction, UN-INSTRAW and ADEP organised an International Conference in Dar-es-Salaam in September 2008 in order to

87. Private conversation, Project Seminar (Bari, 3-4 May 2008)
88. See the work of the research institutes SID and CeSPL and the research conducted at the University of Pavia and the University of Naples "l'Orientale".
bring together members of the Somali Diaspora in Italy, with representatives of Somali women’s organisations and the TFG. This conference will require significant follow-up on many fronts - through a greater commitment of authorities in Diaspora countries towards the needs and opportunities of persons of Somali background, through the active integration of Somali returnees in peace- and State-building processes, and through a commitment by the international community to support gender mainstreaming and women’s participation in peace process and in preparations for the upcoming 2009 elections.

Women of the Diaspora and women living in Somalia have had very different experiences during the two last decades. Nowadays they belong to two distinct worlds, connected mostly by remittances and family bonds, but rarely by common worldviews. It often happens that women in Somalia do not accept women that come from Diaspora communities. Exiled Somali women are seen as pretentious and considered to be the ones who ran away to hide. They are blamed for wanting to come back and impose their ideas and ethics on women in Somalia. On the other hand, women of the Somali Diaspora tend to see women in Somalia as ignorant victims who need to gain consciousness of their condition to be able to identify the key issues that could promote their emancipation. Yet, according to some members of the Diaspora, Somali women are not ready for this level of “empowerment.”

Much needs to be done in order to bridge the cultural divides between women in Somalia and those of the Diaspora. A great challenge for Diaspora women is to find a way to share their views in a manner that is accepted by women in Somalia. The role of remittances in this context also needs to be evaluated, as the relations established on the basis of remittances sent by Diaspora women to Somalia may be an entry point to closing this culture gap. A forum for dialogue and understanding must be created between Diaspora women and women in Somalia. Exiled and in-country Somali women could develop a common agenda on how the peace and State-building processes need to change in order to include the participation of women, both in Somalia and of the Diaspora. This approach is the starting point of the Conference in Dar-es-Salaam. Women from the Diaspora and women in Somalia will identify the main goals and priorities to promote the role of women in the next phase of the development of Somali public authority and institutions. Together they will also meet representatives of the Somali TFG and international stakeholders to present their priorities and establish a forum for dialogue – the First Somali Women's Permanent International Roundtable for Peace – and mechanisms for advocacy for Somali women's political participation.

5. Conclusion – Women, Peace and Security for the future of Somalia

The wars of the 1970s and 1980s led to the downfall of Siad Barre's regime and to the collapse of the Somali State in 1991. Since then, Somalia has been torn by conflicts between warring factions of clans, sub-clans, religious groups, government armies and international troops. The country has been regionally divided by secessions in the North, and the current Somali Transitional Federal Government has little practical authority over the country’s central and southern territories. The current peacekeeping mission of the African Union is too small to have a concrete or lasting impact on the stability of the region, and its precursors in the 1990s brought more pain than security to the Somali civilian population.

90. UN-INSTRAW Seminar Report (Bari, 3-4 May 2008)
The women of Somalia have borne the brunt of the war. Gender-based violence in Somalia is widespread, and the impunity for perpetrators of sexual violence is almost absolute. Despite the insecurity with which women in Somalia are forced to live on a daily basis, most of them work to support their families, with anything from farming to businesses. Many women have set up women's groups or work for civil society organisations to provide health care, vocational training and other support to the local population. In the Report on the Situation in Somalia of 11 October 2005, the UN Secretary-General noted that there are many women’s groups and NGOs in all parts of Somalia, even if it is difficult to estimate the exact number due to the lack of a “systematic national registration system. In the absence of an effective central government, these groups play a vital role in providing basic social services and literacy and vocational training to Somalis.”

Women's work has in fact been essential to helping Somalis cope during the last seventeen years of crisis, as these networks have replaced much of the absent State infrastructure, together with the international aid given to the country.

Despite Somali women's acclaimed work at the grassroots level, very few women are included in decision-making surrounding peace and state-building processes. Some have been able to break through gender power barriers, which in Somali politics are more than simply a glass ceiling. One example is the success of the women working for the inclusion of the “Sixth Clan” made up exclusively of women (see section 2.3), in the Eldoret peace process in 2002. However, these cases of powerful women's advocacy groups are still only flowers in the desert. To ensure a successful peace process and sustainable post-conflict reconstruction, women must be included at all levels, from the grassroots to the top echelons of decision-making. A symbolic percentage of 12% in the Transitional Federal Parliament is not enough to create a critical mass of women to influence Somalia's development, nor to ensure democratic representation of women. The risk is that this quota outlined in the Transitional Federal Charter will be set as a parameter for women's participation in the Somali parliament, including when the current interim government has been replaced with a democratically chosen authority. All institutions must work to boost women's participation not only in Parliament, but also in the government, in the ministries, and at the regional and local levels. It is hence important that not only the Somali Minister of Gender, Development and Family Affairs works to target women's issues, but that this is prioritised within other ministries and decision-making organs. The State-building process is constantly threatened by the continuing armed conflict in Somalia, yet it is not too early to work for women's inclusion in either the peace-process or the TFIs. If women's participation is limited to only a symbolic token at this stage of the State-building process, it will be even more difficult for women to secure voice and vote once peace has been secured. Promoting gender equality must become an essential part of the peace process, in the work of the Transitional Federal Institutions, and for the stakeholders of the international community working for the reconstruction of Somalia.

Can Somali women truly become “ambassadors of peace”? This will to a great extent depend on the work and engagement of women of the Somali Diaspora. The Somalis that have been dispersed around the globe during the last decades have a great impact on the political agenda in Somalia itself. Women of the Diaspora are being increasingly emancipated in many of their new home countries, and their newly-found political empowerment can also benefit women in Somalia. Diaspora women can draw from their experiences to support women in Somalia to include a gender perspective in the ongoing creation of new Somali State institutions and political parties. However, for this to happen,

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the cultural gap between exiled and in-country Somali women that has developed over the last seventeen years must be bridged. Somali women can build bridges over the clan system and the current conflict to promote peace, but they also need to build bridges among themselves and between the Diaspora and women in Somalia. Common ground for confrontation and discussion is needed to identify the political priorities of women both in the Diaspora and in Somalia. This is especially important for the upcoming national elections planned for November 2009 in Somalia, when the mandate of the TFG will end. Somali women need to be heard, and their voices included in the reconstruction of their country. In collaboration with women of the Diaspora, Somali women need to be engaged both as candidates and as voters in the elections of 2009 for their situation to be addressed by a future government.

UN Security Council Resolution 1325 is an important tool for this purpose. Resolution 1325 needs to be put into practice in Somalia to ensure the involvement of women in the current Somali peace and state-building processes, and to improve the security of women and girls in the country. At this stage of the Somali armed conflict, a National Action Plan for the implementation of Resolution 1325 is not feasible since stable institutions are needed to monitor its implementation. However, the work of Somali women's associations both in Somalia and in Diaspora countries is an important resource to strengthen the role of women in Somali society. These women's work should thus be taken into account in the ongoing peace- and State-building processes to prepare the ground for the future full implementation of Resolution 1325. At this stage, awareness-raising activities, advocacy and networking between these interlocutors are fundamental priorities to the eventual development of a National Action Plan on Resolution 1325 in Somalia. This will also ensure that the priorities of such an Action Plan will be set by Somali women themselves, in collaboration with decision-makers and executing bodies in Somalia. The UN-INSTRAW/ADEP project: “Gender and Peace in Somalia: Implementation of Resolution 1325” aims to create a venue for Somali women, both of the Diaspora and in Somalia, to discuss their priorities and begin setting the agenda for the promotion of a gender-responsive State-building process in Somalia. Women's political participation and the inclusion of a gender perspective in this process are not only important for half of the Somali population, but for peace itself and the future of Somalia.
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