



Land Grabbing and Labour Relations: The Case of the Ben- ishangul Gumuz Region, Ethiopia

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Contents

Acknowledgements	iv
Lists of Figures	v
Lists of Maps	v
List of Acronyms	vi
Abstract	vii
Chapter One: Introduction	1
1.1.Capital, Labour and Large Scale Farming	2
1.2.Statement of the Problem	2
1.3.Research Questions	3
1.4.Research Methodologies	3
Chapter Two: Conceptual and Theoretical Framework	5
2.1. Political Economy of Land Grabbing	5
2.2. State and Land Grabbing	5
2.3. Accumulation by Dispossession, Primitive Accumulation and Land Grabbing	6
2.4. Concepts of Capitalism and Labour	8
2.5. Concepts of Livelihoods	10
2.6. Size and Scale of Farming	10
2.7. Resistance of Peasants	11
Chapter Three: Overview of Ethiopian Agricultural Policy and Results and Discussion	14
3.1. Empirical Review of Ethiopian Agriculture Policy and Land Grabbing	14
3.1.1. Review of Ethiopian Agricultural Policy	14
3.1.2. Ethiopian Investment Frameworks and Land Grabbing	15
3.2. Results and Discussions	16
3.2.1. Introduction to The Study Area, Benishangul Gumuz Region	16
3.2.2. Land Acquisition Process	18
3.2.3. Project: Tracon Trading Farm Developemnt	18
3.2.4. Re-settlement Schemes	19
3.2.5. Small-Scale Farms, Livlihoods and Labour Relations	20
3.2.5.1. Classes of Farmers in the Context of Livlihoods	20
3.2.5.2. Small Scale Farms in the Context of Labour Relations	21
3.2.6. Large Scale Farms, Labour Relations and Resistances	24
3.2.6.1. Classes of Labour in Large Scale Farms and Livelihoods	24
3.2.6.2. Institutional Framework of Large Scale Farms	26
3.2.6.3. Working Conditions	27
3.2.6.4. Resistance of Peasants and Labourers	30
3.2.6.4.1 Resistance of Peasants	30-
3.2.6.4.2. Resistance of Labour	31
3.2.7. The Role of Labour Agency and Workers and Social Affairs Authority	33
Chapter Four: Synthesis	34
4.1. New Concepts of Land Grabbing, Accumulation by Dispossession and Primitive Accumulation	34
4.2. State Power and Land Grabbing	35
4.3. Large/Small-Scale Farm and Labour Relations	36
4.3.1.Large Scale Farm and Labour Relations	36
4.3.2.Small-Scale Farm and Labour Relations	38
4.4. Livelihoods of Migratory Farm Workers and Local Population	39
4.4.1.Livelihoods of Migratory Farm Workers	39
4.4.2.Livelihoods of the Local Population	40
4.5. Resistance of Peasants	40
4.5.1. Peasant Resistance against Land Expropriation/Re-Location	40
4.5.2. Resistance against Improvement of Incorporation	41
4.6. The Role of Workers and Social Affairs Authority and Labour Agencies	43
Chapter Five: Conclusion	44
References	47
Appendices	50

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List of Figures

Figure 1: The Farm Land and the Site of the Project	19
Figure 2: The Local Woman Carrying the Purchased Household items after Selling Wood	21
Figure 3: The Local Woman Carrying Wood to Sell	21
Figure 4: Labour Market Place in the Local Smallholder Farms	24
Figure 5: Labourers During Lunch Time	27
Figure 6: The Way Water is Provided for Labourers	28
Figure 7: The Living House of Labourers	28
Figure 8: The Sick Female Worker	29
Figure 9: Labourers asking for the Late wage	29
Figure 10: The Land that the local people have taken from the Project	31

List of Maps

Map 1: The Map of Benishangul Gumuz Region and the Location of Case Study Area	17
Map 2: Map of Administrative Regions and Zones of Ethiopia	17

List of Appendices

Appendix 1: Lists of Respondents Interviewed in Benishangul Gumuz Region, Metekel Zone, Dangur Wereda and Kota, Benghez and Gublak kebeles	50
Appendix 2: Partial List of Land Transfers in the Benishangul-Gumuz Regional State by the Federal Government	51
Appendix 3: Partial List of Land Transfers by the Regional Government (Benishangul-Gumuz Regional State)	52
Appendix 4: Figures of Machineries of the Project	56

List of Acronyms

ABD	Accumulation by Dispossession
ADLI	Agriculture Development Led-Industrialization
AISD	Agricultural Investment Support Directorate
BRICS	Brazil, Russia, India, China & South Africa
CSA	Central Statistics Agency
DBE	Development Bank of Ethiopia
Eth.B	Ethiopian Birr
ECX	Ethiopian Commodity Exchange
EIA	Ethiopian Investment Agency
EPRDF	Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front
ESDA	Ethiopian Sugar Development Agency
EWCA	Ethiopian Wildlife Conservation Authority
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organization
FDRE	Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GTP	Growth and Transformation Plan
Hr	Hectare
IMF	International Monetary Fund
LSF	Large Scale Farm
MICs	Middle Income Countries
MME	Ministry of Mines and Energy's
MoARD	Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development
MoFED	Ministry of Finance and Economic Development
MoTI	Ministry of Trade and Industry
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
PASDEP	Plan for Accelerated, Sustainable Development to End Poverty
PF	Plantation Farm
PSNP	Productive Safety Net Programme
PRSP	Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper
SNNP	Southern Nation, Nationalities and People
SSA	Sub Saharan Africa
SSF	Small Scale Farm
USD	Dollar of United States
WB	World Bank
WDR	World Bank Development Report

Abstract

This study studies the current land grabbing and change in labour relations from a political economy perspective, in the context of Ethiopia, based on the case study research in Benishangul Gumuz region. It strives to uncover the implication of wage labour to the livelihoods of workers and how peasants and workers resistance changes the forces of national capital. The study takes its root from the view that when capital needs land, but not labour of locals or it perhaps needs land and cheap labour (Li, 2011). And also the study has used the current concepts and theories of land grabbing from the context of national capital (Oya, 2013, forthcoming) and peasant resistance from below (Borras & Franco, Forthcoming).

Firstly, the study has found that the Ethiopian government has dual policy approach; promoting large scale commercial agriculture in low land areas and high value crop production and global market link in the highlands. The project and re-location programs that are facilitated by the state seriously constrained shifting cultivators specifically whose livelihood is depend on the immediate environment. Further, locals lost their cultural entities and indigenous knowledge.

Second, the land of locals is needed by the project, but their labour is not needed as they are perceived as having poor working culture. But, the reality is locals demand wage labour which is evidenced by their employment in the local smallholder farms. The farm rather needs cheap migrant labour that is more trapped by poverty which is important for the profit of the farm. Further, the farm oppresses and exploits migrants with a little wage. As a result, labourers leave to smallholder farms for better wage, basic services, security and where there are good social relations. Therefore, wage labour for migrant workers is unlikely to meet their livelihood needs it rather increases their poverty.

Third, regional workers affairs office facilitates labour migration with the help of labour agencies. But, officials do not take attention to labour exploitation and oppression by farms. The challenge to not take regulation of labour issues is that the office is very far from the farm areas. In addition, there are no bottom level labour authorities, trade unions and NGOs intervene in labour affairs. So, these make investors to decide labour issues by themselves (*laissez-faire* approach).

Finally, the claim of labourers in the farm is often backed with un-kept informal promise and oppression. But, claims are unreported due to the distance of institutions and partly by the silent-nature of labourers. Also when labourers claim to the outside local administrations it is rare that they get attention for their claims. Due to the combination of the above factors, there is no or little improvement of labour rights or if there it longs for a very few days. In general, different class interests, directions of resistance and intra-rural conflicts have led to the difficulty of forming collective actions.

Relevance to Development Studies

The agrarian question of capital was solved through primitive accumulation that separates producers from their means of production and its later formation of free proletariat (see Bernstein, 2006). But, Bernstein argues that the agrarian question of capital is ended after 1970s when state led development is collapsed (Bernstein, 2006). Then, if there is an agrarian question today it is the agrarian question of labour. So, the significant question is to what extent the current capitalist system through land grabbing solves the agrarian question of capital and labour. It is also linked that to what extent the current capitalism creates free proletariat as compared to primitive accumulation (Oya, 2013 forthcoming).

The 2008s global financial and food crisis led to the new rush on land in Global South countries to access cheap labour, land and other resources. As Harvey (2003) calls accumulation by dispossession as a continuous forms of primitive accumulation that caused by the crisis of capital accumulation and finds opportunities to invest surplus capital to respond to multiple crisis through economic and extra-economic means. So, land grabbing is used as a means tool of responding multiple crisis (Oya, 2013 and Borras et.al). The other driving force is that land investment is claimed as necessary to increase economic growth and its gradual effect on poverty reduction and to achieve agrarian transition in Global South.

However, land grabbing is often viewed from the context of foreign capital and investing states only. Therefore, as Oya(forthcoming) argued that the role of national capital whether from below or above should be situated in the analysis of resolving agrarian question of labour and capital. The other building element of this study is that capital needs free land, but not labour or it may require cheap labour (Li, 2011). In addition, Borras and Franco(2013, forthcoming) contestation from below shows how local peasant resistance is unrecognized in the current land grabbing literature unlike the more open resistances exist in conventional politics.

Therefore, by taking the central ideas of the above literatures this case study research conducted in Ethiopia will bring empirical findings and understanding to development studies specifically to Agrarian and environmental studies by uncovering the relation of land grabbing through national capital using a political economy approach. It then strives to answer research questions; what is the implication of wage labour for agricultural workers, how and why capital exploits labour and resistance against capital forces.

Keywords

Agrarian questions of Labour and Capital, Agrarian Transition, Adverse Incorporation, Small and Large Scale Farms, Accumulation by Dispossession, Land Grabbing, Primitive Accumulation, Globalization, Resistance, Exploitation, Livelihoods, Ethiopia.

Chapter One: Introduction

1.1. Capital, Labour and Large Scale Farming

Since 2008s food and financial crisis land investment flowing to Global South to capture cheap land and labour with a loose regulations of forces of capital and provision of relaxed investment climates. Following the global rush on land, during a new 'Scramble for Africa', 67 % of global land acquisition was undertaken in Africa in 2009 (Abbink, 2011:514-516).

The state framed agricultural policy that is practical in highland regions of the country. But, its goal of export-oriented commercialization of peasant agriculture through diversified supports did not succeed in bringing agricultural development and making backward and forward linkage with industry as expected. Later, it has shifted in to a more market oriented economy in its last PRSPs and development of private sector, a shift from smallholder to large scale commercial agriculture. State keeps smallholder agriculture as a political tool of reducing rural mass migration and displacement and gain political support while facilitating land investment in sparsely populated regions (See Tom Lavers, 2012).

Since 2009s Ethiopia become among the most African countries which promote foreign large scale land acquisitions as a part of development policy (Abbink, 2011:517) and (see Tom Lavers). The federal state actively promotes land investment in the period 2007-2010 it has signed over some 17 million hectare of land to foreign investors and expects to lease out a total of 7.4 million acres by 2013 (Abbink, 2011:514).

Most of large scale acquisitions are taking place in low land regions by claiming that regions are featured by low population density, free, unused, marginal land and then developing social services by perceiving them as backward and undeveloped. State use re-settlement program in those emerging regions to take away them from shifting cultivation and pastoralism to settled agriculture while offering land for investment purpose. State largely envisioned land investment for wage employment, economic growth, food market supply, technology and management transfer by the pressure of IMF and WB (Abbink, 2011:517).

1.2. Statement of the Problem

ADLI which was a peasant-oriented policy that support smallholders through technology package and institutional support to achieve food security, food-self sufficiency and promote industry based on labour intensive and non-mechanized agriculture. But, it is failed to bring agricultural development and achieve food security. Still 4-6 million people suffer from lack of food and 46% are undernourished (Abbink, 2011:515-16) and in 2009, over 22 percent of the rural population was depend on foreign-assisted food aid and safety net programs (see Rahmato, 2012 & Lavers, 2011).

Since the 2008's financial and food crises land rush has risen to resolve crisis of capital accumulation. Large scale land acquisition is claimed to increase economic growth and the subsequent reduction of poverty and to achieve agrarian transition in Global South (Li, 2011:293). In similar vision, the Ethiopian government has shown a shift of policy from peasant to large scale commercial agriculture through highly mechanized and labour dispelling technology in lowland areas since 2005 (Lavers, 2011). Then, its last two PRSPs focus on large scale commercial agriculture to bring economic growth in general.

Since 2007 both federal and regional governments are actively promoting investment in large farm enterprises (Rahmato, 2012). Then, it is identified that 75 million hectares are suitable for cultivation, while only 14 million hectares are currently cultivated, leaving about 60 million hectares 'free' land though it is not merely free (Lavers, 2012). Most of the identified lands lie in low land regions where there are weak institutions of land administration and regulation. In addition, pastoralism and shifting cultivation are considered as unsustainable and should be transformed through re-location program while land given for investment purpose (Lavers, 2012). The key livelihoods sources of agro-pastoralists and shifting cultivators like: water points, grazing and communal lands and forests are enclosed by investments that seriously constrained their livelihoods (Rahmato, 2012, Makki, 2012 & Abbink, 2011).

As Li, (2009) the 2008s WDR report encourages an exit from agriculture without critically analyzing the wage rate, working conditions, requirements and terms of employment in the destination areas. According to WDR of 2008 (74) agricultural wage employment is targeted for rural landless and nearly landless poor people as a pathway out of poverty. But, the risk is that capital needs free land but not labour or it perhaps needs cheap labour (Li, 2011). Analogously, large-scale mono-crop plantations that are highly mechanized prefer to save on labour and labour management cost (Borras & Franco, 2013:12). Whether tiny or large capital always seeks subsidies and pushes down on the price of labour and profit still depends on cheap, abundant, disciplined labour (Li, 2011:288 & 295).

1.3. Research Questions

The central questions of the study are; how does large scale farming changes labour relations

What is the implication of wage employment for the livelihood of agricultural workers?

What is the extent of labour exploitation and why and how do labourers resist against their terms of incorporation? Why and how do shifting cultivators make claims against their re-location/displacement?

What kind of legal protection for labourers is operating and how?

1.4. Research Methodology

As Gerring, (2009:17) described a case study helps to use a naturalistic evidence gathering and investigate the properties of a single phenomenon. In addition, case study refers to a spatially delimited phenomenon observed at a single point in time and an intensive study of a single case or fewer cases as the fewer cases there are the more intensively they can be studied (Ibid:-20).

Primary data is gathered through semi-structured interviews with respondents mentioned below. Secondary data has been reviewed from federal and regional official reports and empirical and theoretical literature is reviewed from journal of peasant studies.

Data Collection Techniques

The interview process started from regional level investment officer, land and environment protection officer and then proceeded to regional workers and social affairs officer. This first stage interview involves data about investment intensities of both domestic and foreign investments, potential investment areas that in turn enable to priorities and select the case study and the type of labour regime used to easily access labour agencies. In addition to the data obtained concerning investment procedures, investment types and intensities, types, amount of land and extent of land grabbing, land and environmental issues, its effect on local peoples' land, labour, livelihood and environment issues, it further helped to get a support letter to access the bottom level administration levels and the company, identify and contact a case study farm, how to access the areas and key informants step by step.

The second stage of interview was with Zone level land administration and environmental protection office, agriculture and rural development (livelihoods data) and zonal level workers and social affairs office. But, unfortunately the workers and social affairs office was established before two months of the research time and then officers have no data about labour regimes as the office was not fully organized. Totally at regional level there are two offices of labour affairs, this one is the second office which is too young and weak.

The third stage of interview was with Wereda level land administration and environmental protection and agriculture and rural development officers about land investment, environment, resettlement and livelihoods. At this level of administration there is no investment (there is no investment office except at regional level) office, labour agencies and workers affairs offices.

The fourth stage of interview was with the Kebele level officers who are working in a general agricultural office which is not well organized logistically and has not enough staffs. Though the available staffs are loaded with different responsibilities (structural problems), data regarding small scale farmers, the influence of large scale farms, migrant farmers and land rent system and local and migrant labourers and local livelihoods is gathered well. Three Kebeles (one Kebele comprises 2 villages) surrounding the case company were selected and from each Kebele one village is selected (totally three villages). After interviewing officers from each village and then with the help of officers different small scale farmers, migrant farmers and local labourers were interviewed. Interviewing different local small scale farmers was also important as they provide significant employment opportunity for both local, migrant labourers and for labourers who left large farms. The selection of local small scale farmers considers their differentiation based on their land size, rent system, capital amount, and types of farmers and potential of using available land.

Finally, the data about labour issues has been accessed from labour agency and farm officials. After farm officials are interviewed, a focus group discussion arranged and undertaken with labourers after lunch and around dinner time by the help of farm officials. Interviewees were selected based on age, gender and work status.

Chapter Two: Conceptual and Theoretical Frameworks

2.1. Political Economy of Land Grabbing

Circuits of global capital and changes at local level and 'actors' and 'structures' that organize production, commanding labour and land at different levels are analyzed by the political economy approach. Particularly, questions of Bernstein; who does what, who owns what, who gets what and what do they do with it help to analyze the power difference between different actors involved in large scale farming in a labour relation context (White et.al, 2012:621).

The current global land grabbing is defined as the explosion of (trans) national commercial land transactions, large-scale production and export of food and bio-fuel (Borras and Franco, 2012:34). As noted by White et.al (2010:631) diversified 'crises' lies in capturing marginal and empty land across the globe. Similarly, the convergence of global crises has contributed to the dramatic revaluation of land in the global South since 2008 (Borras and Franco, 2012:36).

The current land rush accelerated after the food crisis of 2008 provided new opportunities of accessing cheap land, labour and other resources required to respond to the growing demand for food and bio-fuel (Baglioni & Gibbon, 2013:5). So, land-abundant Southern countries, especially in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) are the objects of a global land rush to overcome limited opportunities for accumulation and used as a response to crisis of neoliberal capitalism (Baglioni & Gibbon, 2013:2).

2.2. State and Land Grabbing

In SSA the convergence of multiple crises, lagging in capitalist transition and slow progress of rural development have led to the support of large-scale investment by African states. African states implement conflicting policies of agricultural modernisation and the preservation of family farming (Baglioni & Gibbon, 2013:7). So, land grabbing is initiated by national states and actors.

States involve in a multidimensional areas of land investment. They make a systematic policy and administrative issues targeted at capturing 'marginal lands' and convert them into investable commodity. They involve also in the formation of cadastres, land records and titles as a means of simplifying a complex land-based social relations (Scott 1998; cited in (Borras & Franco, 2013:6-7). Land deals taken as a state-building mechanism where sovereignty and authority are expanded to previously 'non-state spaces' using coercion and violence to enforce compliance (Borras & Franco, 2013:7).

Moreover, state gives substantial incentives to corporate actors in pursuit of political stability, simple predation and rent seeking (Hall, 2013:8). Similarity, the role of states in the current

land rush is changed in to a 'broker'(Baglioni & Gibbon, 2013:5). In general, according to Jonathan Fox's argument state performs conflicting activities of facilitating capital accumulation and maintaining a minimum level of political legitimacy simultaneously (Borras & Franco, 2013:7).

2.3. Accumulation by Dispossession, Primitive Accumulation and Land Grabbing

'Primitive accumulation' is taken as an ongoing process or 'accumulation by dispossession' by criticizing that Marx's 'primitive accumulation' is only attached to an original stage of capitalism (Harvey, 2003:143-144). ABD is then caused by over-accumulated capital that lacks opportunities for profitable investment (Harvey, 2003:139). So, access to cheap inputs (labour and land) at very low (and in some instances zero) cost from non-capitalist territories taken as an opportunity to accumulate (Harvey, 2003:140).

Capitalism knows both how to create, respond and resolve crisis of capital accumulation. In ABD, financialization and privatization are systems of creating capital crises and 'the management and manipulation of crises'. Also Harvey's market liberalization causes chronic crises of over-accumulation that requires continual release of new assets in which over-accumulated capital seize and convert to profit (Hall, 2013:5-6). In the other way, land grabbing and ABD are considered as a response to crisis which is similar with the view of Borras et.al, convergence of multiple crises as well as the emerging needs for resources by newer hubs of global capital; BRICS and MICs(Hall, 2013:5).

Land grabbing can be contextualized from the dimension of national capital accumulation and involvement of national actors. ABD thesis emphasizes land grabbing as derived by global forces, foreign capital and investing states as key actors (Hall, 2013:5-7). The role of actors and structures in the recipient states by mediating exogenously-generated land demand in the pursuit of agricultural development is not also well recognized (Hall, 2013:8). It is similarly argued that the demand for land is generated not just by exogenous forces but by state priorities and opportunities (Oya, 2013:20).

In relation with domestic land grabbing there is on-going, but slow agrarian transformation towards capitalist forms of production by ongoing rural accumulation, differentiation and domestic agrarian capital. As a result, the development of agrarian capital involves different paths of transition and accumulation from 'above' or 'below' exist in the current 'land rush'(Oya, 2013:20). So, capital accumulation could be seen from different scale of farmers and indigenous actors.

Small sized and scaled domestic farms can be considered in capital accumulation and land grabbing that may limit, advance rural livelihoods and cause resistance. Land grabbing by small-

holder is not taken in to consideration and there is also smaller-scale land acquisitions by actors other than smallholders. Generalizations that acquisitions must be large in scale makes 'smallholder land grabs' an oxymoron. Moreover, dispossession is expected to be massive and the amount of land taken than the number of dispossessed people is overemphasized (Hall, 2013:7-10).

Land grabbing could takes place through using economic or extra-economic means. As Akram-Lodhi views land grab as a 'market-led' processes that involves 'the expropriation of producers from their assets through imperfect markets'. This is similar with Harvey's ABD while labeling it as PA which is 'the expropriation of producers through extra-economic means. The term 'land grabs' refers that land being seized by force which is considered as accumulation by extra-economic means. In similar way, Levien argued that land acquisitions are only grabs when they take place through extra-economic coercion and 'capital needs force at any place and time to sustain accumulation'(Hall, 2013:11). But, land markets cannot be considered as land grabbing in the absence of extra-economic means like enclosure and dispossession are not automatically taken as land grabs. Similarly, Borras et.al conceptualized that grabbing of control over land does not 'always require expulsion and dispossession of people'. Nonetheless, extra-economic means is not the only means of capital accumulation.

In contrast, economic means, like land markets, do not straightforwardly show 'economic' relations. Land sales are usually shaped by the powers of regulation and force. As Li argued that ruling regimes measures tariffs, taxes, rents and wages that causes loss of land. Though transactions seem market-driven, fraud, vague or unwritten contracts and un-kept promises are usual problems observed in land grabs. Therefore, economic and extra-economic distinction may be better seen as a continuum than as a dichotomy (Hall, 2013:11-13).

Capital has the power to penetrate and transform non-capitalist system in to a more commodified form. Welford et al. related land grabs with ABD to be understood as 'an updated and expanded PA whereby direct producers were separated from the means of production, common property rights were privatized and non-capitalist modes of production were either harnessed or destroyed.' PA and ABD indicate that capitalism has an inherent drive to commodify more and more of the life-world. Land is given for capital out of its capacity to utilize (Hall, 2013:13-14).

The challenge in the current land grabs is how the dispossessed and landless people meet their livelihood through a poor wage labour. In classical context, David Moore defined PA as 'the separation of producers engaged in pre-capitalist or subsistence production from the means of production and their subsequent proletarianization'. But, currently capital needs land, but the

labour is not then it results expulsion of people from their land (Borras & Franco, 2013:9 & 12). The dispossessed people are assumed as they were 'outside' of capitalism and self-sufficient peasants producing for subsistence. So, the key point is whether the current land grabs creates 'free' and proletarianised labourers. The highly mechanized large-scale mono-crop plantations prefer to save on labour and labour management cost (Borras & Franco, 2013:12). The dispossessed people create a 'surplus population' due to limited job opportunity and capital's strategies of creating labour reserve that suppress wage (Hall, 2013:15). But, the risk is if expelled people have no place to go and no access to jobs that occur often in highly mechanized mono-crop large farms and labour expelling (Borras & Franco, 2013:9 & 12).

Territories settled by indigenous communities and spaces relatively out of human reach become ideal for enclosure and transform them into economic centres. ABD is understood as a process in which 'common resources are enclosed and transformed into exclusive places' and 'the enclosure of commons, dispossession of indigenous people and altering the environment.' Though primitive accumulation indicates that capitalism has become global, the analysis that land grabs occur in areas 'outside' of capitalism may mislead the politics of and resistance to land grabbing. Because land leased from one capitalist concern by another cannot be seen as 'extra-economic' accumulation and transactions do not always bring anything into it from the 'outside' (Hall, 2013:16).

Now land grabbing extends its scope by seizing public assets that are purposely built for public purposes. Further, land deals occur on state-claimed land that is rather claimed by people whose rights are not recognized (Hall, 2013:14 & 17).

2.4. Concepts of Capitalism and Labour

Capital has different paths and means of formation which is difficult to limit it with fixed features. Marx's 'primitive accumulation' is understood as the first stage of capitalism undertaken through land enclosure, privatization of land and forceful expulsion of peasants and proletarianization (Akram-Lodhi, 2007:1442-1443). However, 'enclosure is a continuous characteristic' of capital that reproduces capitalist social property relations, but not a mere separation from a means of subsistence.

In the classic agrarian transition capital is developed through 'PA' that created surplus agrarian capital and free proletariat (Bernstein, 2006:450 and Bernstein, 2002:439). In contrast, Lenin argued that capital is formed through social differentiation of the peasantry, while both ways of capital formation result inequality in means of production and de-peasantization (Lenin VI, 1982:130-131).

But, the emergence, influence and effect of capital are not the same across the globe. Bernstein observed that agrarian transitions in Global South are affected by earlier transitions to capitalism and change in the dynamics of global capital. Global forces limit agrarian transitions in countries where agrarian capital has not emerged. Global capital is no longer interested in agriculture and exploits land and other resources (Oya, 2013:17-18). Most foreign investors' objective is to exploit cheap land and labour and export their produce countries of origin with no relevance for national economic development that limits structural transformation in Global South.

Capitalist development can take place without a subsequent transformation of agriculture along capitalist lines. Then agrarian capital could be emerged across different scale and size of farm rather limiting it only with Bernstein's large scale corporate agriculture. Byres criticizes that Bernstein has stressed on the exposure of developing economies to an "external sources of external accumulation" through globalization that kicks away the role of "national capitals" (Oya, 2013:18). Therefore, it is necessary to uncover the role of national capital in solving or constraining agrarian questions under the current land rush.

In parallel with the formation of agrarian capital, crisis of labour in the current capitalist system makes agrarian question of labour more critical. Globalization has restructured patterns of capital accumulation that intensifies 'fragmentation of labour'(Bernstein, 2006:455). Further, Bernstein argued that the number of Marx's 'relative surplus population' or 'reserve army of labour' has increased and secured wage employment is reduced. Broadly, social exclusion, adverse incorporation and vulnerability of poor people have roots with class relation (Bernstein, 2007:2).

The livelihood of rural communities is determined by the strategies of capital that investors used to incorporate either the land or labour of peasants or the combination of them. Often investors need free land, but if land rent is high they would prefer to leave farmers and incorporate them in a contract scheme (Li, 2011:284). In most large scale farms capital needs free land, but not labour or it may require cheap labour (Li, 2011: 286). But, whether production is organized in a large centralized farm or out-grower schemes, profit depends on cheap, abundant and disciplined labour (288). Additionally, Li argued that whether capital is tiny or large in scale, it always seeks subsidies and pushes down the price of labour (294). So, it is very important to analyse how investment objectives related with the opportunities and constraints on the livelihood of poor and landless peasants.

2.5. Concepts of Livelihoods

In livelihoods analysis it is necessary to recognize social relations that identifies structural inequality rather than saying 'let start from what people have'. The politics of livelihoods knowledge-making by instrumentalist view is inclined to normative assumptions of bottom-up, locally-led and participatory development whereas rights, justice and struggles by poor people for equality are ignored somewhat (Scoones, 2009:184). Then emphasizing only 'empowering' the poor ignores who might be 'disempowered'.

In addition, analysis of power and politics uncovers the nature of the state, private capital, wider structural forces and inequality that influence livelihoods at local levels (Scoones, 2009:185). So, it requires political economy approach that (Bernstein et al. 1992: 24) exposes social relations in both micro and macro-political processes that determine the distribution of property, patterns of work and divisions of labour, the distribution of income and the dynamics of consumption and accumulation (Scoones, 2009:186-187).

While it helps to consider the local level livelihoods, it is more demanding to incorporate the global and national level social, political and economical processes that determine local level livelihoods (Scoones, 2009:187-188).

It is also important to consider the dynamics of livelihoods in short and long-term changes. Short-term coping to immediate shocks may neglect long-term shifts that will constrain livelihoods in a significant ways (Scoones, 2009:188-189). Emphasis should be given to how sustainable to make multiple livelihood pathways through 'hanging in', 'stepping up' and 'stepping out' Dorward et al. (2005) given the uncertain future shocks and long-term drivers of change (Scoones, 2009:189-190).

2.6. Size and Scale of Farming

It is necessary to consider the national socio-economic differentiation, diverse land tenure, accumulation circuits and acquisition and varying magnitude of capital, farming populations and state officials, donors and agencies to better understand different scale and size of farms (Baglioni & Gibbon, 2013:9). The role of domestic investors to land concentration processes has never been limited to small and medium-scale farming. Both small and large-scale farming should be analysed as paths of capital development. Often they are politically and economically complementary rather than alternative to one another (Baglioni & Gibbon, 2013:8-10).

Relating investment scale merely with land size 'tends to miss broader logic and operations of capital' (Baglioni & Gibbon, 2013:4). Because, farm size may correspond to a very wide range of farms in terms of turnover, use of land, agro-ecology, level of capitalization, farmer's net income and labour relations (Oya, 2013:21-22). Small farms may have large capital while large farms may fall in under-capitalization and vice versa.

Large farms are taken as superior based on the level of technology and high economies of scale they have. So, it is argued that large size of land reaps the scale benefits of draft animals, machinery and scientific agronomy and scientific division of labour that leads to an incentive to 'improve' and vice versa (Baglioni & Gibbon, 2013:15). However, scale does not contributed to propensity to 'improve' rather it depends on the security of tenure and land and labour markets. In practice, if SSFs were not influenced by the above factors they were able to exhibit higher levels of unit investment than LSFs (Baglioni & Gibbon, 2013:22).

Therefore, 'Inverse relation' indorses the capacity of SSFs to supervise labour, meet optimal division of agricultural labour, cultivating more land per unit and use optimal factor combinations (Baglioni & Gibbon, 2013:25-26). There are few agricultural machines whose use was economical only for LSFs, but these could be used economically by SSFs through cooperative ownership (Baglioni & Gibbon, 2013:23). But, as Mill argued that LSF enjoyed no natural economies of scale, exhibit economic inefficiency and cause political destabilisation.

Then, the capacity of SSFs leads to the emergence of the other economic model of 'marrying' LSF and SSF by 'nucleus estates' and out-growers with 'scientific assistance' (Baglioni & Gibbon, 2013:21). But, later the new 'economies of scale' thesis rely on upstream agriculture that demand sophisticated technologies with high fixed costs and economies of scale that is difficult for SSF to compete (Baglioni & Gibbon, 2013:16). Moreover, liberalisation of land and output markets maintains the economic advantages of LSF (Baglioni & Gibbon, 2013:27).

2.7. Resistance of Peasants

Different classes of peasants show the diverse social and class relation that determine their livelihoods and resistance against the force that influence them. Populists bundle together the broad categories of labourers and different peasants as 'people of the land' (Baglioni & Gibbon, 2013:9). However, the term peasantry is no longer applicable due to the socio-economic differentiation of the agrarian population (Hobsbawm, 1973:3). Similarly, there is no single class of peasant rather it involves differentiated classes (Bernstein, 2006:453). In contrast, Chayanov's theory of peasant economy neglects the differentiated class of peasants by seeing peasants as unchanging element.

Peasant struggles are different based on their demand and the forces they resist for or against. Peasants may struggle against expulsions/re-location program that expels them somewhere to continue what they were previously doing. But, the worst scenarios is when people get expelled without compensation, especially people with informal land right and have no place to go and no jobs to do that determines their level of resistance (Borras & Franco, 2013:9). In societies where indigenous peoples live the demand against land appropriation or concentration usual-

ly takes the form of demanding recognition of claims over territory which is equivalent with the struggles to stop expulsion (Borras & Franco, 2013:13-15). But, the struggle for incorporation is claimed by land less or migratory people who recruited as workers.

Mainly struggles move either across labour or land or both of them at the same time. So, 'labour justice struggles' involves only labour issues, whereas 'agrarian justice struggles' move across land and labour issues. So, agrarian and labour justice struggles are characterized by issues that unite and divide. Then the poor people-versus-poor people political contestations are usual in these struggles (Borras & Franco, 2013:13).

Struggle may involve contestations between or within diversity of actors and with different interests of resistance. Specifically, 'poor people-versus-corporate actors' contestation includes incorporation or improvement of the terms of inclusion, 'poor people-versus-the state' involves claims over the actual expulsion of people from their land or terms of relocation and 'poor people-versus-poor people' contestation that comprises an inter and intra-class contestations in which people may react against while others in favour of same land deal (Borras & Franco, 2013:8).

Scale of resistance depends up on the effect of land deals on the livelihoods of communities. So, land grabbing threatens subsistence crisis that determines the political reactions of people; what James Scott's framed it as 'often it is not about how much was taken, but how much was left' (Borras & Franco, 2013:10). Peasants do not need to completely remove domination rather they claim to secure their subsistence needs (Scott, 1986:26-28). In addition, land grabbing become a threat to identity, culture or tradition and 'public goods' of poor people may leads to a political contention (Borras & Franco, 2013:10).

Different people in different place and time use different mechanisms and tools of resistance. One way is, every day forms of peasant resistance, which is the 'weapons of the weak', used by people who face the difficulty of forming collective action and absence of formal institutions (Scott, 1986:6-8). Similarly, every day politics is 'quotidian sort' of struggle of peasants against the unjust, unfair and illegal systems caused by powerful classes (Kerkvliet, 2009). Specifically, peasants use quiet, anonymous and 'guerrilla-style' of resistance with little co-ordination (Scott, 1986:8-9). Similarly, everyday resistance is expressed in quiet, mundane and subtle expressions which is less direct and organized (Kerkvliet, 2009:232).

Everyday resistance can provide inputs for open and confrontational politics with the support of state and state elites (Kerkvliet, 2009:234-35). Then, 'rightful resistance' in China is noisy, public and open because state gives interactive state-society interaction that provides good agen-

cy for rightful protestors (O'Brien 1995, 2013:1-5). So, peasant resistance will be relevant when the support of external forces and opportunities and very large collectivities of communities move on the same direction (Hobsbawm: 1973:9-11). In addition, Tarrow's 'political opportunities' influence poor people's decision to make an overt political contestation (Borras & Franco, 2013:10).

Peasant resistance is not effective due to different factors. Peasant politics does not succeed due to the intra-rural conflict, lack of representation in democratic electoral politics and unable to enforce their class interest (Hobsbawm: 1973:18-20). Similarly, rural communities are socially differentiated and then the impact on and within communities is differentiated that in turn leads to diverse responses (Borras & Franco, 2013:2) though unified by a common adverse impact of the land deals (Borras & Franco, 2013:16).

Furthermore, it is rare to find rural communities mobilizing in a unified fashion due to different directions and interests of struggle against land deals. Then, such differences increase political tensions between groups within and between communities. But, groups that have a broader unity and able to engage with influential allies, state, international actors and media attention are likely to succeed (Borras & Franco, 2013:6).

Fundamentally, many peasants protests are go unrecognized, unreported and overlooked due to what James Scott calls the 'friction of terrain', or 'geographical resistance' (Borras & Franco, 2013:3). Also, urban and rich biased modern politics is hostile to peasants and they are disconnected from the wider movement of politics that in turn determines it (Hobsbawm: 1973:17). However, Hobsbawm's view of the failure of peasant resistance because of their socially and culturally inferiority and passivity seems to undermine peasants' rationality (Hobsbawm: 1973:12-13).

Chapter Three: Overview of Ethiopian Agricultural Policy, Results and Discussion

3.1. Empirical Review of Ethiopian Agriculture Policy and Land Grabbing

3.1.1. Review of Ethiopian Agricultural Policy

The 1991 EPRDF uphold the previous regime's land law by institutionalizing state ownership of land and usufruct right to smallholders (Lavers, 2011:3 & Makki, 2012:87-89). In 1994 Constitution, article 40 of which stated that 'the right to ownership of rural and urban land, as well as of all natural resources is exclusively vested in the state and the peoples of Ethiopia' (FDRE 1995, cited in Makki, 2012:87-89). The exception of the new law is its assurance of the right to land without payment for cultivation and grazing (Makki, 2012:87-89), allow hired labour and land rent (Lavers, 2011:3).

The current regime does not support privatization to stop distress land sale, reduce class differentiation within the peasantry and remove large landholders who are feared to change the economic power into political influence (Rahmato 2009 cited in; Lavers, 2012:109). EPRDF's land policy claims to protect the peasantry from displacement and migration that would cause political instability, ethnic conflict and unemployment in urban areas. The state provides agri-inputs and other supports to the peasantry to maintain its authority and political power (Lavers, 2012:109) and used as a means of political control of rural population (Lavers, 2011:3). Then, the state does not support land re-distribution to keep its monopoly (Abbink, 2011:515-16)

Since mid-1990s smallholder sector is taken as the engine of growth and the state policy was smallholders-friendly (Rahmato, 2012:8). It follows Maoist-like principles that supports living and working with the peasantry in order to gain their support, to secure international legitimacy and development assistance (Lavers (2012:108). So, ADLI's baseline is as 85 % of the population depend on agriculture and the country is labour-rich and capital-poor, so labour-intensive and non-mechanized agriculture is taken as necessary (see also (Rahmato, 2012:8). The policy also aimed to improve yields in the East Asian development model that does not displace labour (MoFED 2003; cited in (Lavers, 2011:3). Further it is targeted to achieve food security and food self-sufficiency (Rahmato, 2012:8) and to promote industry through production of wage food and industrial input (Lavers, 2011:3).

Stagnation in the smallholder sector and forces driving foreign land grabs led to large scale agricultural commercialization as a priority (Lavers (2012:112). A shift from peasant to capitalist farming and small entrepreneur to large foreign investor is conceived in 2001 by rural development policy and strategies (Rahmato, 2012:8). Then, attracting foreign investment, encouraging large-scale agriculture in 2002 and investment proclamations and the regulations of governance is emerged in 2003 (Rahmato, 2012:11). Explicitly the 2005's PRSP, PASDEP, named as "a massive push" for accelerated growth supports agricultural commercialization through a dual approach (MoFED 2005) that compromises between political and economic priorities; support smallholder with high value export market and large scale commercial agriculture through for-

eign and domestic investment and private sector development (Lavers, 2011:4, (MoFED, 2006; cited in Rahmato, 2012:11) & (Abbink, 2011:515-16).

3.1.2. Ethiopian Investment Frameworks and Land Grabbing

Since 2007 both federal and regional governments are actively promoting investment in large farm enterprises (Rahmato, 2012:10). But, MoARD instructs regional authorities to facilitate the transfer of land to investor (Rahmato, 2012:14). The federal government retains the power to select investors and projects and all investors must first apply for an investment license from the Ethiopian Investment Agency (EIA) while domestic investors from regional agencies (Lavers, 2011:6). Regions Investment Commissions require only the submission of a written request for land by the investor. Then commissions record the land identified by investors themselves without any verification. As a result, the real amount of land seized is mostly different from what was recorded before. Investors sign a contract with commissions then inform the relevant bureaus and local level administrations to follow-up and facilitate the transfer of land. Hence, local officials face the burden of land transfer and resistance from the local people (Rahmato, 2012:14).

Consequently, in Ethiopia it is estimated that out of 75 million hectares of suitable land for cultivation only 14 million hectares are currently cultivated while leaving about 60 million hectares 'free'(Lavers, 2012:803). However, the term "cultivated area" does not include land from which peasants and agro-pastoralists access resources vital for their livelihood (Rahmato, 2012:7). It is inaccurate to describe the uncultivated areas as empty as they use it for diversified survival strategies (Makki, 2012:96). Further, the identification of 'unused' land leased to investors is limited by the state's incomplete knowledge of existing land use system (Lavers, 2012:119).

Smallholder-dominated regions have high population density, highland areas cultivated by settled smallholders, while low emergent regions are situated in lowland border areas have low population densities (30 persons/km) and land used for pastoralism and shifting cultivation (Lavers, 2011:11, Lavers, 2012:119 & Makki, 2012:96). Taking the political importance of the smallholder sector in highland areas the government has targeted most investments in sparsely populated areas by claiming that land is 'unused' (Lavers, 2012:106). The most negatively affected by investment are pastoralists and shifting cultivators in lowlands whose 'use' of land is claimed by the state (Lavers (2012:796).

The state policy focuses exclusively on settled agriculture, while it identifies pastoralism and shifting cultivation as unsustainable forms of life that should be transformed through re-

settlement program (MoFED 2003, 2010; cited in (Lavers, 2012:119). Then choice for minority subsisting on pastoralism or shifting cultivation is sedentarisation (Lavers, 2011:3).


3.2. Results and Discussions

3.2.1. Introduction to the Study Area, Benishangul Gumuz Region

The study is conducted in the Benishangul-Gumuz regional state in Metekel Zone. It is located in the northwestern part of the country between 09°17' - 12°06' North latitude and 34°10' - 37°4' East longitude. The region is bordered by Amhara regional state in the north and north-east, Oromia region in the south and southeast, and Gambella region in the south. It also shares an international boundary with Sudan in the west. Administratively, the region is divided into three zones (namely Metekel zone, Assosa zone and Kemashi zone) and 20 *woredas*. The population size of the region was 670,847 (CSA 2008), with a population density of about 14 persons per square kilometer. The ethnic groups that are considered indigenous to the region include Berta (25.9%), Gumuz (21.11%), Shinasha (7.59%), Mao (1.9%) and Komo (0.96%) while non-indigenous peoples comprise 42.53% of the population. Most of the region's population lives in rural areas (86.5%), out of which the overwhelming majority is comprised of indigenous ethnic groups, while the non-indigenous groups reside mainly in towns (MoFA 2010).

In terms of land-use patterns, the region's landmass is predominantly comprised of bushes and shrubs (77.4%), while forestland constitutes about 11.4%. Cultivated land, grazing land and marginal land constitutes about 5.3%, 3.2% and 2.3%, respectively. While the region generally lies between an altitude of 580 and 2731 meters above sea level (masl), its largest part is in the lowlands situated below 1500 masl. In this regard, about 75% of the region is classified as low-land (Tsegaye Moreda, 2013:14-15).

Map 1: The Map of Benishangul Gumuz Region and the Location of Case Study Area






The arrow points the case study area and the project site.

Source: Tsegaye Moreda, (2013:16)

Map2: Map of Administrative Regions and Zones of Ethiopia



Source: Abbink, (2011:534); UNDP (1996)

3.2.2. Land Acquisition Processes

While MoARD investment directorate has a mandate to transfer land more than 5000 hectare of land, the regional government is limited to transfer land up to 5000 hectare for regional investors which should be out of the federal land bank system (Respondent 6).

But, there are two clashes in the delegation of authority for promotion and regulation of investment and land and environments protection tasks. One is that the regional investment office received its authority in 2010 that was held by agricultural office, but investment has been undertaking since 2008(Respondent 6 & Respondent 2). The second is that land administration and environmental protection authority is established in 2011, but most investors have received land in 2009. The establishment of large scale farms before our land administration and environmental office is established enabled investors to start their operation without impact assessment and it influenced us to have no a smooth communication with them(Respondent 5).

As Respondent (2) said Regional and Zonal administrations have no power to regulate foreign investors as they have received land by federal government and also when we go for investigation they are not open to communicate with us. So, there is no harmonious communication between our investment office, lower level administrations and investors. Also federal government does not take evaluation of investors' activities reasoning that there are a serious infrastructural problems, weather conditions and distance of farms.

Furthermore, when investors first come to the area they get many promises of helping the local communities, but are not transferring technologies to the local farmers rather they use public resources built by the state like water pumps(Respondent 2 & 7). Tracing Trading Farm has bought one mill for the community that is not even started operation yet due to incomplete machine parts (Respondent 11).

3.2.3. Project; Tracing Trading Farm Development

The farm is owned by Ethiopian PLC which has many investment activities in the country like coffee processing, plantation and exporting, real estate, building maintenance services, importing machineries, oil and tire, quarry and farming businesses. The farm received 5000 hectares of land from federal government in 2009. It has passed three production seasons since the start of the farm, but used only 904 hr of land out of 5000 hr of land. The farm annually expands 300 hectares of land still now and it will continue till the whole hectare of land is developed through clearing new forest land which is contested by the local people. The farm produces cotton as a main export item and secondarily produces crops like sesame, sorghum and bean as food crops for labourers and for export (Respondent 11 & 13).

The farm relatively uses a capital-intensive technology among the domestic investors. It has 11 tractors, planter, a line maker, 7 spraying machine and machines used to break a compacted soil after plough the land. There are also sophisticated machineries; cutters, choppers and diggers. So, labourers have no job opportunities in these machine-oriented activities (Respondent 11 & 13).

Figure 1: The Farm Land and the Site of the Project



Source: Author's Own, 2013.

3.2.4. Re-Settlement Schemes

As the project received the land from federal government which is identified through satellite image system the local shifting cultivation system was not recognized. Then, shifting cultivators are forced to be re-located by the state through re-settlement scheme that targets provision of better services. According to (respondent R9) response, we do not appreciate shifting cultivation and it is unsustainable way of life so they should be relocated to adopt a modern life through provision of social services. But, it seems that the scheme is not explicitly targeted for the provision of better services as the re-located people are not provided with the necessary services in the destination place (Respondent 11).

As Respondent (7) explained that the re-settlement scheme is targeted by the state for the provision of better services, agriculture extension services and to link them with the market. Similarly Respondent (8) added that there are around 23 households relocated by claiming that they will easily provide their agricultural products(honey)to the market. But, the program in general

has a fixed amount of land to be given for re-located farmers i.e. 33 by 30 hectares for house and 3 hr of land for farming (Respondent 5).

However, shifting cultivators use land in unsettled manner, use land for one production season and leave it for another new land, leave their cattle in forest and use hunting and gathering (Respondent 10). So, the re-settlement program limited their previous way of life in general and their mobility. There are still re-located people who should walk far distance to their previous land in order to farm as their relocation site and their farm land is situated in far distance. In addition, the re-settlement program has no sufficient agrarian supports for the relocated people (Respondent 7).

In addition, different ethnic groups who have no similar cultural identity are relocated together in the same place. This makes some of the re-located cultivators to back to their previous land and conflict with the company (Respondent 9). In general, the program does not fit with the livelihood strategies of the re-located people and have no efficient support to live a new life.

3.2.5. Small Scale Farms, Livelihoods and Labour Relations

3.2.5.1. Classes of Farmers in Context of Livelihoods

Model local farmers produce commercial crops: sesame, peanut, maize and sorghum, hire-in skilled labourers due to the lack of farming skill and use settled farming system. Those who use animal power hire-in both migrant and Gumuz labourers (Respondent 17) and they use Debo system as a second option. But, the challenge is the growing numbers of model Gumuz farmers decreases due to the difficulty of adapting oxen and frequently lose their cattle by animal disease (Respondent 4).

Shifting cultivators do not use animal power and produce commercial crops, but produce mainly sesame and sorghum. They often use their land for a maximum two seasons and leave it as it develops much weed (unsettled farming) (Respondent 10). Shifting cultivators are differentiated in land use capacity; those who do not farm regularly, only 0.5 hr, but most of them use 2-4 hr of land using a Debo system (Respondent 8). In general, the use small land size due to the lack of capital, credit and farming skills.

Shifting cultivators depend on a Debo system (informal community labour group) and family labour to perform agricultural tasks. But, the Debo system demands capital to prepare stuffs for invited people, so those who prepare little could not get enough labourers and vice versa.

They do not produce even enough for consumption. Side to side they mostly produce few poultry and goats for sale during hard season (Respondent 8). In addition, they use hunting during hot weather condition. But, their hunting system is now limited by the new environmental protection rules directed for animal and wildlife protection (Respondent 8 and 10). They also

gather shoots and roots of plants directly from forest, and they sale charcoal, wood, traditional wooden handicrafts and find gold after summer. Currently they are not allowed by environmental protection authorities to sale charcoal to reduce deforestation. They rent-out their land in cheap to migrant farmers in a sharecropping and fixed rent price. Beyond these options they take informal credit in kind from wealthy farmers by un-equal exchange terms. But, the risk is that merchants' sale crops in high price during the hard food shortage season (Respondent 8).

Figure.2. The Local Woman Carrying the Purchased Household Items After Selling the Wood



Source; Author's own, 2013

Figure.3. The Local Woman Carrying Wood for Sale



Source; Author's own, 2013

3.2.5.2. Small Scale Farms in the Context of Labour Relations

Model local farmers have access to much land, but they have no a skill to use animal power. As a result they partly rent-out their surplus land to the previously resettled and migrant farmers. They hire-in migrant labourers as farmers who are skilled in farming. Some of them relatively use little fertilizer, improved varieties and produce commercial crops (Respondent 10 & 17).

The local small scale farmers who migrated before and migrant farmers rent land from the indigenous people in cheap fixed rent price or sharecropping system. Previously migrated farmers rent 2-4 hr of land in addition to 2-3 hr of their land (Respondent 8, 10, 16 & 19). As the average indigenous people has around 5-6 hr of land even though they have no capacity to farm it and rent it to the migrant farmers (Respondent 8).

The land rent price in areas closer to towns and densely populated areas is 1200-1500 while 700-900 birr/hr in remote areas. It is 1000 for forest land and 2000 birr/hr for cleared land in high priced areas. Land is also rented in a sharecropping system of 2/3 quintal/hr/year. Rent price depends on the remoteness, fertility, slope of land and population density.

In addition, migrant farmers, who were daily labourers before, rent land from shifting cultivators by 100 kg of any crop per hr. These farmers eventually developed enough capital which is around 50, 000 birr/year and transformed their livelihoods. They use family labour, hire-in daily labourers and for weeks by 50-60 birr/day and by 4000-5000 birr per year with quality services (Respondent 19). In addition, migrant farmers rent land by fixed price per year from shifting cultivators as their rent price is cheaper and easily cheat them by expanding the area of land beyond the agreed size. But, capitalist local farmers do not rent their land in a cheap price. As a result capitalist local farmers and shifting cultivator conflict each other like each other as shifting cultivators lowers the market price of land rent (Respondent 8).

Shifting cultivator sale involve in wage labour in local capitalist and migrant farms in order to cover extra household expenses. In case they get money, they rent-in animal power with a labourer from rich farmers by 250 birr/day (Respondent 18). Often all farmers do not use local labourers for daily works as they perceive them that they do not work consistently for 8 hrs per day. Migrant farmers use a Merbo system (1/4th hectare) for local labourers while give contract works per hectare for migrant labourers. Migrant labourers do daily works by 50-60 birr/day and contracted for weeks while local labourers hired-in on a daily basis by 30 birr/day. Migrant labourers take a contract work for 700-1200 birr per hectare while local labourers work in a Merbo system (50-60 birr for 1/4 hr). Also local labourers take contract works measured by informal signs or trees by 100-120 birr/hr. There is no meal provided for local labourers by any farmers. Totally, local small scale farmers exploit local labourers cheaply than migratory labour (Respondent 8, 16, 18, 10 & 17).

Mostly migrant daily labourers settle in smaller towns to easily access home rent and buy food when they do not get access to food and house from small scale farmers. But, they compensate it by taking contract works in an expensive price of 1200-1500 birr/hr (Respondent 16, 8 & 10). A contract work is better especially for landowners, but labourers are also advantageous

in small scale farmers rather than in large scale farms (Respondent 10). But, the problem is land owners transfer a certain amount of weed land for local brokers who re-rent it for daily labourers in cheaper price for profit accumulation (Respondent 20).

Small scale farmers provide also job opportunities for migrant labourers for a relatively longer season. Farmers use a sharecropping system on $\frac{1}{4}$ or $\frac{1}{5}$ basis. Land owners provide animal power, food and house services for the hired-in farmers. A $\frac{1}{4}$ norm is better for labourers than a $\frac{1}{5}$ norm. In a $\frac{1}{5}$ norm labourers gain less as they cannot afford the cost of their food and house services by themselves and the share is also lesser. Labourers share all the costs of production on the basis of agreements. Labourers gain better if they have a wife to share their labour costs together. But, they are required to do all activities ordered by the landowner till the end of the agreement. Secondly, labourers may be contracted or hired-in by a fixed amount of money i.e. 4500 birr/year.

However, in a half-half sharecropping system land owners provide land while labourers provide animal power (not always) and farm implements. They share all the labour and input costs equally. Labourers live in their own house and manage their own life independently, but there are cases that land owners provide housing services only while labourers cover their own food and other expenses (Respondent 19).

In conclusion, labourers who are hired as a farmer in the local small scale farmers on $\frac{1}{4}$ or $\frac{1}{5}$ sharecropping system want to upgrade their status to a half-half sharecropping system by covering the cost of their food and home rent. Eventually, they need to rent land from indigenous people by paying a fixed amount of money/year. Farmers who stayed-longer as a labourer are then improved in to a farmer who sharecrop with local farmers on $\frac{1}{5}$ basis. And eventually they are improved to a half-half sharecropping system as they at least cover their own food, house rent, labour and other personal expenses by themselves. The reason for this change is accumulation of money and sharing of their wives' labour. They see this change as a good improvement, but do not have their own oxen, house and other capitals yet (Respondent 19 & 20).

The advantage of working in small scale farms is there are rest days (cultural days) for permanent labourers. Small scale farms pay better wage and quality services, a relative security and no cases of denying wage in contrast to large scale farms (Respondent 23). Furthermore, there is a positive social relation between labourers and land owners (Respondent 20 & 16).

Large scale farms are the key sources of labour power for smallholders as labourers leave large scale farms because of low payment, unsafe working conditions and poor services (Respondent 16 & 8). But, local brokers often orient labourers working in small farms to leave by misinforming the working condition of large farms (Respondent 8).

Figure 4: Labour Market Place in the Local Smallholder Farms.



Source: Author's Own, 2013.

3.2.6. Large Scale Farms, Labour Relations and Resistances

3.2.6.1. Classes of Labour in Large Scale Farms and Livelihoods

Farmer migrants face different living and farming loads in their locality like fertilizer credit, tax, household expenses and other credits because of small and unproductive land. They have burdens of helping their children who demand high amount of school expense as schools are far from their living place. Hence, they decide to sale their labour to cover expenses after finishing their agricultural activities on their small patches of land. Migrant farmers use rotational mechanisms 'going and back system' to perform their own agricultural activities and wage labour. They have specific purposes clearing their living loads in each rotation (Respondent FGD1 & FGD2).

Other farmers leave their infertile land free for a year/s to produce better for the next season due to soil in-fertility problem. They also shift land use into commercial purposes; planting trees that longs for many years to change their livelihoods by the sum of money. Others left free little patches of land to plant commercial crops by purchasing agricultural inputs through wage labour (Respondent FGD1 & FGD2). However, their challenge in the farm is they could not able to save an initial capital to diversify their livelihoods like animal husbandry, planting vegetables and fruits as the wage rate is too little.

Migratory farmers commonly face natural problems like a frequent ice-ball that damages their crop and reduces their consumption level. Most of workers come from the same area called Sekela (Amhara region) which is featured by a long history of soil degradation, landlessness, population pressure, sloppy, effect of fertilizer, and other environmental problems and totally live a mouth to hand life. Workers' agencies and investors know that this area is their key source

of labour power, profit and facilitate importation of labourers for exploitation in a cheap wage (Respondent 14, 22, FGD1 and FGD2).

Most of migrant labourers work wage labour in small scale farms in their locality. But, they do not always get the opportunity to sale their labour as there is scarcity of job, job competition and many cultural days. In addition, jobs are temporary, infrequent and often they access daily works only. They do not get a contract work/hr and contracted for a week/s. The payment is often 20 or 25 per day; through they are provided with better services. So, labourers migrate by expecting an advantage of getting meal three times a day, better wage, contract works and relatively longer days of job opportunity (Respondent 14, 21, 22, FGD1 & FGD2).

Students migrate during vacation to cover school expense, to help their families by withdrawing from school. Other are who failed to score an entrance point to preparatory/higher education. They also cannot cover costs of vocational trainings and private colleges to continue their education.

But, there are many students who refused to go back to home and resign their education. Because they feel guilty of returning back with little wage they earn in large farms and their poor families could not help them anymore in covering their school expenses. Then, they create an organized criminal labour group in forest and remote areas (Respondent FGD1 & R 14). These groups become a treat to local and migrant labour especially new comers as they cause serious conflicts, robbery and deaths.

But, new labourers are imported for remote farms where there is no information about wage rate, security/labour conflict. Then they become forced to work with a little wage and then leave their job immediately to farms that are relatively settled closer to the main roads and small scale farms (Respondent 14, 24, 22, FGD1 & FGD2). However, most of them prefer to stop wage labour and need vocational training to specialize in skilled jobs in their living place.

However, there are labourers who lead their life by wage labour as the only livelihood option. They have much working experience in wage labour, uneducated or withdrawn from school many years ago and have no any means to continue education. They have no any means to get even a minimum assistance from their economically very poor families. So, they always move from region to region, within regions and from farm to farm due to the lack of stable and permanent jobs (Respondent 14, 24, 22, FGD1 & FGD2). They always struggle with a cheap wage labour to accumulate money and change their livelihood option. As a result, they are special victims of wage labour (Respondent 14, 22, 24 & FGD1). But, most of them need to involve in businesses; small shops, cafeteria and rent land from the indigenous people. To make their dream come true it is common to find these labourers using different mechanisms in the farm

like doing beauty salon business (5 birr/person) after the normal working time of the farm and working during the night.

Labour of the Local People in Large-Scale Farms

There is one Gumuz labourer only in the farm even at the time of high labour demand. There are four (1 permanent and three temporary) local security workers who are perceived by farm officials as they do not like field works (Respondent 11 & 13). To be productive and profitable the farm imports experienced workers in cotton and sesame crops from Amhara and SNNP regions (Respondent 13). It also does not consider the local people only as lazy, but as they are few in number who do not fill the labour demand of the farm.

In addition, small scale farmers (Respondent 18 & 19) and the other people characterized the local people as; fear difficult works, have poor working culture, start work late and do not work continually. In addition, they are considered as they do not want much wealth, do not think for tomorrow, have no saving habit and addicted with drinking and smoking (Respondent 16, 18 & 19).

3.2.6.2. Institutional Framework of Large Scale Farms

The farm forces labourers to form a group to do a contract works by blocking the choice of labourers to work individually. Labourers may not agree each other as there is a capacity difference between workers and other differences based on gender, experience and age. Hence, some labourers may spend the day without work (Respondent 13, 14, 21, FGD1 & FGD2).

The project gives contract work (240 Eth.Birr/hr) in the first cycle of weeding (much weeding) which is not beneficial for labourers as it takes 4-6 for three-four workers. So that they earn little money when they divide the total money for 3-4 workers for 4-6 days they gain 15-20 birr per day only. In the second (rarely) and third weeding cycle they may rarely earn 35-60 Birr when the weed is not too much.

However, workers migrate for a contract work to get more than small scale farmers pay them in their locality (30 birr/day). However, they found the contract work difficult, demand much energy and take many days with a little wage. Hence, workers prefer a daily work (30 birr/day) that the farm does not want to give specially for the first-second cycles of much weed. Daily work is arranged for activities like fetching water, cooking, cleaning, and cutting woods. In contrast, the farm needs them to do contract works as much work is done in short time and would cost the farm less as compared to daily work (reduce 10-15 birr per worker per day) (Respondent 13, 14, 24, FGD1 & FGD2).

Alternatively, the farm may arrange daily works that labourers must work for 8 hrs only with a strict control by their foreman. But, in contract works labourers spend the whole day by working hard to accumulate more money. They take contract works (240 birr/hr) for weeding and complete it within 2 (sometimes)-3 days and earn 45-50 birr/day. But this could happen when labourers effort too much, strong workers organized in group and there is no much weed. Workers consider a 15 birr addition from the daily work as a big value even though it costs them too much time and energy. But, the challenge for labourers is that the farm reduces the amount of money (from 240 birr/hr) for the second-third cycle of weeding when labourers could earn more money (Respondent 14, FGD1 & FGD2).

3.2.6.3. Working Conditions

Drinking water is taken directly from the flowing rivers or opened water holes. Even this unclean water gets in short. Also, food stuffs are not clearly separated from unnecessary material as crops are stored for long time and get spoiled. Food crops are not familiar with the diet culture of migrant labourers; a boiled or roasted beans, maize and porridge that longs for weeks. When one food component is accessed (local bread) but the other is not (stew) and then they eat local bread alone. Food stuffs have not good quality; they simply prepared them in mass without spices and unclean manner. The more challenging days are days when the amount of food is not enough as labourers always work laborious tasks and spend days without food (Respondent 14, 21, FGD1 & FGD2).

Figure 5: Labourers During Lunch Time



Source: Author's Own, 2013.

Figure 6: The Way Water is Provided for Labourers



Source: Author's Own, 2013.

The housing condition is not also safe as labourers sleep on the floor with a plastic alone. The floor of the house is not properly cemented and muddy as the water leaks under the ground during rainy seasons (Respondent 14, 21, FGD1 & FGD2). So, mosquitoes and insects reproduced inside mud make labourers susceptible to malaria and other diseases. Further, the houses have no toilets, bathrooms, electricity etc...it is totally an empty room. In each house a maximum of 90 and minimum of 40 labourers sleep together which is morally and legally not fair (Respondent 14, 21, FGD1 & FGD2).

Figure 7: The Living House of Labourers



Source: Author's Own, 2013.

The farm has not available medicines, medical devices and workers. As the area is characterized by the prevalence of malaria labourers are usually susceptible to the disease, because of the lack of medicines. Sometimes the farm provides a single medicine for malaria only. Sometimes labourers take a malaria medicine though they are infected by other diseases.

Labourers go to the local clinic that costs them 15-30 Ethi.Birr for transport and cover their medical expenses by themselves though that was agreed to be covered by the farm. There are labourers seriously sick and need immediate clinical services, but the farm even does not at least provide automobile services (Respondent 14, 21, FGD1 & FGD2).

Figure 8: The Sick Female Worker



Source: Author's Own, 2013.

The farm has only a single fixed salary day per month, but usually it does not pay them on this day. There is a pool of patient labourers in the farm due to late payment and denial of wage. The days patients spend sick is not paid at all. In case labourers leave the farm in serious cases or do not represent a person for their wage the farm would not pay them if they come later. As a result labourers spend unnecessary days in the farm though they must go for urgent family issues or change the farm (Respondent 14, 21, FGD1 & FGD2).

Figure 9: Labourers Asking for Late wage



Source: Author's Own, 2013.

Often labourers want to leave the farm after working a few days. But they signed a contract for 20-30 days. If they want to leave the farm the project will not pay them the return transport cost and wage and their ID card will not be given. Then they are forced to stay in the farm till they finish the contract, because they often may have no money to go back to home (Respondent 14, 21 & FG1).

When the farm becomes economically weak it forces labourers to change from contract works to daily works to access them in cheap wage. It changes the amount of money per hectare and the contract works to daily works in order to reduce the cost of the farm and minimize the gain of labourers. The farm forces labourers to work daily works (30 birr/ day) during the second and third cycles of weeding because when the weed becomes light labourers could gain more (Respondent 14, 21, FGD1 & FGD2).

The farm exploits new workers because they do not know the working conditions and rules of the farm. The farm gives them difficult tasks with little wage that demand high labour time and energy. But, some labourers developed informal relations with foremen and farm officials to get a chance of taking light works (Respondent 14 & 21).

The arrival of new workers and the automatic purposive wage reduction by the farm are two sides of the same coin (Respondent 14 & 21). Then, experienced workers often cause a serious conflict with new labourers by perceiving new labourers as a reason of wage reduction and increase job competition. Evidently, 6 labourers are killed by criminal labour groups, because farms are settled in remote areas (6-9 hrs of walk from the main road). These labourers settled in forest areas for long time, have an organized group (20-30 members), addicted with different behaviours and have no fear of conflict. As a result, new labourers return back to their home or shift to local small scale farms that are closer to the main road and have a relative security (Respondent 14, 22, 24 & FGD2).

3.2.6.4. Resistance of Peasants and Labourers

3.2.6.4.1. Resistance of Peasants

Most of the re-located shifting cultivators are not interested in the re-settlement program and return back to their previous land occupied by the farm. The farm manager(Respondent 11) said that; *"the relocated people have not given a specific and measured land for them to farm and compensation at all that is why they come back to their previous land occupied by our farm."*

But, others who are not interested to be re-located at all claim that the land given for investors is their fathers' and forefathers' property (Respondent 6). As a result, they stop the farm to expand the land and take the cleared land of the farm in each production season to produce for them.

"They use the new land we cleared, but they take and use a very small portion of land. Often they stopped our operation, but we used to give some small gifts like maize and little money for drinks as they are addicted with it, as a result they stop their resistance"(Respondent 13).

Though, the resistance of the local people is known by the federal, regional and local administration levels, it has not been solved yet. The farm manager (Respondent 11) responded that the unsolved resistance of the local people become the challenge for the farm to expand additional area of land.

Most authorities encourage land investment by undermining the way shifting cultivators fulfil their livelihood. According to respondent's(6) view, local people do not use land productively and left free, it is better to give this land for investors who can develop it well. In addition, the farm officials perceive the local people as lazy, unskilled to farm and have poor working culture (Respondent 11 & Respondent 13).

Figure 10: The Land that the local people have taken from the Project



Source: Author's Own, 2013.

3.2.6.4.2. Resistance of Labour

Labourers claim for improvements especially in wage and clinical services, secondarily in water, food, house and other labour issues; non-payment of transport cost, holding ID card and delayed wage which are used by the farm as mechanisms of trapping labour.

Individuals who better understand their exploitation and speak well initiate others and discuss their labour issues during the night. Then they agree to stop working, eating and walk 30-45 minutes from work place to the main office. But, the farm officials use purposive techniques of searching labourers who initiate the mass resistance to give them hard warning or fire from the farm without taking their ID card and wage by considering them as criminals. This makes individual labourers to fear to report their claims (Respondent 14 & 21).

The farm fears mass resistance of labourers and it does not want to mix the new and experienced labourers together. Then it has constructed three houses far from each other to block close communication between them. Because experienced workers understand labour issues well and strongly negotiate and resist the farm against low wage rate. But, new workers agree the low wage rate and commanded easily by the farm officials. So, new workers unknowingly do jobs in cheaper wage that reduce the wage rate of labour in the farm that leads intra-class conflict between them (Respondent 14).

If labourers inform their resistance individually they will have little acceptance and could be fired from the farm. In addition, they fear to ask questions to the farm officials as they warn them to explain their questions either through letter or labour representatives. But, when labourers resist in group or mass the farm officials and security workers relatively fear to fire and take a little attention to their claims.

Mostly the farm officials simply undermine the issues of labourers, give hard warnings and then fire from the farm using security workers (Respondent 14, 21, FGD1 & FGD2). But, the farm improves the wage level by 30 birr only for contract works which is a very little change. But, this improvement comes to the original level after a few working days (Respondent 14 & 21). Further, labour resistance rises again after a few days as the wage change is little.

If there is no improvement their final decision is leaving the farm without their identity card and wage (Respondent 14, 21 & FGD1). But, often labourers keep silent rather than defending their labour rights. They easily accept even a hard command from farm officials. Workers who work daily works (30 birr/day) do not resist at all as they believe that the wage of this work cannot be changed because the farm firmly decided it (Respondent 21).

But, when the extent of exploitation is high around 20-30 labourers go together to the local administrations by walking 20-30 km to inform to the federal police and local courts. So, sometimes polices solve their labour issues by directly communicating the farm officials, but it is not often given due attention (Respondent 14, 21 & FGD2).

Labourers who come through labour agencies sometimes make a phone call to their local workers affairs officials and workers' agencies to report their claims. In addition, when the farm does not pay them the return transport cost, they return to their home by covering the cost by them and inform to their local administration officials. As a result, farm officials and drivers jailed by policemen for weeks when they moved to labourers' region. So, when these labourers stop work in mass officials fear losing of high number of labourers (Respondent 14, 21 & FGD2).

3.2.7. The Role of Labour Agency and Workers and Social Affairs Authority

The farm agreed with the regional workers and social affairs to bring labourers experienced in cotton crop from Southern Nations, Nationalities and Peoples, but currently most of labourers come from Amhara region, Sekella. Farm officials argue that migratory labourers have a good working culture, efficient and work effectively as they have experience of treating cotton, sesame and experienced in all agricultural activities (Respondent 13).

Workers' agencies get their licenses from Amhara and Benishangul Gumuz region workers and social affairs offices to facilitate labour provision between and within regions. Workers' agencies has a schedule of two fixed days a week i.e. Tuesday and Friday in which labourers come for registration and migration (Respondent 12). Labourers put their signature before they go to the farm to ensure that they will do what the farm orders without detailed information in the agreement. Labourers' transport cost is covered by the farm. Once labourers are registered in their locality their ID card is taken by the workers' agencies to be handled by the farm. Hence, labourers could not access their ID card till they finish the contract (FGD1).

Once agencies provide labourers to the farm they do not take regulation of labour affairs (FGD1). As Respondent (11) said we pay the worker agency 10 Eth Birr per labourer and bonuses to import labourers. Then their objective is to provide more number of labourers to get more money through mechanisms of over exaggeration of working condition of the farm that facilitates high labour migration.

Farms do not meet their obligations of respecting workers' rights which is stated in 377/2003 Labour Proclamation (Federal Negarit Gazetas of FDRE, 2003:2457). As the Labour Proclamation 377/2003 (FDRE, 2003:2469-70) states that the working hours per day is 8 hrs and should not be more than 48 hrs per week, weekly day, public holiday, annual leave, special leave with pay, union leave, sick leave, occupational safety, health and working environment are not specifically applicable and articulated for agricultural workers.

The regional workers and social affairs office does not take regulation of farms' operation and labour affairs (Respondent 1). The office exists only at the regional level which is 300 km far from the farm area. There are no independent offices at the bottom level of local administrations that could take regulation of labour affairs. Therefore, using these gaps investors are free to decide labour issues without any interference from any federal, regional and local officials, NGOs and trade unions.

Chapter 4: Synthesis

4.1. Land Grabbing, ABD and PA

Domestic state, capital and other national actors are not considered in the current land grabbing (Hall, 2013:5-8). Also land demand is created by state priorities and opportunities for local elites (Oya, 2013:20). Similarly, the Ethiopian government transfers land to ruling party-affiliated members and political sympathizers (Abbink, 2011:515-517 & Lavers, 2012:123). The failure of ADLI policy led the state to facilitate agricultural commercialization as a new development strategy (Lavers (2012:112). Then, the federal state manages and promotes investment in line with agricultural development strategy (Makki, 2012:93). Further, state offers land free of charge to fulfil official goals for increased production and economic growth and unofficial goals of lining pockets (Li, 2011:285).

In addition, as Oya (2013:20) argued that there is a slow agrarian transformation to capitalist forms of production through different rural accumulation and differentiation trajectories. In the study area, local landless and migratory farmers who use informal and illegal land lease from locals and small scale investors promoted by regional state have involved in capital accumulation. As Hall similarly argued that small scale farmers are involved in land grabbing. So, the assumption that dispossession should be massive obscures small scale land acquisitions. Further, the role of domestic investors to land concentration is not limited to small and medium-scale farming (Baglioni & Gibbon, 2013:8).

The other debate in land grabbing is that whether it takes place through an extra-economic or economic means. As Levien argued that land acquisitions are only grabs when they take place through extra-economic coercion. But, there is a convergence of extra- and economic means of land grabbing; as Li argued that economic means of transactions are manipulated by ruling regimes using force. Also Borra's grabbing of control over land mean that land grabbing does not necessarily cause dispossession. Moreover, Hall viewed that fraud, vague, unwritten contracts and un-kept promises are common in land grabs which are usually performed by enterprises. In the case study, the farm uses force in keeping the ID card of labourers, uses firing, oppressing and denying wage. In addition, the enterprise and state jointly expelled the local people from their land without their interest. Locals are expelled through re-location program which is an accumulation by re-location.

The other dimension of looking at land grabbing is the degree or extent that it penetrates non-capitalist production system and its power to transform it into capitalist production system. Land grab is understood in relation to ABD which is 'an updated and expanded primitive accu-

mulation' whereby direct producers were separated from the means of production, common property rights were privatized and non-capitalist modes of production were either harnessed or destroyed'(Hall, 2013:13-14). The case study shows that shifting cultivators were living in areas where capitalist mode of production had never existed. Rather they were self-sufficient producers producing for subsistence by relying on the immediate environment. But, the project blocked them to access the previously available resources and re-located them to a new place to do settle farming with a limited space and mobility. The re-location kills their previous non-capitalist production system and reduces their subsistence level by blocking the free access to forest resource. It is assumed that the dispossessed people are 'outside' of capitalism and self-sufficient peasants producing for subsistence (Borras & Franco, 2013:12).

Finally, ABD is a means by which 'common resources are enclosed and transformed into exclusive places' (Hall, 2013:16). The local population use shifting cultivation without a formally fixed boundary, but their land is needed for mono-crop and mechanized cotton production. Then they are re-located to new places to live a modernized life.

Land grabbing is taking place on land that state claims as a state property. State easily transferred shifting cultivators' land to investors because they have no formal land title and certification to claim over their land. The risk is locals are not compensated or not adequately. In addition, land grabbing involves in the privatization of public resources (Hall, 2013:14 & 17). In similar way, the farm stopped or competed from using a water pump built for local population.

4.2. State Power and Land Grabbing

As Borras & Franco (2013:6) argued that state involves in a systematic policy and administrative issues targeted at capturing 'marginal lands'. Further, state gives substantial incentives (Borras & Franco, 2013:8). In similar manner, the Ethiopian government offers cheap land rent, tax holiday and long period of lease to both foreign and domestic investors. Specifically, the federal state has established an independent agency that manages and promotes land investment (Makki, 2012:93).

The agency manages land actively in regions where there is no or weak land or investment proclamations (Lavers, 2011:5, Lavers, 2012:120 & Makki, 2012:95). Then, the agency's national land bank system identified through satellite image system and transferred to investors is mostly settled by shifting cultivators and pastoralists (Lavers, 2011:17 & Rahmato, 2012:6). Therefore, the state has failed to recognize land based social relations which is the "simplification of complex land-based social relations" (Scott 1998).

The land which is transferred to projects that is often claimed by the state as 'empty', 'free' and 'marginal' land is usually settled by shifting cultivators and used as a source of their livelihoods. So, land classification is framed from the perspective of the state (Scott 1998, Borras and Franco 2010). Land classification of the state indicates state's incomplete knowledge of existing land use system (Lavers (2012:119), wrong to consider uncultivated areas as empty (Makki, 2012:96). It is also criticized that the estimation of "cultivated area" does not include the land used by shifting cultivators and pastoralists (Rahmato, 2012:7). In addition, the state sees land use system only from the perspective of settled agriculture (Lavers, 2011:15)

On the other angel, state uses land grabbing for state building process (Borras & Franco (2013:7). In analogy with this the Ethiopian government uses land grabbing to extend its authority to shifting cultivators which were politically marginal to state power (Lavers, 2011:20 & Lavers, 2012:814). In addition, state runs Fox's conflicting tasks of facilitation of capital accumulation and maintaining a minimum level of political legitimacy (Borras & Franco, 2013:8). In the case of Ethiopia, while the state facilitates large scale farm in lowland regions for capital accumulation it keeps minimum political legitimacy through re-settlement program in low land areas and a politically sensitive smallholder agriculture in the highlands (Lavers, 2012:106 & Makki, 2012:92).

4.3. Large/Small-Scale Farm and Labour Relations

4.3.1. Large Scale Farm and Labour Relations

When the land is needed, but the labour is not then the most likely outcome of a land deal is the expulsion of people from the land (Borras & Franco, 2013:9 & 12). In the case study, the land of locals is transferred to the investor and they become re-located as their labour is not needed by the enterprise. When land is accessed free investors ensure their profit-making targets, but if land rent is high or the payment is based on 'market' value, companies would be better off leaving farmers on their land and engaging in contracts (Li, 2011:284). The federal government of Ethiopia lease-out land in cheap or almost free of charge (Makki, 2012:96, see also Lavers, 2011 & 2011). However, both of the local population and migratory people are not incorporated in the enterprise through contract. Locals are perceived as they have no farming skills.

As locals' land is needed but not their labour then they become re-located in similar with Southeast Asian locals whose land is needed but not labour (Li, 2011:286). The project employed four locals only as security workers arguing that they do not like to do field works. It is similarly argued that the local people whose land is taken are rarely employed using the 'myth of the lazy native' (Li, 2011:286).

In contrast to Li's argument that plantations face a challenge of getting consistent and cheap labour from people who have access to patches of land (Li, 2011:286), the case study found that even though locals are land rich they demand wage labour they lease-out their land for migrant farmers in cheap price and produce for subsistence due to the lack farming skill, state support and enough capital to use their land efficiently. Evidently they work in smallholders farms.

The project is depends more on techno-intensive production system that would be done by more number of worker in small scale farms and has large size of land which is not fully utilized. It is evidenced that even large mechanized farms of oil palm crop provide limited job in relation to the opportunity cost of land given to plantation but not used (Li, 2011:284). The farm use scientific division of labour: skilled workers for machineries and un-skilled ones for manual agricultural tasks, rely more on wage labour & intensive farm inputs and high operational costs in addition to its adverse effect on environment and society. Therefore, LSF enjoyed no natural economies of scale, exhibit economic inefficiency and political destabilisation (Baglioni & Gibbon, 2013:23).

The project provides jobs for limited activities that do not demand machineries. So, if investors are requested to provide lots of jobs they would put their money somewhere else (Li, 2011:283). But, perhaps capital needs free land and cheap labour (Li, 2011: 281 & 286). In the project workers often earn 10-25 Eth.Birr per day. So, large-scale mono-crop plantations that are highly mechanized prefer often to save on labour and labour management cost (Borras & Franco, 2013:12). The enterprise even does not want to cost for other basic services of labour; water, food, drink, house and medicine. Similarly, whether tiny or large capital always seeks subsidies and pushes down on the price of labour unless organized resistance and political settlements hold it in check (Li, 2011:294).

The other challenge for labour is the mechanism that large scale farms uses different mechanisms of cheating, oppressing and exploiting labour. The farm has a fixed salary day once a month only that the farm uses it as a technique of trapping labour. This in turn influences patient labourers to not get medical treatment in time. In similar way, workers face late, non-payment of wages and abuse amply (Li, 2011:286). The project often denies the wage of workers due to unwritten agreement. Further, it fires labourers without their wage if they claim about their rights. The farm also: does not pay days of sickness, giving extra unpaid tasks, shifting labourers' position as the farm wants, cheating new labourers and separation of new labour and experienced labourers to block information sharing. In addition, if workers leave the farm, they are vulnerable to harassment by police and other authorities as the company keeps their identity cards (Li,

2011:286). The same mechanism of trapping labour is used by the project. Cheating and oppression by their foreman and security of farm is usual in the project.

Land grabs use strategies to generate a labour reserve (Hall, 2013:15). The farm use strategies of labour reserve creation by facilitating labour migration through the help of labour agencies who over-exaggerate the working conditions of farms. Even though the farm has enough labourers it does not stop bringing labourers that in turn reduces the wage level in the farm. In the same way, it is noted that workers are key resources to capitalist firms because of their direct role as labour and labour reserve that suppresses wages (Borras & Franco, 2013:12).

When the cost of handling labour is uneconomical, planters create a labour pool in the farm area (Li, 2011:286). Similarly, the farm breaks its agreement of paying the return transport costs in order to make a labour reserve. Then labourers who have no money to return back need a job even with a minimum wage. Then, the plantations could draw a labour as needed, but for which they took no responsibility (Ibid: 287). In general, investors' profit is more viable when labour is super-abundant, hence cheap and easily disciplined (Li, 2011:286). The regional workers affairs office and labour agencies that facilitate labour migration are responsible for labour creation. As a result, wage reduction and labour pool results conflict between new comers and experienced labourers.

4.3.2. Small-Scale Farm and Labour Relations

Model local small scale farmers have the capacity to use relatively large area of land (>30 hr), produce commercial crops, use relatively less farm inputs and hire-in migrant and local labour in addition to family labour. They at least have one-two permanent labourers as they do not have farming skills and hire-in 5-10 labourers per day. So, peasant households achieve a level of internal specialisation (Baglioni & Gibbon, 2013:23). In addition, they use informal community labour group and share farm tools together rather than relying more on wage labour and machineries. The same is argued that SSFs use a machine economically through cooperative ownership than LSF (Baglioni & Gibbon, 2013:23).

So, scale does not contributed to propensity to 'improve' rather it depends on security of tenure and land and labour markets. In the study area small scale farmers are influenced by land rent price, low output market, lack of credit, interference of local brokers, high input price, infrastructural problem, market information and distance to market. So, if SSFs were not influenced by the above factors they could able to exhibit higher levels of unit investment than LSFs (Baglioni & Gibbon, 2013:22).

In general, labourers in large scale farm are oppressed, exploited, cheated and could not be transformed in to better livelihood status with a little wage. But, labourers in smallholders earn better wage, work with labour demanding crops and less machinery, access quality basic services feel secured and develop positive social relations with farmers and improve their livelihoods. As a result, labourers leave large scale farms for better security, wage and working conditions in local small scale farms. Similarly, contracted smallholders pay high wages for workers that in turn caused labour shortage to the plantations. Though plantations later pay high wage and provide regular employment temporarily, workers buy land through saving and exit plantations since they are sceptical of having a long term job opportunity (Li, 2011:290). But, in the project migrant workers no even few days to save money as compared to those working in smallholders.

4.4. Livelihoods of Migratory Farm Workers and Local Population

4.4.1. Livelihoods of Migratory Farm Workers

The little wage of the farm is unfortunate for migrant farmers who are highly trapped by poverty. These classes of farmers are a vital resource of the farm as they need to work for long time in order to accumulate more money to clear their living loads. So, livelihoods are structured by class relations that in turn shape land, labour, income, accumulation and consumption patterns (Scoones, 2009:186-187).

Similarly, migrants who are landless adults, those permanently withdrawn from school, failed on secondary school and new students becoming out from school for wage work become important labour reserves for the farms. As they have no other alternatives they work in the farm while their salary is hold by the farm for longer time, frequently move from farm to farm by hoping to get temporarily better wages. Others are gradually changed in to criminal labour groups. These are due to the profit-oriented private capital, lack of state and elites support. Then, the analysis of power and politics uncovers the influence of state, private capital, external forces and inequality that constraints the livelihoods of peasants (Scoones, 2009:185).

Wage labour in large scale farms could not meet the livelihoods of poor migrants. Rather it leads to oppression, insecure employment and exploitation. Similarly, wage labour in South Asia is poorly paid, unsafe, and infrequent and does not reflect a social transformation rather it increases immiseration (Akram-Lodhi 2007 in 2009:612). Therefore, it is vital to understand how sustainable is choosing livelihood pathways; 'hanging in', 'stepping up' and 'stepping out' Dorward et al. (2005) (Scoones, 2009:189-190).

4.4.2. Livelihoods of the Local Population

Unlike capitalist model farmers, shifting cultivators do not use; animal power, farm inputs, hire-in labour and settled farming. The use rather simple hand hoe and community labour for farming. Even most of them have no enough capital required to invite community labour and they farm limited land size (0-3 hrs) due to the lack of farming skills though they are land-rich. In addition to their subsistence production, they reproduce a very limited poultry & goats to sale in food shortage seasons. They also heavily depend on hunting animals, gathering roots and shoots of indigenous plants, sale charcoal, wood, traditional wooden handicrafts, find gold and take informal credits. They also rent their land to migrant farmers for immediate cash need or in share-cropping.

So, shifting cultivators and their livelihood paths are significantly affected by the project and re-location program than other settled local farmers. Therefore, it is vital to consider how and whether coping to short term shocks is sustainable given long-term shifts that influence livelihoods in a significant ways (Scoones, 2009:188-189).

4.5. Resistance of Peasants

4.5.1. Peasant Resistance against Land Expropriation/Re-Location

Indigenous peoples demand recognition of claims over territory which is as profound as the demands to stop expulsion of people (Borras &Franco, 2013:15). The most victims of land investment are pastoralists and shifting cultivators in lowlands who have informal land right and whose 'use' of land is claimed by the state (Lavers (2012:796). So, the enterprise and the state forced local communities to be re-located because they cannot claim with their informal land rights. This is what the 'poor people-versus-the state' contestation which involves claims over the actual expulsion of people from their land or re-location (Borras &Franco, 2013:8). However, shifting cultivators have given limited land size without estimating the value of their previous land and compensation.

Communities are socially differentiated and then the impact of land deal between and within communities is differentiated that in turn leads to diverse responses (Borras &Franco, 2013:2). While some of them are re-located to another place others are not interested to be re-located. So, it is related with what is called 'poor people-versus-poor people' contestations that comprise inter and intra-class claims against or in favour of the same land deal (Borras &Franco, 2013:8).

But, the re-located people return back to their previous land due to the little or no provision of better social services, limited mobility and small fixed land; 33 by 30 hectare for house and 3 hr for farming which is related with James Scott's argument; 'often it is not about how much was

taken but how much was left' that influences poor peoples' political reaction (Borras & Franco, 2013:10). Shifting cultivators' subsistence was secured from the immediate environment that does not influence their subsistence level. So, peasants do not need to completely remove domination rather they claim to secure their subsistence production (Scott, 1986:26-28). Similarly, peasants claim as large lands concessions are left unused which are the proper spaces for livelihoods of rural people (Li, 2011:296). Li added that in the absence of national welfare provisions a small patch of land is a crucial safety net.

As a result, shifting cultivators first informed their claim to the local administrations and they also stopped the farm operation by using the cleared land of the farm. But, often land based claims are taken as squatting and vandalism (Li, 2011:295). Though the project manager and shifting cultivators informed the case to local administrations it is not solved yet. Rather authorities simplify that shifting cultivators need a very small size of land using hand hoe. However, in livelihoods approach: rights, justice and struggles for equality are sometimes hidden by more instrumentalist perspectives (Scoones, 2009:184).

4.5.2. Resistance against Improvement of Incorporation

Struggle for incorporation may be by people who are recruited as workers (Borras & Franco, 2013:13). The root of resistance is linked with misinforming labourers by labour agencies and un-kept promise of the project. As 'labour justice struggles' involves labour issues only (Borras & Franco, 2013:13), labourers claim against the enterprise over the multitude of labour issues.

Poor people-versus-corporate actor' contestation involves improvement of the terms of poor people's inclusion (Borras & Franco, 2013:8). Labourers discuss their labour matters at night leading by experienced labourers and then they gather together and stop working in the morning. Then officials fear mass resistance and give a positive promise. If resistance happens continuously the farm improves the wage by a little change. But the farm reduces the wage and quality of services after a few days just like a pendulum. Then, the effect of resistance has little and temporary significance. It seems that it has not a long term effect if institutional supports from external forces contribute for fundamental improvements. However, most of labour claims never improved or changed.

Often labourers warned by officials to stop mass resistance and recommended to claim by selecting representatives that rather leads to hard warning and firing of those represented labourers. Farm officials internally search information about labourers who initiated mass resistance and then fire them from the farm. Often reporting labour issues individually results being fired using security workers and this in turn influences other labourers to not report their claim in fear

of oppression. However, labourers know that resisting in mass helps them than individually or through representatives because representatives and foremen are allied with farm officials to oppress labourers.

Sometimes labourers claim by walking to the local administrations that is 25-30 km far from the farm using unknown directions and without the farm officials knowing it. So, peasants use anonymous and 'guerrilla-style' of resistance with little co-ordination (Scott, 1986:8-9). During much exploitation labourers claim in group to local administrations, then some local policies solve their issues by contacting the farm officials directly, but mostly it is not given due attention. But, those who migrate through labour agencies relatively heard by the farm. Because they inform to labour agencies and regional workers affairs officials when they return back to their home. As a result, there was time that farm officials and drivers jailed when they moved to the labourers' region.

Often claims are unreported as the workers and social affairs office is 300km far from the farm. So, peasant protests are go unseen, unrecognized and unreported because of what James Scott calls the 'geographical resistance' (Borras & Franco, 2013:3). Labourers mostly leave without informing the farm to work in local farms without taking their ID card and part of their wage. Similarly, an everyday form of resistance is used as a 'weapons of the weak' due to the absence of formal institutions (Scott, 1986:6-8).

Peasants use everyday forms of resistance due to the difficulty of forming collective action (Scott, 1986:6-8). Labourers who work on daily basis do not resist at all as the farm fixed their wage level firmly. Further, the rival relation between new and experienced labour reduces unity of labourers in addition to the farm's purposive disconnection between them. It is then noted that the 'poor people-versus-poor' people line of political contestations is usual in the agrarian-labour justice struggles (Borras & Franco, 2013:13). Anonymous criminal labour groups settled become a threat to other labourers who unknowingly work in cheap wage that reduces labour market price. Therefore, it is argued that peasant resistance become irrelevant unless a very large collectivities of communities move on the same direction (Hobsbawm: 1973:9-11).

Different groups have different socioeconomic interests though unified by a common adverse impact of the land deals (Borras & Franco, 2013:16). Different angles of resistance and interests of labourers and shifting cultivators lead to the lack of collective action. While shifting cultivators struggle against land expropriation and re-settlement program, migratory labourers struggle against adverse incorporations. Similarly, while expelled people resist against land deals, others need improvement in terms of incorporation (Borras & Franco, 2013:6).

'Agrarian justice struggles' move across land and labour issues (Borras & Franco, 2013:13). But, as the labour of local people is not needed by the farm, locals struggle against re-location and expulsion, while migratory labourers claim on labour rights only.

The view that peasants are socially and culturally inferiority and are passive (Hobsbawm: 1973:12-13) undermines peasants' rationality. But, in Ethiopia at large and the enterprise peasants are ineffective due to the lack of attention by state officials. These is in contrast with 'rightful resistance' in China that involve state and state elite's support which is taken as an opportunity (O'Brien 1995, 2013:1-5), in Vietnam, cooperative authorities helped peasants by adjusting working systems and then endorsed household farming (Kerkvliet, 2009:234-35). Further, external force as opportunities (Hobsbawm: 1973:9-11) and Tarrow's 'political opportunities' could help rural poor people to involve in contentious politics (Borras & Franco, 2013:10).

4.6. The Role of Workers and Social Affairs Authority and Labour Agencies

The farm imports migrant and experienced labourers arguing that labour is in short supply in sparsely populated areas. By investing in low population density areas, investors argue that labour is in short supply so they must import labour (Li, 2011:286). But, by the enterprise, the logic is as migratory labour is trapped by poverty and struggle always to get out from their poorness, they can be easily commanded, oppressed, exploited and key for profit.

Migratory workers are often charged by planters for their passage or other indenture systems (Li, 2011:286). In contrast, the farm covers labourers' transport cost, but it exploits labour in a very cheap wage in order to compensate the cost of importation.

The ID card of labourers is taken by workers' agency to be kept by the farm as a labour trapping mechanism. Once agencies provide labourers to the farm they do not regulate their labour affairs. Since agencies get 10 Eth Birr per labourer and bonuses from farms they use system of over exaggeration of the conditions of farm.

Regional workers affairs office is situated 300 km far from the farm, it does not take regulation of labour issues though farms improperly exploiting and violating workers' rights which is stated in 377/2003 Labour Proclamation (Federal Negarit Gazetas of FDRE, 2003:2457). Further, there is no bottom level labour authorities established on the behalf of labour affairs. As a result investors become free to decide labour matters without any interference from labour authorities, trade unions and NGOs.

Chapter 5: Conclusion

This study found that the role of domestic capital and actors in land grabbing is relevant (Hall, 2013:5-8 & Oya, 2013:20). The Ethiopian government uses its authorities to promote and facilitate land transfers. State involves in a systematic policy and administrative issues (Borras & Franco, 2013:6). The state claims land investment as a development strategy (Abbink, 2011:515-517, Lavers, 2012:123 & Makki, 2012:93). Then, state opens a path for domestic investors to grab land as also indicated by Baglioni & Gibbon, (2013:8). However, power and politics should be uncovered the influence of state, private capital, external forces and inequality that constraints the livelihoods of peasants (Scoones, 2009:185).

Hall, (2013) observed that an extra- economic and economic means of land grabbing as a continuum. The Ethiopian government re-locates the local people using political power and lowers the land lease rate for the purposive dispossession of people. The farm also uses force; keeping the ID card of labourers, firing and oppressing and denying wage. Hall, (2013) observed that fraud, vague, unwritten contracts and un-kept promises are common feature of enterprises.

The expelled people are assumed as 'outside' of capitalism and self-sufficient peasants producing for subsistence (Borras & Franco, 2013:12). Shifting cultivators were self-sufficient producers for subsistence and accessing resources directly from nature and living in non-capitalist forms of production. But, their territory is needed for exclusive large scale mono-crop farm production by altering the environment (Hall, 2013:16). Then the livelihood of shifting cultivators is constrained by land expropriation and re-location program. Therefore, it is vital to consider how shifting cultivators meet their livelihoods sustainably given the long-term shifts (Scoones, 2009:188-189).

The land of shifting cultivators is needed, but their labour is not needed as also Li, (2011:286) observed. Shifting cultivators are perceived as lagging in working culture and land rich. Similarly, Li argued that locals are perceived with a 'myth of the lazy native'(Li, 2011:286). Though locals are land rich, they do not use land efficiently and affected by food insecurity that led them falling in demand of wage labour. But, the farm needs migratory labors trapped by poverty as key sources of profit. The farm uses strategies of creating labour reserve by importing labour with the help of labour agencies and workers affairs (see Li, 2011), firing and trapping labour to suppress the wage. Similarly, large scale farms create labour reserve that suppresses wages (Borras & Franco, 2013:12 & Hall, 2013:15). As Li argued investors' profit is more viable when labour is super-abundant, hence cheap and easily disciplined (Li, 2011:286). Therefore, it is nec-

essary to recognize that livelihoods are structured by class relations that shape land, labour, income, accumulation and consumption patterns (Scoones, 2009:186-187).

Wage labour could not be taken as a pathway out of poverty unless state intervenes. The farm exacerbates oppression (Li, 2011:286) and exploitation of labour that rather increases poverty. Consequently, migratory labour leave large farms for higher wages as also studied by Li, (2011:290), quality basic services, positive social relations, better and security and working conditions exist in smallholders. But, it is vital to analyze how wage labour is sustainable among livelihood pathways chosen by 'hanging in', 'stepping up' and 'stepping out' Dorward et al. (2005) (Scoones, 2009:189-190).

The automatic link of high economies of scale and technology with large farm size does not imply improvement rather it depends on the security of tenure and land and labour markets. If smallholders were not influenced by poor farming skill, lack of credit, market information, land and labour market, they could achieve high level of unit investment. It is founded that SSFs are less mechanized, use crop rotations and less farm inputs, informal labour group/command family labour which is related with internal specialization of labour (Baglioni & Gibbon, 2013:23), less dependent on wage labour, produce labour demanding crops and cultivate more land per unit. SSF's superior capacity is evidenced through the logic of 'inverse relation' (Baglioni & Gibbon, 2013:22)

However, the farm relies more on wage labour and machineries, intensive farm inputs, wider unused spaces, high operational costs, negative effect on environment and society. Similarly, large scale farms exhibit no natural economies of scale, political destabilizations and economic in-efficiency (Baglioni & Gibbon, 2013:23).

Shifting cultivators claim for the recognition of informal land rights which is similarly noted that they demand recognition of claims over territory (Borras & Franco, 2013:15). Whereas, labourers resist against their adverse incorporation (Borras & Franco, 2013:13). Some people are not willing to be re-located and resist the farm, the re-located one resist re-location and migratory labour claim against adverse incorporation. These diverse social interests, class and social divides influence the success of resistance that may lead to 'poor people-versus-poor people' contestation (Borras & Franco, 2013:8) .

Communities are different in culture and conflict each other which is related with an intrarural conflict argued by Hobsbawm (1973:18-20). The conflict among the re-located people and between labourers of the company decreases the unity of resistance. Further, the farm oppres-

sion blocked labourers' resistance. Generally, peasants' resistance is quiet and anonymous with little co-ordination and less direct (Scott, 1986:8-9).

Labourers' claims remain unreported due to the far distance of labour offices, in similar with James Scott's 'geographical resistance' (Borras & Franco, 2013:3) and the absence of offices that independently address labour issues as Scott viewed the absence of formal institutions (Scott, 1986:6-8). Though there is a multitude of labour claims there is no/little improvement of labour conditions or if there is change it lasts for a very few days. So, peasant resistance will be more open when labourers get Tarrow's 'political opportunity structure' indicated by Borras & Franco, (2013:10).

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Appendices

Appendix 1: Lists of Respondents Interviewed in Benishangul Gumuz Region, Metekel Zone, Dangur Wereda and Kota, Bengez and Gublak kebeles

Name	Organization/place	Date:dd-mm-yy	Type of Respondents
R1	Benishangul Gumuz(B.G) Regional workers and social affairs office	24/7/2013	Regional head/ Officer
R2	B.G Regional Investment Office	24/7/2013	Regional Officer
R3	B.G Regional Land administration and Environmental Protection office	24-5/7/2013	Regional Officer
R4	B.G Zonal Agriculture and rural development office/food security division	9/8/2013	Zonal Officer
R5	B.G Zonal Land administration and Environmental Protection office	29/7/2013	Zonal Officer
R6	B.G Wereda land administration division Office	9/8/2013	Wereda Officer
R7	B.G Wereda Agriculture and rural development office	30/8/2013	Wereda Officer
R8	B.G Kebele Agriculture office village one	30/8/2013	Kebele Officers(2)
R9	B.G Kebele Agriculture office :village two	8/8/2012	Kebele Officer
R10	B.G Kebele agriculture office: village three	6/8/2013	Kebele Officer
R11	B.G Farm Management	2&31/8/2013	Farm Manager
R12	B.G Labour Agency	28/7/2013	Labour Agency
R13	B.G Farm Management	2/8/2013	Labour power administration Officer
R14	B.G Tracon Trading project farm Labour	31/8/2013	Chemical spray-Labourers(2), also work other tasks
R15	B.G Village Small scale farm(village 2)	8/8/2013	Poor local small scale Farmer (1)
R16	B.G Village Small scale farm(village 3 and village 2)	6& 4/8/2013	Two local migrant farmers(land renter via sharecropping/ fixed rent price)(2)
R17	B.G Village small scale farm (village 2)	8/8/2013	Model Farmer(local farmer)
R18	B.G Village small scale farm(village 2)	8/8/2013	Local small scale farmer/shifting cultivator and labourer(both)
R19	B.G Village small scale farm(village 3)	31/8/2013	Land Renter/ half-half Sharecropper
R20	B.G Village small scale farm(village 2 & 3)	8 &4/8/2013	1/4 and 1/5 share croppers(2)
R21	Tracon trading farm employee	31/8/2013	Local migrant labour, but not native Gumuz (1)
R22	Small/Large-scale farming employees	6/8/2013	Migrant and Mobile Labourers(3)
R23	Small scale farming employees	7/8/2013	Migrant labourers in Small scale farms(2)
R24	Indian company farm workers	7/8/2013	Migrant Labourers(2)
FGD1	Tracon Trading Farm Development/Farm labour	3/8/2013	Differentiated Labourers(6)
FGD2	Tracon Trading Farm Development/Farm labour	31/8/2013	Differentiated Labourers(4)

Source: Author's Own,

FGD: Focus Group Discussion

Appendix 2: Partial List of Land Transfers in the Benishangul-Gumuz Regional State by the Federal Government

N	Name of the investors/company	Woreda	Land size in hectare	The amount of Capital in Eth.Birr	Job Opportunity	Nationality
1	KYDM	Guba	3,000	2812500	115	Diaspora
2	Sky	Dangur	3,000	60279035	250	Diaspora
3	Tracon Trading	Dangur	3,000	5675000	80	Domestic
4	Access	Dangur	5,000	Unknown	unknown	Foreign
5	S and P	Dangur	50,000	187000000	120	Foreign
6	Kestone	Pawe	431	Unknown	unknown	Diaspora
7	Bruhwey Agro-Industry	Dangur	5,000	4000000	150	Diaspora
8	Gashaw Bizu Commercial Farm	Dangur	3,000	44266000	358	Diaspora
9	Tigab Agro-Industry	Dangur	3,000	49128025	292	Diaspora
10	CLCAgro-Industry PLC	Pawe/cancelled	25,000	780390000	6800	Foreign
11	Tikimt Agro-Industry	Dangur	3,000	Unknown	unknown	Diaspora
12	Mamye Mihret Nega	Dangur	3,000	Unknown	unknown	Diaspora
13	Getafan Mechanized Farming PLC	Dangur	3,000	9,000,000	494	Domestic
14	Horizon Plantation PLC	Guba	20,000	190,000,000	17,000	Foreign
15	Hashem Esmile Alkawaji	Mao Komo Woreda	3, 000			Foreign
16	Hawal Adna Abdurahman	Guba Wodelbehit	5,000			Foreign
	Total		137, 431			

Source; The Regional Investment Office, Benishangul Gumuz Region

Appendix 3: Partial List of Land Transfers by the Regional Government (Benishangul-Gumuz Regional State)

Number	Name of the project/Investor	Land Size in Hectare	Zone	Woreda
1	Gebeyehu Gola Agricultural Development	410	Metekel	Guba
2	Enat Work Agricultural Development	500	Metekel	Guba
3	Bamboo Trading PLC	40	Metekel	Guba
4	Salehu Bahta Agricultural Development Enterprise	530	Metekel	Guba
5	Ferede Azanaw Agricultural Development Enterprise	474	Metekel	Guba
6	Amard Industry PLC	65	Metekel	Guba
7	T.t. Agricultural Development Enterprise	500	Metekel	Guba
8	Addis Alem Agricultural Development Enterprise	500	Metekel	Guba
9	Wuray PLC	815	Metekel	Guba
10	Abdul Aziz Agricultural Development	85	Metekel	Guba
11	Beamalak Agricultural Development Enterprise	80	Metekel	Guba
12	Mekuanint Agricultural Development Enterprise	80	Metekel	Guba
13	ABrha Agricultural Development Enterprise	90	Metekel	Guba
14	Liwam Metekel Modern Agriculture PLC	108	Metekel	Guba
15	Meakat AGricultural Mechanization PLC	108	Metekel	Guba
16	Worku Ahamed Agricultural Development Enterprise	40	Metekel	Guba
17	Sumeya Hlid Agricultural Development Enterprise	55	Metekel	Guba
18	Silesh Adamu Agricultural Development Enterprise	85	Metekel	Guba
19	Yazezew Solomon Agricultural Development Enterprise	110	Metekel	Guba
20	Bewal Agricultural Development Enterprise	115	Metekel	Guba
21	Endalkachew Simachew Agricultural Development Enterprise	115	Metekel	Guba
22	Mekonen Sahile Agricultural Development	105	Metekel	Guba
23	KIHEDAM Trading Plc.	115	Metekel	Guba
24	Worku Baro, Sharewu Wubbe and Friends PLC	75	Metekel	Guba
25	Wesfe Hassen Agricultural Development PLC	46	Metekel	Guba
26	L.Amid Agriculture PLC	1034	Metekel	Guba
27	Molla ENdashaw Agricultural Development Enterprise	165	Metekel	Guba
28	Birhane Tesfaye Agricultural Development Enterprise	474	Metekel	Guba
29	Asmeret Yirsaw Agricultural Development Enterprise	476	Metekel	Guba
30	Wujzeer General Business PLC	150	Metekel	Guba
31	Riskay Agricultural Development	170	Metekel	Guba
32	Bazezew abera Agricultural Development Enterprise	130	Metekel	Guba
33	Selam Crop and animal production enterprise	280	Metekel	Guba
34	Ligud Agricultural Development PLC	550	Metekel	Guba
35	Finote selam teke mankush Sesame Agricultural Development	250	Metekel	Guba
36	Maereg Agricultural Development PLC	510	Metekel	Guba
37	Tsegaw Mebratu Agricultural Development Enterprise	125	Metekel	Guba
38	Tsegay Gebiru Agricultural Development Enterprise	145	Metekel	Guba
39	Hiwot Agricultural Development Enterprise	210	Metekel	Guba
40	Balankur Agricultural Development Enterprise	80	Metekel	Guba
41	Ayima Agricultural Development Enterprise	110	Metekel	Guba
42	Fisseha Zemichael Agricultural Development Enterprise	330	Metekel	Guba
43	Kabral Agricultural Development PLC	140	Metekel	Guba
44	Eyasu Agricultural Development Enterprise	105	Metekel	Guba
45	Metekel Agricultural Development PLC	107	Metekel	Guba
46	Dawit Agricultural Development Enterprise	130	Metekel	Guba
47	Musefa Agro-industry PLC	75	Metekel	Guba
48	Esa hassen Agricultural Development Enterprise	50	Metekel	Guba
49	Fekade Limeneh Agricultural Development PLC	50	Metekel	Guba
50	Guba Agricultural Development Enterprise	120	Metekel	Guba
51	Aregawi Agricultural Development Enterprise	81	Metekel	Guba
52	Ekubba and Samuel Agricultural Development Enterprise	80	Metekel	Guba
53	Firegidawa Agricultural Development Enterprise	72	Metekel	Guba
54	Jemal Agricultural Development Enterprise	115	Metekel	Guba
55	Mohamed Agricultural Development Enterprise	72	Metekel	Guba
56	Edget Fana Agricultural Development Enterprise	107	Metekel	Guba
57	Addis Alem Agricultural Development Enterprise	107	Metekel	Guba
58	Edget Betiret Agricultural Development Enterprise	107	Metekel	Guba
59	Benishangul Gumuz Agro-Industry Agricultural Development	?	Metekel	Guba
60	Abiye Egzia Agricultural Development private Enterprise	?	Metekel	Guba
61	Kahsay Agricultural Development	308	Metekel	Guba
62	Tofik Agricultural Development	65	Metekel	Guba
63	Almaz Agricultural Development	55	Metekel	Guba
64	Wunbiro Plc	500	Metekel	Guba

65	Aschalu Yirsaw Agricultural Development Enterprise	500	Metekel	Guba
66	Abilhorse Agricultural Development Enterprise	55	Metekel	Guba
67	Melat Millennium Agricultural Development Enterprise	155	Metekel	Guba
68	Meriam Mohhamed Agricultural Development Enterprise	50	Metekel	Guba
69	Alnur Beshir Agricultural Development Enterprise	224	Metekel	Guba
70	Getnet Yeshaneh Agricultural Development Enterprise	460	Metekel	Guba
71	Y Z A Agricultural Development Enterprise	112	Metekel	Guba
72	Abbay Gebrer Rufael Agricultural Development Enterprise	160	Metekel	Guba
73	Ali usta Agricultural Development Enterprise	185	Metekel	Guba
74	Osis Agro-industry	91	Metekel	Guba
75	Zeyfereda AGro-Industry PLC	135	Metekel	Guba
76	Neja Agricultural Development Enterprise	90	Metekel	Guba
77	Tiru Agricultural Development Enterprise	140	Metekel	Guba
78	Sayro Investment Plc	120	Metekel	Guba
79	Mulunch Admasu Agricultural Development Enterprise	116	Metekel	Guba
80	Edget Birhan Agricultural Development Enterprise	108	Metekel	Guba
81	Aychich Ayima Agricultural Development Enterprise	210	Metekel	Guba
82	K/Mariam Agricultural Development Enterprise	65	Metekel	Guba
83	H/Mariam Agricultural Development Enterprise	210	Metekel	Guba
84	Mekonnen Abrham Agricultural Development Enterprise	220	Metekel	Guba
85	Bejir Agricultural Development Enterprise	130	Metekel	Guba
86	Hisayo General Business PLC	115	Metekel	Guba
87	Tena Agricultural Development Enterprise	105	Metekel	Guba
88	Aicidi Agro-Industry S.C	160	Metekel	Guba
89	Bambud Agriculturel Work PLC	95	Metekel	Guba
90	Feysel Bon Agricultural Development Enterprise	165	Metekel	Guba
91	Abenezer Agricultural Development	205	Metekel	Guba
92	Mengistu Agricultural Development Enterprise	150	Metekel	Guba
93	Nega Yemane Agricultural Development Enterprise	165	Metekel	Guba
94	Hayat Agricultural Development Enterprise	110	Metekel	Guba
95	Yohannes Agricultural Development /YZ	280	Metekel	Guba
96	Omedella Agricultural Development PLC	310	Metekel	Guba
97	Ayint Agricultural Development Enterprise	31	Metekel	Guba
98	Gebru Tomass Agricultural Development Enterprise	145	Metekel	Guba
99	Dawit Birhanu Agricultural Development Enterprise	70	Metekel	Guba
100	Merab Agriculture PLC	500	Metekel	Dangur
101	Java Agro-Business PLC	520	Metekel	Dangur
102	Zekeke Agricultural Mechanization PLC	1550	Metekel	Dangur
103	Mesi Agricultural Development Enterprise	370	Metekel	Dangur
104	Walta Agricultural Development Enterprise	126	Metekel	Dangur
105	Abreham Desta Agricultural Development Enterprise	87	Metekel	Dangur
106	Birhoy AGro-industry PLC	100	Metekel	Dangur
107	Sky Agricultural Development PLC	250	Metekel	Dangur
108	Kuanda W/Hu Agricultural Development PLC	125	Metekel	Dangur
109	Tracon Trading PLC	95	Metekel	Dangur
110	Getafan Mechanization Farming PLC	494	Metekel	Dangur
111	Mambuk Agricultural Development PLC	120	Metekel	Dangur
112	Deguay Agricultural Development	25	Metekel	Dangur
113	Shiwaz Lucky PLC	712	Metekel	Dangur
114	Beles PLC	507	Metekel	Dangur
115	Burka Agricultural Development Enterprise	37	Kamashi	Yaso
116	Boka Hulegeb Agricultural Development PLC	250	Kamashi	Yaso
117	Chigsha Agricultural Development Enterprise	220	Kamashi	Yaso
118	Sepa Agricultural Development Enterprise	325	Kamashi	Yaso
119	Bifatu Gudina Digaga Agricultural Development PLC	220	Kamashi	Yaso
120	Sapte Agricultural Development PLC	110	Kamashi	Yaso
121	Kenean Land Agricultural Development PLC	135	Kamashi	Yaso
122	Septe Kokora Agricultural Development Enterprise	103	Kamashi	Yaso
123	Tsega G/Hiwot Agricultural Development	175	Kamashi	Yaso
124	EYa Agricultural Development Enterprise	138	Kamashi	Yaso
125	Zelalem Alemayehu Agricultural Development Enterprise	100	Kamashi	Yaso
126	Kenean Land Agricultural Development Enterprise	66	Kamashi	Yaso
127	Don John Agricultural Development Enterprise	110	Kamashi	Yaso
128	Ezana and TSion Agro-Industry	320	Assosa	Kurmuk
129	Ram International PLC	95	Assosa	Oda and Bildglue
130	Admo International Business PLC	32	Assosa	Oda and Bildglue
131	Haftu Seged Agricultural Development Enterprise	210	Assosa	Oda and Bildglue
132	Mohhamed Said Agricultural Development Enterprise	100	Assosa	Oda and Bildglue
133	Habte Luel Agricultural Development Enterprise	185	Assosa	Oda and Bildglue

134	Abreham Derbe Agricultural Development Enterprise	230	Assosa	Oda and Bildglue
135	Albel Agricultural Development Enterprise	60	Assosa	Oda and Bildglue
136	Rodas Agricultural Development Enterprise	75	Assosa	Oda and Bildglue
137	Goitom Niguse Agricultural Development Enterprise	75	Assosa	Oda and Bildglue
138	ENzi Shederiya Mixed Farming	7	Assosa	Assosa
139	Wegegita General Trading PLC	205	Assosa	Assosa
140	Slam Alebell Agricultural Development Enterprise	560	Assosa	Assosa
141	Abdu Hussien Agricultural Development Enterprise	82	Assosa	Assosa
142	Selga Agricultural Development PLC	93	Assosa	Assosa
143	Atakelti Kebede Agricultural Development Enterprise	110	Assosa	Assosa
144	Dereje Agricultural Development Enterprise	140	Assosa	Assosa
145	Zeraye w/Gerima Agricultural Development Enterprise	110	Assosa	Assosa
146	Gendebe Agricultural Development Enterprise	105	Assosa	Bambasi
147	Tesfaye Redae Agricultural Development Enterprise	70	Assosa	Bambasi
148	Albereka Agricultural Development Enterprise	100	Assosa	Bambasi
149	Rash Agricultural Development Enterprise	23	Assosa	Bambasi
150	Muha Agro-Augmenter Enterprise	85	Assosa	Bambasi
151	Guteta Goshu Agricultural Development Enterprise	100	Assosa	Bambasi
152	Atnafu Agricultural Development Enterprise	110	Assosa	Bambasi
153	Juhar Agricultural Development Enterprise	175	Assosa	Bambasi
154	Mohamed Yasin Agricultural Development Enterprise	170	Assosa	Bambasi
155	Kassahun Atalel Agricultural Development Enterprise	110	Assosa	Bambasi
156	Amare and Anteneh Hulegeb Agricultural development PLC	116	Assosa	Bambasi
157	Jena Agricultural Development Enterprise	130	Assosa	Bambasi
158	Mohamed Hussien Agricultural Development Enterprise	210	Assosa	Bambasi
159	Hilma Amanu Agricultural Development Enterprise	110	Assosa	Bambasi
160	Ahadir Loan Agricultural Development Enterprise	114	Assosa	Bambasi
161	Fassil Yeshitila Agro-Industry PLC	60	Assosa	Bambasi
162	KAlih Mohammed Agricultural Development Enterprise	35	Assosa	Bambasi
163	Wura Agriculture and Animal Production Enterprise	125	Assosa	Bambasi
164	Belo Jiganfoy Agro-Industry PLC	541	Kamashi	Belo Jiganfoy
165	Biyo Agicultural Development PLC	172	Kamashi	Belo Jiganfoy
166	Didesa Wenz Hulegeb Agricultural Development PLC	46	Kamashi	Belo Jiganfoy
167	Shenkora agro-industry Agricultural Development	54	Kamashi	Belo Jiganfoy
168	Gumbi agro-industry Agricultural Development Enterprise	32	Kamashi	Belo Jiganfoy
169	Sena Agro-Industry PLC Enterprise	24	Kamashi	Belo Jiganfoy
170	Bini Birhan Agricultural Development PLC/DMS Trading Plc.	96	Kamashi	Belo Jiganfoy
171	Anger Bishan DIma Agricultural Development Enterprise	26	Kamashi	Belo Jiganfoy
172	Ras Dasheden Agro-Industry PLC	250	Kamashi	Belo Jiganfoy
173	Adeineb Agricultural Development Enterprise	118	Assosa	Sherkole
174	Tsegay Tareke Agricultural Development Enterprise	70	Assosa	Sherkole
175	Zemen Abreho Agricultural Cooperative Association	1015	Assosa	Sherkole
176	(T.G.M.D.K. The Promise Land)	570	Assosa	Sherkole
177	Amarre Negash Beyene Agricultural Development Enterprise	412	Assosa	Sherkole
178	Yared Agricultural Development Enterprise	95	Assosa	Sherkole
179	Kelemu Gelaw Agricultural Development Enterprise	50	Assosa	Sherkole
180	Habtamu Tadesse Agricultural Development Enterprise	135	Assosa	Sherkole
181	Tenaw Alehegn Agricultural Development Enterprise	125	Assosa	Sherkole
182	Silki Agricultural Development and trading PLC	235	Assosa	Sherkole
183	Tadesse Asfaw	2060	Assosa	Mao Komo
184	Yayinu W/Mariam	60	Assosa	Mao Komo
185	Araya Tsehaye	152	Assosa	Mao Komo
186	Meaza Atsebecha	152	Assosa	Mao Komo
187	Atakilt Bahta	152	Assosa	Mao Komo
188	Alem Tesfa Yohannes	110	Assosa	Mao Komo
189	Dr. Abdu Abdulkadir	60	Assosa	Mao Komo
190	Hadush Tewale	145	Assosa	Mao Komo
191	Tewodros Biyadgu	98	Assosa	Mao Komo
192	Solomon Mekonnen	185	Assosa	Mao Komo
193	Efrem Tilahun	120	Assosa	Mao Komo
194	Tigistu Belay	67	Assosa	Mao Komo
195	Mohamed Nur Hassen	120	Assosa	Mao Komo
196	Adnew Terefe	160	Assosa	Mao Komo
197	SGiferaw Mesfin	152	Assosa	Mao Komo
198	Kiros W/Aregay	304	Assosa	Mao Komo
199	Ben Adorbit Agro-investment PLC	518	Assosa	Menge
200	Diamond Trading PLC	247	Assosa	Menge
201	Cusion Trading PLC	247	Assosa	Menge
202	K.D.T.M.S Agricultural Development S.C	210	Assosa	Menge
203	Kidane Agricultural Development Enterprise	110	Assosa	Menge

204	Hammer Agricultural Development Enterprise	110	Assosa	Menge
205	Abay Zuria Hulegeb PLC	587	Metekel	Pawe
206	Teferi and Brothers Agricultural Development PLC	175	Metekel	Pawe
207	Hailemariam Abay Agricultural Development	125	Metekel	Pawe
208	New Hope Farm PLC	74	Metekel	Pawe
209	Abe Agricultural Development	25	Metekel	Pawe
210	Winner Agricultural Development Enterprise	115	Metekel	Pawe/Dangur
211	Molla Kebede Animal Production Enterprise	130	Metekel	Pawe
212	Eshete Ferede Agricultural Development Enterprise	115	Metekel	Mandura
213	Hasset Agro-Industry PLC	92	Metekel	Mandura
214	Ades Development, Agriculture and Trading PLC	520	Metekel	Mandura

Tabulated by the Author, Source; The Regional Investment Office, Benishangul Gumuz Region

Appendix 4: Figures of Machineries of the Project

Tractor and planters



Ploughing Machine



Cutter and Chopper of residues



Deep Digging Machine



Source; Author's own, 2013