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A report for the BRIDGES Project

Conflict in the Somali Region of Ethiopia: Can Education Promote Peace-Building?

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We the authors of this report are solely responsible for any errors in its contents.

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ABBREVIATIONS

ABE	Alternative Basic Education
BRIDGES	Building Relationships through Innovative Delivery of Growing Education Services
CSO	Civil Society Organization
DFID	Department for International Development
EFA	Education for All
EPRDF	Ethiopian Peoples' Revolutionary Democratic Front
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
MDG	Millennium Development Goals
ONLF	Ogaden National Liberation Front
OLF	Oromo Liberation Front
PCAE	Pastoralist Concern Association Ethiopia
PCU	Program Coordination Unit
PDP	Peace and Development Program
SMC	School Management Committee
SCUK	Save the Children UK
SCUS	Save the Children US
SSDF	Somali Salvation Democratic Front
SNM	Somali National Movement
TFG	Transitional Federal Government
TVET	Technical and Vocational Education Training Center

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Piloting the Delivery of Quality Education Services in the Developing Regional States of Ethiopia, also known as “Building Relationships through Innovative Delivery of Growing Education Services” (BRIDGES), is being implemented by Save the Children UK, Islamic Relief, and Mercy Corps in the Somali Region of Ethiopia. It is a twelve-month project funded by the UK Department for International Development (DFID). The purpose of the project is to strengthen the capability and commitment of state and non-state actors in Somali Region to promote peace, security, and development through the delivery of quality education. An important aspect of the project is to generate lessons that might influence future strategies for peace-building and improved education in the region.

Analytical support to BRIDGES is provided by the Feinstein International Center, Tufts University. This support included conflict analyses in Somali Region, focusing on an analysis of the causes of conflict in Afdher and Shinile Zones, and the ways in which improved education could contribute to conflict reduction.

Key findings

1. Education is a development priority

- Education is critical to addressing the development needs of Somali Region and is a much-needed service at this time. Education, especially at the basic and primary school level, also has a critical *long-term* role in societal and conflict transformation.
- Although education is a development priority, it is probably not the best instrument to transform conflict, address the structural and proximate causes of conflict, or bring about stability in the *short term*. The assumptions that conflict arises from a lack of education and “development” need to be examined carefully, given the overarching, high-level political drivers of conflict in the region.
- Similarly, the assumption that fragility and

stability can be directly and immediately addressed through strengthening the state’s ability to deliver services requires testing and the collection of evidence over time.

Improved service provision *per se* is unlikely to alter the conflict situation significantly without inputs in a range of other areas including, in particular, the need to address directly the causes of conflict.

- The impact of conflict on education provision is not as significant as might be expected given the prevalence of conflict in the region, but it still has major consequences for families and for the future of the education system. Equally, the analysis found that except under special, localized conditions involving land, education is neither a primary cause of conflict, nor a trigger for violence.
- The findings above indicate a clear need to continue to support basic education in the Somali Region, while also reshaping expectations on the conflict-related outcomes of improved education.

2. Conflict drivers and dynamics

- The drivers of conflict are evolving and changing in the region, but there are three basic types of conflict that occur in Shinile and Afdher Zones:
 - Inter-clan/ethnic conflicts
 - Those with international regional dynamics
 - Those with inter-regional Ethiopian dynamics
 - Those within the Somali Region
 - Intra-clan
 - State versus insurgents
- The main structural and proximate causes that drive these conflicts fall into three main groups including:
 - Political and governance concerns
 - Economic and environmental concerns
 - Socio-cultural concerns
- Although all three basic types of conflict are found in both Shinile and Afdher Zones, the situation is far more serious in Shinile Zone. The levels and intensity of violence that

occur in Shinile are more severe and relate to complex political dynamics, long-running territorial issues, and a relatively homogenous clan composition.

- The role of basic education as a means to transform conflict in the short term is constrained by the disconnects between limited education and the structural and proximate causes of conflict in the region, and the reality that education programs do not work directly with those actively taking part in conflict (although they should). However, education programs still need to ensure that they adopt a strong and serious conflict-sensitive approach to their work.

Recommendations

1. Conflict-sensitive and long-term approaches to education

The education sector in the Somali Region should concentrate primarily on improving delivery, and more specifically, on improving quality. Education should adopt a two-pronged approach.

- First, adopt a serious *conflict-sensitive* approach to the sector's work aimed at effective education delivery "in conflict" environments.
- Second, methodologies should deliberately incorporate a *long-term approach* and theory of change aimed at addressing issues that work "on conflict." More explicit linkages with livelihoods and the employment sector, as well as relevance to ways of life, should be coupled with a scale-up of the Mercy Corps work that is specifically targeting those who are involved in conflict.

Conflict-sensitive programming

There is a need to adopt a serious conflict-sensitive approach to all education and service delivery work in the Somali Region aimed at effective delivery "in conflict" environments, and including the development of indicators that ensure a way of measuring impact. In particular:

- Work on both sides of a conflict—particularly across regional boundaries (e.g.,

Afar and Somali Region as well as Oromiya)—and ensure equitable distribution of resources and inputs and conduct "micro-conflict analysis" to each kebele and school situation to understand the extent to which trauma and conflict need to be addressed.

- Don't build education facilities on contested land.
- Be very careful around regional state boundaries.
- Reduce the risk of conflict impacting on children and schools.
- For pastoralist communities living in disputed territory, ensure that schools:
 - Continue to be mobile and flexible.
 - Do not formalize Alternative Basic Education (ABE) and create permanent physical structures, but rather upgrade the school through the provision of improved "school kits" that enhances materials, methodologies, and educational opportunities instead of structures.
- Assist the community to undertake a risk mapping exercise in terms of conflict (i.e., are there "hotspots" that schooling should avoid such as water points, salt licks, etc., where conflict often occurs), coupled with their usual grazing lands and dry and wet season mobility routes. Where is it appropriate to site a school? Where is it most safe and yet most convenient with facilities for the children such as water? Where is the school going to move if an incident occurs? When and how is it best to relaunch education after bloodshed to take into account addressing and healing trauma?
- For agro-pastoralist communities in conflict with pastoralists, ensure that schools are situated as far from any potential conflict sites as possible, i.e., at the back of the settlement.

Commit to long-term change

Adopt a long-term approach and theory of change aimed at addressing issues that work "on conflict" through societal change. There is also a role for education to play as an approach to addressing state-strengthening through improving accountability and transparency in

the sector and developing the expectations and role of community in school governance and through debates around education and what constitutes a “good education” in the region. This could mean:

- Ensuring that there is a closer link between education and the improvement of livelihoods and associated skills, i.e., “education for life.”
- Developing curriculum content that is aimed at messages of tolerance and respect for different views and perspectives.
- Support experiential methods of learning that consider behavior change models with respect to conflict. This could include the use of “peace clubs” in schools, art, and music, as well as opportunities for cross-conflict stakes in shared livelihood generation.
- Identify possible opportunities to pilot the use of early childhood education in tackling tolerance and the ethnic dimension of conflict in the Somali Region.
 - Develop a “saturation” approach to education that builds a critical mass of understanding and willingness to change values and behaviors through components of non-formal education and opportunities of working with women, elders, imams, and other key community leaders, as well as school children.
 - Scale-up the work of Mercy Corps aimed at those who instigate and are directly involved in violence.

2. Education to address the impacts of conflict

Education has a key role to play in assisting children and adults who have been affected by violent conflict. For example:

- Explore the utilization of a “community-based, psychosocial pedagogy” aimed at healing trauma and countering the normalization of violence.
- Explore the use of schools as safe havens and areas of agreed non-violence by all parties.
- Explore ways to continue to build intercommunal and interpersonal trust between conflicting groups to encourage mixing and to break down the trends towards segregation and separation.

3. Future research

Consider constructing an action research program to be embedded in the Peace and Development Program (PDP) that explores and tests the following:

- Gathering and analyzing the evidence base of the relationship between increased and improved service delivery and a reduction of fragility and conflict in the Somali Region.
- The development and use of sector-specific conflict-sensitive indicators for the implementation of primary and ABE schools and education programs.
- Consideration of the use of a set of self-selected (and support around capacity building and training to achieve the expected improvements) measurements that together form an index around performance in the delivery of education at the woreda level that could be used as the basis for periodic self-assessments. This could involve a number of stakeholders including the community, students, the School Management Committee (SMC), and the government officials at the local level and the NGO.
- An analysis of the land ownership and land tenure legislation at federal and regional state levels, the available dispute mechanisms, including both statutory and customary mechanisms, and the development of a series of recommendations to improve efficiencies and effectiveness that could be piloted in different locations depending on the particular circumstances. This piece of work could include both suggestions to changes in legislation, policy, and practice that are best suited to the needs of the different stakeholders.

4. Other recommendations

Other suggestions for adapting education programs to work in a conflict environment are as follows:

Conflict prevention:

- Consider the use of “conflict preparedness” plans for those schools that are most vulnerable to the impact of conflict.
- Assess the potential for conflict early

warning systems to be put in place, ensuring that schools are an intrinsic part of the system as part of the conflict preparedness plan, possibly involving the SMCs.

- Expand the use of public discourse, media, and public debate to further develop the opportunities for good governance to be modelled within the education sector and establish norms for other sectors.
- Strengthen the opportunities for women to play a greater role in community affairs and peaceful coexistence through targeted adult education and awareness raising, ensuring there is support for it from the men.
- Pilot an early childhood education that includes emphasis on ethnic tolerance and shared histories.

Conflict mitigation and management:

- Build and extend on the work that Save the Children US has pioneered with Pastoralist Concern Association Ethiopia in Filtu and Dollo Ado regarding use of mapping of transhumant routes for the placing of ABEs, conflict “hotspots” such as water points, as well as consideration of traditional natural resource management systems that could play a role in a broader conflict management system around use of natural resources such as grazing areas.
- Work with journalists and media on how to report on conflict issues, e.g., draw on examples from Kenya following the last round of electoral and ethnic violence.
- Look at incorporating agreements for “peace zones” around shared resources into discussions and negotiations between pastoralists and between pastoralists and agro-pastoralist conflicts.

1. THE TASK

1.1 Introduction

This analysis aims to raise understanding of the specific types and causes of conflict in the Somali Region of Ethiopia and, in particular, in the areas where the BRIDGES project is currently operating, Afdher and Shinile Zones. The analysis aims to identify and differentiate between the conflicts that are active or latent in these areas to consider how the project might try to address them, and any specific education programming options that could be implemented that will assist in the promotion of peace and state-building in the Somali Region. The analysis seeks to consider similarities and difference between the two areas as well as explore the regional and international dynamics that influence the conflict dynamics that are to be found in them.

Recommendations are based on a number of assumptions:

- That peace-building is accepted by all stakeholders including government, as a legitimate activity of NGOs when working in conjunction with the appropriate authorities.
- That stakeholders do want peace and that, as reported by the majority of stakeholders, education is part of the long-term solution to conflict in the region.¹
- A key assumption is that there is space for NGOs to operate and implement the suggestions that are outlined below.

The success of Mercy Corps in working with a range of stakeholders and specifically alongside the government of Ethiopia suggests that it is possible to undertake work of this nature provided that there is strong trust and relationships with the key stakeholders. Increased political space, facilitated by the federal government and supported by donors, would increase the efficacy of interventions. It is also important to note that, like the majority of writing on the topic of conflict, it is recognized implicitly that conflict can be both positive and negative and when managed can contribute to positive progress. All conflict is not bad, but in

this report we are talking about *violent* conflict as destructive and to be avoided and prevented.

1.2 The BRIDGES project

Piloting the Delivery of Quality Education Services in the Developing Regional States of Ethiopia, also known as “Building Relationships through Innovative Delivery of Growing Education Services” (BRIDGES) is being implemented in the Somali Region of Ethiopia. It is a twelve-month project funded by the UK Department for International Development (DFID). The project is being implemented in nine woredas in five zones. The purpose of the project is to strengthen the capability and commitment of state and non-state actors in Somali Region to promote peace, security, and development through the delivery of quality education for all children contributing to Education for All (EFA) and the Millennium Development Goals (MDG) goals. Specific objectives include:

1. To improve access to, and the quality and relevance of, primary education, especially for pastoral peoples, in selected conflict-affected areas of Somali Region.
2. Develop and test strategies for state and non-state actors to work in partnership to promote peace-building and state-building in Somali Region through the provision of improved education services.
3. To strengthen Somali government capacity to plan, monitor, finance, and develop pedagogic materials that promote peace and relevant primary education services.
4. To learn lessons for the delivery of primary education services and other basic services in Somali Region which deliver improved services and contribute to peace-building.
5. To investigate proposals to accelerate development of education services proposed under the Ministry of Federal Affairs Special Support Programme in the Four Developing Regions.

The one-year time frame of the BRIDGES project is a very short period of time to be considering the application and impact from

these types of issues and the possibility of being able to draw firm conclusions. The practical pressures facing start-up, and the very real difficulties of getting a “good run-up” and some momentum to the project, mean that emphasis is often placed on achieving ambitious progress targets and short-term perspectives rather than investing in the long term. A mid-term review had also been undertaken during the period of this consultancy and will be a useful companion document for this analysis (Napier and Bekele, 2010). Lessons learned and discussion of issues encountered from the pilot is expected to be utilized to inform the design of larger interventions that are in the pipeline, such as the upcoming multidonor-supported Peace and Development Programme (PDP).

2. METHODOLOGY

A team from Tufts University consisting of an international team leader with a national expert undertook the analysis, with logistical support and technical input from the consortium partners. It is important to note that not all conflicts encountered were explored in depth, as there are many minor conflicts that were either not significant, or were historical and had not resurfaced for more than ten years or so.

2.1 Locations visited

Two field trips were undertaken to Southern Ethiopia to zones where the BRIDGES project is being implemented. The first trip, hosted by SCUUK, focused on understanding the dynamics in Shinile Zone and the second, hosted by Mercy Corps and Islamic Relief, in Afdher Zone. The team was also able to visit Babile and Kebre Baye and it was hoped that access to Fiq might be a

possibility in the second phase, but unfortunately this was not the case. Sites were selected on the basis of the following criteria: project implementation areas; accessibility; and relevance and proximity to conflict issues.

2.2 Stakeholders consulted

Given the sensitive context in Ethiopia surrounding exploration of issues having a bearing on conflict, the focus in terms of the discussions with stakeholders centered naturally on the education aspect. Meetings were held as a matter of courtesy, protocol, and in order to obtain their perspective, with government offices at all levels wherever we visited. At each site representatives of various stakeholder and interest groups were interviewed and, wherever possible, a range of actors were consulted (Table 2).

Table 1: Locations visited			
Shinile Zone	Afdher Zone	Jijiga Zone	Other
Afdem Woreda (Oct. 2010)	Hargelle Woreda (Feb. 2011)	Kebre Baya Woreda (Feb. 2011)	Gode Town (Feb. 2011)
Mieso Woreda (Oct. 2010, Feb. 2011)	Cherete Woreda (Feb. 2011)	Babile Woreda (Feb. 2011)	Dire Dawa (Feb. 2011)
Erer Woreda (Oct. 2010)	El Kare Woreda (Feb. 2011)	Gursum Woreda (Feb. 2011)	
Dembal Woreda (Feb. 2011)		Jijiga Town (Oct. 2010, Feb. 2011)	

Table 2: Stakeholders consulted	
Government Institutions and Organizations	Community Stakeholders
• Somali Region government officials including the following Bureaus and Departments: - Education - Bureau of Livestock Crop and Rural Development - Sports and Youth	• Community leaders • Clan elders • Key informants • Teachers • School Management Committees/ Parent Teachers Associations

(continued on the next page)

Table 2: Stakeholders consulted *(continued)*

Government Institutions and Organizations	Community Stakeholders
- Border Affairs - Programme Coordination Unit • Ethiopian Wildlife Conservation Authority at Babile Elephant Sanctuary • Woreda government officials, including - Heads of Administration - Education - Security • Ethiopian community-based organizations • UN agencies including: - UNDP - FAO - UN Department of Safety and Security - UNICEF • Donors: - DFID - USAID - Danida - BRIDGES Consortium members: - SCUK - Mercy Corps - Islamic Relief	• Opinion leaders • Youth • Women • Cattle herder • Traders • Farmers • Academics

The primary methodologies employed throughout the field work were:

- Open-ended semi-structured questioning within focus peer-group discussions (e.g., elders, youth, women, etc.).
- Key informant interviews with those identified as having a deep knowledge of the issues and history of the situation, to deepen understanding and triangulate information.

Meetings and discussions were also held with project staff from SCUK, Mercy Corps, and Islamic Relief. Balance in opinion was sought by consulting with people on both sides of the conflicts, as well as those with more independent views and not directly involved in the conflicts as a stakeholder.

2.3 Literature review

The formal published literature was reviewed, including academic studies covering natural resource management, conflict and governance, and socioeconomic issues. The grey literature on Somali Region was also reviewed, covering development and humanitarian reports, baseline assessments, and project reports produced by Mercy Corps and SCUK. Additional documents included government statistics, policy and legal documents, including regional state development policies related to pastoralist areas, and poverty reduction strategy papers.

2.4 The challenges of research and analysis

A number of challenges were encountered during the analyses that are worth noting, aside from the inherent difficulties of consulting different interest groups with different outlooks operating within the broader political context. This context includes the recent introduction of the new CSO legislation that strikes a positive note by formally acknowledging the potential contributions of NGOs to peace-building. However, the extent to which this recognition is mirrored by local government officials affects the boundaries of NGO activities on the ground.

Challenges have included the following:

- The timing of the first trip coincided with the appointment of new government at the regional and woreda levels. This meant that a number of key stakeholders were involved in other activities and consultations, either in Addis Ababa or in their constituencies, and so were not available for meetings. In addition, the level of political activity in the areas visited on both visits meant that the visibility and profile of the team was unfortunately enhanced. This may have affected the degree of candidness and comfort levels of some interviewees.
- In two locations, the level of tension between protagonists had very recently erupted into violence, which meant that levels of suspicion, fear, and anxiety were high. Therefore, communities and officials did not feel able to discuss issues openly while official investigations were underway (Afar and Oromiya). Fortunately, the team was able to address this constraint in the second phase.
- Access to some stakeholders and certain geographic areas affected by conflict were also difficult and limited, as they were outside the project areas. The key point here is that the findings of the analysis cannot be extrapolated beyond the areas visited during the field work.

3. THE CONTEXT

3.1 Key trends in Somali Region

As BRIDGES is a pilot project, the consortium and donors have been interested in better understanding how the context is changing in Somali Region, the nature of the main trends that impact on or reflect changes in people's way of life, and how conflict dynamics are positioned within these changes. The trends described below were identified by stakeholders during discussions, and to some extent, this information is supported by the literature. Many of these trends are inter-related and reinforce each other as drivers or consequences of other changes.

3.1.1 Demographics

Population growth was noted as a major factor impacting on all aspects of life, but perhaps its' most significant aspect is the increasing concentration and rapid rural-to-urban population shift taking place. The main reasons for this movement appear to be improving transport, communication, electricity, and other infrastructure, as well as the wish to go to school, access services, or search for employment opportunities. People elected as kebele, woreda, and regional representatives also move their families to town, and there were "pastoral drop-outs" and bored youths who also move looking for a different way of life. This trend was also putting pressure on social support mechanisms within the kinship and clan system. At the personal level, this impacted tremendously on families in town, with demands for assistance from rural relatives to look after children wishing to continue their schooling.

3.1.2 Livelihoods

Pastoralists noted declining access to rangelands and increasing farming and land enclosure. Interestingly, both agro-pastoralists and those relying only on agriculture previously were diversifying and had an increasing number of animals to look after. This placed increased pressure on the grazing areas surrounding, or close to, land being used for agriculture. Restrictions on mobility were affecting

pastoralists as changes in land use, or in some cases in security, were impacting on seasonal access to water and pasture. More extreme climatic variations were consistently reported, and attributed to climate change, affecting agriculture and quality of grazing. This is a complex subject and hard data that documents changes and impact of alterations in weather patterns at the micro-level is not available. Changes in livestock ownership patterns, commercialization, and composition are also affecting mobility and which types of grazing are accessed (Aklilu and Catley, 2010). A good example of this encountered in the field was the increased number of trade camels moving to Babile market, which has increased the use of Babile Elephant Sanctuary for pasture.

3.1.3 Changes in the governance environment

There were contradictory changes reported concerning the governance environment and the generalizations outlined here are not necessarily reflective of the situation in all places—local situations varied depending on the personnel involved. On the positive side, there was increasing decentralization of government funds down to the woreda level, which allowed for the possibility of far greater accountability and transparency in the utilization of funds and other resources. Coupled with this trend was the increasing capacity of government at lower levels as staff became better qualified and were drawn from a younger generation with different aspirations, expectations of the world, and understandings of their jobs. Technical staff were said to be increasingly recruited on the basis of their knowledge and qualifications. Government staff also noted that there had been a recent trend of increasing party discipline, leading to increased government effectiveness. Some informants described this trend in relation to spaces for alternative views and pluralism within government.

Possibly as a consequence of the ethnic federal system, the clan-based approach for apportioning representation and political power was said to be reinforcing an increasingly politicized ethnicity.

Some informants argued that this was currently the only realistic method to ensure political power-sharing during the transition to a more democratic political system, providing checks and balances through this social association. Other informants argued that because clans are a social system of organization, distinctions between majority and minority viewpoints become expressed through geographical coverage, strength, and wealth (also see Bradbury, 2009).

While formal government was becoming stronger in these historically peripheral areas, there was also a simultaneous, declining influence of traditional customary institutions in some clans, which had implications for the capacity of communities to manage conflicts as well as the cohesion of the community. The importance of the traditional institutions varied, being less influential in the urban areas and more influential in the rural environment. This is expected given the need for social insurance in areas where the state is less strong and capable of providing services. Similarly, clan cohesion in urban centers was reducing at a faster rate in the “melting pot” of multiclan populations, and as individual agendas and the influence of competition for political power affected internal clan dynamics. This was reflected in the increasing lack of clarity around who was authorized to represent a clan’s perspectives as a spokesperson and the variety of messages that were expressed as “formal positions.”

3.1.4 Changes in other social dynamics

Discussion of religious trends was also a sensitive issue given the regional influence emanating from the situation in Somalia, the Yemen, and the Middle East. Concerns regarding possible linkages between Islam and instability and insurgency in Somali Region, coupled with the past presence of groups such as *Al Itihad* with their religious motivations, increased sensitivity. This despite the changes that have taken place in the region, such as: the changed relationship between *Al Itihad* and the Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF), with the latter

distancing themselves from Islamic agendas; as well as changes in the name, form, and way that *Al Itihad* conducts itself, including its relationship with the government of Ethiopia. As a result, opinions and perceptions were guarded in discussions and provided mixed messages. Most people were of the opinion that the flavor of Islam was changing and moving away from the Sunni schools of Islam (in particular, the Sharafi School) mixed with traditional beliefs, towards the more conservative Middle Eastern Salafi or Wahabi interpretations.² They were also of the opinion that the social environment was becoming increasingly religious, with people becoming more devout and the actual practice of Islam increasing (e.g., more people praying regularly together at the work place). Small indicators such as the more common use of an Islamic frame of reference and Islamic terms within people’s speech were also reported.

An interesting debate was also the use and influence of *khat* across the region. It appears as though its use is declining in urban environments (also see CHF International, 2006) but possibly increasing in rural areas. The urban decline—if it is indeed happening—was associated with increasing religious practices in young educated people, as some considered use of *khat* to be un-Islamic. In rural areas, influencing factors may be increasing transport services expanding to more remote villages.

3.2 Forces shaping the history of conflict in the Somali Region

The Somali Region has been beset by competition and conflict between different groups since time immemorial. Contributing factors that have influenced the history of conflict in the region include the legacies of European colonialism and the geo-politics of the Cold War, as they were expressed in Africa. The Somali areas of the Horn of Africa have always been of strategic importance to the countries of the region, and the formation of colonial boundaries ensured that Ethiopia, Kenya, and Djibouti all had substantial Somali populations living outside of Somalia itself (including

Somaliland, Puntland, and southern Somalia). Therefore, the countries have been inextricably linked, and this is especially true of the relationship between Ethiopia and Somalia.

During the period of Imperial rule in Ethiopia, at least two specific events shaped the current conflict dynamics in Somali Region. In 1935, Italy attacked Ethiopia from Eritrea, and, partly in response, members of the Somali Issa clan were recruited and armed in Somaliland. However, the Issa then attacked the Afar on the Allegedhi plain, to gain access to the Awash River for their livestock. This area is still under contention now. The other event occurred

during the 1970s and was, reportedly, the deliberate poisoning of Issa wells by the Ethiopian army resulting in livestock and human deaths and the Issa and Oromo becoming enemies (Catley and Iyasu, 2010). These events reflect the deep historical roots of inter-tribal conflicts and clan dynamics, which, over time, were exacerbated by trends such as land enclosure, commercial use of land, and the changing political environment. Conflict has continued to the present day with sporadic but explosive violence as well as smaller "drip"³ deaths and incidents such as livestock raiding. Some of these incidents have a distinctive pattern and are relatively predictable.

Table 3: Timeline of conflict-related events in and around Shinile Zone
(Source: Catley and Iyasu, 2010)

Time period	Events
Early 1900s	Migration of Oromo Ittu into Mieso from western Hararghe highlands, to access grasslands for livestock production. Ittu were mainly pastoralists at this time. Construction of the Djibouti-Addis Ababa railway, with Issa from Djibouti employed as workers and guards who later occupied areas around the railway in what is now Shinile Zone.
Imperial Early 1930s	Government allocates around 500 ha of land in Mieso to two private investors for cultivation and livestock production; large pasture lands are fenced. Although armed guards used to protect the area, Ittu and Issa collaborated to destroy the farms and raided the animals. October 1935, Italy attacked Ethiopia from Eritrea and Italian Somaliland. The Issa were recruited by the Italians and received modern arms and training, which they used against the Afar to control parts of the Allighedi plain—a key grazing resource for livestock and with access to the Awash River.
Imperial 1960s	Government gives concessions to foreign and domestic investors along the Awash River for commercial irrigation, mainly cotton, without consultation or compensation to the Afar. Some Afar leaders also appropriate land for irrigation. Pastoralists lose access to large stretches of the river and dry season pastures, with impacts on livestock.
Imperial 1970-74	Commander of armed forces in eastern Ethiopia encourages Oromo and Afar to attack the Issa; gains from livestock raids distributed to raiders. Some Issa youth left the country. Both Issa and Afar very badly affected by drought and famine, without much assistance from government. Infant mortality of 615/1000 recorded among Issa during the 1974 famine (Seaman et al., 1978). Issa wells were reported to be deliberately poisoned by army, with livestock and human deaths; led to Issa and Oromo becoming enemies.

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Table 3: Timeline of conflict-related events in and around Shinile Zone *(continued)*

Time period	Events
Socialist Mengistu 1974-1991	1974 land reform with all land under state ownership. Landlords were dispossessed and land instead allocated to Ittu, leading to a growing trend for private enclosure of land, i.e., the Ittu became more agropastoral. The Issa resisted the expansion of cultivation, e.g., organized attacks during the planting and harvesting seasons to try to secure extensive communal grazing land. Siad Barre regime in Somalia trains the Western Somalia Liberation Front (WSLF) in preparation for invasion of Ethiopia. Issa who had previously fled Ethiopia were organized by Hamud Farah. In 1977 they cooperated with Siad Barre in the war launched against Ethiopia and rejoined clan members in Ethiopia to fight against the Oromo and Afar, pushing deeper into Afar areas. Although Ethiopia repels the invasion in 1978, with Afar support, the Issa occupy settlements along the main Djibouti road, Gadamaitu and Adaitu. As well as trade and contraband, the Issa use the settlements as entry points for livestock movements further north into Afar. The period is characterized by supply of automatic weapons. The Oromo Ittu were supplied by the Ethiopian government; Somalia and Djibouti supply the Issa. In 1984 the Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF) is established, with leaders drawn from the WSLF.
EPRDF and Regional Autonomy From 1991 to 2000	Formation of the Somali Regional State, bordered by Oromiya and Afar Regions, but with borders in key areas left undefined, e.g., the western edge of Shinile Zone and Afar Region. Somali-Oromiya issues—Oromiya and Somali regions to jointly administer Mieso woreda, but a dispute emerges over control of Bordede, a customs and tax collection point connecting the eastern region to the center of the country. Although an administrative dispute between regions, there was continued violence between the Issa and Ittu. Somali Region later claims that 21 kebeles, including Bordede, should fall within its borders. These events led to a referendum in November 2004, which allocated 20/21 of the contested kebeles to Oromiya. As a result the Issa “undertook indiscriminate retaliatory attacks on non-Somalis, to punish the ethnic groups that favoured Mieso administration under Oromiya. Many people were displaced or lost assets” (Ahmed Shide, 2005). Up to 2005, conflict intensified, with frequent incidents of indiscriminate killings when federal army not present in the area. Increasing Issa attacks to prevent Ittu use of grazing areas. Ittu expansion of cultivated land supported by land tenure policy which favored private use of land for cultivation; further supported by agricultural development policies cf. supportive property rights for communal grazing land. Ittu increasingly disarmed, e.g., due to government concerns about their support to the Oromo Liberation Front. Issa more difficult to disarm due to their mobility and cross-border access, and within a context of weak control of firearms proliferation in the wider region. This led to imbalance in terms of physical power, and made the Ittu more at risk of large-scale or “commercial raiding.” Issa able to

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Table 3: Timeline of conflict-related events in and around Shinile Zone *(continued)*

Time period	Events
EPRDF and Regional Autonomy From 1991 to 2000 <i>(continued)</i>	sell raided stock at local markets or move them across border to Djibouti to avoid repossession. Income from sales partly invested in better weapons. As conflict reaches the level of territorial expansion by government entities (the regions) and dispute between regions for resources, customary institutions less able to overcome conflict. Afar-Somali region—continued conflicts between the Afar and Issa, essentially resourced-based and around control of grazing resources and access to the Awash River. The Afar-Shinile Zone border remains unclear and Issa acquire a third settlement, Undofo, along the Djibouti main road. The occupation of the three settlements becomes a specific and intractable point of dispute between the two regional governments. 1988-1991—Somalia civil war and overthrow of Siad Barre. The self-declared independent Republic of Somaliland is established in the northwest; the onset of protracted political instability and humanitarian crises in the south. 1991-1992—civil war in Djibouti linked to the representation of the Afar in the Issa-dominated Djibouti government. 1998-2000—Ethiopia-Eritrea war over disputed border, followed by long-running tensions to present day and proxy support from Eritrea to insurgency groups in Ethiopia.
2001-2005	The 9/11 terrorist attacks in the US in 2001 lead to shifts in the foreign and development assistance policies of major aid donors, towards "aid for security." Somalia increasingly perceived as harboring Islamic fundamentalists. The US establishes the Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) in Djibouti in early 2003 as part of counterterrorism measures; in Ethiopia, activities are conducted around Dire Dawa (adjacent to Shinile Zone), Gode, and other areas. Somaliland holds multi-party elections in December 2002 followed by presidential elections in April 2003. A stable system of government continues to evolve which "fuses traditional forms of social and political organization with Western-style institutions of government" (Bradbury et al., 2003). Somaliland is not recognized internationally.
2006-2010	The Transitional Federal Government in Somalia increasingly under pressure from the militarized Islamic Court Union. Ethiopia views the rise of Islamic groups as a threat to national sovereignty and Ethiopian army moves into Somalia in 2006 to support the TFG. In April 2007 the ONLF attacks a Chinese-run oil field in Abole, Somali Region, killing approximately 65 Ethiopians and nine Chinese nationals. A large-scale counterinsurgency operation is launched by the Ethiopia, with military operations focusing in Fik, Deghabur, Warder, Korahe, and Gode Zones, and related restrictions on humanitarian agencies.

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Table 3: Timeline of conflict-related events in and around Shinile Zone *(continued)*

Time period	Events
2006-2010 <i>(continued)</i>	In June 2008, military clash between Eritrea and Djibouti; French Foreign Legion and CJTF still present in Djibouti. Ethiopian army officially starts to withdraw from Somalia in January 2009. Shinile Zone—new conflict between Issa and agropastoral Hawiya in 2009 over informal designation of Mulu town as the administrative center of Mieso-Mulu woreda (Mercy Corps, 2009b). Mulu is located in the Hawiya area. Access of Issa to Mieso livestock market curtailed and was still restricted in March 2010 (also see section b. below). Negotiations continue between Afar and Somali regional governments over the border demarcation; Afar rejects proposal for the Issa-occupied settlements along the Djibouti road to be designated a “special woreda” under Afar Region. Plans announced to improve the road from Djibouti via Dewale, through Shinile Zone. This would create a main highway for Djibouti-Ethiopia traffic through official Issa areas.

In recent times, since 1992, Ethiopia has intervened in Somalia to greater or lesser extents trying to influence power dynamics and, at times, ensure that Islamists or those with aspirations to control the Ogaden are weakened. Most recently the Ethiopian army entered Somalia and had a presence in Mogadishu for approximately two years (2007-2009), supporting the Transitional Federal Government (TFG). During the late 1970s and early 1980s, the Somali Salvation Democratic Front (SSDF) and the Somali National Movement (SNM) used Ethiopia as a base for insurgencies into Somalia, following repression after the Ogaden war. In turn, Somalia has at times made territorial claims on the Ogaden region of Ethiopia as well as the Somali-occupied Northeastern Province of Kenya, with the aim of forming a “Greater Somalia.” Somalia’s claims to the Ogaden led to the Ogaden war of 1977-78, the legacy of which is still very much evident and influences clan dynamics to this day in the Somali Region. For example, the Afar complain that some of the roots of the current troubles between them and the Issa are a direct consequence of movements of people at the end of the Ogaden war. According to the Afar, the Issa who had entered traditional Afar lands during the war failed to return to their own areas, thereby creating the disputes over control of land up to the Awash River.

The Somalis in the region are predominantly pastoralists, and many observers have noted that over the past hundred years or so, pastoralists’ needs have not been reflected or well represented in national policy, or protected in legislation. In the Somali context, there are many contradictions between a centralized, or even a reasonably decentralized state, and a pastoral culture that create the conditions for conflict (Bradbury, 2009). Regional international relations also play a role in shaping forces on the ground. At the higher level, Egypt and its Arab allies have seen Somalia as a counterweight to Ethiopian regional control and its power over the waters of the Nile. The long-running and bitter conflict between Eritrea and Ethiopia has also influenced dynamics in the peripheral areas of Ethiopia, particular in Gambella, Somali Region, and the southern areas where the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF) were active, with Eritrea prosecuting its war through proxies.

3.3 Current patterns and cultures of governance that impact on the conflict dynamics

The ethnically-based federal system of government in Ethiopia has been a unique approach and bold endeavor in Africa, attempting to address the ethnic diversity of a

large population within a state constitution and framework. Interpretations around its intent are varied and depend on perspectives. This governance system and the way that it operates in practice has, like all systems, its pros and cons. On the one hand, it allows for the expression of cultures and reflects cultural norms and differing ways of doing business across the country, to be incorporated under a national umbrella. At its best it can be seen as a system that enables the large and diverse ethnic groups, encompassed within the country of Ethiopia, the optimum opportunity to determine directions and govern themselves at the regional level, within a broader system.

In Somali Region, the overriding cultural imperative that imposes itself on society and dominates power relationships at the regional level is the clan structure. In order to ensure that marginalization and the creation of a disgruntled section of society are limited, formal systems of political representation could enable, directly or indirectly, a system of clan-based proportional representation. Should such a system evolve, it would strengthen the “clan hand” and encourage a culture whereby clans believe that they have entitlements and “rights” to resources and opportunities based purely on their clan membership. Such a system would undermine a culture of meritocracy, whereby, for example, the best person for a job is appointed and would undertake that appointment for the broader good of all, no matter what their clan. This system, should it exist, may also risk the allocation of senior government jobs and ministries becoming a continuous juggling act, aimed at ensuring that the balance of power between the clans is roughly maintained and no one feels excluded. It would require attention to two further variables, the numbers of appointments from the clans and the careful distribution of the different ministries given their relative importance, budgets, and relationships with federal government.

Thus in certain situations, state-building and the interests of the state and peace-building at local levels could be contradictory processes that operate against each other. Although the state may provide security and law enforcement, within the context of regional power relations it may also try to maintain certain ethnic groups

(within the state) at a disadvantage or “off balance.” These groups may be regarded as a threat to central control, based on perceived or actual involvement in resistance to the state, and because they may also have experienced the state as an instrument of oppression.

Similarly and linked to the above point, in the event of direct or indirect support to clan-based representation, it might not be in the state’s interest to allow individuals to build up a strong power base. In turn, this would lead to instability because of a high turnover of senior government officials and the short-term perspectives of these officials. These arrangements would hinder the development of long-term institutional memory, and provide incentives for individuals to maximize personal and clan benefits as rapidly as possible. There have been approximately twelve Regional Presidents appointed in the Somali Region since the overthrow of the Derg, compared to the three or four Presidents appointed in each of the other regions over the same time period.


At the woreda level in Somali Region, a system of proportional representation would create a situation in which the largest majority clan within a woreda would obtain most of the key positions available. This in turn would encourage clans to claim ownership of lands and, where possible, ensure dominance in terms of physical numbers and so further increase their political power and access to resources. This situation would become particularly apparent when administrative boundaries were disputed between regions due to the mixed ethnicity of the population. For example, if an area was populated by approximately 50% Oromos and 50% Somalis, then both regional governments could claim the right to administer the area. One way to address these claims would be via a local referendum, organized by a federal body, and ensuring that voting was free and fair. The oversight of such a process would also need to monitor unusual influxes of people into one area, which would potentially increase the number of voters on that side. Any actual or perceived unfairness in the voting arrangements could have long-term implications for peace and development, with people opting not to live in areas governed by an administration that was

perceived to hold power following an unfair process. There might also be knock-on effects in other areas, with people becoming reluctant to engage in new referendums.

Under ethnic federalism, and perhaps many other systems of formal governance, the overlay of administrative boundaries onto a clan/tribal structure within a broadly pastoralist region can work against traditional systems of tolerance and mutual sharing of resources. This is because control of the land and its resources, and a strong physical presence, ensures political representation and power which in turn, allows for the power over resource allocation. The ability to resolve “boundary disputes” is also constitutionally hampered as, although the original creation of regional state borders was a federal decision, reshaping of the borders depends on agreement between regions and such agreement can be difficult to reach (Vaughan and Tronvoll, 2003).

A further element of the clan dynamics in Somali Region is the huge importance of the Ogadeni clan and how they are governed. The Ogadeni clan is the largest in the region and has elements that support the ONLF, with their respective woredas being the arena where the insurgency is being played out. The federal government has taken great care to ensure that important posts at the regional level, and increasingly at the federal level, are occupied by Ogadeni people to demonstrate that the clan is able to participate fully in the national governance structure. This undermines any positions that the ONLF may take regarding the extent of their political marginalization and also allows the government to reach out more positively to the diaspora who may be supporting the ONLF, be it financially or morally. Given the size and isolated nature of Ogadeni areas, plus the strict access control by the Ethiopian government, it is difficult to gauge the extent to which government appointees of Ogadeni origin are able to represent the needs of their constituents.

Figure 1. Somali Region of Ethiopia



(Source: UNOCHA)

4. THE CONFLICTS OF SOMALI REGION

4.1 Assessment findings and broad conflict trends

This analysis can be considered as a snapshot of the conflict situation in specific areas of Somali Region over the past few months. Undoubtedly there are dynamics pertinent to each conflict that require more time (and trust from informants) to uncover.

Based on both the October 2010 and February 2011 consultations, the overall situation in Shinile Zone in early 2011 was quite tense. Many people were weary from the hostilities of the past few years, and despite relatively low but persistent levels of violence, they were somewhat relieved by the uncertain reduction in open conflict. More positively there appears to be progress with the peace process between the Hawiye and Issa in the Zone, with an agreement reportedly being signed between the *Ugas* (traditional leaders) of the two clans and the content of the agreement starting to be disseminated at the community level. However, in all places visited in the Shinile Zone, an underlying nervousness about the future was evident, and the risk of further conflict seemed to be high. It is worth noting, however, that the tragic and relatively large-scale battles are easily recalled, whereas the persistent *drip* of killings (one or two people at a time), sadly, seems to be an almost accepted condition, except at the local level,⁴ and does not attract the same kind of attention. For this reason, it was difficult to ascertain whether the situation was actually getting better or worse. In contrast, the situation in Afdher Zone was more stable and, in general, people were not so concerned about the possibility of conflict, except in the area of Shakiso where a latent border conflict exists.

During the analysis we classified the range of conflicts based on their underlying causes (type, structural, and proximate causes) to identify patterns of conflict and any linkages between them and their relationship with education. A number of striking observations were deduced, as detailed below.

The fundamental drivers of conflict are changing: Conflicts arise from a number of contributing factors, often operating simultaneously. While

many of the factors in the Somali Region have remained constant over time, there have been significant changes in the way that they are perceived, and in their relative importance. Stakeholders reported that the primary cause of conflicts has changed. In the past, protagonists explained conflict by reference to the need to access resources such as grazing and water. While resource access issues are still important proximate factors and triggers, an underlying cause of conflict has now become the *ownership* of these resources, rather than simply their use and access to them. In turn, ownership is partly determined by formal institutional arrangements, e.g., government policies and legislation. In the most serious recent conflicts in the areas visited, the drivers of conflict were land ownership and related governance issues.

Impact on education: The number of schools consistently and directly affected by conflict in the project areas appeared to be low. This was unexpected given the overall level of violence that was evident in Shinile, and to a lesser extent, in Afdher. It appeared that conflict was not one of the defining factors that influenced accessibility, levels of enrolment, or retention of students, as explained further below. However, one important caveat is the situation in the areas that are subject to the ONLF insurgency movement that were not visited.

Long-term approach: Within the context of the education sector and its ability to transform conflict, a long-term approach is required in the Somali Region that aims at shaping the broader social environment positively, given that specific causes of the conflicts observed are not within the direct realm of education. To this end and in order to effect change as rapidly as possible, education programs should adopt a “saturation” approach to those affected by conflict and address the needs of youth, women, and elders, as well as government institutions, in peace education.

The legacy of the Ogaden war: The analysis revealed how the Ogaden war caused a proliferation of arms and the disruption of lives and the displacement of people into new areas outside of their previous traditional range. This continues to cause tensions and violence in some parts of the region.

Politicization of ethnicity: The majority of recent serious conflicts have a strong ethnic dimension due to the politics of ethnicity. Governance systems, and especially the issue of regional state boundaries, surfaced as a dominant theme when considering conflict causality and potential solutions.

Conflict conduction: The resolution or temporary abeyance of hostilities between two antagonists can provide an opportunity for one or both to concentrate their attentions on a third party or other conflict instead.⁵ In Somali Region, the picture and data are not comprehensive or accurate enough to consider whether this conflict conduction is an issue. However, it was noted by some informants that pressures on one “clan boundary” were impacting on relationships, land ownership, and resource access at the interface with a different clan. For example, the pressure from the Issa moving north and creating tensions along the Afar border then spills over, and the Afar at times then press on the Oromos (Kariyu tribe) as an involuntary coping mechanism to access grazing (Catley and Iyasu, 2010). When some conflicts are very active, this can also have the opposite effect of reducing the intensity of another conflict. For instance, it was noted that the Afar–Oromo conflict reduced in intensity as the Issa–Hawiye conflict, coupled with its relationship to the Oromos, had increased in intensity.

The urban—rural relationship: An interesting alternative form of conflict conduction is the interaction between clans and its expression in rural and urban environments. One informant in Jijiga called this experience “referred pain” and others agreed with the general effect when describing conflict. They observed that tensions between clans might be expressed as, “*a cold war taking place in the towns and cities while a hot war takes place outside of the towns.*” They also noted that violence in rural areas was affected, and sometimes instigated (although specific examples were not given), by leaders and the political dynamics in the urban environment. The converse influence from rural areas to the urban environment was not an issue. This is most likely because tolerance and the ability of two competing clans to live alongside each other within

a town, without tensions being expressed violently, is influenced by dynamics such as the presence of security forces, a dilution effect of the issue with other clans, and people all around to soften and buffer the interface between antagonistic clans. There is also the common interest in ensuring continued access to the resources that a family needs, such as health, education, etc. This dynamic deserves more attention and observation to understand what is occurring and how programming in either the towns or outside of them can then influence the conflict dynamics and prevent the expression of conflict through violence.

Buffer zones: Another notable feature of Shinile Zone was that conflicting communities outside of the urban environment were hardly interacting at all. Instead there were “buffer zones” created, and these were either imposed by the federal military along the Afar–Somali Region borders, or alternatively, self-imposed. These buffer zones were coping mechanisms, introduced as conflict reduction methods to prevent violence where conflicts are too “hot” and the environment consequentially not secure. As short-term temporary methods they are important, but need to be reviewed within the context of longer-term solutions and reconciliation efforts. Buffer zones positively reduce violence and interactions between conflicting parties. However, they may also reduce opportunities for peace-building efforts and the potential positive influence of education programs, by reinforcing segregation and distance and inhibiting communication between the conflicting parties. This means that suspicion and ill-informed attitudes about the “other side” are difficult to break down, and the possibility of building a new trust and relationship based on experience in school (for instance,) impossible. Attitudes will be informed by societal influences from outside school, with no alternatives presented through the school place.

4.2 A typology of current conflicts

There are various ways to classify conflicts in the Somali Region. Some academics and practitioners classify conflict by “way of life” types, e.g., herder–herder, agro–herder, etc. (Hagmann, 2003). An

alternative approach considers the different root causes of conflicts. However, this option can be problematic because most conflicts have multiple causes, and these usually have a constantly changing emphasis and relevance to the conflict. The “way of life” approach (as with most “models”) has the drawback that it can oversimplify the issues at stake.

For these reasons, our analysis used a broad approach to classify conflict that also indicates the likely (or potential) scale and severity of the conflict. It also provides an intuitive implication of the degree to which there is a likelihood of escalation of conflict following an initial trigger occurrence.

There are three broad types of conflict that are significant in the region using a two-layered basis for initial typology classification. There is an inevitable overlap between these and some conflicts fall into more than one classification.

- The primary layer of classification is that of the major identity of the actors or protagonists.
- The secondary layer is that of the geographical reach of the conflict.
- A further layer can be included considering the basic ways of life of the conflicting parties. Their livelihoods also shape the potential responses that can be brought about by education.

Other threads that differentiate the conflicts include the current key influences shaping them, but as these are changing (or different facets become more important at different times), they are not used as definitive differentiators within a classification system.

Box 1: Fundamental types of conflict in the Somali Region

1. Inter-clan Conflicts
 - I. Those with international regional dynamics
 - II. Those with inter-regional Ethiopian dynamics
 - III. Those within the Somali Region
2. Intra-clan
3. State versus Insurgents

4.3 Structural and proximate factors influencing conflict

The main contributing factors or proximate causes of the different conflicts encountered in the two zones can be grouped under three main headings:

• Political and governance concerns

- Political opportunism and the exploitation of ethnic and cultural differences
- Competition between and breakdowns in the relationships between Regional Administrations
- Unresolved border or land ownership disputes between neighboring groups
- Unclear political will to administer justice or mediate disputes
- Limited capacity to manage disputes peacefully
- Biased access to and allocation of government resources and projects from regional sectoral bureaus on a clan basis (perceived—but no practical examples were given)⁶

• Economic and environmental concerns

- Competing land use systems: pastoralist versus cultivation
- Competition over scarce grazing lands or water points (with increased pressures caused by drought)

• Socio-cultural concerns

- Erosion of customary laws and the authority of elders and chiefs
- Deliberate marginalization of minority ethnic groups⁷
- Incompatibility in the systems found between different sets of customary laws,⁸ exacerbated by limited communication channels between the ethnic groups

For the purposes of creating Tables 4 and 5, these causes have been summarized under a few major headings to allow ease of navigation in the Tables.

Table 4: Typology of conflicts in Shinile Zone

Protagonists	Geographic Extent of Conflict Influences	Conflict	Livelihood	Policy and Institutional Environment ⁹	Main Drivers of the Conflicts	Current Status	Features of the Conflict
State Versus Insurgents	International	OLF–GoE	N/A		• Identity • Political “marginalization”	Latent	
Inter-clan/ ethnic Group	Regional International Dynamics	Afar–Issa	Pastoralist/ Pastoralist	- Weak mechanisms for resolving regional state border disputes. - Weak police and judiciary. - Clan system undermining meritocracy. - Social norms governing the acceptance of violence.	• Land ownership • Access to resources (in particular the Awash River) • Administrative boundaries • Identity	Ceasefire active	• Recurrent • Clan-based • Full attack
		Issa– Gedabursi	Pastoralist/ Agro-pastoralist	- Contradictory legal/policy arrangements governing land and water ownership. - Tendency for land control to be vested in those who farm, rather than those who graze livestock. - Weak police and judiciary. - Governance system that supports clan-based politics. - Social norms governing the acceptance of violence.	• Land ownership • Access to resources	Latent	• Clan-based • Full attack
	Inter-Regional Ethiopia Dynamics	Afar–Issa	Pastoralist/ Pastoralist	- Weak mechanisms for resolving regional state border disputes. - Weak police and judiciary. - Governance system that supports clan-based politics. - Social norms governing the acceptance of violence.	• Land ownership • Access to resources (in particular the Awash River) • Revenge/payback • Administrative boundaries	Active violence	• Recurrent • Clan-based • Full attack • clan- based

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Table 4: Typology of conflicts in Shinile Zone *(continued)*

Protagonists	Geographic Extent of Conflict Influences	Conflict	Livelihood	Policy and Institutional Environment	Main Drivers of the Conflicts	Current Status	Features of the Conflict
Inter-clan/ ethnic Group <i>(continued)</i>	Inter-Regional Ethiopia Dynamics <i>(continued)</i>	Hawiye—Issa	Agro-pastoralist/ Pastoralist	- Contradictory legal/policy arrangements governing land and water ownership. - Tendency for land control to be vested in those who farm, rather than those who graze livestock. - Weak mechanisms for resolving regional state border disputes. - Weak police and judiciary. - Governance system that supports clan-based politics. - Social norms governing the acceptance of violence.	• Land ownership • Access to resources • Administrative power¹⁰ • Political involvement • Revenge/payback	Ceasefire (peace process underway)	• Broad clan-based • Full attack
		Afar—Oromo (W. Hararghie)	Pastoralist/ Agro-pastoralist	- Contradictory legal/policy arrangements governing land and water ownership. - Tendency for land control to be vested in those who farm, rather than those who graze livestock. - Weak mechanisms for resolving regional state border disputes. - Weak police and judiciary. - Governance system that supports clan-based politics. - Social norms governing the acceptance of violence.	• Land ownership • Resource use and access • Livestock theft • Administrative border • Revenge/pay back	Active violence	• Individual • Opportunistic

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Table 4: Typology of conflicts in Shinile Zone (continued)

Protagonists	Geographic Extent of Conflict Influences	Conflict	Livelihood	Policy and Institutional Environment	Main Drivers of the Conflicts	Current Status	Features of the Conflict
Inter-clan/ ethnic Group (continued)	Inter-Regional Ethiopia Dynamics (continued)	Issa—Oromo ¹¹ (W.Hararghie)	Pastoralist/ Agro-pastoralist	- Tendency for land control to be vested in those who farm, rather than those who graze livestock. - Weak mechanisms for resolving regional state border disputes. - Weak police and judiciary. - Social norms governing the acceptance of violence.	• Land ownership • Access and use of resources • Political opportunism and exploitation of ethnic differences • Administrative border	Uncertain	• Clan-based
		Hawiye— Oromo	Agro-pastoralist/ Agro-pastoralist	- Weak mechanisms for resolving regional state border disputes. - Weak police and judiciary. - Social norms governing the acceptance of violence.	• Political opportunism and exploitation of ethnic differences	Latent	• Clan-based • Full attack
	Within the Somali Region	Issa— Gedabursi	Pastoralist/ Agro-pastoralist	- Tendency for land control to be vested in those who farm, rather than those who graze livestock. - Weak police and judiciary. - Social norms governing the acceptance of violence.	• Land ownership • Access to resources • Administrative power	Latent	• Clan-based • Full attack

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Table 4: Typology of conflicts in Shinile Zone (*continued*)

Protagonists	Geographic Extent of Conflict Influences	Conflict	Livelihood	Policy and Institutional Environment	Main Drivers of the Conflicts	Current Status	Features of the Conflict
Inter-clan/ ethnic Group (<i>continued</i>)	Inter-Regional Ethiopia Dynamics (<i>continued</i>)	Hawiye— Issa	Agro-pastoralist/ Pastoralist	- Contradictory legal/policy arrangements governing land and water ownership. - Tendency for land control to be vested in those who farm, rather than those who graze livestock. - Weak mechanisms for resolving regional state border disputes. - Weak police and judiciary. - Governance system that supports clan-based politics. - Social norms governing the acceptance of violence.	• Land ownership • Access to resources • Administrative power • Political involvement • Revenge/payback	Ceasefire	• Clan-based • Full attack
Intra-Clan	Localized within Somali Region	Gedabursi— Gedabursi	Agro-pastoralist/ Agro-pastoralist	- Contradictory legal/policy arrangements governing land and water ownership. - Weak police and judiciary. - Social norms governing the acceptance of violence.	• Land ownership	Latent	• Full attack
		Isaaq—Isaaq (Jijiga ¹²)	Agro-pastoralist/ Agro-pastoralist	- Contradictory legal/policy arrangements governing land and water ownership. - Weak police and judiciary.	• Land ownership • Land enclosure	Resolved	• Full attack

Table 5: Typology of conflicts in Afdher Zone

Protagonists	Geographic Extent of Conflict Influences	Conflict	Livelihood	Policy and Institutional Environment ¹³	Drivers of the Conflicts	Current Status	Features of the Conflict
Inter-clan/ ethnic Group	Regional International Dynamics	Degodia— Garre (Kenya is the international dynamic)	Pastoralist/ Pastoralist		• Access to resources • Livestock theft	Not significant at present ¹⁴	• Recurrent • Individual
	Inter-Regional Ethiopia Dynamics	Hawiye— Oromo	Agro-pastoralist/ Agro-pastoralist	Weak mechanisms for resolving regional state border disputes.	• Political opportunism and the exploitation of ethnic differences • Boundary disputes	Latent	• Potentially clan-based
		Magarre— Dhaweed/ Oromo	Agro-pastoralist/ Agro-pastoralist	Weak mechanisms for resolving regional state border disputes.	• Boundary disputes • Identity linked to land	Latent Ceasefire	• Potentially clan-based
	Within the Somali Region	Sheikash— Ogaden	Agro-pastoralist/ Pastoralist	Governance systems that support clan-based politics.	• Identity • Power representation	Resolved	• Clan-based
		Duube—Afgab	Agro-pastoralist/ Pastoralist	Tendency for land control to be vested in those who farm, rather than those who graze livestock.	• Land	Resolved	• Clan-based • Full attack
		Afgab— Garumarre	Pastoralist/ Pastoralist	Contradictory legal/policy arrangements governing land and water ownership.	• Water points	Latent	• Recurrent • Individual
		Afgab—Gerrire	Agro-pastoralist/ Agro-Pastoralist	Contradictory legal/policy arrangements governing land and water ownership.	• Water Points	Resolved	• Recurrent • Individual

(continued on the next page)

Table 5: Typology of conflicts in Afdher Zone (continued)

Protagonists	Geographic Extent of Conflict Influences	Conflict	Livelihood	Policy and Institutional Environment ¹³	Drivers of the Conflicts	Current Status	Features of the Conflict
Inter-clan/ ethnic Group (continued)	Within the Somali Region (continued)	Afgab-Dhaweed	Agro-pastoralist/ Agro-Pastoralist	Contradictory legal/policy arrangements governing land and water ownership. Tendency for land control to be vested in those who farm, rather than those who graze livestock. Governance system that supports clan-based politics.	• Political power • Resources • Livestock theft	Resolved	• Recurrent
Intra-Clan	Localized within Somali Region	Gulbul—Gulet (Afgab sub-clans)	Agro-pastoralist/ Agro-Pastoralist	Tendency for land control to be vested in those who farm, rather than those who graze livestock.	• Revenge	Resolved	• Individual
Other	Localized within National Park	Wildlife—Community (Babile)	Pastoralist/ Pastoralist	Contradictory legal/policy arrangements governing land and water use and ownership. Weak mechanisms for resolving regional state border disputes.	• Resources	Potential	• Recurrent • Individual
	Along Riverine Areas	Resettlement	Pastoralist/ Agriculturalist	Tendency for land control to be vested in those who farm, rather than those who graze livestock.	• Land • Water	Potential	• Potentially clan-based

4.4 Conflict features and differentiators

There are a number of issues that affect the nature of different conflicts and the potential programming responses. This section discusses these issues with an education programming response in mind. The issues are inter-related and sometimes mutually reinforcing, and, therefore, should be considered as a “bundle” of ingredients.

Seriousness and intensity—conflict status: How “hot,” active, or serious the conflict is can be an indicator of whether it is appropriate or not to engage in implementing an education program. From a conflict-reduction perspective, these serious types of conflict might be a priority, and therefore the arena in which they occur should be targeted. It may also mean that those living in the conflict area have their right to education constrained. On the other hand, very active conflicts are likely to have a more significant negative impact on an education program and from a peace perspective may also be more difficult to resolve, as the mindsets of the protagonists may not yet be open to solutions. Access to the area, the safety and security of program staff, and the potential consequent impact on the level of disjointed activities may also weigh in the balance of risks that influence the possibility of programming. Equally, it is important to understand where there are latent conflicts present that may not be active at all, that these should also be treated seriously in order to avoid triggering a resurgence of violence.

Scope: Linked to the above factors is the scope and geographic extent of the conflict. To what extent is it localized and how is the conflict expressed across the conflict arena? This is related to intensity, but from a slightly different angle. This can reflect whether or not the conflict is considered a clan issue or whether it is actually a less-significant clash between individuals or small groups.

Possibility for escalation: The possibility for conflict to expand rapidly beyond an immediate incident or trigger into more widespread violence is difficult to assess. What are the factors that influence whether or not a conflict “blows

up” or dies down? Are they controllable and to what extent do they influence education strategies? Feedback from participants during our analysis suggests that it depends on whether the incident taps into existing or semi-latent conflict, and whether it is perceived as a clan issue. Participants provided an example of an incident at school between pupils who belonged to two different clans witnessed by the mothers who then get involved and then it goes from there. Another was the use of incidents that by themselves are not so significant, but are taken by politicians or leaders and used to stir up hostilities or mobilize support. Escalation at a larger scale, as evidenced by the Afar attack on Adeytu in 2007, was a result of long term building up of resentment that has no outlet and where the whole clan’s identity and future is seen to be at stake.

A simple way of looking at these factors is to describe the seriousness of the conflict in terms of a series of opposed descriptors describing the characteristics of the conflict (Table 6).

Table 6: Conflict descriptors

Less Serious	More Serious
Latent conflict	Active conflict
Declining intensity	Increasing intensity
Small-scale clash	Full attack
Once-off incident	Recurrent
Opportunistic	Organized and predictable
Involving individuals	Involving clan/group

4.5 Analysis and discussion of typology

From Tables 4 and 5 it is clear that in terms of causes of conflict, land ownership is a dominant theme in Shinile and Afdher Zones. This finding agrees with the situation in Africa in general, where even in peaceful agrarian societies, land disputes account for 40–60% of court cases (Alden Wiley, 2007). Among the 30 plus major conflicts in Africa in 1990, there were only three cases where land was not the dominant structural issue (Alden Wiley, 2006). That land is such a

dominant issue also points to flaws within policy, legislation, and its implementation, that indicate a review is warranted to see if they are meeting the needs of stakeholders. It also suggests that the dispute mechanisms available for addressing these conflicts are often inadequate to the task, especially if the area of land being considered is a large tract and associated with the identity of a clan. The policy and legislation arena where these issues surface include the following aspects:

- Contradictory legal/policy arrangements governing land and water ownership, access and use.
- A tendency for land control to be vested in those who farm, rather than those who graze livestock.
- Weak mechanisms for resolving regional state border disputes, in a relatively new system of ethnic federalism.
- A requirement for strengthening the police and judiciary.
- A governance system that has yet to fully overcome the clan-based politics, with confusion over the parameters of traditional institutions.
- Social norms governing the initiation and resolution of conflict, and acceptance of violence.

If one takes this view then the underlying issue is a lack of governance capacity as the fundamental root cause of the conflicts with land as the key resource at stake. This would then suggest that there is insufficient capacity to police and enforce the legal expectations that in turn allow the space for inappropriate violent behavior. There is increasing cross-regional coordination between police forces, which is assisting to improve the situation but this is reportedly hampered by the clan factor in some areas.¹⁵ Some suggested the use of completely “neutral” police from other clans in difficult environments. An excellent example was given where this operates in Gode and Hargelle where the police from Hargelle were utilized in Gode and vice versa. At a regional level an additional example can be seen with the use of federal police being placed along the road to Djibouti between the Afar and Issa.

However, this does also raise the issue of what is considered inappropriate violent behavior in

pastoralist societies in the Horn of Africa. For instance, two common situations are revenge and livestock theft, but these responses are influenced by the cultures operating there. Killing for revenge or theft of livestock is not necessarily considered inappropriate by those perpetrating the acts. In fact, it may be considered highly *appropriate* and in line with traditional honor systems and expectations governing their clans’ or tribes’ behavior. The difficulty then is that neither governance system is able to cope with the situation at this point in time while systems are in transition. Rapid adaptation within such systems is difficult at the best of times, especially when changes are taking place in the broader socioeconomic environment. This means that a dual system is operating at the moment. The modern statutory system is unable to cope with these conditions—partly because the judicial system is not respected by many of the active participants—due to its failure to provide appropriate judgements and enforcements and also because tribal *Xeer* is still strong enough to be the dominant accepted system in some rural areas. Equally, the customary system is not able to cope with the situation either in various cases because *Xeer* is not in place (e.g., Issa–Afar), or because those involved do not feel bound by the traditions, or the scale of violence is beyond the resolution capacity of *Xeer* when many people are killed, livestock taken (and possibly sold on across international borders), and issues are around land ownership. *Xeer* is better able to address less complex incidents and issues, although there have been difficult cases such as the Gedabursi–Issa conflict where the government strongly recommended the use of *Xeer* as the most appropriate and effective conflict resolution mechanism. This can then result in legal situations remaining unresolved and festering within the clan consciousness. During consultations, many times respondents reported with resentment that the issue at stake had not been addressed by government and that no justice or resolution had been achieved. This unfortunately allows a build-up of unresolved issues that may exacerbate their eventual expression through violence.

This analysis suggests that improved capacity is required during this ongoing transition from

customary dispute resolution mechanisms to modern statutory mechanisms,¹⁶ to ensure that the primary function of the state—to protect its citizens—is fulfilled. This requires a dual approach; firstly through the institution of relevant policy and legislative arrangements (e.g., for resource ownership), and by encouraging societal norms and behaviors that do not deal with disputes by first resorting to violence. Secondly through increasing the capacity of those mandated to enforce the policies and legislation; i.e., the judiciary and police. Within a relatively new system of ethnic federalism the government has taken heartening steps to support customary institutions to respond to and address these issues, and this support and approach needs to be continued. Documenting and harmonizing *Xeer* or initiating a process to create it where it is missing could be a useful way forward in this regard, coupled with the setting-up of clear communications mechanisms between groups. However, as described by respondents from all stakeholder groups, the difficulties over who participates in peace committees or regional councils and their legitimacy is an ongoing issue. There have been experiences where those mandated to resolve inter-clan issues and conflicts have in fact initiated them in order to take advantage of the resources made available by government in all good faith to address them. The need for improved and more sophisticated accountability mechanisms, particularly to the communities, deserves attention.

The conflicts associated with land become more acute when the area under dispute is close to an administrative boundary. Here the differences between ownership, administration, and access to and use of the resources all become blurred. Increasingly, people are not differentiating between ownership, land use and access, and administration. As the administration of woredas is usually dominated by the majority clan in that woreda, this creates an issue if land that is perceived to belong to one clan¹⁷ is effectively being administered by another clan as it starts to become perceived that it is owned by that clan. Deep within an area that is inhabited by only one clan this is not an issue, but it can be the case where regional boundaries are within the land under dispute. A good example of this is in the

north of Shinile Zone where the disputed land lies between the Issa and the Afar and is being administered by the Somali Region, which is not acceptable to the Afar.

In some cases a conflict is placed in two classifications of the typology because there are a number of dynamics involved. This means that it may have slightly different features or status depending on whether or not the additional “tier” within the hierarchy is important currently.

A consideration of the livelihood factor does not appear to reveal any particular insights regarding the intensity of the conflicts, but it does influence the features of the conflict and indeed the issues facing the education sector. This is because pastoralists are relatively more mobile than agro-pastoralists, with the latter having a more sedentary position in the areas where they farm. This also has implications for the grazing patterns of the pastoralists, as seasonal pastures that are only used for part of the year, now become “all year round” grazing areas for agro-pastoralists. From the pastoralist perspective this means that the grazing, if it is set aside for the dry season, may be a less-rich resource when they need it most. It also potentially reduces the resilience of the pasture with less time to recover.

Political dynamics also enter the conflict equation and this involvement can take several forms, ranging from direct support to a clan or group that is involved in conflict, to non-active “moral support.” It may also take the form of *not* being involved, in other words allowing something to happen. According to some government officials, one of the lessons learned from the border referendums between Oromiya and Somali Regions was the danger of allowing politics to enter into what perhaps could be called administrative issues.

Clearly the conflicts where the stakes and the human cost are highest are those that involve the clan rather than individuals, and which are recurring. In the Shinile Zone those conflicts concerning the Issa appear to fall into this category.

4.6 Comparison of Afdher and Shinile Zones

Table 7 summarizes the differences in conflicts in Shinile and Afdher Zones. The most significant factors that differentiate the Zones are the levels of violence and intensity of the conflicts, which are much lower in Afdher Zone compared to Shinile. This begs the question—why is this the case? Possible explanations that were discussed with key informants included the following:

- The quality of conflict management systems—the strength of traditional mechanisms.
- The number or strength of proximate, contributing factors to the conflicts.
- The relationships between group identity and issues rather than individuals.
- The quality of natural resources at stake or the source of the conflict.
- The degree of clan homogeneity in the area.

The first factor that has played a substantial role in the severity and scale of the conflicts is the geo-political dimension that reaches both federal

and international levels. In the case of the Afar–Issa conflict, the dispute is also influenced by the fact that the Issa are the majority clan in Djibouti, which provides the critical main transport route for the import and export of commodities to and from Ethiopia. Given the national economic importance of this route, the Issa are in a strong political position to take advantage of their control of this route and the need for the federal government to accommodate their wishes. This suggests that the government has, *de facto*, chosen to maintain good relationships with the Issa which recognizes and institutionalizes an instability and vagueness in the Afar–Somali regional border that allows the Issa to expand with informal government approval. If so, the government accepts that conflict will continue for the foreseeable future and considers this a reasonable trade-off in terms of securing access to Djibouti port (and with reasonable tariffs etc. for imported goods), rather than invest in a resolution to the issue. At the same time, it implicitly recognizes that a referendum would disadvantage the Afar, under present circumstances. Should the government secure better access to Berbera or

Table 7: Comparison between Afdher and Shinile Zones

Zone	Differences	Similarities
Shinile Zone	• Scale of violence much higher • Legacies of history are stronger • Major international dynamics at play— Djibouti and Somaliland¹⁸ • Two Ethiopian regional state boundaries—Afar and Oromiya • More homogeneous in terms of clan make-up in the north • Greater politicization of conflicts	• International dynamics • Borders with Oromiya • Generally similar types of conflict are prevalent in both Zones • Somalia–Ethiopia (Ogaden) war legacy
Afdher Zone	• Decreasing levels of violence • The scale and severity of violence is lower with few recurring clashes • International dynamics—Somalia and Kenya but not significant • One Ethiopian regional boundary • Greater diversity of clans within the Zone	

other ports then there could be implications that alter the shaping influences for this conflict.

In the case of the Hawiye–Issa, federal politics associated with the political aspirations of the Oromo people have also played a significant role in the way that it has unfolded.

The explanations that emerged from the discussions point to aspects of the land issues that are at stake in the Shinile Zone. Of the two most significant conflicts, the first, the Issa–Afar, is concerned with a large tract of land whose ownership is contested on the *regional* boundaries with access to the Awash River. This makes resolution extremely difficult due to the complicating factors between the two regions and lack of connectors or mechanisms to resolve them, as well as the incompatibility of the traditional dispute resolution forms. There is a need for federal involvement and boundary demarcation to find a final resolution to this long-standing conflict on the assumption that a suitable solution can be reached that ensures that the critical benefits of international trade are not jeopardized within the national economy, and yet still allows the long-term benefits of peace between the Afar and Issa to accrue.

The second factor, noted by all informants, is the strong sense of identity and clan solidarity that characterizes the Issa. In the words of one informant, “if you touch one Issa then you touch them all.” In other words, a single incident can be translated into a clan issue rather than an individual issue very quickly. Many times Issa respondents noted that they will all “come together” to sort out an issue. This contrasts with the Afdher Zone, where the heterogeneity of the clan mix in a geographic area dilutes the higher sense of identity and the consequent degree of mutual support. The Issa are renowned for their ferocity and are recognized as being capable of large-scale attacks to ensure their needs are met. For instance, in 1975 the Issa reportedly attacked the Oromo in Anano kebele of Mieso to secure grazing land that was slowly being engulfed by encroaching farmlands. The result was the death of forty-five Oromo and the land has never been used for farming since and is still only used for grazing by both Issa and Hawiye.

Box 2: The story of Haji Basho (an Oromo tale)

Basho the cat was a fierce fighter and was at constant war with the mice. However, he decided to go on the Haj to Mecca to pray and fulfil his Islamic duties. On his return from the Haj the mice sent some elders to Haji Basho to check whether he had changed his behaviors or not, now that he was a respected and pious religious elder.

They asked, “*Have you returned from Mecca the same cat as you went Haji?*”

Haji replied, waving his tail, “*I am indeed a changed cat, except that the journey has made me absolutely starving....*”

An additional aspect may be that in terms of livestock raids by Somalis, the return of livestock is more likely following intra-ethnic raiding compared to cross-ethnic raiding. As noted by Catley and Iyasu (2010, page 33) “...*the traditional social organization of Somali pastoralists and their compensation mechanisms around violence have evolved primarily to deal with internal Somali-Somali conflicts, and, a life on harsh rangelands with variable, uncertain resources. These systems deal less well with non-Somali actors and in some circumstances, may provide incentives to direct aggression towards groups where no clear compensatory mechanisms are in place.*”

The general effects of conflict on education are well documented by both DFID and SCUK (SCUK, 2006 and 2010; Smith and Vaux, 2003). The primary point made by these studies is that if the second MDG of achieving universal primary school education is to be achieved, then special attention needs to be given to education in conflict-affected countries. These countries are significantly under-resourced, have the highest levels of poverty, and fewest opportunities for its children to attend school—with possibly a third of the world’s children missing out as a result of this situation. The case for investment in these significantly under-resourced conflict-affected countries also extends to conflict-affected environments such as the Somali Region of southern Ethiopia, with the premise being that investment in education in conflict-affected areas “accelerates recovery and institutional stability” as well as laying the foundation for peaceful and prosperous nations (Save the Children UK, 2010).

5.1 The effects of conflict on education in Somali Region

The number of schools consistently and *directly* affected by conflict in the BRIDGES project areas appears to be surprisingly low, and this was unexpected given the overall level of violence in Afdher and Shinile. Stakeholders did not consider conflict to be one of the defining factors that influenced accessibility, levels of enrolment, or retention of students. The BRIDGES mid-term review findings confirm this situation (Napier and Bekele, 2010). This does not mean that there are no impacts of conflict on education but that they are not as significant as expected. The reasons for this are as follows:

Location of violent incidents: For those conflicts characterized as inter- or intra-clan, that are pastoralist-pastoralist, and are recurrent (being caused by competition over resources like water and pasture), the violence generally takes place in

Box 3: The effects of conflict on education

Conflict can:

- Destroy the educational infrastructure either deliberately as a target or as side-effect of conflict activities.
- Result in the killing and maiming of students and educational staff, again either as deliberate targets or as “collateral damage.”
- Displace populations and alienate them from their livelihoods as well as from their normal local services or resources (e.g., health posts, schools, water points, etc.).
- Restrict access to educational facilities with insecurity preventing children going to school where they may be at risk on the way or at school.
- Increase drop-out rates, reduce enrolment rates and the educational options available to families, especially if their livelihoods are affected.
- Reduce the quality of education. Aside from damage noted above, educated people like teachers tend to have more options and mobility to escape conflict arenas.
- Force children out of school and into military movements willingly or unwillingly to become fighters.
- Discourage donors from supporting education programs whether due to policy issues, short-term perspectives, or fear of ineffective or wasted resource investment.

the pasturelands. Usually, this is not close to the schools. This does not mean that the children are not affected, as they may be involved in herding activities, but it does usually mean that the provision of education is not constrained.

More serious conflicts that are characterized by full-scale attacks concerning ownership of large tracts of “clan land” can also target education facilities. The most recent example of this was reported in the Hudet area close to the border of Region 4 and 5, in January 2011, where there was conflict between the Garre and the Borana. In this case a school was built and then, once completed, was promptly burnt down by the Borana as it was located on disputed land between the two regions. There have also been cases of permanent schools being burnt in Shinile Zone at two locations, Mencha and Dhaladu. The reasons for these attacks were consistent—the buildings were located on disputed land. They were built for the use of a “majority” clan but the building was perceived by the other disputant as being on “their land” and potentially legitimizing the presence and ownership of the land and resource of the “interloper” clan. In all of these cases the schools were not being used at the time, and children were not the target.

Access to schools: At the ABE and primary school levels the students who attend are generally from the same clan, or possibly from different sub-clans but still within the higher level of the “identity hierarchy.”¹⁹ The most violent of the conflicts are those which are inter-clan and across regional boundaries (see above in typology section). The level of interaction between the two clans in schools outside of urban environments is minimal. So children at ABEs, and to a lesser extent fixed primary schools, tend not to mix across clans. This also means that if conflict does affect the clan then the whole group moves back to a safer location. Thus in Afdem woreda in Shinile Zone ABE schools had not been affected as the school had moved with the community further away from potential danger. Students did not need to cross “front lines.” Students may still be at risk if

the school is close to the front line. In the case of secondary schools, these are located in towns, and so the risk of conflict affecting school access seemed to be lower. Although some students may travel to school from outside the town,²⁰ the majority of students appear to live in town with relatives.

Enrolment: For the same reasons outlined above, it would appear that enrolment at the ABE and primary school level is not unduly affected by conflict. The factors that influence whether children are enrolled appear to be the more traditional and economic, such as parent awareness of the value of education, cost, and competing priorities such as helping the family with livelihood activities such as herding or family duties.

Attendance: When conflict arises it is possible that schools are closed. For example, one school was closed for approximately nine months in Mulu (Shinile Zone), and Mencha (Shinile Zone) was also closed (being a permanent school). School attendance for Issa children was affected following the open conflict in Mieso town and their withdrawal from the town in 2005. Other communities across Shinile and Afdher, Babile, and Jijiga reported that their schools had not been closed at all and that conflict was not a factor. Again, the main determinant of school attendance was whether or not a child was needed to support livelihood activities. Here, a key dynamic was the dispersal of families in different directions to access dry season grazing areas or to search for water—this hindered school attendance. The newly-introduced card system (enabling students to access other schools in the area where they have moved to) appears to hold much potential, but is not yet widely used. Secondary school attendance in recent times also does not seem to have been unduly affected by conflict.²¹

Incidence and timing of conflict: A further factor that affects the provision of education services is when and how conflicts occur. The actual acts of violence do not happen regularly. As noted in the typology, there are conflicts that are

recurrent in nature and these tend to happen at certain times of the year with limited frequency, and are chronic.²² The relatively minor “once-off” incidents tend not to have significant causes and are resolved quickly. Nor do they tend to be as extensive in their impact²³ as those that are recurrent. The most dangerous conflicts are those that involve the whole clan and are essentially war between two clans. Under these conditions children may get caught in cross-fire. Nevertheless, the horrendous incidents where many people are killed tend to be relatively rare, occur once every few years (e.g., Afar–Issa or Hawiye–Issa), and have not taken place when school was in session. Finally, as schools and children are not the intended targets of the violence and, in theory, they are covered by the concept of *birimageydo*²⁴ under customary law and practice, they have fortunately managed to avoid the worst direct impacts of the violence. In Afdem worda (Shinile Zone), close to the “front line” with the Afar, the government has not established any formal schools, partly so that children are not vulnerable. The schools that are operating in this area are community schools and are able to move in times of danger. Generally, the Afar do not attack the stations themselves, as the Issa are strong here and the Afar perceive little political or economic gain from doing so, but instead they tend to operate in the areas where the Issa pastoralists are living or have settlements with the animals in the rangelands. This is also partly due to the nearby presence of the federal army at Gedamaitu and Adaitu, as well as the regulation imposed since the year 2000 whereby no one should carry a gun within a 5 km distance of the Djibouti asphalt road. The consequence of these factors means that the education system in the last few years has managed to avoid the worst impacts of conflict.

Indirect impacts of conflict on education: While the schools may have been fortunate to escape the worst impacts of conflict, children and families are still affected and feel the impacts of these conflicts. Some of these indirect impacts are as follows:

- **Loss of life in the family:** In the course of some of these conflicts children have experienced the loss of parents—particularly their fathers—and this inevitably shapes

their lives. Not least, this may mean that they can no longer continue at school as they need to spend more time on livelihood activities. The strong tradition across the Somali clans is that of vengeance if no blood money payment is made in acknowledgement of the loss. This can reinforce the violence as it becomes “tit for tat,” or young males harbor ideas of vengeance for the loss of their family. Both indirect and direct trauma may also play a role in the lives of students. Being present when bullets are flying around and people are losing their lives may have a large impact on the student, and at present there does not appear to be any provision for psychosocial support to students thus affected. It is also difficult to assess the extent of this as a factor to be addressed, but consideration should be given as to how it should be included in the teacher training modules.

- **Women:** Women are especially vulnerable both during and after conflict, and before resolution or cessation of hostilities has occurred. In the past, forced marriage was a tactic of war with women taken from the opposing side.²⁵ While women have often been able to cross conflict lines without being subjected to violence, stakeholders noted that incidents did occur where women are raped or assaulted. We were also given examples where women had served as traditional peace makers. For example, the Afar and the Issa used to send women to open peace negotiations, and women had been able to continue to act as a bridge across lines. This is particularly the case with trading and livelihood activities. Thus Hawiye women continued to bring *khat* to the market for the Issa despite ongoing hostilities. More recently there have been attempts to create mutual economic and livelihood benefits across conflict lines in the Shinile Zone, with livestock trading between groups of Issa and Hawiye young men. This has had mixed success so far, but may have potential in the future (see Bekele, 2010).
- **Disruption of livelihoods:** One of the more significant impacts of conflict on education

is that it disrupts the livelihoods of people and this in turn affects the priorities of families, especially if they are agro-pastoralists who may have lost crops in the conflict. The Hawiye seem to have suffered particularly in this regard. This may mean that students have to spend more time on survival activities for the family and obtaining food, rather than going to school. Catley and Iyasu (2010) describe the relationship between livelihoods and conflict in the Mieso area of Shinile Zone in some depth.

- **Normalization of violence:** One of the long-term impacts of conflict is the normalization of violence as part of life and as a way to solve issues over generations. One story from an informant in El Kare, who had had experience in Somalia, was how children there had been conditioned to violence to an unacceptable degree. This person described how, if there was a clash in a village and children were shot, the other students simply jumped over their bodies to get to school and carried on as if nothing had happened. Children and child soldiers²⁶ are involved in conflict both at the inter-clan level, as well as the conflict associated with insurgency. This has broader societal implications, as well as direct trauma and

mental health impacts on the child. During prolonged conflicts, over many decades, attitudes such as “violence being normal” are passed on to future generations, and become embedded in culture and identity (Gampel, 2000; IASC Task Force, 2007). One way of addressing this societal problem is to work with entire groups (in addition to offering individual therapy where appropriate), and ensure that the education system supports both formal and non-formal education programs (see conflict transformation section) and promotes a community-based, psychosocial pedagogy.

5.2 The effects of education on conflict in Somali Region

The direct causal relationships between education and the different types of conflict in Somali Region are of particular interest for the BRIDGES project. An understanding of these relationships can assist the project to develop specific, practical strategies that may be adopted through the education sector, and that have the potential for impacting positively on the different conflict dynamics. The literature provides examples of how education can be a cause of conflict, as summarized in Box 4.

Box: 4 How can education be a direct cause of conflict?

Education as a cause of conflict:

- Education-based inequalities can create space for violent, political, or social contestations leading to the politicization of education.
- Through cooption of key groups in the education system e.g., students or teachers and/or the creation of educated elite.
- Education can act as a catalyst for political struggle.
- Education and associated resources can create competition in resource-poor environments or legitimize agendas.
- Education can reflect or exacerbate existing conflict fault lines through being perceived as support for agendas.
- The content of the education being provided can potentially create “cultural marginalization” or be discriminatory, shaping different and incompatible identities of ethnic communities.

However, key findings from our analysis are that in the BRIDGES project areas:

- Education is not a primary cause of conflict.
- Education has limitations in terms of its likely impact on conflict due to factors such as:
 - In general, education does not target and interact directly with people who are taking part in conflict.
 - The root causes of conflict are not within the immediate realm of the project scope or influence.
 - The education system is only one of many influences on children.
 - The way that education support is delivered by NGOs is important, especially if NGOs themselves exhibit behavior that fosters good relationships at all levels.

These findings are described in more detail below:

Education in the Somali Region is not a primary cause of conflict: The most significant finding (and good news) emerging from this analysis is that education is not a primary cause of conflict in the Somali Region. Not a single incident was found, nor stakeholder consulted, who considered education a specific cause of conflict in the Region. However, people recognized that the education sector could trigger or exacerbate existing conflicts between groups. This was also the observation of the team itself.

The limitations of education as a short-term strategy for peace-building: Despite the laudable aim of the BRIDGES project to be conflict sensitive (rather than simply “Do No Harm”), there were also a number of constraints that limit the efficacy of education as a short-term tool for conflict transformation, no matter what conflict typology is used.

- ***The primary targets of education are not those who are taking part in conflict:***²⁷ The first and most obvious issue is that those who tend to be directly involved in the conflicts (as described in the earlier section of this report) are not usually the children who are at school—conflict actors are not the primary participants of the education

program. This does not mean that there are not children who are directly involved and active in conflict. There are boys who are conscripted or volunteer for the militias, or who may take up arms for the clan, or simply to protect livestock. It is normal for Somali boys to be given a gun at the age of fifteen or so, if the parents can afford it, and men may describe their family as having “ten guns,” meaning that they have ten boys.²⁸ However, these teenagers are not usually within the schooling system, and so are not directly affected by formal or ABE education. One conclusion from this, coupled with increasing enrolment and attendance rates, could be that education does indeed reduce the number of young people who are involved in conflict, but this would require further in-depth research to understand and validate. During our analysis, parents, teachers, and SMC members all noted, in different ways, that children who went to school “did not like to carry guns,” and cited this behavior as one of the reasons why education had a favorable impact on conflict dynamics—but in the *long term*.

- ***The root causes of the conflicts are not within the immediate realm of influence by the program:*** The second constraint to the effectiveness of education as an immediate and direct conflict transformation tool is that the education strategy of BRIDGES does not impact on either the root causes of conflict or the key proximate and trigger factors. Broader political factors and related policy and institutional issues create the overriding framework within which conflict can occur. For example, the development of settlements along riverine areas and related policies can exacerbate existing tensions over land use and tenure systems. However, education has very limited impact on these dynamics.
- ***The education system is not the only voice influencing young people’s behavior:*** Alongside education, there are competing voices and demands from other parts of society that influence behavior and, in part, determine whether someone resorts to violence or not. Outside of school, peer

pressure, elders, parents, and cultural demands all play a role in shaping behaviors and conflicts.

- **NGO behaviors:** Being physically present in a conflict-prone environment impacts on the attitudes and behavior of all stakeholders, including NGOs. In worst case scenarios NGOs can unwittingly reflect conflict dynamics or behaviors that occur in the environment where they are operating. It might be useful for the BRIDGES consortium members to reflect on whether the attitudes and behaviors they exhibit are prevalent in, and reflective of, the operating environment. Some forms of behavior that were observed that could be interpreted in this light included:
 - limited and strained communication between organizations;
 - suspicion and lack of trust concerning approaches, and a fear that the organization is at risk or vulnerable because of the other's actions.

Staff within an NGO are often recruited from local communities for good reasons. They often represent the ethnic group in the area of operation and can therefore communicate well with the program participants. However, the negative aspect of this practice is that staff on one side of a conflict can find it hard to escape their cultural context and attitudes and become more objective. This can result in a project having a constrained or incomplete perspective and interpretation of what is happening on the ground.

6. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR EDUCATION AND CONFLICT TRANSFORMATION IN SOMALI REGION

6.1 A two-pronged approach

Our analysis and the literature both show that there are considerable constraints to the role that education can play as a short-term conflict transformation tool. Development programmers should be wary of expecting too much from education in terms of addressing state fragility and conflict over the short-term (Rose and Greeley, 2006; Smith and Vaux, 2003). In contrast, education has a far more significant role to play over the long term and as an “inter-generational change agent” (Berry, 2007). This provides the scope for education programs to work on some of the “enabling environmental” issues that influence whether or not conflict takes place, and how it is managed. If we assume that the *“best predictor of high social capital is simply years of formal education”* (Putnam, 2004, quoted in Colenso), then education can provide the tools for people to help them better manage conflicts at the personal level. Education also plays a significant role in the inculcation of values such as tolerance of difference and respect and assists in the breakdown of division in societies by bringing children together in a safe environment to overcome ethnic, religious, and gender divides in the classroom (Colenso, 2005).

The long-term time frame required for assessing educational outcomes and the impact on fragility and vice versa has also been noted with programs such as the Education For All—Fast Track Initiative. To this end, education programs should take a two-pronged approach to their work when operating in conflict environments.

Recommendations for a two-pronged long term strategy

1. Adopt a serious conflict-sensitive approach to program work aimed at effective delivery “in conflict” environments including the development of indicators that ensure a way of measuring impact.²⁹
2. Methodologies should deliberately incorporate the long-term approach and theory of change aimed at addressing issues that work “on conflict.”

6.2 Application of the typology to education methodologies and delivery mechanisms

During our consultations, stakeholders were asked whether there were linkages between conflicts and education and if the delivery of education could be modified to improve its impact on conflict. However, the root causes of the conflicts in Afdher and Shinile Zones (Tables 4 and 5) are unlikely to be influenced by the formal education system. Similarly, at the very practical level the structural and proximate causes of conflict are not within the realm of basic education. In terms of the actual forms of violence that take place (whether insurgency, inter-clan, or intra-clan), they are basically the same, with only the scale of violence being significantly different.

Looking at livelihoods and conflict, the key factor for education delivery relates to the relative mobility of pastoralists compared to agro-pastoralists. Thus the location of a violent clash will depend on the livelihood profile of the groups concerned. If a pastoralist group is attacking an agro-pastoralist group, the event will take place at either the specific area under dispute (e.g., pasture land being utilized in some form by another group), or at the farms and settlements of the agro-pastoralists. In the case of “pastoralist versus pastoralist,” the attacks depend on the scale of the issue and what is at stake. For example, in 2005 the Afar attacked the Issa across the north of Shinile Zone from five different directions simultaneously, as they felt that their tribal land was being taken from them. On another occasion in 2007, the Afar attacked the town of Adeytu in Shinile Zone believing that the Issa were intent on occupying the land up to and including the Awash River.³⁰ At the lower level of chronic, recurrent conflict, clashes tend to occur at the site of the resources in dispute, and on an opportunistic basis when small groups meet. Another aspect is the frequency of the clashes. In general they do not occur so often that one needs to alter the existing delivery mechanisms of the education programs.

Recommendations for conflict-sensitive delivery of basic education (also see Recommendations under section 6.4 for Education working “in conflict”)

1. For pastoralist communities living in disputed³¹ territory, ensure that schools:

- Continue to be mobile and flexible.
- Do not formalize ABEs and create permanent physical structures, but rather upgrade the school through the provision of improved “school kits” that enhances materials, methodologies, and educational opportunities instead of structures.
- Assist the community to undertake a conflict risk mapping exercise, with key questions such as:
 - Are there “hotspots” that schooling should avoid such as water points, salt licks, etc. where conflict often occurs, coupled with their usual grazing lands, and dry and wet season mobility routes?
 - Where is it appropriate to site a school?
 - Where is it most safe and yet most convenient with facilities for the children such as water?
 - Where is the school going to move if an incident occurs?

2. For agro-pastoralist communities in conflict with pastoralists, ensure that schools are:

- Situated as far from any potential conflict sites as possible, i.e., at the back of the settlement.

6.3 Education and the structural proximate causes

An analysis of the direct linkages between education and the causes of conflict in the Somali Region indicates few opportunities for direct leverage in the short term.

Political and governance concerns: At the basic education level there is not an obvious link between the causes of conflict and education. However, various opportunities exist to influence political and governance concerns through education:

- The clearest route is through the provision of a carefully-designed civic education program for adults and young people. This would need to be designed in close collaboration with the government. Similar programs have had success in Kenya in assisting communities to understand when political figures are trying to exploit them in terms of conflict. Accountability for use of resources

around education is also an area that deserves exploration.

- In terms of work across regional state borders, the Project Coordination Unit is based in Jijiga and reports to the Presidents of Oromiya and Somali Regions. It has started to organize “cross-border” sectoral meetings, as well as Joint Woreda Task Forces to ensure that planning is conducted in a conflict-sensitive way in border areas, as well as function as an early response mechanism for cross-border conflict.³² It would be useful to undertake a similar mechanism across the Afar–Somali regional state borders.

Economic and environmental concerns: In terms of the economic and environmental causes of conflict, again there are few obvious linkages at the basic education level. At the higher levels, working with woreda administrations on land planning and zoning at the interface between cultivated farming areas and pastoral grazing

could be helpful. Similarly, care is needed when introducing additional resources such as water points, and conflict-sensitive approaches should be used. Otherwise, linking education with livelihood education would also make sense but would not really address the root drivers of conflicts.

Socio-cultural concerns: Addressing socio-cultural concerns is perhaps the area with most applicability to long-term change in the region and deeper discussion of the role of the curriculum and its content such as tolerance and respect for difference is addressed in section 6.5.1.

6.4 Education working “in conflict”

Our analysis has emphasized the fundamental importance of education in Somali Region. This importance relates to the role of education for supporting economic and cultural growth and diversity, and reaffirms education as a basic right. More specifically in pastoralist areas, education is a core strategy for encouraging livelihoods diversification, by providing employment opportunities within, but more importantly, outside of pastoralist areas. This strategy is becoming critically important in the face of growing levels of destitution in pastoralist areas of Ethiopia, due to a complex set of long-term factors such as commercialization and population growth (Aklilu and Catley, 2010).

However, given the fundamental disconnects between conflict and education in the Somali Region, what are the opportunities for education to make a difference if it is not a root driver of conflict? Also, what are the risks for education programs in conflict environments, and how can conflict-sensitive approaches be used?

Equitable distribution of resources—physical location of schools: Consistent and strong advice from all stakeholders was not to build or place schools in disputed land. Aside from being a potential target, the placement of schools in such an environment is seen to play a role in legitimizing the claim to ownership of land by the users of school—“*this is our school on our land.*” A linked secondary aspect is that the building of a school then attracts people to the resource, and

settlements and population centers shift to be closer to it.³³ When conflict is prevalent and tensions high, only the clan that has the upper hand at the time will utilize the school and settle there. The presence of people living in an area then further reinforces claims to ownership of the land and also allows them a greater chance of political representation. This feeds resentment from the clan or tribe that has been displaced, or considers the land to be theirs by right and by history, and can result in violence. The sedentarization of populations around services also encourages the location of additional resources or services such as water points. Perhaps the more important point is that overall, this is a self-reinforcing cycle. Political representation (particularly with gate-keeping at the Jijiga level) allows access to resources and so some communities receive schools while others do not, and this imbalance further increases the risk of conflict. The danger regarding structures was also noted in northern Kenya, where “*the political manipulation of aid projects by politicians to consolidate new administrative districts or to mobilize constituency support illustrates how building infrastructure by itself contributes little to tackling a governance gap*” (Bradbury, 2010, page 6).

Equitable distribution of resources—support materials: If not delivered within a transparent process for the overall allocation of resources, the placement of schools (and the accompanying benefits and resources) risks exacerbating feelings and perceptions of unfairness and inequitable distribution, and can reinforce antagonism between clans. The resources involved include downstream access to training, staffing, and ongoing funding for teachers, books, and other school equipment. Therefore, the governance of education is critical and the regional government has, for example, worked hard and successfully on reducing the incidence of ghosting (receiving resources to support non-existent facilities, staff, etc.). However, there is still a need for greater upward accountability through the use of a woreda network, through the clustering of schools under the project, and by having the SMCs monitoring the school grants and whether the grants reach the schools or not.³⁴

Work on both sides of a conflict: Given the dangers of exacerbating unfair resource

distribution, it is critically important for education and all development programs to work on both sides of a conflict simultaneously. Approaching work from a “conflict systems” perspective would ensure that:

- NGOs do not exacerbate conflicts through provision of resources to one side only (which can also potentially create a sense of ownership and partisanship around the NGO itself)³⁵ nor reinforce existing competition between regions and the difficulties imposed through the overlay of administrative boundaries.
- The implementing agency has the opportunity of better understanding perspectives from both sides of the conflict.
- An NGO can itself more easily identify and utilize potential bridges across the conflict.
- The NGO itself is more inclusive with the recruitment of staff from both clans allowing for modelling alternative relationships between clans (i.e., demonstrating that clans can live and work together) and increasing the likelihood of breaking down and challenging attitudes that may be also replicated within organizations.
- The likelihood of NGOs training up and providing more opportunities and capacity to one side of the conflict is reduced.

Recommendations for working “in conflict”

- That the consortium adopts a conflict systems approach to their work whereby geographic coverage of project implementation is determined by the conflict dynamics at work rather than simply ease of administration processes. Practically this means working on both sides of any conflict (e.g., Afar and Issa rather than simply on the Issa side) and ensuring that staffing and resourcing are consequentially in accord and in balance across the conflict.
- Ensure that no ABEs or schools are built on disputed clan lands, particularly when near to regional borders.

6.5 Education working “on conflict”

6.5.1 Educational content

There are clear opportunities to ensure that the content, attitudes, and messages encapsulated in education services are tailored to maximize impact on conflict.

Curriculum: There is potential for education to play either a negative or positive role in the Somali Region, depending on the kind of bias, or specific positive or negative cultural messages, embedded within the content of the education being provided. Mercy Corps has undertaken an analysis of the curriculum for bias around specific cultural messages and have not found anything of concern. Nevertheless, how the history of a country is represented is significant in shaping people’s awareness of their identity and how one is perceived by others. The civics course within the GoE curriculum is aimed at ensuring that students are provided with information about their rights and responsibilities as citizens, as well as about concepts such as democracy. Some education officials felt that there was little need for any further guidance regarding moral values or behaviors because “... *everything they need is in this course.*” While education is sometimes perceived as a panacea for the ills of society, clearly messages, behaviors, and attitudes come from and are shaped by the whole environment. The old-fashioned view of education whereby a student is considered a “blank slate” to be filled with knowledge at school is no longer prevalent, but in attempting to identify the community’s perceptions of the relative influences on children’s attitudes, the role of the teacher is still considered to be extremely important.³⁶

Recommendation—curriculum content

That the consortium, in close conjunction with the Ministry of Education, develop and adopt a uniform approach to the development of “values” content regarding ethnicity, tolerance, and respect for difference within ABEs and to pilot this approach within an Early Childhood Education project in the Somali Region.

Role of education in shaping values: One of the key strengths of education is that it can provide the forum for increasing tolerance and breaking down stereotypes by mixing different groups together in a structured and controlled environment. A difficulty in parts of Somali Region is the consequence of a very important and otherwise positive policy in terms of language. The Ethiopian government, through its implementation of ethnic federalism, supports the use of mother languages as the medium for primary education. This is in line with global research and best practice, as it has been found that this maximizes the potential for children to learn well. However, the other side of the coin is that the lack of a common language of education can reinforce separation and distance between groups and reduce opportunities for communication, mixing, and the breakdown of those social barriers that the program is aiming for. The most acute case of this is that of the Afar–Issa divide, where there are few opportunities for children to mix or communicate, partly because of the different language base, but mainly because the Afar do not want to mix at all, let alone have their children speak Somali at school; they see this as an additional avenue where the Somalis are “taking over” their culture and identity.³⁷

From a conflict-prevention point of view this is unfortunate as evidence from Bosnia suggests that mixing of school children of different ethnicities, coupled with a social inclusion model to facilitate dialogue, communication, and joint action among students, teachers, school management, and parents can be very positive (UNICEF, 2009).

Mixing of conflicting clans can take place within urban environments and therefore at the primary and secondary school levels in towns. This should be developed further and the types of training and approach that Mercy Corps is using for the Issa and Hawiye trainings could be applied within the schools.

Education and identity: Identity has an important role to play in creating and maintaining conflict. Issues encountered in the analysis such as land and resources can become embedded within a larger set of values, beliefs, identities, and culture, which means that they then take on increased symbolic significance, and compromise of any sort is considered a loss. Identity is integral to one’s self-esteem and how one interprets the world. Any threat in this realm may result in persistent conflict (Maiese, 2003). Identity issues can also create rigid perceptions of whom or what the other ethnic group is and an acceptance and belief in negative stereotypes that then become entrenched. Understanding how we see ourselves and how we see others opens up new possibilities for how we interact, build community bonds, and overcome violence (Shapiro, 2011).⁴⁰

Education and culture: Intrinsically linked to identity is the role of culture, which is largely below the surface of our lives but influences identities and the meaning and care that we attribute to aspects of life, and who we believe ourselves to be. This facet is a vital aspect to consider and address within the education system if conflict is to be transformed, given the ethnic dimensions to the conflicts of Somali Region. This may not be best placed within the formal curriculum and education system itself, but

Recommendation—education for shaping values

Support the formation of peace clubs within schools that could then undertake the following activities:

- Undertake trainings based on the Mercy Corps theory of change regarding personal development and conflict.
- Undertake peace activities for youth such as music, drama, and art for peace.³⁸
- Celebrate cultural aspects with cultural festivals, which can provide opportunities for youth to acknowledge positive aspects of their identities and heritage.
- Undertake “exchanges” or visits between peace clubs across lines to undertake joint activities.³⁹
- Undertake outreach activities on market days and other community events.

would lend itself to the concept of school peace clubs where the cultural dimension could be explored through story-telling and the creation of metaphors, as well as other indirect approaches (LeBaron, 2003). This approach could also include exploration of the conflict resolution mechanisms within clans and the different roles that people take.

Education and livelihoods: One of the potential transformative aspects of education in BRIDGES project areas is the link between education and livelihoods. The fundamental differences in terms of way of life and livelihoods between the different conflicting groups are also an area that could be exploited. The fact that in rural areas there are agro-pastoralists who are essentially sedentary and pastoralists who are essentially mobile suggests that the use of specific education strategies employed in the program should target the issues surrounding way of life rather than only conflict. Thus the issues facing pastoralists lend themselves to distance education approaches (it is recognized that this is already being developed by SCUK⁴¹), mobile schools and kits, and a serious consideration of the possibility of boarding schools, innovative ways of broadcasting lessons, and use of radio, as well as appropriate curriculums.

At present, people also have very high expectations that education will ensure future employment. At its worst, the consequences of this expectation not being met may well exacerbate some types of conflict. And indeed, communities were vocal in their opinion that education was not yet delivering the expected results in terms of jobs. Parents were worried that students were not going on to secondary school, that they were ending up, *“On the street as they did not want to return to their basic traditional way of life, and that if they did return to their family then they ended up where they started—leading the string of camels (‘Awrba awrka hore ayuu socodkiiss lecyehay’).”* In one kebele parents noted that of the 36 children who completed primary school, only two had continued to secondary school in Jijiga. The remainder were *“on the street”* where frustrations could be expressed in antisocial behaviors. These informants suggested that it would not be long before unoccupied school leavers *“went to Djibouti.”* This term was code for

a range of possibilities, from going to Djibouti or Somaliland in search of job opportunities, or more worryingly, heading to Somalia or joining the ONLF. This suggests that in future programs, the links between basic education and livelihoods should be far more explicit.

Alternatively, programs need to support additional mechanisms that address the growing gap between opportunities for employment and the education being provided. For example, while there may be opportunities for young pastoralists or agro-pastoralists to learn about ways to improve the health of their animals or the yields of their crops, or they already possess this knowledge in depth, where are the services to support their knowledge in its application? For instance, the provision of veterinary drugs or extension services or credit facilities to enable them to maximize profits or economic opportunities?

While Mercy Corps has started to work with Technical and Vocational Education Training Centers (TVETs) to consider vocational training, this is not yet at a scale that will have a significant impact on the situation.

Recommendation

Link the content of education in the Somali Region more explicitly with livelihoods and future employment opportunities.

6.5.2 Educational methodologies

Experiential learning models espoused by educationalists such as Paolo Friere, or constructivist cognitive models by theorists such as Jean Piaget, that have increasingly dominated the education systems of the world show that content is only a small part of the overall education process. While the Do no Harm workshops also incorporate role plays and practicing of mediation skills, it is not yet clear how experiential teaching methodologies have been incorporated into the formal education portion of the BRIDGES project. If we consider the health development sector, there has been much progress with applying behavioral change models to issues such as HIV/AIDS, which have both environmental and personal facets. It might be interesting to consider whether there are ways

in which these behavioral change theories could be applied in the education sector to influence conflict dynamics. For example, Social Cognitive Theory (Bandura, 1989) could be considered, where the reciprocal interactions between behavior, the social environment, and what an individual thinks or feels, may offer important insights to approaches to influence conflict.

Learning is experiential and is shaped by multiple elements from multiple sources, and these elements are formal, non-formal, and informal. In this respect it is important, therefore, to take a far more holistic approach to education within conflict environments. To maximize the impact of education as a “force for good” in a conflict environment, it should be constructed within an “education for the community” framework. This could at a minimum provide alternative opinions and options in interpreting “life,” while also attempting to prevent the reinforcement or perpetuation of negative attitudes that maintain an increased potential for violence. Education in a community therefore should be conducted with the aim to maximize broader community participation and simultaneously target some of the other significant influences in the community that affect how a child behaves. However, this could take the form of adult education, livelihoods support, and provision of microfinance.⁴²

Recommendations for education methodologies

- Expand the methodologies used to design one that explicitly tests a behavioral change model approach as applied to conflict.
- Expand the target groups for education to include women, religious teachers, and others (see below).

6.5.3 Education delivery mechanisms

Given the prevalence of conflicts in the Somali Region, it is worth exploring different delivery mechanisms for education in terms of their relevance and possible impact. Although the state is usually the most appropriate mechanism for the delivery of education, where limited capacity

is a constraint and where government is involved in conflict, additional approaches are needed. In environments such as the Somali Region, it makes sense to utilize a range of delivery mechanisms to ensure:

- Maximum learning and adaptation regarding appropriateness of delivery mechanisms to the conditions.
- A reduction in the risk of exacerbating conflict, given that in some cases education may be used as a proxy to feed into or to forward specific agendas. For instance, a kebele administration may be keen to site a school near a border to legitimize and establish their control over that area, which could then trigger conflict or disputes over boundary demarcation.

In practice, this means that a program such as BRIDGES should continue to:

- Emphasize and strengthen the community management systems within the education sector. Continuing to empower the community to meet its own needs in terms of service delivery is the best way to support the legitimacy of the state and, at the same time, ensure service delivery is meeting the needs of the community.
- Get the right balance between direct state strengthening and the use of other supporting implementation mechanisms that add value; do not undermine the role of the government, but simultaneously expand the quantity and quality of services. In other words, a strong and continued role for NGOs and CBOs to assist in the delivery of education services in this context is vital.
- Non-state partners have a particularly critical role to play in providing:
 - Technical support to build the capacity of government departments.
 - Assisting communities to consider the roles that they and other actors are playing in the conflict dynamics and hence to ensure that children are safe and the provision of education remains a positive force in the context.
 - Relieving some of the burden on the state and their resources while they continue to stabilize the security environment.
 - Experimenting with different models that may enhance success, for the benefit of the

state. Equally, bringing good practice (or emerging good practice) and learning from other conflict environments, which could be applied to the Somali Region context.

- Providing the opportunities to address conflict directly through innovative methodologies. As noted above, there is little room within the formal curriculum to fit the many aspects discussed that start to work “on conflict” and transform society and the attitudes of citizens. These critical aspects need to find forms and delivery mechanisms that must sit alongside the formal education sector. The state is not yet best placed to deliver these critical inputs but it does recognize the need for them.⁴³
- Assisting in the creation and stimulation of cross-sector and cross-administration linkages to address the needs of the education sector operating in these conditions.

In other words, NGOs are best placed to support education needs that are linked to more than simply the provision of basic education as it currently exists within the sector. Government management and administrative systems are by necessity adapted to the delivery of services that are tailored for the nation. This can reduce the flexibility that is needed within conflict environments in terms of content and approach. This gap is best filled by non-state actors with a humanitarian perspective. For instance, developing the linkage between livelihoods and education, which is critical as a conflict transformation approach, requires an ability to explore programming opportunities that could not currently sit within the formal education system without a lengthy and prolonged process to change the curriculum or the structure of formal schooling.

6.5.4 Education and state-strengthening

For the Somali Regional government to improve its track record and be seen to be driving the agenda regarding service delivery in general, as well as education, specific support to state-strengthening needs to occur. This will assist in addressing the two key factors associated with

state-building, legitimacy and accountability.

Education and governance: Perhaps the most critical aspect that deserves support is assisting the government to build capacity in the administration of education delivery and improve transparency and accountability. As noted earlier, increased stability, and reduced fragility and conflict, appear to be most linked to improvements in governance and the minimization of political involvement. There also needs to be a reduction in the gap between the state and communities in terms of upwards influence and accountability to the community. The introduction of SMCs and their role in running schools is an excellent start. Nevertheless, this could be strengthened through greater responsibility and opportunities for their involvement in their roles by providing them with a greater amount of resources to improve their schools and holding the teachers to greater account and being involved in their recruitment. A further step could be taken through the introduction of a self-assessment process (coupled with a training program and mentoring) for SMCs and for the Education Departments at the woreda level, to improve the performance in education delivery and its quality. An index of appropriate, compiled indicators could be designed and applied (supported through a self-assessment) in a participatory manner in a number of selected woredas, and then the participatory self-assessment process undertaken on an annual basis to monitor performance. Support to more traditional aspects of governance and the education sector can be considered in the region using many of the criteria utilized by Euro-Trends (2009) when conducting their *Study on Governance Challenges for Education in Fragile Situations* in a number of locations globally.

Resolving conflict: Federal and regional state governments express a clear commitment to prevent and manage conflicts and they have exerted their authority to prevent many conflicts from continuing to escalate. However, addressing the root causes of conflict remains a challenge. Donors could assist the government to address the structural causes of the inter-clan conflicts in the Region (putting aside the insurgency⁴⁴) through support to an analysis of

land tenure policy, with implementation of recommendations on how best to improve the policy to meet the needs of stakeholders. Also:

- Support the government to undertake a consultation and stakeholder process to design and implement conflict resolution processes for the intractable, chronic conflicts such as that between the Afar and Issa.
- Support the further development of the PCU and other government mechanisms that can improve cross-border coordination on a sectoral and administrative basis in terms of conflict-sensitive resource allocation.

Recommendations to support government resolve conflict

Donors could assist the government to address the structural causes of the inter-clan conflicts in the region through support to:

- A review of land tenure policy and its implementation.
- The further development of the Project Coordination Unit and other government mechanisms that can improve “cross-border” coordination on a sectoral and administrative basis to enhance conflict-sensitive resource allocation.
- The Border Affairs Bureau to progress the regional state border demarcation process.

6.6 Education and conflict prevention, management and resolution

Given the multiple facets of the conflicts found in Somali Region (and arguably in all conflict arenas), it follows that for education to play the maximum positive role that it can on changing behaviors in a conflict system, it needs to consider a very holistic approach that addresses multiple actors and multiple approaches aimed at the environment (as noted above). One could term this a “saturation approach” whereby it is necessary to have sufficient critical mass within the citizenry, who have an understanding regarding the dynamics of conflict and their own roles within it, and recognize that change is possible. To this end, the work that **ALL** the partners in the BRIDGES consortium are undertaking needs to be scaled up considerably

across the region to increase the potential for impact on the broader system. In particular, the work of Mercy Corps that more directly targets the causes of conflict and the actual actors involved in violence is not at sufficient scale to be able to effect the types of change that are wanted and needed. There has been little work done like this in Ethiopia and it needs to be given every chance to succeed and then be evaluated for lessons learned.

Within such a “saturation approach” the different participants of the education will be best served by different educational approaches most appropriate to their needs, the subject matter, and the methodology. Activities addressing conflict or peace-building can also be considered as positioned within a spectrum of approaches (see below), with conflict prevention at one end moving through to conflict resolution at the other. It is useful to reflect on how education programs can contribute in these three main areas of the spectrum. The formal, non-formal, and informal education sectors cover the majority of fields of learning for humans including cultural mores, language, and behaviors and so a matrix combining the two, peace-building and education sectors, can assist to clarify expected program outcomes and impacts on conflict.

Conflict Prevention



Conflict Mitigation



Conflict Resolution

6.6.1 Conflict Prevention

As can be seen from Table 8, the BRIDGES project is already working in a number of the aspects within the formal and informal sectors. However, the areas that are arguably the most in need of strengthening are in the informal education arena and the linkages across all of the education sectors.

Working more with women: At this stage of the project there is room for working more strongly with women. In focus group discussions, women noted proudly that they were involved in conflict

Table 8: Conflict prevention and different education approaches

	Formal Education	Non-Formal Education	Informal Education
Prevention of Violent conflict	• Placement of schools • Allocation of resources • Curriculum content • Student attitudes (tolerance, ethnic difference etc.) • Modelling behaviors	Working with key stakeholders: • Women • Elders • Government • Youth • Early warning • Improved good governance	The broader environment: • Media • Public discourse • Exposure tours to see early warning systems • Improved educational participation and good governance

and supporting their men in battle by bringing them milk and food, as well as more ammunition. Both women and men also thought that women could play a much stronger role in preventing conflict and in changing the attitudes of young men. Women were shy to admit that some of the poems they tell to the young men can enflame conflict further (informants admitted that this does happen, confirming Mercy Corps baseline findings on this dynamic). Two suggestions were made:

- Empowering women would have a positive effect on the community.
- Teaching women their rights and providing information about peace would enable them to play a stronger role in the family, as well as adult literacy.

Despite probing, it was not possible to obtain actual examples of poems that women use that are either derogatory of other clans or that spur young men on to conflict.

Women's livelihoods: Most stakeholders recognized that women are sometimes also able to cross conflict lines at certain stages, even when there is active conflict. They also run a grave risk and examples were cited where women were badly treated, being raped, assaulted, or abused when in the “wrong place at the wrong time.” However, in urban environments and in certain trades such as the

khat trade (across the Oromo–Issa line) women continue to communicate. Thus, “cross-line women’s livelihood groups” appear to be an opportunity for strengthening shared futures and reducing tensions.

Early warning systems: During the analysis there did not appear to be strong early warning systems in place that could be used to prevent the outbreak of violence, or ensure that vulnerable people such as children and women could move to safety in the face of violence. There are now some peace committees across the Hawiye–Issa conflict, and the Joint Woreda Task Forces apparently play this role across the Oromyia–Somali Region boundaries, but these systems could be extended to many of the other conflicts identified in the assessment. Multiple stakeholders could play a role in such a system, including key people identified within the SMCs, in conjunction with elders and government. If this is feasible and there is a confirmed need, then it means that communication between these groups would need to be available and strengthened, and the use of mobile phones is one avenue that could be explored in this regard. A perennial problem in chronic conflict environments is the power of rumor and lack of accurate information that creates uncertainty and can at its worst actually create conflict. Models in Somalia have utilized radio as a medium to ensure accurate

information is broadcast and at times to dispel untrue rumors. This has had the impact of preventing conflict or escalation due to incorrect information. Exposure tours and the possibility of training from Ethiopian government-approved groups such as Conflict Early Warning Mechanism (CEWARN) (the Intergovernmental Authority on Development—IGAD mechanism) or looking at models in Kenya, to show groups of elders, from both sides of conflict lines travelling together, how early warning mechanisms could be utilized may be a further opportunity to address this aspect.

It is also important to see whether there is the possibility of agreement between groups that schools and other targets are excluded from the conflicts; in other words, the introduction of the concept of “peace zones” which have been utilized in other environments such as Nepal to good effect.

Elders and traditional authorities: In the past there has been a much greater dependence on traditional authorities for peace and stability, but the structures are much eroded in recent times and in crisis. This is partly because there has been a proliferation of elders, and it is increasingly unclear who is legitimate and who is not. It was suggested that this is a result of the politicization of the clans as well as political ambitions within the elders. It is difficult for them in rural areas to cope with the different issues and rapid social changes such as demographic changes, urbanization, poverty, changing cultures (western and diaspora influences), and religious changes.

The paradox of the traditional authority is that they are both peace and conflict makers simultaneously and *Xeer*⁴⁵ has both positive and negative dynamics. This topic deserves a paper in its own right as there are many layers to uncover, and it must be considered how best to support the traditional authorities with respect to peace-building and within an education framework. For instance, finding out where *Xeer* currently exists and the extent to which people know, understand, and abide by it could form part of an educational approach positively valuing cultures and heritage (perhaps through clubs).

However, elders suggested that the use of *Xeer* is not possible with some of the conflicts, as there is no history of *Xeer* between the conflicting clans or where the conflicts are between Somali and non-Somali actors. So the key question to consider is, “Is it possible in this environment to create new *Xeer* which can help manage conflict?” Where there is a history to build on, it may be possible to revise or enter new *Xeer* with a focus on *wanaag* (the positive aspects) as opposed to *xumaan* (the negative aspects). In some cases, it also may be possible to formalize *Xeer* by documentation and possibly using it as a basis for involving several clans, rather than simply using the existing bilateral inter-clan *Xeer*. A task for SCUUK could be to align existing *Xeer* with human rights for women, children, minorities, and vulnerable groups, and this could be done through workshops with a combination of both the SMCs and the *guurti* or elders to increase understanding of these issues. Here, the principle of *birimageydo*, those who are not allowed to be harmed, including women, which is considered “*haram*,” could be a point of entry around protecting women and children subject to domestic violence in marriages as well as conflict. The distribution of *mag*⁴⁶ is also discriminatory against women.

Public discourse: Linking the formal education system with the broader environment it is trying to service is one avenue to strengthen common interests in development, a shared future, and improved governance. Thus a program that promotes education can be a tool to affect attitudes more broadly. The underlying premise is that increased public participation and more accountability in the education system will provide greater opportunities to reduce disparities and increase the potential, in the long term, to assist the transition from an ethnic clan-based distribution of power to a more democratic environment. One approach to this is to use the SMCs as the foundation for public debate and discourse on the importance of education. A three-tiered approach is possible:

- Stimulate debate in the community.
- Stimulate dialogue between SMCs and possibly conflict lines, the idea being to establish a common “cause/interest” that is of importance to all clans.
- At the Somali regional level, encourage

discourse on subjects such as *“What is the purpose of schooling? What is an educated child? If education is so vital why do we treat teachers so poorly?”*⁴⁷

The purpose is to encourage analysis and suggest solutions, as well as to encourage people to talk about their concerns and consider what they would like in an education system. If one starts from the concerns of the SMCs, it may raise questions such as how the curriculum might be improved to be more relevant for pastoralist and agro-pastoralists, as well as exert social pressure on all stakeholders responsible for education. It would also be a small step to introduce more sensitive subjects within the education debate, such as “friendship” and “ethnicity” (not in those terms, of course).

One major constraint though that underpins many of these suggestions is the language barrier. There are few means of communication across some of the conflict lines (e.g., Afar-Issa) which makes breaking down attitudes and building bridges between communities difficult. There is no easy solution to this except in the long term with the introduction of a common language across the conflict systems, as well as the Somali Region. This could form a further area for debate: *“Should the Somali Region education system have a common language introduced as well as the use of the local language in primary school—and if so what might that language be?”*⁴⁸

Media: While media can be a very sensitive area of work in Ethiopia, it may be possible to work with the Education Ministry on a public campaign encouraging education. For instance, advertisements such as *“Do you know what your child learned at school today?”* Training of journalists or even government officials together on how to report on good practices and successes e.g., case studies of effective schools, as well as areas that need improving (e.g., why there aren’t teachers in certain areas). Even if this is too sensitive, SMCs working together could have teacher exchanges under the BRIDGES consortium umbrella, and exposure to areas where the impact of conflict is greater or resources are needed. The purpose of these activities is to encourage a broader set of actions in conducting social analysis and devising

solutions that can be implemented. A more radical approach that might be interesting to explore is to conduct some public debates or forums with the aim to increase accountability, but in a constructive manner. This could explore the factors that influence the effectiveness of school governance and SMCs. More controversially it could debate questions such as why the Somali Region education statistics are so low (using government-acknowledged data)—more constructively phrased this could be a debate on *“How can communities and local authorities improve the educational status of Somali children?”* Public competitions of essays or illustrations on *“What is a good teacher? What is an educated child? If the Minister of Education asked your views on improving your school, what would you tell him?”* could be held.

Public interest in education and good governance could also be increased through the introduction of awards for “Schools of the year” and “Teacher of the year” (perhaps ensuring that there is one rural, one urban, two teachers—a male and female). These could all provide opportunities for a greater linkage to peace and education, linking communities across lines. Some of these questions could also be debated in public with a good facilitator (to ensure they remain positive and to encourage accountability) and between different stakeholders, for instance donors and students, Ministry of Education officials and elders.⁴⁹ Additional methodologies could be the use of soap dramas (radio or even TV) that consider education issues, conflict, and social issues and raise these issues as well as possible solutions and dynamics. This has been a very effective tool in a number of environments where there is a multiplicity of issues that affect the environment and are experiencing chronic conflict, such as Afghanistan and South Sudan.

Early childhood education: While there is clear ethnic tension in parts of the Somali Region and ethnicity is sometimes asserted to be a critical contributor to conflict in the Region, research suggests that *“Ethnicity neither causes conflict, nor in many cases does it accurately describe it. Rather ethnicity/identity is increasingly mobilized and politicized in contemporary violent conflicts”* (Bush, 2000). Ethnic attitudes are formed early on in life and once these attitudes are formed—be they

positive or negative—they tend to deepen with time (Padilla et al., 1974). This suggests that it would be interesting to attempt some pilot early childhood education efforts that link into the broader formal education system, perhaps in the urban environment particularly (where mixed groups are most likely possible), to shape the formation of ethnic attitudes. As is well recognized, education is a long-term process and not a product, but this in turn does require donor support and commitment for such projects for the long term, and not simply for a couple of years.

Recommendations—conflict prevention

- Consider the use of “conflict preparedness” plans for those schools that are most vulnerable to the impact of conflict.
- Assess the potential for conflict early warning systems to be put in place in schools as part of the conflict preparedness plan.
- Expand the use of public discourse, media, and public debate to further develop the opportunities for good governance to be modelled within the education sector and establish norms for other sectors.
- Strengthen the opportunities for women to play a greater role in community affairs and peaceful coexistence through targeted adult education.
- Pilot an early childhood education that includes emphasis on ethnic tolerance and shared histories.

6.6.2 Conflict mitigation

The BRIDGES project could be used in conflict mitigation in two main ways: management of the conflict, in other words, the containment of conflict; and the prevention of escalation and the normalization of tensions and the situation following a violent event.

Preparedness planning: As noted in the conflict prevention section above, some conflict can be prevented by ensuring that schools are located in areas that are not disputed. In conflict management, it makes sense for the SMCs in key conflict-vulnerable areas to have already considered the location of “back-up” ABEs or schools in areas that are safer. This means that the BRIDGES consortium could invest in assisting SMCs, elders, and teachers to consider adopting a preparedness approach should early warning systems or rumors suggest that conflict is about to erupt. This may especially be the case at certain times (for example, disputes over access to grazing and water are almost predictable in some areas during the dry season). Questions that could be considered in a preparedness plan for the school include:

- Where are safer areas for children to withdraw to?
- What are the routes to these safe areas?
- Where could the “safe” school be located?
- Is there water there?

Table 9: Conflict mitigation and different education approaches

	Formal Education	Non-Formal Education	Informal Education
Conflict Mitigation	• Preparedness and contingency planning • Location of “back-up” schools • Increasing and improving capacities for conflict management, Do No Harm, alternative dispute resolution, mediation, and negotiation skills	Working with key stakeholders: • SMCs • Elders • Government—security forces • Youth • Imams and other religious leaders • Rebuilding traditional management mechanisms—e.g., those concerned with natural resource management	The broader environment: • Media

- What are the triggers for moving and implementing the plan?
- What is the best timing for schooling and education to take place?

Obviously these sorts of questions impact on the whole community as children also play a key role in herding livestock etc., and so the approaches adopted will need to take into account the family as a whole. The school areas (both the shade of trees and local shelters, structures, or buildings) also naturally provide the location for communities to meet or gather to decide such issues.

Capacities to manage conflict: Mercy Corps is already covering this aspect with their suite of trainings including Do No Harm training coupled with mediation and negotiation skills. Although this is being provided for a wide range of stakeholders, it might be useful to extend this training also to include Imams or religious leaders, given the concerns in Ethiopia about the role of religion and its links to conflict. There has been considerable success in the cross-border area between Somalia and Kenya with this approach, with trained religious leaders then taking initiatives to contain violence and solve disputes.⁵⁰ There are now good materials created for this purpose. A further aspect that deserves exploration is the application of the work that SCUS has been pioneering with PCAE in the southern part of the Somali Region, in Filtu, Dollo Ado, and Dollo Bay, concerning traditional natural resource management mechanisms. A combination of mapping the routes of the pastoralists and identifying conflict “hot spots” can lead to more appropriate siting of schools in safe areas in dry and wet seasons, as well as the possibility for better management of these areas. In some areas the use of both joint “*sahan*” (scouts who assess the quality of the grazing) and management committees may be options to better manage timed access, routes of access, and minimal damage to crops. The ideal situation would be to have user management groups meet to agree on terms and conditions of use for these contentious hot spot resources. In many places this might not be practicable as the tensions between groups are too high, but in less-contentious areas this methodology

should be explored. Coupled with this would be membership of someone from the SMCs who could then explain or ensure that knowledge is passed down to the children who are herding and are vulnerable to being caught in outbursts of violence at these locations. Agreements of safe “peace zones” are also worth exploring particularly in areas where agro-pastoralists are living. As these people are not as mobile as pastoralists, conflict usually has a greater impact on them and their livelihoods.

Media: There is a role for media in this area by communicating messages of calm following conflict incidents, both from community leaders and the authorities. Training of media actors in how to ensure that they do not enflame conflict inadvertently and how to report on conflict objectively and appropriately could also be helpful. Normalization of relationships too could provide material for the media, for instance reporting and providing information regarding shared markets, perhaps with an increased security presence, could assist in enabling people to access these facilities safely and earlier, followed up by the reporting of peaceful occasions such as those where ethnic groups mixed.

Recommendations—conflict mitigation and management

- Build and extend on the work that SCUS has pioneered with PCAE in Filtu and Dollo Ado regarding use of mapping of transhumant routes for siting of ABEs, conflict “hotspots” such as water points, as well as consideration of traditional Natural Resource Management (NRM) management systems that could play a role in a broader conflict management system around use of natural resources such as grazing areas.
- Work with journalists and media on how to report on conflict issues.⁵¹ Look at incorporating agreements for “peace zones” into discussions and negotiations between pastoralists and agro-pastoralist conflicts.

6.6.3 Conflict resolution

The BRIDGES project as it is currently formulated is not best placed to resolve the fundamental root causes of the conflicts in Somali Region. However, it can certainly play a role in conflict mitigation and management (as described above), especially conflicts of a minor nature or ones that may, if left unaddressed, trigger broader violence or play into deeper conflict issues.

Other than minor conflicts, it is difficult for BRIDGES to address conflict resolution issues because these issues are disconnected from the parameters of education. It should be acknowledged that there are very deep multi-layered factors that have defied long-term resolution throughout the Horn of Africa. Community peace-building efforts in Kenya, Uganda, Somalia, and Sudan have all played a role in addressing conflict, but rarely managed to completely resolve the conflicts and address their root causes. These approaches have prevented and reduced deaths, and contributed towards a greater understanding of the dynamics as well as a more peaceful society, with improved capacities to manage conflict. In the majority of cases, the government is the main stakeholder that needs to address the key issues, e.g., boundaries, land ownership, political representation systems, justice and redress, broader development, and poverty alleviation.

6.7 Further research

There is a need to incorporate a longer-term action research component into BRIDGES that would address some of the questions and issues that are raised in this conflict analysis and to

make a broader contribution to the literature and praxis in fragile states. Specific options include:

- Evidence-based exploration of the relationship between increased and improved service delivery and reduced fragility and conflict.
- The development and use of sector-specific conflict-sensitive indicators for the implementation of primary and ABE schools and education programs.
- Consideration of the use of a set of self-selected (and support around capacity-building and training to achieve the expected improvements) measurements that together form an index around performance in the delivery of education in the woreda that could be used as the basis for periodic self-assessments. This could involve a number of stakeholders, including the community, the students, the SMC, the government officials at the local level, and the NGO.
- An analysis of the land ownership and land tenure legislation at the federal and regional state level, the available dispute mechanisms, including both statutory and customary mechanisms, and the development of a series of recommendations that could be piloted in different locations depending on the particular circumstances. This piece of work could include suggestions to changes in legislation, policy, and practice that are best suited to the needs of the different stakeholders.
- UNICEF is currently conducting an exercise mapping the location of all schools with GPS. This could also be a way forward for other services such as water provision and health facilities. When this information is available, it could provide the foundations for

Table 10: Conflict resolution and different education approaches

	Formal Education	Non-Formal Education	Informal Education
Conflict Resolution	• Depends on the conflict—SMCs, student committees	• Various Peace committees and stakeholders • Government • Traditional management mechanisms	None

a number of useful overlays by the project. For instance, it will enable a deeper survey and mapping to be conducted regarding which specific schools are on conflict “fault lines,” or that are particularly vulnerable to conflict now or may be in the future. This knowledge could be used to invest more time and energy into target areas with early warning systems and in ensuring that there are mitigation and management capacities in place. In this regard, the role of the SMC and the planned future linkages to other peace actors could also be critical in collecting data. While it is acknowledged that the capacity of SMCs is low and there would inevitably be questions regarding consistency and accuracy of data collected, investment in these capacities and support to SMCs to undertake this would be a worthwhile exercise. Understanding where existing data may be being collected and where it might be accessed (and who may be able to access it) would also be helpful.

- The long-term impacts of improved education need to be tracked by selecting cohorts of school children and monitoring their lives over 10 to 15 years.
- There is a need to map those areas where there are mixed ethnicity school classes as this will determine whether this is only the case in urban areas. It was noted that there is also a clear movement of people into their ethnic majority areas taking place, which possibly threatens to entrench the “ethnicization” of the regions where the majority of people living are of your clan or tribe. For instance, when passing through the Mieso area, it appears as though many Somalis no longer live there following the referendum in November 2005 when disputed kebeles were allocated to the Oromiya Administration. A large number of Issa moved out of Mieso town during this period. The reasons for this movement are not completely clear, but are likely to be a combination of fears regarding their security as a minority group, the ability to access education in the Somali Region where Somali language is the primary medium, or issues surrounding preferential treatment for Oromos. This deserves more probing to understand what is happening as the standard

of education on offer in the Oromiya Region is considered to be of a higher standard than in the Somali Region. Assuming that one of the methodologies for reducing conflict is to increase the mixing of ethnic groups, increasing the opportunities for the normalization of relationships and mutual tolerance between them, then this movement suggests that there are many difficulties associated with countering the trend. It may also be associated with the desire of Somalis to learn English within their education as well.

7. CONCLUSIONS

In conclusion, it can be seen that education is a much-needed service in the Somali Region and while its role in short-term conflict transformation is limited, it has a clear long-term development role to play in helping to address conflict and stability. Education alone is not the panacea to the conflict issues in Somali Region and it should be developed in conjunction with other initiatives aimed specifically at addressing the root causes of conflict.

For the education sector to maximize its role in development while also influencing conflict, additional inputs and threads alongside the formal sector need to be explored, in addition to strengthening the performance of formal delivery. These additional inputs could include a range of education programs to “saturate” the social environment to ensure voices for peace are not only within the formal education system but are also supported by key community leaders with influence. Non-formal and informal education initiatives with explicit links to improved livelihoods, shared economic linkages across conflict lines—particularly between women—as well as increased skills at addressing conflict could also play an important role, as youths come through the education system and may end up disillusioned with few opportunities facing them. Scaled-up approaches targeting those involved in violence, either directly or indirectly through influencing the protagonists, are likely to yield more results than current efforts.

ENDNOTES

- ¹ It is not completely clear that all of the key conflicting stakeholders actually do want peace—aside from the spoilers in whose interest peace is not positive. Nor is it entirely clear in people’s minds how education will create peace. When challenged, most people responded by saying that educated people do not fight, it is only the uneducated people who do so. Sadly, this is not the case, and this does not take into account the manipulative powers of those educated people, such as politicians, who shape an environment to their advantage, not caring whether people are injured in the process. Nevertheless, the authors have continued on the basis of these assumptions on the premise that one can build an environment where the possibility of conflict is reduced if expectations are entrenched regarding peace.
- ² Wahabi was influenced by the Hanbali mahdhab, which was an attempt to redress what it saw as wrong interpretations of Islam by other schools.
- ³ By “drip” deaths is meant deaths or killings of one or two people at a time rather than in a more dramatic large-scale attack.
- ⁴ Possibly, as this is considered the “norm” for pastoralist societies by many people.
- ⁵ Personal experience of one of the authors (SR) when implementing peace programs in Southern Sudan; also reflected in Bradbury (2006).
- ⁶ One example was given in Kare where water pumps were all distributed by the woreda head to members of his clan but he had explained to those complaining that this was a mistake by one of his staff. Fortunately, there was no violent conflict as a result of this “mistake.”
- ⁷ Lack of thought around sharing resources with minorities.
- ⁸ No return of livestock or guns or blood money between the Afar and the Issa—unless government mediated.
- ⁹ This column illustrates the potential institutional gaps that allow the drivers of conflict the space to operate.
- ¹⁰ Issa are not ready to be administered by a Hawiye minority.
- ¹¹ Issa side says that the Oromo are actively involved, but there are others from the Oromo side who deny this and consider it latent.
- ¹² Note that while in Jijiga Zone it is a useful example because of the causes and link to the broader social trend that enclosure is on the increase in Somali Region.
- ¹³ This column illustrates the potential institutional gaps that allow the drivers of conflict the space to operate.
- ¹⁴ We did not visit this area as part of the study.

- ¹⁵ This means that on occasion the police reportedly have clan pressures placed on them that potentially mean they do not follow through when their own clan members are involved.
- ¹⁶ Or an appropriate mix of mechanisms that recognizes clear parameters for the limits of customary processes.
- ¹⁷ According to law, it doesn't belong to the clan; it belongs to the state, which illustrates the disjunct between the formal state policy-legal setting and the normative understanding and acceptance by the people at the grass-roots level, according to their history and cultures. According to state law, neither the majority nor minority clan in this example actually own the land.
- ¹⁸ In the case of the Gedabursi conflict with the Gedabursi, Somaliland played a positive role in resolving the issues at stake given that the Gedabursi are also a significant clan there. This illustrates that not all international dynamics necessarily have a negative role on conflict issues within Ethiopia.
- ¹⁹ By this we mean that people will state their identity as being "Ethiopian," "Moslem," of "Somali" ethnicity, "clan" e.g., "Gedabursi," and sub-clan e.g., "Makhildere." Which one is chosen depends on the level of threat or the venture being undertaken.
- ²⁰ We did not come across any example of this during the assessment.
- ²¹ It should be noted that while we discussed secondary schools with stakeholders the team did not actually visit a secondary school during the analysis.
- ²² For instance, in the Hawiye-Issa conflict, Hawiye stakeholders estimated that 36 people from their clan had been killed over the last three years. This is a maximum mean average of one a month. While this is a horrific statistic, in terms of schools being affected across the Zone it is not significant unless the deaths occurred close to the schools or involved school members.
- ²³ This is not always the case though; an example is the Gedabursi versus Gedabursi conflict.
- ²⁴ Those like women and children who are not supposed to be attacked or harmed during war.
- ²⁵ In the past if women were taken in war they could extend their hand to their captor and that man had to take the responsibility of being a "father" to them and look after their interests. Wives used to be exchanged between the Afar and the Issa. Towards the end of 2010 though, around September/October, the Issa and Afar clashed in grazing lands 20–25 km from Gawane, towards the river. The Afar caught 4 out of 12 women who were cutting grass. Of the other 8 women who escaped back to the Issa, one told them that the Afar had caught and killed a woman. The Afar denied this but it was a considerable cause of high tension between the two clans. Later the Issa found her alive wandering around but she had lost her mind from fear.
- ²⁶ The UN Declaration of the Child considers a child as someone under the age of 18 years old.

- ²⁷ This is not completely the case now as Mercy Corps' work is starting to address this aspect with its trainings for youth and communities involved in violence in February 2011—in particular within the Hawiye–Issa conflict.
- ²⁸ This finding was also confirmed by a Child Protection Specialist who examined these issues in February 2011, under the BRIDGES project (Lelieveld, 2010).
- ²⁹ A baseline before the introduction of PDP could assess the number of schools affected—this to be linked with the UNICEF mapping exercise—similarly with the provision of water and health facilities. Indicators for conflict sensitivity could include both process indicators to ensure that relevant actors have been consulted, as well as impact indicators.
- ³⁰ The Issa agreed that this was indeed their intent.
- ³¹ Organizations working with such communities need to take care to consult on both sides of a conflict and triangulate the information that they receive carefully if they are asked to support such a development. Woreda and kebele officials may have understandable positions on where and how facilities should be built, but equally they are most likely to be members of the dominant clan living in that area and so have a vested interest in a specific outcome.
- ³² The PCU is undergoing an evaluation of its work over the past five years. This should have many lessons for future programming.
- ³³ This is one of the premises behind the government policy of villagization—their ability to provide services to the majority of people in rural areas and reach national development goals depends on the settlement and concentration of people in centers rather than being dispersed across a large geographic area.
- ³⁴ It should be noted that while the grant system is a good start, the amount of resources at stake is considered to be very small by communities compared to say even the price of a goat. In future the potential for SMCs to become fund-raisers is an important opportunity and perhaps increasing the pool of resources available for a school to manage may provide added value to this aspect of the program.
- ³⁵ On previous visits to Ethiopia we travelled to the area around Moyale on the borders of Regions 4 and 5. Borana informants were very clear that Save the Children US was a Somali NGO whereas CARE was “theirs,” representing the Oromo. This was articulated many times.
- ³⁶ Several parents amusingly noted their common experience at home when being informed of some fact or during disputes that “teacher said so.” This then was considered the closing irrefutable statement that confirms the truth of what the child has stated or opined.
- ³⁷ This is putting aside the fact that currently there is a state of war between the groups, which means they don't talk to each other.
- ³⁸ This approach has been usefully applied in the Gambella Region of Ethiopia.

- ³⁹ This would have to be a very cautious approach to ensure that such activities do not take place too early in a peace process. As some elders noted, “*We need to let some grass grow on the graves first.*” In other words, if the hurt is too acute and recent, the activities will not be able to take root and indeed may end up in violence. There have been examples in South Sudan where peace meetings led to death during the meeting because of insufficient preparation and were held before people were ready to undertake the activities needed to move forward in the healing process.
- ⁴⁰ This source is the two-page, brief but extremely useful narrative that accompanies the education and training program for Issa and Hawiye youth and parents, that sets out the thinking and approach of the workshops.
- ⁴¹ A useful recent document that may be a strong resource in this respect is the “Getting to the Hardest to Reach: A Strategy to Provide Education to Nomadic Communities in Kenya through Distance Learning” (Swift, January 2010).
- ⁴² Note that this is not simply reshaping an education program to be an integrated livelihoods program, but rather attempting to consider how different forms of training or learning could provide the vehicle for meeting the needs of the community and additional entry points to a holistic approach influencing community attitudes to conflict i.e., education for peace.
- ⁴³ Many of these suggestions emerged from different government departments and bureaus.
- ⁴⁴ In this case, the obvious role for international governments is to put pressure on both sides of the conflict to come to the negotiation table. The UK may be in a useful position to play a greater role in this approach given that the ONLF leaders appear to spend significant amounts of time in the UK. Equally, given its large-scale intended support to addressing service provision in the Somali Region, this may be considered an opportunity for discussion with the government about this massive central impediment to the development of the region.
- ⁴⁵ *Xeer* is an oral memorized code regulating intra- and inter clan affairs. Generally it is a bilateral agreement based on a collective rights perspective, old customary norms, and Sharia, between neighboring clans or clans with historic relations. There are different types of *Xeer* to regulate various special aspects; for instance, amongst others, *Xeer dhaqan* to consider theft, banditry, and family matters, or *Xeer dhiig* dealing with serious crimes such as killings, rape, and injury.
- ⁴⁶ *Mag* is the Somali word for blood payment—also known as *dia* derived from the Arabic *diiya*. This refers to the group collective responsibility towards payment of compensation in the event of an injury or killing by a member of the group.
- ⁴⁷ There are some excellent examples of this approach in Tanzania that could be drawn on, pioneered by the Tanzanian NGO “Haki Elimu.”

- ⁴⁸ For instance, it was notable that the Somali Region has a marked preference for the use of English as a second language to enable students to access global opportunities. Another interesting observation regarding language and education was the fact that there is large variation of language across the Oromo region and the formal version of the Oromo language used in school is very hard for many using other vernacular. This creates further barriers within both the Oromo and the Somalis who speak Oromo living in the border regions who reportedly tend to choose to go to school in the Somali Region because even though the standards of education and schooling may well be better in Oromo, they will not learn English and the formal language makes it harder to do well in school.
- ⁴⁹ Many of these suggestions have been put into practice by Haki Elimu, including the next stage of improving education governance, which is budget tracking to see where the education budget is utilized. This would be a step that would require careful attention in Ethiopia. The SMCs would be the obvious platform on which to build a budget-tracking approach to education to improve the governance and accountability of regional and woreda authorities.
- ⁵⁰ Pact in Kenya has produced materials for this purpose already in the Somali language.
- ⁵¹ There are some good examples of this sort of work in Kenya following the last round of electoral and ethnic violence.

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APPENDIX 1: TERMS OF REFERENCE

Terms of reference for a consultant to conduct conflict analyses in the Somali Region of Ethiopia

Background

Save the Children UK in Ethiopia is implementing a one-year project in the Somali Region of Ethiopia which combines education and peace objectives. Partners include Mercy Corps, Islamic Relief, and the Somali regional government. The project is funded by DFID and includes a strong component of lesson learning and documentation, with a view to influencing future DFID investments in the Region.

Specifically, the project aims to develop and test strategies for state and non-state actors to work in partnership to promote peace-building and state-building in Somali Region through the provision of improved education services. It intends to gain a better understanding of the role and function of local civil society organizations in supporting education service delivery and peace-building in conflict-affected areas of the Region, which includes issues of CSO access, capacity, and politicization. Other areas of interest are the role of community groups in promoting peace-building and the use of pedagogical and curriculum development to encourage tolerance, social cohesion, and peaceful settlement of conflicting interests. The Feinstein International Center (FIC) at Tufts University has a contract from Save the Children UK to provide analytical support to the project.

The Somali Region of Ethiopia has a long history of complex and protracted conflict. There are multiple types of conflict, with diverse root causes, and the scope of conflict analysis can range from localized competition for natural resources, through to regional political dynamics and the foreign policy interests of western states. It follows that attempts to promote peace need to specify which type(s) of conflict are being targeted and why, and also, explain why certain education strategies are likely to be successful (or not). Questions within this analysis vary from understanding the causes of political dissention through to the potential role of youth peace committees or school peace committees.

In Ethiopia, the role of NGOs in conflict resolution is somewhat unclear and is often perceived by NGOs as highly sensitive. However, the recent CSO legislation in Ethiopia lists “the promotion of conflict resolution and reconciliation” as a charitable purpose, and NGOs such as Mercy Corps and Pact have been working on conflict issues with government partners, the former in Somali Region. Part of the uncertainty over NGO roles relates to the specific conflict issues which government views as relevant to non-state actors.

Terms of reference

A consultant is required to conduct conflict analysis in Somali Region as a means to raise understanding of the specific types and causes of conflict which the project might try to address and the specific education programming options. Six woredas have been provisionally targeted by the project, three in Shinile Zone, two in Fik Zone, and one in Afdher Zone. At the time of drafting these TOR in August 2010, access to Fik was limited and therefore, field visits under the consultancy would most likely focus in Shinile and Afdher Zones. However, the consultant will be expected to be flexible should access to Fik improve.

1. Produce a contemporary and applied conflict analysis for Somali Region which covers the following areas:
 - a. A general analysis for Somali Region which describes the conflict profile, causes (structural, proximate, triggers), and actors and dynamics from international to local levels.
 - b. Specific analyses for Shinile and Afdher Zones, including similarities and differences in conflict in the two areas. This part of the analysis should include cross-border issues such as inter-ethnic conflicts (e.g., Issa–Afar, Issa–Oromo) across regional state borders within Ethiopia.
 - c. Based on a. and b. above, an analysis of the specific types and causes of conflict which might be addressed through improved education services and the specific educational approaches most relevant to

each type/cause of conflict. Where there are differences between the two Zones, these will be explained. The analysis should explain the extent to which the SCUK project needs to address cross-border issues, be they internal regional state borders and/or international borders.

The analysis is expected to draw on existing literature and key informant interviews. The conflict analysis report is a deliverable of the consultancy.

2. Provide verbal briefings/presentations to DFID, SCUK, Mercy Corps, Islamic Relief, and FIC, and other stakeholders as identified with these agencies. These briefings are a deliverable of the consultancy.
3. Propose further areas of analysis or study which would contribute to the project, and which might form the basis for a second input later in the project.

Time input: Five weeks (35 days).

Consultant skills and experience

- At least 10 years of experience of applied conflict analysis in the Horn of Africa.
- Strong writing and presentation skills.
- Ability to work in a politically-sensitive environment and engage government and other actors accordingly.
- Experience of education programming and related donor and NGO strategies.

Other information/options

The FIC office in Addis Ababa has a collection of resource documents on Somali Region, and Mercy Corps recently commissioned a combined conflict-livelihoods analysis in Shinile Zone. SCUK, Mercy Corps, and Islamic Relief have staff with considerable experience in the region. The consultancy might also include interviews with regional conflict experts in Nairobi.

APPENDIX 2: SUGGESTED CHECKLIST FOR SCHOOLS AND CONFLICT

Key issues concerning conflict and education	Key question that needs to be addressed	Implications	Possible educational program adaptation
Frequency of conflict incidents	How often do the identified conflicts erupt into actual violence? More subtly—how often do tensions within relationships between protagonists express themselves in changed behaviors?	Conflict does not necessarily have to erupt into violence in order to have a negative impact on people's behaviors, but this is the most extreme manifestation of the dispute and the most damaging. Thus, for instance, if tension is high, children may not go to school or may not be able to travel. What are the broader child protection mechanisms within these conflict environments?	Close schools when tensions are high. Consider what early warning mechanisms are in place and institute indicators for SMCs and others to trigger action. Institute a monitoring mechanism for conflict within the SMCs that are affected by conflict—while there will be capacity issues, a slow steady approach will pay dividends in the long term SMCs proactively engage with peace committees, elders, government, and Alternative Dispute Resolution mechanisms to: (a) ensure communication across lines happens and preferably violence is averted; (b) ensure agreements are in place that schools and children are considered neutral and are not targeted; (c) access and security for students and teachers is assured even if the conflict is unresolved.
Severity	How many people are actively involved in the violent incidents? How many people are affected? How many children have been affected by violent conflict? Have there been particular incidents of trauma?	How widespread is the knock-on effect and impact on education facilities? For how long do these impacts affect people and in particular students? This aspect is critical to consider the extent to which trauma has occurred and the psychological impact on children. Are there mechanisms in place for identifying traumatized children and ensuring they receive appropriate assistance?	Put in place psychosocial healing mechanisms linked to and within schools, possibly using SMCs as the means to identify those who need support following violent outbreaks and ensure that students and families affected are provided with necessary support. Consider designing a portfolio of possible student activities that teachers and others can draw on within class time for addressing these issues. For instance, kits could be on hand that have teacher and student materials prepared in the event of conflict. These could be options through the use of art etc. Research the existing indigenous mechanisms for addressing trauma and then use this as the foundation to design appropriate interventions.

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APPENDIX 2: SUGGESTED CHECKLIST FOR SCHOOLS AND CONFLICT *(continued)*

Key issues concerning conflict and education	Key question that needs to be addressed	Implications	Possible educational program adaptation
Timing and location of the violence and conflict	When do these incidents occur? Are there particular times/seasons of year? Are there patterns associated with time of day or type of event associated with the conflict? Are there particular locations (e.g., water points) where violence occurs?	Consideration of where ABEs and schools might be located—if this is close to a “hotspot” then one might expect the school to be targeted or potentially enflame the situation. When term time or school times are organized or how schooling is arranged may also be factors, as well as seasonal elements.	Have participatory mechanisms that engage the SMC, peace committees, elders in mapping “hot spots,” disputed territories, and migration pathways within a woreda to better identify suitable areas for school locations that take into account access to water, security, and other appropriate factors. At the moment school is organized around the duties that fall to the children such as herding and looking after the animals, as well as aspects such as the heat of the day and migration patterns, etc.
Shape of violent disruption	What type of schooling is most affected —i.e., ABE, primary, or secondary schools? How do the conflicts affect the schools? How do the schools affect the conflicts?	Targeting where resources for addressing conflict and where the impact of conflict is felt most would be influenced if there are indeed patterns to be identified in this area. The schools visited were at the ABE level, so it is not clear whether the same conclusions and findings noted in this report are accurate or relevant to other types of schools. It is possible, though untested, that conflicts impact on the different levels of education differently (i.e., in secondary school rather than primary school) and equally that different types of schooling have different impacts on the conflicts in the Somali Region.	These could be addressed through some of the following adaptations: (i) Have different elements within the materials and curriculums taught in the different levels—e.g., civics could incorporate discussions around different ways of lives and how to reach agreements on shared resource use. (ii) Creation of clubs within the schools that could serve as entry points into provision of both peace education but also different activities and ex-curricular information such as HIV prevention, etc. (iii) If one assumes that attitudes and the family home affect attitudes and behaviors of students in the school, then it is equally valid to assume that attitudes in the home can also be shaped by the school and what happens there. So the possibility arises for innovative “school projects” that could be applied in the home around issues of ethnicity and challenging stereotypes or perceptions.

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APPENDIX 2: SUGGESTED CHECKLIST FOR SCHOOLS AND CONFLICT *(continued)*

Key issues concerning conflict and education	Key question that needs to be addressed	Implications	Possible educational program adaptation
Relationships between school locations and clans/ethnic groups	Have the schools been equitably distributed in terms of population and need or have schools and associated resources been allocated as a result of specific political representation?	Exploration of this relationship is most important concerning primary schools that are made of “permanent” materials (i.e., concrete, etc.) rather than simply bush materials. Knowledge of where and how schools have been located to date and whether reports of schools allocated as a result of political patronage in areas with low need (and that are not used) are accurate, will enable real needs and issue of balance to be addressed appropriately and fairly.	Ensuring that new schools are placed in areas where populations are located and which are not covered by existing resources should increase enrolments and access to education. Equally important, it can be ensured that schools are not located in disputed lands or that they are deliberately placed in neutral areas that reduce the possibility for conflict and maximize the opportunity for mixing of ethnic groups.

APPENDIX 3: EMERGING ISSUES THAT MAY AFFECT CONFLICT DYNAMICS IN THE SOMALI REGION IN THE FUTURE

Oil and minerals: The presence of oil, in particular if found in commercially-viable amounts to be extracted, will have profound implications for the Somali Region. Sadly, the general experience across Africa when minerals or oil have been found has not been a positive one for the development of local people (a notable exception being Botswana). The use of the term “resource curse” is commonly used to describe this negative effect and neighboring country Sudan provides an excellent example of some of the dangers associated with oil and conflict. The killing of Chinese and Ethiopian oil workers in 2007 surveying in the southern areas of the Somali region is illustrative of the sensitivity associated with resources. Should significant minerals or oil be found, the governance, transparency, and accountability regarding the use of those resources will be critical in averting major problems.

Land: The issues associated with land in the Somali Region are considerable and not easily managed. As continually observed, the changing nature of land use and ownership within the pastoral areas is a critical aspect of the conflict dynamics associated with all of the different relationships. It is difficult to envisage these problems subsiding until current policies regarding land tenure and its utilization are revisited. In fact, it is likely that issues will continue to become more acute with expanding populations and greater pressures on existing lands. The fundamental issue at stake is how to accommodate community ownership of land and the implications associated with this, as well as the consequences of overlaying administrative boundaries on what has historically been a system of usage by pastoralists and transhumants determined by disequilibrium dynamics (Behnke, R.H., and Scoones, I., 1993). Currently, the most fertile lands are being increasingly absorbed for uses other than grazing, for example small-holder farming, large scale commercial farming for cotton, bio-fuels, and other crops.

Settlement along riverine areas: A recent initiative has been proposed by the Somali


regional state government to address food security problems by more efficient utilization of the rivers in the region for irrigation development. This suggestion has emerged from the regional government’s direction of 2003 financial year to conduct a mass sedentization program in riverine areas for approximately 800,000 people mainly in Gode, Liban, and Afder Zones of the region.⁵⁷ This in turn is linked to the national rural development strategy which aims to transform the pastoralist way of life in Ethiopia by creating sedentization programs along the banks of major rivers. If this goes ahead then it will have major implications for the region. It is reported to be based on a voluntary participation system with targeting criteria expected to identify the “poorest of the poor.” The way that this is implemented will be a major factor in determining whether it succeeds or not. Nevertheless, as framed currently it assumes that this land is “empty” and is not owned by anyone along the river basins. This will inevitably bring about conflict with clans and ethnic groups who consider that this land belongs to them and will be unlikely to accept large numbers of new in-migrants settling in these important areas. Access to these rivers are also of critical importance to pastoralists’ livelihoods and experience in the southern areas of the Somali Region where increasing settlement occurs in riverine areas has already increased conflict between agriculturalists and pastoralists in the Ganale–Dawa Rivers close to Dollo Ado and Dollo Bay. The approach also assumes that the pastoralist way of life is unsustainable and the policy approach articulated in the national development strategy is questioned deeply by pastoralists across all ethnic groups. Within the proposal there is also the planned provision of schools and other infrastructure and this will have a bearing on the education program in the future as well as the proposed PDP program that will be supported by DFID and other donors.

While some participants considered that this type of program has been attempted throughout the history of Ethiopia, including in the Derg period, and has never actually materialized or

been able to be implemented, nevertheless if it does go ahead it will be fraught with issues that will inevitably create friction and possibly outright conflict. As can be seen by the diagram below of the proposed development corridors this will affect a very significant area of the State.⁵⁸

Reduction in the number of woredas: The Ethiopian government is also undertaking a process of reducing the overall number of woredas in the Somali Regional State in order to improve efficiencies of administration. The current large number of woredas makes it hard to ensure that central resources are distributed across them all. Nevertheless, as with all changes to administrative boundaries in multi-ethnic environments, where borders are reassigned has implications for which groups may consequently become minority or majority groups. Within the

current political system this has implications around representation as well as where resources within the woredas may be allocated and which clans benefit. In one case in Dollo Bay a woreda has been created in split locations that are separated by another completely different woreda in order to ensure that all of one ethnic group are administered together and that they have political control of that area and its resources. However, this is clearly unworkable on a practical level as it is like administering two separate islands with a sea in between that is not easily passable. This approach also reinforces the concept of ownership of specific geographic areas by clans or ethnic groups which is likely to create further tensions where new boundaries overlay on areas traditionally used and “owned” by other clans or groups who now do not have control of the woreda.





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